Posts by Godfrey

Typo. Desire, not pleasure....

Quote from Cassius

Is "variety" in pleasure the reason we find it is desirable to get out of bed tomorrow? Or is the reason just that we didn't succeed in making "pure pleasure" today so that we try again tomorrow?

I don't necessarily think that either or these is the reason to get out of bed, although in a particular instance they could be. One thought is that pleasure is something that we're attracted to, so any pleasure may gte us out of bed: a beautiful day outside, the smell of coffee, the anticipation of some activity that awaits.

Another thought is that desire, not desire, is the reason to get out of bed. The desire to relieve a full bladder, to drink a cup of coffee, to accomplish such-and-such. Experiencing pleasure may actually keep you in bed: enjoying the sun shining through the window in your bedroom, the pleasure of anticipating some future event, etc. It could be a desire for variety, or a desire to achieve pure pleasure today.

Quote from Cassius

I would think there must be an equally simple way of dealing with a question such as: "If your view of the goal is (1), and you reach it one day, why do you want to live another day?"

This gets back to the Cyrenaic view of pleasure. As I recall, they thought that there was no lasting pleasure so that as soon as you reached your goal and satisfied one desire for a pleasure, you had to then satisfy another desire for pleasure. This also points out an issue with goal setting in general which is being discussed in some circles these days: once you reach your goal, what do you do? Instead, some writers recommend developing a habitual process of moving forward toward achieving what is important to you.

Too, pleasure is able to increase in duration, so if you reach your maximum of pleasure one day, you can still increase it by continuing it for another day.

Quote from Cassius

"living the sort of life specific to the being in question"

Any properly functioning being has an innate drive to pleasure/health/vitality, which I assume would drive it/them naturally to get out of bed and do stuff, if able.

Other thoughts on variation....

External sources of pleasure have uncountable variety. Internal experiences of pleasure seem to be confined to location, duration and possibly intensity. How does the variety of external pleasures equate to variety of internal experiences? Is it through location, in that different nerve endings or neurons are stimulated by different stimuli? If you eat one cherry, then another and another, are you increasing the intensity of stimulation at each nerve ending or are you stimulating an increasing number of nerve endings?

At that, my neurons are overstimulated. Peace out.

Quote from Cassius

Godfrey I don't recall that you commented on "why accept the minimum when more us possible" and I suspect that is key to completing this analysis. There is some aspect to "Intensity" that fits into this puzzle. More intensity has to be obviously desirable just like it is obvious that you want the most duration and locations.

Minimum what? As long as all pain is gone from the body and mind, there is no minimum because you are by definition at the maximum of pleasure (macro). If we're talking about micro pleasures, then the minimum would mean that you're limiting yourself to one location of pleasure or to one moment of pleasure. Once pleasures have accumulated throughout your body and mind, you're at the maximum of pleasure.

It would appear that there's no sliding scale of intensity, other than through location and duration, by definition. At least That's what I'm thinking right here, right now. That may change.

Quote from Godfrey

PD03 “The limit of quantity [intensity???] in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever [location] pleasure is present, as long as it is there [duration], there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once.” Bailey (1926)

Paraphrase: "The most pleasure that one can experience is the removal of all pain, throughout one's body and mind, for the duration of their life. This maximal pleasure comprises pleasures which occur in various parts of one's body and mind and at various times, to such an extent that they fill the entirety of the person's body and mind for the duration of their life." PD03

Is this a correct paraphrase of PD03? If so, why? If not, why not?

Quote

PD09 “If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)

Paraphrase: "If any pleasure could be extended for the duration of the life of a particular organism and extended throughout the body and mind of the organism, this pleasure would be the same as any other pleasure so extended." PD03

Is this a correct paraphrase of PD09? If so, why? If not, why not?

We experience pleasures as differing from one another, so what does this mean? How do the pleasures differ from one another besides in location and duration? Are extension, accumulation, condensing, intensification, all describing the same thing? What is that thing? Reading the sentence, does the thing apply only to the location and duration of the pleasure, or to the pleasure itself? How does this thing relate to the maximal pleasure in PD03?

I'm thinking that PD03 and PD09 are keys to solving this puzzle, although I haven't looked at other of Epicurus' writings in this regard. For the record, I don't think that the answer will be found in Cicero although the answer should explain what Cicero is saying about pleasure.

PD03:

“The magnitude [intensity???] of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure [location], so long as it is present [duration], there is no pain either of body or of mind or both.” Hicks (1910)

“The limit of quantity [intensity???] in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever [location] pleasure is present, as long as it is there [duration], there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once.” Bailey (1926)

PD09:

“If every pleasure were condensed [intensity?], if one may so say, and if each lasted long [duration], and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it [location], then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation [intensity], if this had gone on not only in time [duration], but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man's nature [location], there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now there now is.” Hicks (1910)

“If every pleasure could be intensifed [intensity] so that it lasted [duration] and infuenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature [location], pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)

As I recall, Don interpreted PD09 as saying that pleasure cannot be condensed (by analyzing Epicurus' counterfactuals. Based on our most recent posts I think this could be saying that there is no component of intensity. There is only the feeling of pleasure/pain, it is a two-way switch, and it varies in magnitude only through location and duration.

Cassius , my post just now and your last post (which cross-posted) are talking about the same problem, I think. Just approached slightly differently....

Quote from Cassius

I think we could reword that this way:

A question is "why is absence of pain (which is the definition of pleasure) through the organism (at macro level) the limit of magnitude, whereas a more localized pleasure (at the micro level) can increase?"

If that is saying the same thing, which I think it is, the answer is pretty obvious: a macro level pleasure cannot increase by definition. because it has no more room to increase, while pleasure at any smaller degree than macro level can increase because it still has room to increase.

Sorry for disappearing... busy day!

Yes, that rewording of the question is the same thing.

The last paragraph in Cassius ' quote shows that, yet again, I wasn't clear enough in my overall analysis above. As far as it goes, what is presented in this paragraph is obvious. The components of location and duration obviously cannot increase at the macro level, but they can at the micro level.

What's not obvious to me is the role of intensity. If intensity can increase at the micro level beyond the absence of pain, why can it not increase at the macro level? Or is intensity the wrong description of this component of pleasure? Is it really just a two way switch that jumps from pleasure to pain? If this is the case, then the three components are feeling, location and duration. If so, "feeling" describes both the composite of the three components and one of the components, in which case I think it's a better description to say that pleasures and pains vary through the modifiers of location and duration, and avoid the word "intensity". Which might actually be the way the Greek texts are written: at least in PD09, I've been understanding (as has at least one translator) "condensed" to be equivalent to varying intensity.

I don't have a problem with that, and that might be exactly the conclusion from PD03 and PD09. This means that what is perceived as "intensity" is, in fact, an increase or decrease (condensing) in location and/or duration. My general sense is that I can increase the intensity of a pleasure or pain without increasing the location or duration. Is that actually incorrect? If one was to dig into the science, is a nerve ending (if that's the correct term) an on-off switch? Imagine a pleasure or pain resulting from a pressure. Does increasing the pressure simply recruit more nerve endings (increase the location) rather than elicit a greater response from the original quantity of nerve endings? If I'm getting this right, that seems to be what Epicurus intuited and what he based his conception of maximum pleasure on.

Am I making a comprehensible presentation? If so, does it make any sense?

(Cross posted again...)

Quote from Cassius

Maybe quantity applies at the macro level but at the micro level that is where you have duration, intensity, and location?

I've actually been wondering for a while if magnitude/quantity was describing the same thing as condensing/intensity, but I think you're going in a better direction. Here's my latest thinking:

Magnitude/quantity simply comprises intensity, location and duration. This can occur at any intensity at any location for one moment, or at many locations for a long period of time. The limit of the magnitude/quantity is the absence of pain throughout the organism, for the life of the organism. But, practically speaking, we can work with intensity, location and duration of individual pleasures (through reasoning about our desiresand comparison with our experiences of pleasure and pain) in order to maximize the pleasures available to us. This is exactly what Epicurus did on his deathbed: there wasn't much physical pleasure available to him, so he maximized his mental pleasures, through recollection of his most intense pleasures, in the time that he had left.

A question is "why is absence of pain throughout the organism (macro) the limit of magnitude, whereas a more localized pleasure (micro) can increase beyond mere absence of pain?"

- Macro pleasure, by definition, can't increase in location. A micro pleasure can.

- Can macro pleasure can increase in duration? Or is it specifically "godlike"? A micro pleasure can increase in duration.

- Can a macro pleasure increase in intensity? Epicurus is apparently saying that it cannot, that it's limit is the absence of pain. From experience it seems that a micro pleasure can increase in intensity.

- Intensity the actual Feeling of pleasure or pain, right. Location and duration are simply where and when that Feeling occurs.

Is there something special about intensity at the macro v the micro level? Is Epicurus' description of the limit of magnitude/quantity as a type of homeostasis? Could the latter case be a situation where there are no pains anywhere, ever, to overcome so that there is no need to pursue a pleasure in one place to offset a pain in another place?

Technically, having the absence of pain throughout your body and mind is the fullest pleasure. Practically, I'm not sure that I've ever experienced that! Maybe when I was a baby?

In any part of the organism, once all pain is gone you can experience increasing pleasure in that part, at least until the increased sensation causes pain. So, interestingly, the maximum pleasure of the entire organism is the absence of pain, whereas the absence of pain is the minimum of pleasure for any specific location in the organism.

This explains the interaction of intensity, location and duration. The location of the minimum pleasure in every location throughout the organism is considered a greater pleasure than the most intense pleasure in a few parts of the organism. Practically speaking, this provides some guidance for maximizing pleasure through working with all three of the components instead of just the component of intensity.

(oops, we cross posted)

So, to paraphrase PD03:

"In terms of an entire organism, the maximum pleasure is the absence of pain throughout the organism. In any part of the organism, any degree of pleasure removes all pain in that part for as long as it is there, because pleasure is equal to the absence of pain."

In trying to understand Hieronymus' assertion that the absence of pain is not pleasure, the only way that it makes sense to me is if there's a neutral state dividing pleasure and pain. A neutral state does exist according to Cicero, but it would seem that he's ignoring it here in the interest of obfuscation.

Great discussion in this episode!

Well stated Cassius !

I interpret these PDs slightly differently, especially PD09. I see each as listing things that Epicurus considers to be of key importance in his ethics, even though they're expressed as counterfactuals.

Don , the way that you interpret PD09 seems to be the way that many translators interpret it, but to me this is incorrect. I say this as somebody who knows no Greek: I'm reasoning out the ramifications of the English wording as they apply to my experience. I think that it's incorrect to separate "condensed" from "time" and "parts". I think that the conclusion that pleasures differ from one another is common to both interpretations and is correct, but I think that it's incorrect to say that pleasures cannot be condensed (I read "condensed" as "intensified").

I paraphrase the PD as "the three components of pleasures are intensity, duration and location. If every pleasure was the same in these three ways, all pleasures would be the same. Pleasures are not the same in these three ways, but in fact these three components are the most useful ways of analyzing pleasures." In fact, the translation in post #8 reads to me as being interpreted in this way (although far less verbose!)

PDs 10 & 11, to me, are similarly structured but not open to misinterpretation in the way that #9 is. They're listing things that are important to understand for Epicurus' ethics, but they’re expressed as counterfactuals, which allows them each to be read in two ways.

I guess my primary quibble, then, is with separating "condensed", and saying that pleasures cannot be condensed. Other than that, the use of counterfactuals allows each of these three PDs to be read in two ways: 1) that the things listed are important to understand, and 2) that it's very unusual for the "ifs" to occur.

PD09 "If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another."

Cassius ' description in post 1 does a great job of clarifying this PD as well. It's describing the individual components of pleasures, and at the same time saying that it's pretty unlikely that a person can experience 100% pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain.

This quote is of major importance in terms of the way that I've been trying to visualize PD03. I had been thinking in terms of the affective circumplex [here](RE: How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain by Lisa Feldman Barrett) and trying to reconcile that with PD03 by using a graphic representation. What I find puzzling is that pleasure has a maximum, but pain seems capable of increasing until one passes out or dies.

With the circumplex, maximum pleasure are at opposite ends of an axis of affect, the zero point of the axis would be the imaginary "neutral state":

max pain max pleasure

<-----------------------------0--------------------------------> [1]

PD03 "The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress." This could imply that if pain decreases to the right in this illustration, the "/" point, where pain is removed, denotes maximum pleasure. But pleasure then decreases to the right from the "/" point, which doesn't seem to make much sense.

<------------------------------/<----------------------------- [2]

Or you could have an illustration where pain and pleasure have an overlapping relationship:

<---------------------------------------------------- [3]

---------------------------------------------------->

At which point I become totally befuddled, and I realize why Epicurus didn't give mathematicians and geometricians any credence: math and geometry aren't very useful for describing biological phenomena. But the quote above is quite concise in describing the relationship of pleasure and pain.

Peter Konstans , it would be extremely helpful if you would break up your writing into proper paragraphs. With all due respect, I can't even read what you just posted: it just comes across as an overwhelming stream of words.

In the interest of respecting the ideas that you're expressing, please consider giving some time to formatting your posts in such a way as to maximize what could prove to be a very interesting discussion.

Thanks! Godfrey

Interesting. Are you saying that you would raise young members to entertain the possibility of idealistic myths such as an afterlife? I'm curious to hear your reasoning in this regard.

Quote from Cassius

Quote

Quote from Godfrey I'm leaning toward the idea that katastematic/kinetic is really just a description of durability. Breadth is important, but not katastematic or kinetic. Breadth would be something like "does this thing bring me both physical and mental pleasure? Does it affect one part of my body, or is it a more widely distributed feeling? Does it give me mental satisfaction in one way or in a variety of ways?"

I'm not sure I follow what you are saying here. I see why you are saying that breadth is important but why is "duration" not important

What I'm saying is that katastematic/kinetic (k/k) involves duration but that I don't think that k/k involves breadth. Both duration and breadth are important in order to maximize one's pleasure. The combination of the two, to my current way of thinking, is more important, both practically and theoretically, than the concept of k/k pleasures.

Basically I'm toying with the idea that k/k may not deserve the amount of attention that it gets. My thinking is that k/k is really just a way of describing duration, and we don't have any existing texts from Epicurus to which would give it any more importance.

An existing text that we do have is PD09. I'm currently interpreting it as defining the three components of pleasure as intensity, duration and location. The more I think on it, the more useful these seem to be for working with maximizing one’s pleasure. And if I'm interpreting PD09 correctly, which is open to debate, then to my mind it has more relevance than the texts dealing with k/k, as it is directly attributed to Epicurus.

So I'm suggesting that the three components of pleasure as described in PD09 are a more valuable topic of study than katastematic and kinetic pleasure. As far as I can tell, PD09 has been pretty much ignored, possibly due to its confusing wording, while k/k is the subject of endless, and endlessly open-ended, discussion. And I'm wondering if the focus on k/k is more useful to opponents of Epicurus than to practicing Epicureans.

(Note that I'm not in any way disparaging Epicurean discussion of k/k! I'm just thinking that, once again, opponents such as Cicero and his ilk have cynically sent us off on a wild goose chase!)

Re post 27, I'm saying that we plan ahead by imagining how a particular pleasure will feel, but that we can only confirm our "hypothesis" by actually experiencing the pleasure. Basically just a common sense statement, but poorly worded. I began the statement with a double negative: "All this is not to say that I can't plan ahead..." meaning "this is how I plan ahead". Kind of like some of Epicurus' wording