Posts by Godfrey

So we don't have much to go on from Epicurus himself, including this fragment:

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

Can any significance be derived from the fact that he wrote that peace of mind and freedom from pain imply a state of rest, whereas joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity? Could he have been suggesting that a katastematic state isn't experienced directly, but only through such pleasures as peace of mind and freedom from pain? Could he have been discounting katastematic pleasure altogether and answering Plato, et al, that it is only a mental description based on experienced pleasures?

This is a great example of the much documented issue of lack of documentation

Further, Cicero’s opposition to Epicurus is well established. Knowing his agenda, relying on his presentation of what has become such a key idea is pretty much guaranteed to lead us into the conundrum we're grappling with. This was his agenda after all.

Quote from Don

My question: Does this describe a life of katastematic pleasure as a foundation filled with kinetic pleasure?

Reading it in this context and considering the source, it strikes me as quite a sarcastic and misleading description of that. As we often discuss, "a life of ease", of otiosus, might be absolute pleasure to some people yet entirely odius to others. And "crammed full of pleasures" seems to indicate disdain for prudent choices and avoidances.

OK abiding probably isn't a great word choice I'm having trouble coming up with a correct word; background condition is one attempt, maybe underlayment is another. I'm trying to express it from experience, not texts, so it's challenging.

Quote from Don

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

Thanks for this quote Don . it's been some time since I read Nikolsky, Wenham or Gosling and Taylor; how does this square with their arguments? Isn't their point that katastematic and kinetic weren't terms used by Epicurus? This would seem to contradict that view.

Quote from Cassius, of Arenson

Epicurus made a name for himself in the ancient world when he identified pleasure with the absence of pain and proceeded to distinguish it from a second, seemingly different variety of pleasure--that found `in motion' (kinetic).

As I've been struggling to express above, I'm beginning to have what I think is an answer to this argument. FWIW I'll try to clarify it here.

1. Pleasure and pain are, first and foremost, feelings.

2. Pleasure and pain are opposing feelings, so absence of either of them implies the maximum quantity of the other by definition.

3. Properly understanding natural science results in an abiding absence of pains which are due to fears of the gods, fears of death, and other fears caused by common myths. It also gives us knowledge of how to best live our lives in our particular circumstances, through prudent choices and avoiding of desires to pursue.

4. This abiding absence of pain due to understanding natural science is the only pleasure that could be properly considered katastematic. All other pleasures and pains come and go. Being pleasantly full for two or three hours is not, to my current thinking, katastematic. However living in a situation in which you will never have to worry about hunger, due to your reasoning about pleasures and pains concerning food, could be considered katastematic regarding hunger.

5. This abiding absence of pain is a pleasure which is properly referred to as wisdom and is also called ataraxia. If Epicurus indeed ever used the term "katastematic pleasure", which is debatable, I propose that this is what he was referring to. By this interpretation katastematic pleasure isn’t meant to refer to being replenished, or to any specific part of the neurological process of experiencing pleasure. It's simply a background condition that we've created for ourselves through correct study and correct reasoning.

Could this be a valid counterargument to the above quote? Or am I misinterpreting something?

Here are some of my notes from TGOP which reinforce Don 's post above:

19.2.3 Ataraxia and aponia are considered conditions of life, not particular pleasures.

19.2.4 Since aponia is just a condition of painless perception it does not mean that Epicurus thought of a non-perceiving state as pleasurable.

19.3.2 Katastematic pleasures refer to "the well-established katastema (condition) of the flesh. Not to replenishment, movement, or katastasis eis phusin (restoration to the natural state). The latter was an argument against pleasure, on the basis that what was being returned to was the good, not pleasure. When the organism is operating properly it will be in a state of pleasure, and pain is a matter of unnatural operation.

19.3.3 Therefore kinetic pleasures are not a different kind than katastematic ones: they too are sensory and a matter of some part of the organism operating properly. Due to this most of Cicero can be discounted in this regard.

19.4.27 Ataraxia is achieved by the removal of superstitious fear and false beliefs, the constant memory of the truth, and attention to present experience and perception. Now the mind is free of disturbance and so memory and expectation operate without anxiety. Similarly when physical pain is removed the body operates without pain and that will mean that always some pleasurable and painless perception is occurring, a condition of good cheer.

19.4.30 When the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception; since the operation is harmonious the perception is pleasant and without pain; that is just what aponia is. Ataraxia is the condition when, because of correct views, our expectations are undisturbed by fear, our desires do not pursue empty objectives and our memories are pleasant: this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously.

Related to this are these notes:

18.3.15 A wise man needs to know certain basic facts about man and nature, convince himself of them and acquire certain habits of life. These will ensure that pleasure predominates. No daily hedonic calculus is necessary; the calculation is all at the stage of working out the facts, the effects of belief in them, and the proper regimen. From

time to time one will have to review one's knowledge and confirm one's attitudes and practices. Once one is convinced of the truth of Epicurus' doctrines and has incorporated his teachings into one's life, one ceases to worry and lives a life as near to ataraxia and aponia as is possible for one. To achieve the best life possible, conviction and good habits are enough. One's wisdom shows in the acquisition and development of those

characteristics that will keep his life as pleasant as it can be, and that being so he will not be deluded into thinking that it will improve if only it lasts a little longer.

18.3.19 Ataraxia consists in a condition of correct belief, and aponia in a condition free of bodily lack. The distinction between wisdom and ataraxia is therefore verbal rather than real. Since absence of wisdom is equivalent to the absence of ataraxia and therefore of mental pleasure, and its presence to the presence of mental pleasure, using it or mental pleasure as a criterion of worth amount to the same thing.

Before reviewing my notes I had been thinking of these last two notes as references to katastematic pleasure, but now I see that wasn't what Gosling and Taylor were saying at all.

As I recall from a while ago, one of my conclusions from reading The Greeks On Pleasure was that the considered katastematic pleasure to be obtained when you absorb and understand the conclusions from natural science that we need not fear the gods or death.

PD18: As soon as the pain produced by the lack of something is removed, pleasure in the flesh is not increased but only embellished. Yet the limit of enjoyment in the mind is produced by thinking through these very things and similar things, which once provoked the greatest fears in the mind.

PD19: Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning.

Also,

PD11: If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural. PD12: It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural.

To me, these describe how to achieve katastematic pleasure: by studying nature and achieving a correct worldview. This worldview provides a pleasure which is unchanging, unaffected by the slings and arrow of outrageous fortune. It doesn't mean that we've left behind the myriad of other pleasures and pains, but that they are embellishments to the pleasure of a correct worldview. We've built a stable base on which to make choices and avoidances regarding all other pleasures, all of which are constantly changing.

There's also this tidbit....

A Google search for "isonomia David Sedley" revealed the book Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity by David Sedley. It has what appears to be a pertinent chapter titled "Epicurean Infinity". https://books.google.com/books?id=SgRuJ…epage&q&f=false

It's always worth asking David Sedley

Thanks Cassius that's helpful. But of course I have more questions

DeWitt mentions Zoroaster as an influence for thinking in terms of good and evil, and good and evil would fit with the analogy of the legal system. But they don't seem to fit with Epicurus' description of justice. I'm curious if love and strife are more direct influences, being pre-Socratic influences on and precursors to the development of atomism. (Was it Parmenides theory? I tend to get the Pre-Socratics mixed up.) This would be what is being described in the underlined portion of the quotation in post #2.

It also seems curious that the term isonomia doesn’t exist in extant Epicurean texts but is only found in Cicero, per DeWitt. Curious in that Cicero, the crafty lawyer, would express it in legal terms. And that such terms imply good and evil....

"The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better."

I also don't see the truth in this statement. To me, in an infinite universe there is an infinite progression of "better". I'm fully on board with the idea of an hierarchy, but in keeping with the mind-bogglingness of infinity, I can't conceive of a limit such as "best". I suppose there could be something that is "biggest", but, again, does infinity contain such a limit?

BTW Cassius in what section of DeWitt is the quote in post #2 located? At some point it might be helpful to track down his footnotes. And do you know offhand where it is that Lucretius discusses this?

Quote from DeWitt via Cassius

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

I've had problems wrapping my head around isonomia from the first time I read DeWitt. Using this quote as a summary helps to analyze my concerns with the idea.

First aspect: at first it makes sense that in in an infinite universe there would be perfection as well as imperfection. But on further thought, how is perfection defined? Isn't this a mental concept rather than something inherent in a material universe? If anything, I would consider the universe itself as perfect rather than some aspect of it. This leads me to a definition of perfection as a self-contained, self-perpetuating system, a definition which then leads back to the original question of the destruction of the world. And maybe this leads to the imperturbability of the Epicurean gods as well. But the key point in my mind is that perfection is a value judgment, and therefore has no place in describing a material universe.

The second aspect, that the number of gods must equal the number of mortals, makes absolutely no sense to me. Can someone explain this?

The third aspect seems to make sense to me, but I should read the conversation between Martin and Marco before I make up my mind.

Anybody have other thoughts or explanations about isonomia? I'm rather befuddled.

In modern physics we're unable to measure things smaller than a certain size because the act of measuring will affect the thing being measured. For example, something smaller than a photon cannot be observed/measured using light, and something smaller than an electron cannot be measured using an electron microscope. There's a name for this which escapes me; hopefully someone has the name at hand and can correct me if I've mis-stated it.

This would be the modern equivalent of a single atom not being able to emit a film.

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Quote from Nate Anyway, CBT made it easier for me to go on to tolerate the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. What it failed to do was provide direction.

That's one of the core criticisms I read about CBT -- it doesn't suggest a positive idea of what a healthy human being will do once "cured" of temporary problems, and without an orientation toward how to proceed positively in life it amounts to looking to Tylenol or Aspirin as the goal of life.

For me, one of the keys of EP is that it encourages opening to the nuances of your feelings. I find this far more efficacious than relying on reason or conforming my thinking to religious doctrine. However I have no clinical conditions (that I'm aware of) and I recognize that reason and religion can be effective up to a point, and some people are content to stop there. But, personally, not taking that last step of becoming intimately aware of my feelings falls short of allowing me to live my most pleasant life.

PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

As we've discussed here and elsewhere, there's a philosophical context to this PD that many people today seem to be unaware of. With that in mind, I've been thinking of the following scholion:

PD03. (Some say that pleasures are unlimited, and therefore pleasure cannot be the goal. In fact,) the limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

I don't remember offhand if such a scholion already exists, but it seems like it should!

War also reduces pleasure and pain to the more primitive animal or newborn levels of basic survival. They're still guides, but the pleasures are not what we might normally think of when we think of pleasure.

"Epicurean ethics are defined by prudent choices and avoidances, which are guided by the feelings of pleasure and pain." That's an unwieldy first stab at popping the boil with a very blunt instrument.

Quote from Kalosyni

It would not be safe to spend too much time "seeking happiness" in an unsafe environment.

Have we ever pinned down concrete definitions of happiness, joy and pleasure? I ask this because my reaction to this specific quote is that it’s even more necessary to seek pleasure and avoid pain in an unsafe environment. It's just that the desires involved would focus intently on the natural and necessary: safety, shelter, food, etc.

Quote from Kalosyni

So now why are there those who are living in peace and safety unhappy?

This, too, comes down to desires: have these people seen to their financial, job and family stability? Have they embraced an effective personal philosophy? Are they pursuing unnatural and/or unnecessary desires?

This can be analyzed per the ethics of choices and avoidances based on pleasure and pain. In some cases we choose pain, with the intention of greater pleasure to follow. Exercise is a common example. What is notable is that the painful experience is instrumental to achieving pleasure.

While it's natural to feel pain when others are suffering, ceasing to seek pleasure will only diminish one's own efficacy. So I would say that it's actually necessary to continue to seek pleasure. That's the basis of our ethics: if we throw that out, we have nothing to guide us.

If we're in a position to help others who are suffering, then we can choose certain pains with the expectation achieving the pleasures of successfully helping them. If we're not in a position to help them, seeking out pain is basically pointless.

Thanks for this, Don ! The Eames's are legends in the Los Angeles design community. I had the pleasure of growing up in a house full of Eames furniture. While enjoying a museum exhibit on the Case Study houses a couple of decades ago, I was surprised to discover that an old family friend was the architect who stamped the drawings for their iconic house in the Pacific Palisades. Their old studio in Venice was something of a landmark, although I'm not aware of its current state.

That's a great question reneliza !

In the quote that you referenced I was attempting to articulate some of my thinking regarding pleasure and pain as guides. Part of the difficult work in following this ethical theory is to really listen to and feel our pain. Sometimes that pain is in the foreground as Epicurus described on his deathbed, but sometimes it's more of a chronic ache that we've become used to living with. It's the latter situation that I was trying to address.

We always seek to have a balance of pleasure over pain; sometimes we just need to take a penetrating look at our pain and examine a variety of solutions to what's ailing us. *Ideally*, we've been able to structure our lives so that each of our various "roles" brings us a balance of pleasure. If there's a particular role that brings a balance of pain, maybe there's a way to treat that. Or you could look at it as different "levels" of pleasures... or "reaches" of pleasure. What comes immediately to mind for me as a deep level or far reaching pleasure is an understanding of one's guiding philosophy, as this has a positive effect on all aspects of my life. Others are what Epicurus refers to as natural and necessary desires, which can give a person a grounding of pleasure in their life.

As for Epicurus on his deathbed, he knew it was the end for him and he was enjoying looking back on a life well lived, despite his extreme pain. That wasn't papering over pain, but an experience that anybody would want (sans the extreme pain!). And you don't have to die to do it, you can look back on a day well lived, or any experience well lived, and bask in a certain joy.

Thinking about it, Mackintosh's architecture and furniture was more Arts and Crafts style, with some Nouveau touches. His early influences included Art Nouveau, and he and his wife, Margaret, did watercolors and textiles that were Art Nouveau.