Posts by Godfrey

Quote from Max DuBoff

I don't think there's any way for katastematic pleasure to have intensity, because if so it couldn't be perfect at every moment (we could always imagine that it could be a bit more intense

This is an intriguing comment!

A pleasure with no intensity would, to me, describe a neutral state, which of course doesn't exist for Epicurus in the pleasure/pain relationship. This is why I prefer "complete" to "perfect". To my understanding a pleasure or pain requires all three components of intensity, location and duration: if any one of these doesn't apply, how can a pleasure or pain be experienced? Further, to my way of thinking a katastematic pleasure can vary in intensity, say from contentment to joy.

On a related note, I'm not clear as to what constitutes a bodily katastematic pleasure. Or possibly any katastematic pleasure.... It would seem to me to be a matter of duration, of being "lasting". This gets into the squishy question of what is meant by "lasting". Eternal? Being around longer than most pleasures? Persisting regardless of any external circumstances or new information?

Being now a "senior citizen", it's become quite apparent to me that all bodily pleasures and pains come and go. This is the lens through which I view bodily katastematic feelings with suspicion, but of course it may have nothing to do with that I suppose. Does it have to to with a material world in which everything is ultimately physical?

Quote from Max DuBoff

But why is tranquility the pleasure that confers a blessed life? Epicurus, like many Greek philosophers, thinks that a good life is a perfect life (pantelēs; PD 20, 21; Pyth. 116). It's not clear to me exactly why he holds this assumption (very curious for your thoughts; I think this is one of the big puzzles of his ethics, for which we don't have extant sources). "Perfect" in this sense means "not able to be made better, in the respect in which it's good." But pleasure fits a bit awkwardly with this assumption.

Quote from wbernys

Someone feeling perpetual joy or delight is not in any way inferior or superior to feeling constant Serenity or Tranquility. Both are equally Pleaseant. Kinetic and Katastematic pleasures are variations of pleasure. Pretty sure this is Austin's view and Gosling and Taylor's as well. They are variations of the same condition, Epicurus recognized this variation (Dissgreeing with Kolosky) but didn't consider it a huge deal.

This is why Tranquility is not the absolute goal, but any continuous Pleaseant state, whethe it be either constant Tranquility/Serenity or Joy/Delight.

Quote from wbernys

I think this is because of the dominance of Plato, he wants to respond to the Platonic objection that the good life can't be one filled with pleasure because pleasure doesn't have a perfectly attainable limit for humans to reach. So the good must be perfect was the accepted belief.

Epicurus responds that Pleasure can be perfect (in removing all pain, often thought the neutral state) and afterwards admits only variation. Just as the Stoic sage may vary in different qualities (rich/poor, young/old, Greek/Non-Greek), but not be more wise, pleasure varies in state to state (Joy/Tranquility), but not be more perfect

Regarding pantelēs: I'm quite ignorant of the nuances of Greek (not just the nuances, most of it) but I see from Nate Bartman's compilation of PD translations that translations of PD21 are fairly evenly divided by translating it as perfect and as complete. In my mind there's a significant difference between these two words, at least in English. "Perfect" seems to have platonic connotations of an ideal state, a state that doesn't empirically exist. "Complete," on the other hand, implies something that one can judge for oneself. I'm curious what the thoughts of those with knowledge of the Greek make of this....

I agree with the middle quote from wbernys . This is in fact a perfect (pun intended) example of why it's important to acknowledge the parsing of pleasure into intensity, location and duration, at least in my way of thinking. The only definitive difference between kinetic and katastematic pleasures is duration: katastematic duration is extended, kinetic duration is short. Both kinetic and katastematic can vary in intensity and location. Having said that, I consider katastematic pleasures to be mental, but there are also kinetic mental pleasures. And both kinetic and katastematic pleasures can cover the full range of intensities. This aids in personal choice of pleasures based on desires in particular circumstances, without concerns over an idealized ranking.

Quite an enjoyable and thought provoking thread!

I feel the need at this point to add in my reading of some of the PDs, which when carefully considered (at least to me), delve into further parsing pleasure as intensity, duration and location. All pleasure is pleasure, full stop. The way to differentiate between various pleasures is not by attempting to rank the pleasures but by looking closely at their intensity, location and duration. For example:

PD09. If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.

Quote from Max DuBoff

a major theme of PD 18-21 (as I understand them) is that a finite life can be perfectly good (pantelēs), i.e., unable to be improved in the respect in which it is good. PD 20 begins with an argument about why an additive conception of pleasure can't meet that standard

PD20. The flesh assumes that the limits of joy are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only through infinite time.... (Saint-Andre translation)

Max DuBoff , is this the extent of the beginning of PD20 that you're referring to? I'm reading this as dealing specifically with pleasures of the flesh and infinite time. So if I'm understanding you correctly, you're considering these specific pleasures as additive, since no physical pleasure can last more than a relatively short time. This would be very similar to the Cyrenaic point of view as I understand it. Am I following your logic correctly?

PD20 cont'd: ...But the mind, thinking through the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time....

For me, combining these two portions is simply saying that the body, or our instincts, desire to live forever or at least as long as possible. But if we understand the philosophy of Epicurus then we understand that we are finite beings who occupy but a tiny portion of infinite time, and that the rest of eternity doesn't concern us as we will be dead and therefore have no way to experience it. I also see this complete PD as a refutation of the Cyrenaic conception of pleasure.

Is this at all helpful with parsing this PD as we each understand it?

I'm not aware of the accepted interpretation of PD20. My personal understanding is that Epicurus is simply pointing out that every human life has a natural limit. If we understand that our lives are finite, then infinity becomes irrelevant and wishing for infinite time is an unnatural desire. In my mind this is a continuation and elaboration of PD19.

Of course pondering infinity is a useful philosophical pursuit. But understanding that our lives are just little blips in time is key for a proper perspective of the limits of our lives. Particularly in a world with nothing supernatural and no afterlife.

Quote from Pacatus

“Attention-Fluid, Hypertexting Brain” (my more affirming version of ADHD – especially rejecting that last D).

Well said!

I'll go further out on a limb and posit that EP is the study of nature (Epicurus advised the study of nature though I don't know that he went so far as to say his philosophy is the study of nature), then you arrive at pleasure as the goal through intense examination of pleasure and pain and how they occur in the body and mind. This is perhaps how you come to an understanding of intensity, location and duration (ILD for short).

Labeling mental and physical pleasures may come either before or after in this process, but a detailed understanding comes from understanding ILD.

Having a format (such as Lucretius) that explicitly introduces the philosophy as the study of nature, and from there gets to pleasure as the goal might be a useful modern pedagogy.

What I've attempted to say is that it's a matter of location. You can experience pain in your stomach and throat as well as painful thoughts, all at the same time. Or you could experience any one of them separately. You can add pleasure/ remove pain from any and all of them by using specific remedies.

This is a way of saying that pleasure is pleasure, without putting one above the other, in order to counter the "absence of pain" argument or the "ascetic" argument. You evaluate pleasures/pains by intensity, location and duration.

Taking the previous examples: 1) the dread can show up in the mind, but at the same time in the chest or the gut. 2) anticipation is primarily located in the mind, but at the same time can cause a feeling of giddiness or increased energy throughout the body. 3) obsessing occurs in the mind, but also possibly in the gut or chest. 4) Remembering a conversation with a friend can either be pleasant or painful, depending on the subject and context, and either way may elicit feelings in the body.

An illustration is that the ancients argued whether the brain was in the gut or the chest, apparently because bodily feelings are so associated with thoughts.

The last few days my body has felt pain free (a rare occurrence!) and this is giving me mental pleasure. The feelings move in both directions. A good workout elicits all sorts of feelings in a variety of locations, and you could say that those in the mind and those in the body are constantly changing in intensity, location and duration.

A good cup of coffee not only tastes good, but that good taste brings mental pleasure in response to the taste. It also might bring physical pleasure in the brain once the caffeine kicks in. Which in turn could bring the mental pleasure of increased alertness.... &c

So, practically speaking we can use the mental model of mental and physical feelings, but I think that if you dig deeper, the model of intensity, location and duration is more accurate. And possibly could bridge the gap between proponents of "absence of pain" vs those following "pleasure".

Black. I have a daytime theme running. If I switch to nighttime the document goes to shades of gray. I have it open in the ReadEra app.

Quote from Kalosyni

So, if you remove mental pains, it doesn't necessarily add in bodily pleasure. Just like if you add in bodily pleasure, it doesn't necessary remove mental pains.

At some point separating the mind from the body makes no sense to me. The mind and body are intricately interwoven and continuously interact. If you have a lousy night's sleep (physical? mental?) both your mind and body can feel out of sorts. "Hangry" is another example: hungry (body) and angry (mind) together.

Separating "pain" from "suffering" is a common way to prevent your thoughts from increasing your pain, whether the pain is mental or physical. So I think the word necessarily is important in the above quote. There's a whole spectrum of interaction between what we consider to be mental or physical, a fact that to my layman's understanding is being emphasized by current neuroscience.

As a practical matter it's useful to be able to understand the location, duration and intensity of your feelings in order to better pursue pleasure. But at some level separating mental and physical is the same as separating pleasure from absence of pain. But maybe I'm just a curmudgeon

Quite impressive Bryan ! Speaking as one who is completely illiterate in Latin, I can say that this is a great resource

What this point immediately brings up is that the fluid added to the vessel will just mix with the fluid already there, which does make sense. This would allow for a mixture of pleasure and pain in the analogy. One answer to this is to use two different fluids such as oil and water, with the one being added always the opposite of the one in the vessel. In this case the two would be unmixed, while the vessel would contain differing amounts (analogous to intensity), and each fluid would be in a different location.

Another approach is to keep the existing model but emphasize that what the vessel contains is air and water, and be clear that one represents pleasure and the other pain. The problem with this is that air extends continuously from within the vessel into the entire atmosphere; that might imply something other than what's intended to some people. But then one might also say that water vapor also extends continuously from the bottle, which leads to quite the rabbit hole.

In line with Joshua 's point, I've often thought of the categories of desire as an improvement on Eastern philosophies that treat desire as something to be suppressed. This may be historically controversial but I feel like it's a high probability FWIW. There was plenty of cultural exchange in the ancient world and it only makes sense that a radical thinker like Epicurus would make use of all of the information available to him.

Pacatus ' concluding sentence sounds right to me.

I would add that my somewhat vague understanding of positive psychology is that it is originally based on Aristotelian concepts, so this might compromise it's application to EP. I would also add that, for me, gaining a layman's understanding of basic neuroscience is perhaps more in line with the natural philosophy approach that Epicurus applied.

Don you can be gratified that you're now established as an expert source!

Although I'm not saying that PD25 states this, at the moment I don't agree that everyone pursues nature's end. I for one spent years pursuing my "duty", and all it gave me was a life of misery. I would say that the consequences of using reason to override nature's end in all likelihood will be an abundance of pain. Being unaware of nature's end may lead to the same result.

To me, Epicurus is saying to "walk the talk."

VS26: Understand that a long discourse and a short one both achieve the same result.

And that given situation always includes the personal pleasure/pain of the person doing the evaluating. The internal situation of this individual consists of a variety of factors, and these may change over time or in relation to external circumstances.

Personal responsibility isn't for the faint of heart.

Does this apply to widowers, too?

There's also the issue of natural philosophy as well as the anachronistic nature of the situation proposed. Epicurus' life predated so much of our contemporary knowledge, although his thinking in many ways laid the groundwork for it. If he was presented in his day with the opportunity to go to the moon, might the intellectual pleasure of exploring a piece of the sky override the potential dangers involved?

Further, if somehow he turned up in our time with the opportunity to go to the moon, what would he make of the world we live in, and how would going to the moon compare to the cacophonous comglomeration of stimuli in which we spend our days?

I may be getting too far afield though. @Eikadistes answer is probably the most direct and convincing response