Posts by Godfrey

These two passages seem to touch on this subject as well:

PD26: The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.

VS21: Nature must be persuaded, not forced. And we will persuade nature by fulfilling the necessary desires, and the natural desires too if they cause no harm, but sharply rejecting the harmful desires.

I find it interesting that, at least in St-Andre's translation, harm is referred to generally and not as specific to the individual. This, to me, correlates to what Don has described above. Basically, to achieve maximal pleasure you must consider the consequences of your actions.

For a more positive answer to the problem of the invisibility cloak, I'll point out PD05:

It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.

For the practicing Epicurean, this supercedes the negative reinforcement.

Quote from Kalosyni

perhaps even though there are many "images" coming into the psyche, it is only the "blessed and incorruptable" which are those of the gods. So those other images which are dark, painful, and ugly are not considered (or not labeled) to be the gods.

This immediately brings up, for me, the vengeful and angry Old Testament god. While I can find value in the Epicurean notion of a god, it's difficult for me to accept this idea as universal. I do, however, think that it can be a universally beneficial way of idealizing the notion of god, or of perfection.

Polystratus is saying, I think, that it makes no sense to say that either relative or non-relative is exclusively "real," for if that is the case then even something as obviously real as minerals has to be unreal. At least that's how I read what's presented here.

I'm a little surprised by that, because I would think that his position would be that "larger" and "smaller" would just be "events," and therefore not real. At least they would not be material; he seems to be saying that an event is real, even if not material. Didn't Lucretius have something to say about that? The details don't come to mind at the moment. Perhaps an event is real in the same sense that the dreams of madmen are real?

Yesterday I was told by my cardiologist that the latest recommendation is to not take fish oil supplements as they may cause arrythmias. So I've stopped for a few months until my next follow up and we'll see what happens. I've been taking liquid fish oil for years, it seems to keep triglycerides quite low, among other benefits.

The missing Epicurean fragment: "live like a god among men [get a dog!]"

Perhaps meaning might also be thought of as an "encompassing" pleasure....

Quote from Kalosyni

Vatican Saying 48:

"While you are on the road, try to make the later part better than the earlier part; and be equally happy when you reach the end."

Quote from Godfrey

VS48 is quite good! However, I don't think that it's referring to meaning, but more to how one can most effectively pursue pleasure in one's life.

If I look at my own definition of meaning as an organizing pleasure, VS48 could be read as a way of organizing pleasure and hence as a type of meaning. Hmmm... And I think I see where you're going, Kalosyni , with VS17; that seems like looking at VS48 from another angle.

That's a big topic! But since I'm not yet fully awake, I'll take a groggy stab at it...

I would start by saying that "meaning," at least in the way that I think that you're thinking of it, is a type of pleasure.

Perhaps a "multivalent" pleasure: by this I mean something that brings pleasure (say in the form of satisfaction or fulfillment) on more than one level.

Or maybe better described as an "organizing" pleasure: something that brings one's life into a type of focus, and that serves as a filter for choices and avoidances (commitments and rejections, pursuing and fleeing &c). Actually, I like this take on it better than the multivalent idea.

And that's it. Period. Anything else is just one's personal understanding of it and how it works in their particular situation.

Friendship is highly valued in EP, but I'm not sure that it would be classified as meaning, although it can multiply one's pleasure and one can derive personal meaning from friendship and/or family.

The definition of transcendence is a little hard to pin down, I think, but as I interpret what's written in post #1, that's not something that would enter into an Epicurean equation. I think that the best take on something close to transcendence or a legacy would come directly from the example of Epicurus, particularly in his last letter and his will. One can take steps during one's lifetime to try to influence what happens after they die, but at some point, that can turn into an unnatural desire and do one more harm than good.

VS48 is quite good! However, I don't think that it's referring to meaning, but more to how one can most effectively pursue pleasure in one's life.

My final thought is to reiterate that we can define "meaning" as "an organizing pleasure." However I reserve the right to revise that!

Choosing from the list in post #26 above, I find that "rejection" resides in a nice place. More oomph than "avoid," less action packed than "flee."

Likewise with "commit." So my leanings at the moment are toward commitment/rejection, commit/reject. Is that where this is heading for others?

This is an excellent case study in the difficulties of translation

Am I correct in understanding that, based on the above, a proper English replacement for choose/avoid would be pursue/flee?

If so, it's much more action-packed

This idea of simplifying down to two words is intriguing and somewhat alluring. But when I think of it as a response to a Stoic pairing of "work and play" it comes into better focus for me. The Stoic worldview is idealized (made up? maybe that's too harsh...) and so it's really quite simple to come up with simple descriptions and clever exercises. The Epicurean worldview is based on observed reality, which is messy. Therefore I think that trying to adapt Epicurean philosophy to a Stoic-friendly format is ultimately unproductive.

Another example of this mismatch between Stoics and Epicureans is a closer look at "is it in my control or not" and where that fits into a process of choosing and fleeing (with a nod to Don). Stoics apparently keep this idea firmly in mind at all times. As I think about choosing and fleeing, whether something is under my control or not only comes into play when I fear that something might not be under my control, which usually occurs later on in my thought process.

Having said all this, I guess that I'm leaning toward "choosing and fleeing" (or choice and avoidance) because it acknowledges both pleasure and pain. Or "pursuing pleasure." What’s important is grasping the wider concepts, the shorthand and outlines are really just reminders of the bigger picture.

The kitchen example falls apart because there is only one "thing:" food. Absence of food leaves nothing. Absence of pain involves two "things:" pain and pleasure. So if there is no pain there is pure pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

I would say that is an implication that should never go unchallenged.

Yes, I've noticed that!

Epicurus may have been dealing with similar conflicts, and his categories are, to me, quite an improvement over the other versions of dealing with desire. Having said that, even once (or if) we settle on an appropriate definition of the term, we'll find that desires are wide-ranging by nature. That's what the categories are most valuable for, at least in my humble opinion.

In terms of the difficulty of pinning down a definition, "desire" is quite like "pleasure." They're also quite alike in terms of pinning down a workable Epicurean ethics.

We've given a lot of effort to understanding what Epicurus meant by "pleasure;" the same effort needs to be applied to understanding what he meant by "desire." And that is not to imply in any way that they are the same thing: they're not. I tend to agree with how Julia and Todd are interpreting it, and I also agree that a good look at the original passages in the Greek may be helpful (by someone who understands Greek, not by me!)

As for choice: between desire and pleasure or pain lie choice or avoidance.

(Oops, I see that I missed the two posts above.)

Quote from Julia

To you and quite possibly to most people, this might be splitting hairs, but to me it makes all the difference that it is not the desired object-or-event itself which motivates me. What motivates me, is the pleasure of having accomplished my desire. For example, the knowledge that I desire a new car and true love does not motivate me one bit. What motivates me – and indeed the only thing about that which motivates me! – is the pleasure I can predict to experience once I have attained a new car or true love.

That's a good hair to split, as we're trying to come to clarity. I agree with your conclusion.

Quote from Julia

Desire is not the motivator, according to VS71 desire is the thing to be evaluated (“Every desire must be confronted by this question: […]”). Pleasure – if it is predicted to arise from attaining the desired object-or-event – should be the motivator (pleasure is the guide to life – not desire!).

Well said. And this is where the categories of desire fit in, as one way to evaluate the desire.

Quote from Julia

In my understanding of language, a desire which was determined to lead to pain ceases to be a desire, and will henceforth be, variously, an addiction, a compulsion, a confusion, an obsession, an urge, …

I wouldn't go this far... I would call some of these unnatural desires, but they're still desires. An urge, I believe, is synonymous with a desire. Some desires lead to pain if unfulfilled, these are natural and necessary. Some lead to net pain and these are unnatural desires. Some lead to short-term pain in order to obtain net pleasure, these I think would be considered natural and unnecessary desires.

This last category would include something like "I'm going to go work out, which I hate, and which will bring me pain. But I'm doing it for the net pleasure of fitting into my old jeans or having a wild affair or going on a ski vacation &c."

Quote from Cassius

There are many different ways of looking at things and therefore lots of charts, but I am tempted to say in the fundamental abstract that the first question is always as stated in "VS71. Every desire must be confronted by this question: What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished, and what if it is not?"

In my own mind I have a very hard time separating "desire" from "pleasure and pain" and "choice and avoidance" or even "willpower," and that's a major reason I have a problem separating out "desire" as if it is some fundamental of human nature apart from everything else. I think they are all a part of a bigger picture and acting as if there is a "desire" part of your brain that acts totally on its on is going to lead to lots of problems.

Cassius there's a lot to chew on here, but at the risk of oversimplification I'll take a quick stab at it before dinner

VS71 is a great way to analyze this. To my understanding, desire can be considered something that motivates me. The object of one's desire is, for example, a new car or true love. Or, in my current case, dinner. What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished is, ultimately, pleasure or pain. I think that it's pretty much as simple as that.

Desire and pleasure/pain, then, are two different things. Desire is the motivator, pleasure/pain is the result. The only qualification is that some desires might be considered pains. But they are still a motivator in that they make you want to do something. The way that you choose to eliminate that pain can lead to either pleasure or to more pain, so it's helpful to think what categories of desire might be involved as you choose/avoid how to eliminate that pain in order to obtain the resultant pleasure.

At least for me, willpower is another subject.

I think that it can be instructive to read some simplified neuroscience books to get a better grasp on the subject. Obviously Epicurus wasn't privy to that, but his intuition was remarkably close as far as I can tell. I'm guessing that Don and others may have something to add....

But for now, I think that I shall choose my natural/necessary desire for dinner over my desire to philosophize. All philosophy begins in the stomach, after all.

Titus it's interesting that you mention the Stoic "what's in my power." As I was thinking about the desires in my first post above, that kept popping into my head. Much to my discomfort! Thanks for reminding me of the benefits of the categories, with which I firmly agree.

But there comes a point where the fullness of pleasure is elusive, and not due to imaginary fears or social media. And even when our basic needs are safely met and the flowers smell nice and the zip lines are well greased. Life is full of fears and disturbances beyond the gods and the afterlife and I think Epicurus was addressing those as well. Sometimes simple pleasures and having met our needs is sufficient for the fullness of pleasure. Sometimes additional reasoning in the midst of upheaval (of whatever type) is called for.

PD16 Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason. (St-Andre)

Re post #12 graphic: also include PDs 15, 21, 26 and 29, in addition to 30.