Posts by Don

See also

[ U340 ]

Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions," (Refutation of all Heresies, I) 22.5 [p. 572.14 Diels.]: He {Epicurus} concluded that the souls of men are dissolved along with their bodies, just as also they were produced along with them; these, in fact, are blood, and when this has gone forth or been altered, the entire man perishes. In keeping with this tenet, it follows that there are neither trials in Hades, nor tribunals of justice; so that whatsoever any one may commit in this life, that, provided he may escape detection, he is altogether beyond any liability of trial.

[ U582 ]

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, IV.22, [p. 228.7 Sylb.]: Even Epicurus says that a man who he esteemed wise "would not do wrong to anyone for the sake of gain; for he could not persuade himself that he would escape detection." So then, if he knew he would not be detected, he would, accordingly, do evil.

[ U532 ]

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 6, p. 1090C: That their general prospects are poor even for a life without mental anguish you may also judge in the light of the remarks they address to others. Criminals and transgressors of the laws, says Epicurus, pass their entire lives in misery and apprehension, since even though they may succeed in escaping detection, they can have no assurance of doing so. Consequently, fear of the next moment weighs heavy on them and precludes any delight or confidence in their present situation.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 97.13: Hence I hold Epicurus’ saying to be most apt: "That the guilty may happen to remain hidden is possible," or, if you think that the meaning can be made more clear in this way: "The reason that there is no advantage for wrong-doers to remain hidden is that (even though they got lucky) they have not the assurance of remaining so."

Cf. Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.5: It is not impossible to feel assurance of being undetected in wrong-doing, if indeed it be necessary to avoid detection by men: it is not necessary, however, on every occasion even to seek to avoid detection, where a man has power to overmaster those who have discovered him. So the disbelief in providence is a ready way to wrong-doing. For a very worthy person indeed is he, who after holding out pleasure to us as a good, and granting us security from the gods, still thinks to provide a plan to prevent wrong-doing. He acts like a physician who, having neglected to give help while the sick man was yet alive, attempts after death to devise certain contrivances for curing the dead man.

Arrian, Diatribes of Epictetus, III.7.11: A man acts foolishly {according to Epictetus’ derisive portrayal of Epicureanism}, if, when he is a Judge and able to take the property of other men, he keeps his hands off it. But, if you please, let us consider this point only, that the theft be done secretly, safely, without anybody’s knowledge. For even Epicurus himself does not declare the act of theft evil – only getting caught. Only because it is impossible for one to be certain that he will not be detected, does he say, "Do not steal."

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1152:

Hence, the fear of punishment spoils the {ill-gotten} prizes.

Violence and wrong catch people in their own nets

and those who start such things are most often entangled.

It is not easy to pass a peaceful life

if you act in a way that disturbs the general peace.

Although you elude the gods and the human race

you still must wonder whether your secret will be kept forever.

The (majority of those) references in that Google amalgamation are atrocious.

Quote from DaveT

Am I wrong to conclude that women were not free to navigate the cities alone

The hetairai were more "free" than wives or other women, so I would think it was primarily they who attended. Women were more free in Roman settings than Greek.

FWIW From my Menoikeus commentary:

μακάριον

This word is often translated as "blessed, fortunate, wealthy, 'well-off.'" There appears to be no certain etymology of the root [makar] or the longer form [makarios/on]. It appears to possibly have something to do with being wealthy, either literally or figuratively. Taking Ancient Mythology Economically by Morris Silver (see link below) has a very interesting section on the origins of the word. This is yet another example of the inadequacy of using one word to translate from one language to another.

Taking Ancient Mythology Economically

books.google.com

***

A quick digression on eudaimonia is appropriate here. εὐδαιμονία is defined by LSJ as "prosperity, good fortune, opulence; true, full happiness."

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57%3Aentry%3Deu)daimoni%2Fa

The word is derived from εὐ- (eu-) "well, good" + δαιμονία (daimonia) "spirit, divine power." This is where English gets the word "demon" but it could be either benevolent (eudaimon) or malevolent (kakodaimon). If you have a good, benevolent in-dwelling spirit, you will lead a prosperous, healthy, flourishing, fortunate life. Socrates claimed to be listening to his daimon for guidance which was used against him at his trial as evidence of impiety. But the term generally in common parlance means what LSJ refers to. However, it encompasses a range of qualities but is often pared down in English to simply "happiness" which is woefully inadequate. It's much more than that, encompassing that and more. Translators try to convey this with paraphrases like "complete happiness," but our comparative translations just use "happiness." Sometimes it's left untranslated and only transliterated eudaimonia, but this is somewhat of a cheat, too. A cheat I may be guilty of shortly! If you look up that word in Merriam-Webster, it gives "well-being, happiness." So you see we can go in circles. Personally, I think "well-being" is better than "happiness" since it is almost a literal translation with a twist: eu- "well" + daimon "being" (the latter having a little double entendre). So, when you see any of those -- happiness, well-being, flourishing, eudaimonia -- remember that it's that word plus a little more. That's why I advocate using eudaimonia itself. There's a rabbit hole of papers, essays, and websites that convey the deep meaning of εὐδαιμονία if you feel intrepid.

FWIW, here are two threads from a few years ago where the katastematic discussion was taking place:

Post

RE: Is pleasure as the natural goal of life falsifiable?

As long as we're soapboxing...

I feel I should stand up for ataraxia in the face of Cassius's withering attack...

Although it may end up that we're not as far apart as it may at first seem since that seems to end up being the case on many occasions in the past. Even so...

Starting at the beginning, let me address a couple of @A_Gardner 's points and then @Cassius 's posts.

[…]

No question. And Epicurus addresses this exact thing, especially in the letter to Menoikeus, in the lines about…

Don

February 9, 2023 at 12:03 AM

Thread

Confidence in Katastematic Pleasure

This thread grows out of another thread, specifically my "soapboxing" posts that were a response to @A_Gardner and @Cassius where I "took a stand for ataraxia."

For those who don't want too much review, my primary contentions were:

1. Epicurus advocates strengthening a quiet, calm, anxiety-free mind.
2. Equanimity/tranquility/ataraxia is available at all times, even under duress and trying circumstances.
3. IF we can cultivate ataraxia, we have a much better chance of making a good choice to remove,

…

Don

February 10, 2023 at 11:00 PM

I think I still generally agree with what I posted over there in 2023.

I found this Medium article interesting, too: https://medium.com/thought-thinke…ce-4301dccc3990

Excerpts:

We learn about the specific of reading practices in ancient Greece mostly not from written evidences which would describe the process of reading, but from the terms which the Greek used for the word «read». There are more than 10 verbs with this meaning in ancient Greek. Analyzing these verbs we can understand the patterns of the ancient reading practices, because they indicate how the process of reading was perceived. It means that the difference in reading practices was enshrined by the language [1].

For example, there was a verb nе́mein, which meant «read out loud» and «distribute something, including yourself among recipients». It means, that the words which were read aloud were addressed not only to the listeners, but also to the reader itself. It is just one of the examples of the verbs which were used in Ancient Greece to specify one of the aspects of the reading process [1].

Other ancient Greek verbs with the meaning of reading also refer to reading aloud. It means, that people of that epoch read not much and with difficulty and it also means, that exactly the sounding word played crucial role in the culture. Moreover, for the concept of reading in ancient Greece the man and his voice were considered to be instruments at the service of the text. Written speech demanded mandatory scoring, it was considered to be not complete by its nature. Until the writing began to sound, it meant not more than just a set of symbols. That is why it was not the reader who was the addresser of the text, but the listener — he was listening to the text which was read to him [1].

Quote from Kalosyni

I don't think that it would be correct to compare Epicurean communities with early Christian communities.

Wasn't one of Cicero's criticisms of Epicureans that they attracted women, slaves, and the common people? That's the same criticism levied against the early Christians.

One could study the philosophy without being able to read. Attending lectures, memorizing texts with a friend who could read or in a group where the texts were read aloud.

Book 28 of On Nature ends with:

Quote from Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28

And now I think I have finished prattling to you this twenty-eighth installment of our consecutive lecture series.

He uses the word ἀκρόασις "hearing, hearkening or listening to" where "lecture series" is the translation even though its a written work. The work is also written partially as a dialogue between Metrodorus and Epicurus, using first and second pronouns. This strikes me as different than Plato's dialogues in that he created characters (including his dead teacher, Socrates). I would see On Nature being more like transcripts of actual teachings.

We know that at least Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoikeus were literate: We literally have Epicurus' letters addressed to them. We know the Founders were all literate and wrote extensive treatises. We know Philodemus was prolific in his writings. We know that Diogenes, living in Oenoanda, was literate and also thought enough people could read that his inscription would be useful to passers-by. But if the popularity of Epicurus' philosophy was as wide spread as to make Cicero clutch his pearls, I doubt literacy was widespread throughout the community.

Bart Ehrman has a relevant blog post talking about early Christian communities that includes:

Quote from EhrmanBlog

So let’s assume that [the literacy rate in Graeco-Roman times] was 20%. That would mean that an average church, with 70 members, of whom 20 were adult males, would have, on average four who would read. And of course their reading abilities would cover a wide range: some could probably read very painstakingly and slowly, maybe one or two could read pretty well – it’s hard to say. Overall, there would be, around the year 100, 400 Christians (in the entire world) who could read.

He goes on to say that those who could read then would be leaders in their communities. I would think this would hold for Epicurean communities.

I found an interesting lecture online about reading, even silently, in the ancient world: https://www.gresham.ac.uk/watch-now/anci…torical-context

There's also the encouragement - even requirement - for ancient Epicureans to commit epitomes to memory. That's why Epicurus provided summaries of his work, so that the written document became superfluous. For students who were not fully literate, this would have meant working with a teacher to internalize the most important works.

Epicurus to Pythocles (emphasis added): To aid your memory you ask me for a clear and concise statement respecting celestial phenomena ; for what we have written on this subject elsewhere is, you tell me, hard to remember, although you have my books constantly with you. I was glad to receive your request and am full of pleasant expectations. [85] We will then complete our writing and grant all you ask.

Epicurus to Herodotus: For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome56 of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines,57 to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of Physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom.

Epicurus encourages Menoikeus to study what he's written night and day with a like-minded friends (so they can read the work to each other?), likely to impress it into his mind so he has the information asleep and awake.

I realize Philodemus railed against Epicureans who had strayed from studying the books, but if On Nature really was a series of lectures, this could just as easily meant getting back to attending lectures from my perspective.

Quote from Max DuBoff

"I think the evidence that Epicurus believed a complete life can't get any better is clear; I don't know how else to interpret KD 3, 18, and 20-21, and Men. 128 and 131." To reiterate, I think there's strong evidence that Epicurus thought this; I personally don't know why he was so committed to it. But that doesn't change that, as far as we can tell, he was really committed to it. I don't necessarily disagree with your point about reaching an implausible interpretation; but, at least as things stand now, your approach seems to me to have more problems.

I always appreciate it when references to specific texts are given. It provides assurance that we're all looking at the same thing, although interpretation/translations sometimes/often differ.

In your assertion that "the evidence that Epicurus believed a complete life can't get any better is clear" you refer to those specific texts. Here's my take and a little of why I'm not entirely onboard with your interpretation.

To my understanding:

KD3 is Epicurus statement as to why pleasure CAN be the summum bonum against other schools' assertion that pleasure is inexhaustible or never able to be satisfied and therefore cannot be the telos. There IS a limit to pleasure, and it is the “The removal of all feeling of pain ... Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.” (Inwood & Gerson (1994)) I think a key phrase there is "for as long as it is present." To me, this echoes Diogenes Laertius' "Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures." (10.121) I've always added "such as mortals enjoy" to the end in my mind; BUT Epicurus did say clearly that we can "live as a god among humans" (Men. 135) BUT we are not gods. That's also clear. Epicurus did not teach some kind of apotheosis from what I have read. We're still mortal. We still die. I will admit that there is a tension between living "as a god" and being mortal.

KD18 covers both physical and mental pleasures. Satisfying physical pleasures, per this KD, doesn't bring increase but only brings diversification/ variation / embellishment, depending on the translation of ποικίλλω. I like Epicurus' use of this word in that it evokes the various colors in a work of embroidery or other cunning workmanship. That's a poignant metaphorical connotation. The limit of mental pleasures in KD18 are specifically said to be due to reflecting on these bodily pleasures and sensations related to them and also having a eradicated "the greatest fears" to which I'm equating the fears of death, the gods, divine wrath: the first two KDs and VSs and first two lines of the Tetrapharmakos.

KD20 & 21: Again, this is Epicurus emphasizing how pleasure has a limit and why it can be the summum bonum. The "perfect way of life (I&G)/ complete life (Long) / complete way of life (S-A)" τὸν παντελῆ βίον (ton pantele bion) still to me evokes a life in which all goals are accomplished, in this case, the limits of pleasure have been achieved. But is it the understanding that pleasure is the telos along with the eradication of the fundamental fears of death and the gods that makes that "pantele" life or the actual elimination of all pain? I don't think Epicurus teaches that ALL pain can be eradicated from the life of the mortal human. He certainly couldn't do it, but he could do battle against physical pain and his greatest fears were eradicated, root and branch, from his mind. KD21 reinforces that what we REALLY need, at our most basic level, is limited. We can add variation of pleasures, but we don't NEED them. I think this is illustrated by Epicurus' periodic fasting and eating minimally so he KNEW what he needed to live pleasurably. So, if the going ever got tough, he knew exactly what was necessary for him.

I'm not going into Menoikeus since I think I've addressed that before. One other item I wanted to touch briefly on is:

Quote from Max DuBoff

Well, Epicurus's deathbed letter gives evidence that, in other cases of extreme pain, that pain won't interfere with blessedness. (Ditto for the, perhaps implausible, claim in Diogenes Laertius that the sage will be happy under torture.) If I didn't have this evidence, I'd predict that that pain would interfere with blessedness; and I worry that it does despite the claim that it doesn't. But I really believe Epicurus thought the pain didn't interfere, and the challenge is explaining why.

The problem people express with the "happy under torture" phrase (and it must be something Epicurus taught because it comes up in multiple sources) is that Epicurus, to my reading, never meant the sage would be joyous or giddy or happy in the common effervescent way we sometimes think of that. Diogenes Laertius uses "eudaimonia" that slippery, untranslatable, multivalent word. To me, and I admit this is likely idiosyncratic, the only reason I can think that a sage could have eudaimonia on the rack is if it means they could feel they did everything they could to have avoided this outcome. They would be in extreme pain, crying out, no question. If they were doing it to protect a friend, if they knew they had done everything to avoid it, they would still have an underlying sense of well-being and maybe that they had lived well and that the pain couldn't go on forever. They're not happy happy joy joy. But they have some perspective to give them some kind of "eudaimonia." And we're also talking a "sage" here, not your average student of the philosophy. Is some of this hyperbole to give the student confidence, to illustrate "here's the kind of mental fortitude you can get from following this path." Likely. But I'd rather take this idea of the sage rather than the Stoic sage who can't be concerned if his wife and children die in a war and who takes no more concern for a dead child than a broken cup.

Quote from Max DuBoff

Alex Gillham's in his 2018 dissertation

Also

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362560907_How_Are_Friends_and_Friendship_Worthwhile_to_the_Advanced_Epicurean

All you really needed was one literate person in a given Epicurean community to read any correspondence or texts. My understanding is that it was common to listen to texts. This is what I understand happened in early Christian communities.

Ancient Greece and Rome were also much more oral cultures, too.

Consider too that the Peripatetics literally walked around while discussing philosophy, so it is easy to imagine students and teachers in the Garden sitting around discussing and teaching and listening to lectures. My understanding is that On Nature was a series of lectures Epicurus gave. The only writings of Aristotle are the lecture notes compiled by a student of his.

Quote from Cassius

do you agree with a statement Don in an earlier post that he believes tranquility is specifically defined in terms of a lack of fear of gods and of death?

Quote from Max DuBoff

No, tranquility must be the absence of all fears.* Epicurus identified fear of the gods and of death as particularly common fears, so he devoted a lot of attention to them. But there are plenty of other fears.

*I've been struggling recently with fear of future pain. As KD 4 notes, fatal pain will be short; but it'll be bad when it happens, so it seems like the sage should justifiably fear it in the meantime, thus disturbing the sage's tranquility.

If I'm being invoked, I feel I need to expand my thoughts on this. Cassius , what I think you're referring to is this below where I wrote:

Quote from Don

I understand that ataraxia refers specifically (for Epicurus) to the absence (a-) of "disturbance" (tarakhe) in the mind caused by fear of the gods, anxiety about death, worry about having "enough" and what other people think, etc.

I'll freely admit that "etc." is doing a lot of heaving lifting.

As for a what Epicurus thinks is covered under ataraxia, he says in the Letter to Herodotus: "mental tranquillity (ataraxia) means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths." (10.82) The "all these troubles" refers back to 10.81 to his assertion that "the greatest anxiety (τάραχος) of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief ; ... if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety (ταραχὴν) than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague." This is similar to the Letter to Pythocles where Epicurus writes (DL 10.85): "In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind (ἀταραξίαν) and firm conviction." So, getting a firm understanding and belief that celestial phenomena are not caused by supernatural forces has the goal of peace of mind/ataraxia.

As Max DuBoff points out, "Epicurus identified fear of the gods and of death as particularly common fears, so he devoted a lot of attention to them." I would say he devoted a lot of attention to them because he identified them as the most important and detrimental disturbances to our minds. The first big hurdle we have to get over to establish ataraxia. Getting a correct perspective on the gods and not fearing them comes first in Principal Doctrines, first in the Vatican Sayings, first in the Letter to Menoikeus, first in the Tetrapharmakos. I would say he placed paramount importance of ridding ourselves of those fears and anxieties of the gods and death and related topics like supernatural causes of celestial phenomena, divine punishment, etc.

Yes, I agree there are plenty of other fears and anxieties, and I would agree Epicurus tries to teach how to alleviate them. So, yes, ataraxia could include the eradication of fears and anxieties both at the level of gods and death but also at the level of less significant or overwhelming sources of pains.

He tries to eliminate or alleviate, for example, fear of future pain by his living example of his last days and the observations of "pain is short if..." But he also tries to get us to replace fear and anxiety with prudence, virtuous behavior, wise choices. If we fear what might happen to our loved ones after die, make plans for what happens after we die. If we fear retribution from enemies, try to not make enemies or stay away from them. All this would contribute to a stable peace of mind that we are doing, have done, or will do everything within our power to trust that the pleasures we have now continue into the future.

So, for his at least, I would say ataraxia includes freedom from fear and anxiety writ large; with the caveat that the BIG ONES are death and the supernatural gods.

Quote from Cassius

We're packing a lot into this conversaton already

LOL Ya think so?

We have to be careful and not conflate pleasures with desires. There are not necessary, natural, and empty pleasures. There are necessary, natural, and empty desires.

Anything that brings pleasure is good, but some pleasures are not worthy to be chosen due to the pain they bring in their wake.

Quote from Cassius

when Epicurus referred to pleasure he meant all that is desirable... Even Epicurus' extension of pleasure to "all that is desirable"

I'd be careful with that phrasing. Empty desires are still "desirable." Or are you citing a specific text that I forgot? By pleasure he meant all that is pleasurable (yes, maybe that's a tautology), all that gives pleasure and not pain.

FWIW, here's a post I did on katastematic pleasure, specifically looking at aponia:

Post

RE: Neither "ataraxia" nor "not ataraxia", but "Joy as the goal"

Great thought-provoking posts, @Matteng and @wbernys . I'll address a couple points in a bit.

For me, there has to be something to the fact that aponia and aponos, in regular popular ancient usage, meant things like non-exertion, laziness; without toil or trouble,free from the necessity of labour. The adverb aponōs shows up in Herodotus as "without trouble":

[…]

I know Epicurus redefined some words to fit his philosophy, but they were all still in the semantic range of the popular usage.…

Don

May 3, 2026 at 7:35 AM

Quote from Cassius

Friendship is, by Maxs's account, additive in exactly the way ice cream and a fine view are additive. More trust, more years, more depth is always better, other things being equal. If additive goods are structurally barred from contributing to a "perfect" or "complete" life, and only katastematic pleasure can clear that bar, I don't see why wisdom would single out an additive good as its single greatest tool for reaching blessedness. Does "additive" really disqualify a good from being central to the blessed life, or doesn't it?

By additive, I take it he means more and more can be added, but adding more and more friends doesn't seem to me to be in the same category as eating more and more ice cream. Eating more and more ice cream or wine or fish leads inexorably to pain and indigestion. Making more and deeper friendships leads to more security, more pleasurable memories, more support. More friends also varies the pleasure of friendship.

Quote from Cassius

4. Would a tranquil person with no friends, no joys, no positive pleasures — just an undisturbed, empty mind — count as having achieved the blessed life in full?

By definition, someone with a tranquil mind is experiencing pleasure. We're also not only minds but bodies. There's no way to have "tranquility" in one's mind without a body, one is a physical sensing being to be tranquil in the first place. While I think I understand what you're getting at, #4 seems to be a little bit of a straw man. Having no friends and no other pleasure wouldn't lead to tranquility, with no friends, there's no security or support, leading to more anxiety. For my understanding of the philosophy, a primary purpose of a tranquil mind, free from anxiety and fear and worry, is to more fully experience every other choiceworthy pleasure and to make prudent decisions on what those are. PD27 states that friendship is the wisdom, wise choices, leads to friendship. A wise, tranquil person is likely to have friendships.

Since Cassius brings up PD27, I thought it might be instructive if we all refresh our minds on what it says (using St. Andre English trans):

Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one's entire life, by far the greatest is friendship.

ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

The original does use μακαριότητα "blessedness" (directly related to μακάριος etc.)

This could be referring to friendship as a result of one's wise choices. The PD could be reworded/paraphrased as "Friendship is the greatest thing that wisdom provides for one's entire blessed life."

Max DuBoff : I want to really emphasize that I greatly appreciate your willingness to engage on these topics. This thread has grown WAY beyond a "Welcome Max DuBoff" so this has been both intellectually stimulating and fun. Thank you.

Quote from Max DuBoff

I think it'd be more helpful to write a few paragraphs than respond to individual points.

Agreed. I like your approach. I may ramble here, but I'll try and respond to your points and see where we may differ and where it may end up we have the same interpretation but different words. Possibly?

Quote from Max DuBoff

In On Moral Ends he assumes that the good simply is the summum bonum, i.e., what leads to blessedness. But Epicurus has an entirely different assumption: there are goods that don't contribute to blessedness, and some goods that actively impede blessedness.

So, my understanding of Cicero (On Ends, 1.42) and Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics is that the summum bonum / telos / τἀγαθόν is that to which all actions and decisions point. It is the final answer of asking people "But why did you do that?":

Quote

...the Good is That at which all things aim.” ~Aristotle

"...it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably. " ~Cicero (via the character of Torquatus)

If one keeps asking the question of someone, "Why did you do that? Why did you make that choice?" The final answer (from a psychological hedonist approach if we want to go there) is "It gave me pleasure." So, that is why pleasure is the summum bonum / telos / τἀγαθόν. It is "That at which all things aim."

I would also agree that all pleasures are by nature good. If actions, thoughts, memories, bring pleasure, that is good by Epicurus' definition. Pleasure = good; pain = bad.

Quote from Max DuBoff

But Epicurus has an entirely different assumption: there are goods that don't contribute to blessedness, and some goods that actively impede blessedness. So it's important to ask, on top of what is good (i.e., pleasure), what we should actually pursue, because we can't pursue all the goods (not just because we don't have time/space, but because some goods preclude other goods).

I don't know if I agree that Epicurus has an entirely different assumption. I read Epicurus as still accepting the challenge of identifying "That at which all things aim." He identifies pleasure as "That at which all things aim." He also says that some pleasures bring more pain than pleasure in the end (ex., endless drinking bouts, constant revels, etc.). He's not saying these are not pleasurable, but having insatiable appetites for them is detrimental to your physical health and mental tranquility, the goal of a blessed life (Men.128)

Quote from Max DuBoff

When I emphasize tranquility, it's in this context. PD 25 is the lode star of my interpretation: "If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead stop short at something else when making either avoidance or pursuit, your actions will not follow arguments" (trans. Inwood and Gerson, with my modifications). I understand "the goal of nature" as particularly connoting katastematic pleasure (following the use of this term in Men. 133 and VS 25, where it most naturally refers to katastematic pleasure).

Why do you understand "the goal of nature" as particularly connoting katastematic pleasure? I've translated that in Men. 133 as "one who has rationally determined the τέλος of one's natural state" which I take "the natural state" to be pleasure, one's telos is to pursue pleasure. And, if I understand your previous posts, you equate "pleasure" in this sense specifically with tranquility, correct? VS25 is interesting, but I don't see how katastematic pleasure plays into that "goals of nature" VS25: Poverty is great wealth if measured by the goals of nature, and wealth is abject poverty if not limited by the goals of nature. I suppose it could with the same sentiment in Lucretius (5.1117-1119, emphasis added) when he talks about a "mind content":

Yet were man to steer
His life by sounder reasoning, he'd own
Abounding riches, if with mind content
He lived by thrift; for never, as I guess,
Is there a lack of little in the world.

To me, the goal of nature / telos / summum bonum is to live pleasurably and, yes, to have a blessed life. I agree that tranquility is a vital component of the pleasurable, blessed life, but, again, Epicurus specifically says in Men. 128 that "The steady contemplation of these facts (the categorization of desires) enables you to understand everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life." (St. Andre trans.) Both bodily health and a tranquil mind are the goal of a complete blessed' life.

To single out tranquility as THE blessed life leaves out the first part: "health of the body." Why isn't that as important as tranquility? I would propose that maybe "the health of the body" is the other katastematic pleasure of aponia by another name? It seems me that the pleasure of those endless drinking bouts is not choice-worthy because it would be detrimental to health of the body AND the serenity of the mind. PD5 plays a role here, too, in describing how to live a pleasurable life which doesn't specifically cite tranquility (although I can see that it could be implied if one is living wisely, justly, and nobly since "The greatest fruit of justice is serenity (ataraxia)." (U519)

Quote from Max DuBoff

Lots of pleasures are good additively: when I eat ice cream, it's always better if I eat more ice cream (other things being equal, which, to be fair, they're not). ... So these kinds of pleasures can never support a perfect life.

Your ice cream analogy, to me, breaks down along these lines, too. The idea that pleasures are good additively breaks down the same as endless drinking bouts. That also seems like Plato's argument as to why pleasure can't be The Good.

Epicurus drank with his friends, he wrote a whole work titles Symposium where they talked about wine and sex. I can easily see Epicurus saying a short drinking bout or a single drinking bout can be cautiously engaged in. It's the endless string that's leads to pain. Same with ice cream. A little is tasty, more and more leads to indigestion and pain. This is where prudence is the most important instrumental virtue. To know when to stop a given pleasure before it turns to pain is an application of practical wisdom.

I'm going to leave any deeper look at katastematic and kinetic pleasure for the light of day. I think it's a useful categorization or at least interesting. If Epicurus thought it was important enough to point out, that's good enough for me to try and get a handle on it. (There are some who think Epicurus didn't even teach this, but I can't agree with that direction.)

I don't know if this is illuminating for my position, but this is what I get for putting this off until late at night.

Quote from Godfrey

"Perfect" seems to have platonic connotations of an ideal state, a state that doesn't empirically exist. "Complete," on the other hand, implies something that one can judge for oneself.

I personally like something like "complete" to riff on the connotation of "all (pan-) goals (telos) have been met or achieved." There's nothing lacking, which I realize form an English semantic perspective, you could use "perfect." But to me, "perfect" leaves the door open for the potential for that Platonic ideal concept to creep in.