Don wrote a new article:
FWIW...
I'm getting it via interlibrary loan soon.
Since I have been relatively quiet* lately, I wanted to wade back into discussions with a little more substantive post specifically in this thread.
I freely admit I had an initial negative visceral reaction to Cassius's (what appeared to me at the time) heavy-handed wielding of the ban-hammer and flurry of editorial policy statements. I questioned whether my own views fell under the interdict.
I'm better now and don't believe I hold views opposed to the (actually longstanding) editorial policy of the forum.
Also, congratulations to Cassius for the generally positive reaction from Gregory Sadler. Hopefully that drive some eyeballs to the article.
The point that prompted this post was Cassius mentioning, almost in passing, that:
Quote from CassiusRather than taking the passage "Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion" in isolation, we should consider it with all the rest we know. We know that Epicurus held that because there are only two experiences, for the living human whenever pain is not present what is present is pleasure. This quoted passage need be saying nothing more than that mental or bodily well-being (meaning when pain is absent) constitutes a "stable" perspective on the goal of life. This is a perspective that does not change and does not vary from person to person.
This hit me like a ton of bricks and I don't know why it never did before. The living, sentient, sensing being ONLY feels pleasure OR pain. The dead feel neither. Pleasure comes in various varieties/flavors/experiences but is always pleasure. That terse quotation from Epicurus (which I continue to feel is genuine given the various references/citations Diogenes Laertius give it) is simply referring to the various experiences of pleasure by living, breathing people. AND he firmly plants his flag that THAT IS the goal by which we steer our ships. Pleasure, in all its multifarious manifestations, IS the North Star. And, no, he says, we can't exclude pleasant smells, pleasant sights, pleasant tastes, pleasant motions, any more than we can exclude contemplation of a healthy, fortunate state. It's all pleasure. For anyone to parse one pleasure above others, if it brings no pain, is a fool's errand it seems he's saying with this one (now infamous) katastematic/kinetic line.
*My statement here assumes anyone would even notice if I was quiet or not. 
I apologize for the narcissism inherent in saying that.
I thought it might be helpful to see what the author has said about Epicurus' philosophy:
https://bigthink.com/thinking/epicureanism-greek-philosophy-atheists-happiness/
I have not watched/listened/read these yet, but several I believe have been shared on the forum previously.
https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250454256/theartofenough/
The Art of Enough: The Ancient Epicurean Philosophy of Finding and Keeping Happiness
Author: Jonny Thomson
Book Details
A modern-day guide to the ancient philosophy of Epicureanism, celebrating a radical new mindset: We already have what we need in order to be happy.
Life can be exhausting; there is always more to do and more to strive for. This quest for optimization has found a popular ally in Stoicism, a philosophy of self-mastery and determination. But in a restless world, this impossible hustle is making us unhappy. When all we want is more, we find that we never have quite enough.
Thousands of years ago, Epicurus argued that we need philosophy to offer a better way forward. And so, in a world where anxiety, loneliness, and isolation are increasingly normalized, we need more than endurance. We need a mindset that helps us thrive in the world as it is. We need Epicureanism.
In The Art of Enough, popular philosopher Jonny Thomson blends together ancient Greek philosophy and contemporary science to show how we can deal with the beautiful, messy realities of life. Through real-life examples and philosophical principles, Thomson shows how the Epicurean ideals of introspection, close friendship, and commitment can teach us to enjoy the many pleasures we’re simply too anxious to see.
Intelligent, warm, and timely, The Art of Enough is not a book about wanting less. It’s a book about finally appreciating what enough looks like—and discovering it was there all along.
I might disagree about exactly how much ataraxia is under our control--it's quite unclear, I'd say. Clearly there are some sources saying we can have it under many different circumstances; but PD 4 seems to imply that fatal pains might be pretty rough for a short time, and there's the evidence in DL 10 that not all circumstances can lead to a good life.
Ah, this might be a good way to get at why or how we might have a different perspective on this. My understanding of our control over our own ataraxia stems from my view of tranquility/ataraxia being (possibly) less expansive than you.
I maintain that ataraxia is best understood specifically as the state of mind engendered by the eradication of false/empty beliefs and the fears and anxiety they produce. Once those beliefs are totally eradicated from our minds, pulled up by the roots, they don't come back and the tranquility - literally the undisturbed state - is solid. The eradication of those fears and anxieties is final IF we've really understood and internalized at the gut level, asleep and awake, the understanding that the gods present no reason for fear, that death is nothing to us, that pleasure is the goal and should be the North Star by which we steer our little boat. Pleasure writ large as Epicurus defined it, which means we undergo some pain if we know there's pleasure on the other side of the pain.
If I remember, you include ALL fears and anxieties within ataraxia; which MAY be the case if it is understood that there is no reason for fear and anxiety IF we steer our boat by the goal of nature, which is pleasure. My understanding is that if one defines ataraxia/tranquility to be encompassing of every fear and anxiety, it has to be understood in that way.
I go back to Metrodorus, Fragment 5: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul/mind/psykhe but the sound state of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα), and the sure hope of its continuance?'" I take this to mean the entire body - body & mind - taken as a whole, the Good of the Mind is inextricably linked with the stable state of the body
PD4 does say that fatal pain is bad, but fatal physical pain is short (per Epicurus' writings) and we know from his example that eudaimonia is still possible under pain.
I'm curious to explore what you refer to when you mention "not all circumstances can lead to a good life." I certainly don't disagree, especially if you're referring to chasing after empty desires. We're not guaranteed a good life if we persist in empty desires, and we're not guaranteed a completely pain free life if we're mortal.
PS: I woke up with other ideas on how to explain my perspective on how much control we have over our own feeling of ataraxia. Martin Ferguson Smith's Oenoanda inscription is instructive in this (Formerly fr. 34 VI-VII, now separate fragment 38 I-II):
Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states (κατασ̣τήμασι) and in actions (πράξεσιν); and let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions that disturb the soul are removed (τῶν ὀχλούντων τὴν ψυχὴν παθῶν ὑπεξαιρεθέντων), those that produce pleasure enter into it to take their place. Well, what are the disturbing emotions? (II) [They are] fears – of the gods, of death, and of [pains] – and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils (αἱ ῥί[ζαι] κακῶν π̣ά̣ντων), and, unless we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.
So, we need to cut those fears of gods, death, etc. at the root so they don't grow back. I find it interesting that VS79 has a negative related form of the word Diogenes uses here for troubles AND a word related to ataraxia for peace: VS79 He who is as peace within himself also causes no trouble for others. ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος. The "within himself" (ἑαυτῷ) also reminds me of the title of Metrodorus' book.
By Zeus! Gedney's going after Robertson's assertion that the Epicureans advocated "experiential avoidance" and does a good job from my perspective. The fact that he doesn't mention pleasure seems irrelevant in this context.
When an Epicurean is going against a Stoic in defense of the philosophy, it seems to behoove us to circle the wagons. You'll likely counter that "that's not the philosophy," but I see nothing in those two concise comments to make me ungrateful that he's willing to speak up against Stoic slander.
Jack Gedney has struck a blow for Epicurus in two comments to that Robertson article! Huzzah!
But the fact that we have so many examples of Cicero, and Plato and Aristotle's work has me puzzled still. I guess I can buy into the hypothesis that the Christians burned the copies, except that they had no real influence in the Roman empire until the end of the 5th century.
I've heard the estimates are that we only have about 1-5% of ALL texts from the ancient world. (One source example)
I thought it might be instructive to see how "blessed" aka makarios is used in other contexts in ancient Greek contexts unrelated to the Epicurean description of the gods.
What, then, and how many are the lives in which a man—when he has chosen the desirable and voluntary in preference to the undesirable and the involuntary, and has made it into a private law for himself, by choosing what is at once both congenial and pleasant and most good and noble—may live as happily (μακαριώτατα makariōtata) as man can? Let us pronounce that one of them is the temperate life, one the wise, one the brave, and let us class the healthy life as one; and to these let us oppose four others—the foolish, the cowardly, the licentious, and the diseased.
What a happy fellow (μακάριε makarie) you must be,” said the Sacian, “for every reason, but particularly because from being poor you have become rich. For you must enjoy your riches much more, I think, for the very reason that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became rich.”
Stranger, you must think me a specially favoured mortal (μακάριός makarios), to be able to tell whether virtue can be taught, or in what way it comes to one: so far am I from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I actually do not even know what the thing itself, virtue, is at all.
Xanthias
Oh! tortoises! happy (μακάριαι makariai) to have so hard a skin, thrice happy (τρις μακάριαι makariai) to carry this roof that protects your backs! Oh! creatures full of sense! what a happy thought to cover your bodies with this shell, which shields it from blows! As for me, I can no longer move; the stick has so belaboured my body.
it is important to set aside other spiritual/philosophical notions and ideas such as "Nirvana/bodhi/satori" etc.
Good point. While there may be superficial similarities to these notions, those fall apart upon any closer examination. There are completely different underpinnings and frameworks.
after having fully grasped this new way of mentally relating to the idea of death, it is impossible to lose this understanding.
Exactly! Well put.
a kind of fearlessness that the gods possess.
I've never heard it put quite that way before. I like that idea.
See also
[ U340 ]
Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions," (Refutation of all Heresies, I) 22.5 [p. 572.14 Diels.]: He {Epicurus} concluded that the souls of men are dissolved along with their bodies, just as also they were produced along with them; these, in fact, are blood, and when this has gone forth or been altered, the entire man perishes. In keeping with this tenet, it follows that there are neither trials in Hades, nor tribunals of justice; so that whatsoever any one may commit in this life, that, provided he may escape detection, he is altogether beyond any liability of trial.
[ U582 ]
Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, IV.22, [p. 228.7 Sylb.]: Even Epicurus says that a man who he esteemed wise "would not do wrong to anyone for the sake of gain; for he could not persuade himself that he would escape detection." So then, if he knew he would not be detected, he would, accordingly, do evil.
[ U532 ]
Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 6, p. 1090C: That their general prospects are poor even for a life without mental anguish you may also judge in the light of the remarks they address to others. Criminals and transgressors of the laws, says Epicurus, pass their entire lives in misery and apprehension, since even though they may succeed in escaping detection, they can have no assurance of doing so. Consequently, fear of the next moment weighs heavy on them and precludes any delight or confidence in their present situation.
Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 97.13: Hence I hold Epicurus’ saying to be most apt: "That the guilty may happen to remain hidden is possible," or, if you think that the meaning can be made more clear in this way: "The reason that there is no advantage for wrong-doers to remain hidden is that (even though they got lucky) they have not the assurance of remaining so."
Cf. Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.5: It is not impossible to feel assurance of being undetected in wrong-doing, if indeed it be necessary to avoid detection by men: it is not necessary, however, on every occasion even to seek to avoid detection, where a man has power to overmaster those who have discovered him. So the disbelief in providence is a ready way to wrong-doing. For a very worthy person indeed is he, who after holding out pleasure to us as a good, and granting us security from the gods, still thinks to provide a plan to prevent wrong-doing. He acts like a physician who, having neglected to give help while the sick man was yet alive, attempts after death to devise certain contrivances for curing the dead man.
Arrian, Diatribes of Epictetus, III.7.11: A man acts foolishly {according to Epictetus’ derisive portrayal of Epicureanism}, if, when he is a Judge and able to take the property of other men, he keeps his hands off it. But, if you please, let us consider this point only, that the theft be done secretly, safely, without anybody’s knowledge. For even Epicurus himself does not declare the act of theft evil – only getting caught. Only because it is impossible for one to be certain that he will not be detected, does he say, "Do not steal."
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1152:
Hence, the fear of punishment spoils the {ill-gotten} prizes.
Violence and wrong catch people in their own nets
and those who start such things are most often entangled.
It is not easy to pass a peaceful life
if you act in a way that disturbs the general peace.
Although you elude the gods and the human race
you still must wonder whether your secret will be kept forever.
I suspect Bruno would say that he too had peace of mind standing up to the church even as they were burning him at the stake.
An Epicurean sage experiences eudaimonia even under torture?
Am I wrong to conclude that women were not free to navigate the cities alone
The hetairai were more "free" than wives or other women, so I would think it was primarily they who attended. Women were more free in Roman settings than Greek.
FWIW From my Menoikeus commentary:
μακάριον
This word is often translated as "blessed, fortunate, wealthy, 'well-off.'" There appears to be no certain etymology of the root [makar] or the longer form [makarios/on]. It appears to possibly have something to do with being wealthy, either literally or figuratively. Taking Ancient Mythology Economically by Morris Silver (see link below) has a very interesting section on the origins of the word. This is yet another example of the inadequacy of using one word to translate from one language to another.
***
A quick digression on eudaimonia is appropriate here. εὐδαιμονία is defined by LSJ as "prosperity, good fortune, opulence; true, full happiness."
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57%3Aentry%3Deu)daimoni%2Fa
The word is derived from εὐ- (eu-) "well, good" + δαιμονία (daimonia) "spirit, divine power." This is where English gets the word "demon" but it could be either benevolent (eudaimon) or malevolent (kakodaimon). If you have a good, benevolent in-dwelling spirit, you will lead a prosperous, healthy, flourishing, fortunate life. Socrates claimed to be listening to his daimon for guidance which was used against him at his trial as evidence of impiety. But the term generally in common parlance means what LSJ refers to. However, it encompasses a range of qualities but is often pared down in English to simply "happiness" which is woefully inadequate. It's much more than that, encompassing that and more. Translators try to convey this with paraphrases like "complete happiness," but our comparative translations just use "happiness." Sometimes it's left untranslated and only transliterated eudaimonia, but this is somewhat of a cheat, too. A cheat I may be guilty of shortly! If you look up that word in Merriam-Webster, it gives "well-being, happiness." So you see we can go in circles. Personally, I think "well-being" is better than "happiness" since it is almost a literal translation with a twist: eu- "well" + daimon "being" (the latter having a little double entendre). So, when you see any of those -- happiness, well-being, flourishing, eudaimonia -- remember that it's that word plus a little more. That's why I advocate using eudaimonia itself. There's a rabbit hole of papers, essays, and websites that convey the deep meaning of εὐδαιμονία if you feel intrepid.
FWIW, here are two threads from a few years ago where the katastematic discussion was taking place:
I think I still generally agree with what I posted over there in 2023.
I found this Medium article interesting, too: https://medium.com/thought-thinke…ce-4301dccc3990
Excerpts:
We learn about the specific of reading practices in ancient Greece mostly not from written evidences which would describe the process of reading, but from the terms which the Greek used for the word «read». There are more than 10 verbs with this meaning in ancient Greek. Analyzing these verbs we can understand the patterns of the ancient reading practices, because they indicate how the process of reading was perceived. It means that the difference in reading practices was enshrined by the language [1].
For example, there was a verb nе́mein, which meant «read out loud» and «distribute something, including yourself among recipients». It means, that the words which were read aloud were addressed not only to the listeners, but also to the reader itself. It is just one of the examples of the verbs which were used in Ancient Greece to specify one of the aspects of the reading process [1].
Other ancient Greek verbs with the meaning of reading also refer to reading aloud. It means, that people of that epoch read not much and with difficulty and it also means, that exactly the sounding word played crucial role in the culture. Moreover, for the concept of reading in ancient Greece the man and his voice were considered to be instruments at the service of the text. Written speech demanded mandatory scoring, it was considered to be not complete by its nature. Until the writing began to sound, it meant not more than just a set of symbols. That is why it was not the reader who was the addresser of the text, but the listener — he was listening to the text which was read to him [1].
I don't think that it would be correct to compare Epicurean communities with early Christian communities.
Wasn't one of Cicero's criticisms of Epicureans that they attracted women, slaves, and the common people? That's the same criticism levied against the early Christians.
One could study the philosophy without being able to read. Attending lectures, memorizing texts with a friend who could read or in a group where the texts were read aloud.
