In DL book 10, paragraph 28 is the list of Epicurus' books; seventh in the list is Chief Maxims (Mensch translation).
Sure wish we had some of the books in that list!
In DL book 10, paragraph 28 is the list of Epicurus' books; seventh in the list is Chief Maxims (Mensch translation).
Sure wish we had some of the books in that list!
This seemed much less "formal" than something we might do... almost like if someone wanted to read a paper they were working on during our monthly Skype call. I don't know anything about the Forum that put this on: was it a regular meeting of some sort?
I think, at a minimum, for a "presentation" it would be better for the speaker to put their script next to their camera so they at least seem to be more engaged; kind of like a low tech teleprompter.
Pardon my tardiness in posting: I attended the presentation but am only now able to weigh in.
I got the impression that this was not a finished paper but a work in progress. She seemed to be working with athroa epibole versus kata meros epibole in order to draw some conclusions. Basically, is there a difference between a "big picture" epibole and an epibole of a detail or details? Is memory involved in one but not the other? Is memory involved at all in an epibole? Is attention?
Also she was examining whether epibole are projections from outside things, projections outward from the mind, or projections inward into the mind.
Again, my impression is that she's still grappling with all of this. I think at one point she said that at this point her main goal was to catalog the occurrences of epibole being mentioned in the sources. She also mentioned that grammar doesn't seem to be the main guide, theory is.
In the Q&A she or somebody said that one needs to attend to epibolai in order to do epistemology. This would be different from "attending" being part of an epibole.
Tony Long pointed out that epibolai are not acts of the mind, but how it's being affected. At least as he grasps the idea ![]()
As an aside, it just occurred to me that the architectural setting is Roman, not Greek. As far as I'm aware the Greeks didn't build with arches but with posts and lintels, developed through the classical orders.
If this has any relevance to the discussion at hand, it may indicate that Raphael wasn't taking a literal view as to who was who and had another, overarching (pardon the pun) agenda.
Hicks and Yonge both use "rebound," as does Mensch, although she seems to arrange the passage differently:
Quote44 The atoms are in constant motion for eternity. [He says later on that they also move with equal velocity, the void yielding equally to the lightest and the heaviest.] Some travel great distances from one another, while others continue to oscillate in place when they find themselves entangled or enclosed in a mesh of atoms. 45 This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which cannot provide any resistance; and the atom’s solidity makes it rebound after any collision, no matter how distant, whereupon it finds itself entangled in a mesh of atoms. Of these motions there is no beginning, since they are caused by the atoms and the void.
This idea of continuous motion and vibration, to me, makes much more sense than the swerve!
Also from Herodotus:
Quote60. Further, one must not assert that the unlimited has an up and a down in the sense of an [absolutely] highest and lowest point. We know, however, that what is over our heads from wherever we stand, or what is below any point which we think of—it being possible to project both indefinitely—will never appear to us as being at the same time and in the same respect both up and down. For it is impossible to conceive of this. Consequently, it is possible to grasp as one motion the one conceived of as indefinitely [extended] upwards and the one conceived of as indefinitely [extended] downwards, even if a thousand times over a thing moving from us towards the places over our heads should arrive at the feet of those above us or a thing moving from us downwards should arrive at the head of those below us.
This article was of interest to me because of it's overall theme and how Sellars related to Lucretius. Lucretius doesn't show up until the end but is considered to be a good example of living philosophy. I like the approach because it doesn't rely on "spiritual exercises" or specific daily practices but is more of an approach to integrating philosophy into one's life.
Beware! He does say that Lucretius' goal was tranquility, but aside from that I found it to be a quick and worthwhile read.
That's a good question! I've been using Kindle for books and Google Play Books for pdfs. I haven't checked to see how well GPB syncs as I read most e-stuff on my tablet. GPB seems to be limited in the file size that it will accept, so I downloaded ReadEra pdf reader on my tablet to read and bookmark the Epicurean Friends version of Lucretius. ReadEra only works on Android though as far as I know.
It would be nice to find a reader for pdfs and epub that works as well as Kindle does for mobi! Plus there's my love/hate feelings toward Amazon....
Here's my two cents:
Sedley at his finest: he discusses how the proem to book 1 is a direct response to Empedocles' poem On Nature and a transition from Empedocles philosophy to that of Epicurus. Then he constructs the contents of Epicurus' On Nature and has a couple of charts showing how this correlates to Lucretius DRN. Later he posits that the final book or two of DRN correlates to the Peripatetic Theophrastus via Epicurus.
He further posits that Lucretius was in the process of a rewrite at the time of his death, and that he had only completed books 1-3. His theory is that Lucretius first put Epicurus On Nature into verse, then was reworking the structure of his poem to fit his goal of persuasion as opposed to Epicurus' goal of exposition. He describes Epicurus' books as the contents of a series of lectures, btw.
As to the plague of Athens, Sedley's theory is that it was Lucretius' initial pass, to be reworked. He presents the overall DRN as a cycle of books beginning with pleasure and ending with pain, and posits that the plague of Athens portion would probably have been reworked to show how an Epicurean deals with pain, similar to Epicurus on his deathbed.
He's kind enough to translate 99% of the Greek and Latin; overall it reads quite well for a layman such as me.
Makes me want to read DRN yet again!
The Epicurus side of the double herm seems to be the best likeness of the batch.
https://www.myminifactory.com/object/3d-prin…ie-vienna-21407
https://www.myminifactory.com/scantheworld/
I just came across this site for various 3D models. There are a few of Epicurus, of varying quality. There may be others of interest on the site as well. I noticed that there are other "myminifactory" links above but I don't know if they're part of this site or not.... At any rate, here's yet another link!
Doesn't look like the same cup judging by the profile of the top rim and the detail of the garland.
It seems then that the behavior being debated as instinctual is quite complicated since it involves two beavers and a division of labor. This, to me, makes it sound more like learned behavior. But since it doesn't seem to be clear what constitutes instinct, there is the possibility that this degree of complexity may be instinctual.
In Don's example I wonder if the beaver that built a dam was male or female ![]()
Bailey is explicit that concepts clarify sensations. According to modern science, sensations confirm "pre-rational concepts." In conscious thought we use concepts to clarify sensations, but Barrett argues that rationality is somewhat of an illusion since so much of the process occurs subconsciously through predictions, simulations, affect, etc.
When I say Anticipations are similar to "mental concepts" in modern neuroscience, I'm not talking about rational reasoning
Don I was going to make exactly that point. "Pre-rational concepts" are what I would consider to be the faculty as well as the "etchings."
I'm curious as to whether there is any functional equivalence between "pre-rational concepts" and "rational concepts" or if it's just confusing terminology. It seems as if they may be different levels of usage of the faculty, but I don't know if that's neurologically correct.
An illustration that comes to mind is of breathing: we breathe subconsciously to stay alive, but we can also consciously control our breathing.
Ok Godfrey you started this. What would you say to Elli's Greek beavers who need training in building dams?
I would think that beavers would need to learn to build dams. But one of Don's links explains that they don't, so if that's correct then as good Epicureans
that should be our basis for going forward.
Meanwhile, I got around to reading the links that I attached earlier. It turns out that one is pretty useless, but the other describes some of the history of this debate (although not specifically beavers). I've attached the paper from the second link here. Better minds than mine have wrestled with this for a long time!
So I guess the bottom line is "damned if I know!" (Sorry, I couldn't resist. )
QuoteHa that article seems to imply they just want peace and quiet!
They're seeking absence of pain ![]()