Epicurus' parents were very probably 'transported' or 'removed' in this way, and on Samos took up whatever work they could find--pedagogy for his father, always a dismal line of work in antiquity, and some kind of low folk magic for his mother, according to the rumors.
This is fascinating! (And exactly the kind of thing I was looking for). Thank you!
I was reviewing the Last Will, and something occured to me about (potentially) anti-Epicurean, Athenian prejudices against the Garden. I think there’s a misogynistic assumption laced-in there, and a xenophobic element that reflects property laws, which was a primary concern in the Will. Epíkouros, himself, seems to have been respected, but I’m not so sure about the rest.
Based on my attempt to reconstruct Epicurean history by each, individually-attested figure's name, I am considering the following, based on 27 or so, well-established, early Epicureans (there are another 20 or so from uncertain locations):
I’m curious if anyone might be able to expand on sociological prejudices in ancient Athens (that city, in particular, for context in the Garden). My general understanding is that prejudicial, cultural thinking among the Greeks had less to do with your appearance and more to do with whether or not you could speak Greek, but I’m sure that’s just a generalization.
I might be influenced by current events, but, I’m curious if some of the attitudes regarding immigration that are playing out right now in America (and were seeded a long time ago) are in any way comparable to prejudicial attitudes of traditional minds in ancient Athens. Or maybe they lack those characteristics that I am calling “prejudicial”? (or not…)
Anyway, here is another consideration I had, if they faced xenophobia (which, again, based on the #1 concern as Epíkouros states in the Last Will, I think it may been). The following may have been a challenge in making a "first-impression":
Was there Athenian prejudice by native Athenians versus foreign-born Athenians? We’re having this exact debate right now in America, and re-defining how we look at citizenship based on location of birth. I suppose this is not just a modern issue.
Would foreign-born people establishing the Garden down the road from the Academy have been received ... sort of ... the way that establishing an Islamic, cultural center in NYC was received by many after 9/11? Political evaluation aside, I observed a lot of traditional minds angered by that suggestion, and I wonder if we can find an analogue in Antiquity.
All right, so, if any other philosophers repesented sociologically prejudicial attitudes of any type (I’m looking at you, Aristotle), I wonder if they attached their nativist prejudices against the Garden. For example, I can imagine a Peripatetic student, rambling about the Lyceum, complaining about “those damn foreigners” in the Garden … or not! I'm just curious.
Here’s another consideration I’m wondering:
Unless the names of hetairai were over-represented by biographers in an effort to exaggerate and demonize Epíkouros' sex-life, and others were under-represented, the Garden seems to have been safe for women seeking education, including pregnant women, and, mothers. This was not the case with all schools of philosophy, and Aristotle, in particular ... talked a lot of shit.
The Peripatetics entertained a misogynistic attitude, but they weren’t the only ones. As I understand, this was a popular view, given the Athenian political system. Outside of the non-traditional Cynics, I imagine that the hetairai were popular targets for Epicurean opponents. We have record of this from polemics, and then later demonization from Christian writers. Dr. Pamela Gordon writes extensively about this in her book The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus.
So, imagine you’re a grumpy, prejudicial Peripatetic in 300 BCE, and the Epicureans moved into the Garden only a few years ago. Everyone seems to be charmed by the Founder, but he has a bone to pick with virtue, has been kicked out of at least one island in the past for his teachings, and keeps unusual company … about 3 of 4 Epicureans from their perspective are either foreigners, or women whom they unfairly disparaged as prostitutes.
If there were prejudicial minds among the schools of their opponents, Epicureans must have been prime targets for a form of misogynistic, xenophobic prejudice that is very recognizable from a contemporary perspective.
‘Same time, I don’t mean to project my own perception of history on them. So I’m curious.
Greetings, all! I published some thoughts about the limitations in our employment of the word "atomism" as an expression of ancient Epicurean particle physics. I'll admit that I might be splitting hairs here, and exploiting a post-structuralist position about the symbols and their context ... I read a lot of Derrida back in college. I apologize in advance. 
In a nutshell:
But, like always, no one gets penalty points for saying "atomists" (I've always been partial to the designation "atom-prophets"). Nor is it a party foul to employ "Epicureanism" instead of "Epicurean Philosophy" (though I try not to.) Elli some of our earlier conversations about language and context lead me down the path of these kinds of thoughts. 
I'm fond of our Golden Rule, which might be a candidate (KD32):
μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι
neither harm nor be harmed
Though, that's just the formula for justice. The formula for an ethics of pleasure also includes being "noble" and "prudent", in addition to being "just" (KD5). At least, KD32 is a nice line I like to dispense.
Ellipublish here! Facebook won't let me read it without re-enlisting. 
I may post a simple version of my argument, if there is interest. Thank you.
Please do!
While none of the Hellenists predicted the wide spectrum of discoveries that the 20th-century uniquely hosted, Epíkouros seems to me to have anticipated more of the contemporary nuances than any other philosopher. One, subtle example I like to use is the question of the "Center of the Universe". Most of us believe that the Heliocentric model is the correct model ... for the Solar System. But at the time, we weren't modeling the Solar System. We were modeling all of the stars, and we put the Sun in the very middle of all of them. Heliocentrism is this regard is false. To my knowledge, only Epíkouros shared the subtle insight that, indeed, "there can be no center to infinity."
I have always seen there to be some level of a conceptual correspondence between isotakheia and Einstein's propositions about the nature and propagation of light, so I would love a general outline of some of these advanced topics in contemporary physics and mathematics.
Also, are you familiar with Einstein's introduction to Diel's German version of De Rerum Natura? His commentary makes me wonder if he found direct inspiration from Epicureans. Per Einstein:
"The work of Lucretius will work its magic on anyone who does not completely wrap himself in the spirit of our time and, in particular, occasionally feels like a spectator of the intellectual attitude of his contemporaries. One sees here how an independent man equipped with lively senses and reasoning, endowed with scientific and speculative curiosity, a man who has not even the faintest notion of the results of today’s science that we are taught in childhood, before we can consciously, much less critically, confront them, imagines the world.
The firm confidence that Lucretius, as a faithful disciple of Democritus and Epicurus, places in the intelligibility, in other words, in the casual connectedness of everything that happens in the world, must make a profound impression. He is firmly convinced, he even believes he can prove, that everything is based on the the regular motion of immutable atoms, ascribing to atoms no qualities other than geometric-mechnaical ones. The sensual qualities warmth, coldenss, color, odor, taste, are to be attributed to the movements of atoms, likewise all phenomena of life. He conceives of the soul and mind as formed from especially light atoms, by assigning (in an inconsistent way) particular qualities of matter to particular characteristics of experience.
He states as the primary objective of his work the liberation of humanity from the slavish fear, induced by religion and superstition, that he sees as nourished and exploited by priests for their own purposes. This certainly is a serious issue for him. Nonetheless, he does seem to have been guided mostly by the need to persuade his readers of the necessity for the atomistic-mechanical worldview, although he dare not say this openly to his much more practically oriented Roman readers. His reverence for Epicurus, Greek culture and language, which he considers greatly superior to Latin culture and language, is altogether moving. It redounds to the glory of the Romans that this could be said to them. Where is the modernnation that holds and expresses such noble sentiments with regard to one of its contemporary nations?
DIels’s verses read so naturally that one forget it is a translation.”
(Einstein, forward to: T. Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, Vol. 2, Lukrez, Von der Natur, trans. by Hermann Diels, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1924, pp. via-vib)
Welcome! (And awesome first post!)
Superficially, I'm not sure I like the idea of identifying"fear" as the motivating factor behind preventing preventable death, versus, perhaps, rational avoidance. Then again, we practice avoidance to prevent non-constructive pain, and fear is definitely painful ... but is it constructive? In that regard, fear is a fellow actor on the stage of wisdom, but, playing the role of an antagonist? So I think I hesitate to place "fear" in a positive context. But it is natural, so... I'm not sure.
Regardless, I really enjoyed the approach Professor Austin took in terms of reviewing the response to the fear of death as a thing that can be "politically managed", beyond cultivating impassiveness. Contextualizing civic engagement as an approach to satisfying our natural and necessary desires, I believe, is the right way to discuss the field of politics from an Epicurean perspective, and I'm definitely going to spend some time thinking about modern politics from this view.
Truly, we all live in a city without walls when it comes to the true, universal antagonists of human history, those being disease and natural disasters. We have to find a way to tolerate those things. We're all faced with the death of our parents, and the deaths of friends. We're all faced with infirmity. Someone will suffer our own absence. One, measly volcano popped 70k years ago, and (SLAM) our species dropped below 10,000 individuals. One, tiny mutation occurs in one, little microbe, and (SLAM) 20 million people die. Human beings have (perhaps until the modern era) no capacity to mitigate those events; but on the spectrum of Choice-to-Fate, some threats are more "fate", and some are more "choice". We can't stop volcanic eruptions. Maybe we can learn to re-direct a planet-hungry asteroid? Still, by comparison, we can definitely mitigate political violence and civic unrest (even if our ability to influence it is very, very small: that freedom exists).
And, given that, coherent with the Epicurean project, I think it's correct to be pissed when good law is violated, when friends engage in betrayal, and when children die of political violence. Should we "fear" those things? ... maybe? ... I think I ultimately agree with Professor Austin. I'm not sure if we should, or if we can justify that Epíkouros thought so, but I certainly do fear.
There's a lot here, but what I can say for sure, is that, personally, I fear dying before I have the opportunity to enjoy the same privileges of the rest of my family. I observe my parents' generation, and all of my older cousins, all of them, both educated and uneducated, blue collar and white collar, academic, industrial, commercial, casual, formal ... all of them had kids, bought cars, owned homes, invested in the market, and half of them advanced their economic class. In history books, I learn that they enjoyed several decades of historically-unique social advances. From childhood, I remember my parents enjoying unemployment and supplemental income. In middle management, my dad was afforded a company car, and a company phone, and robust health insurance on top of his competitive salary that only required a general B.A. from WVU in the 70s. All of those people in my life were presented with the opportunity to choose to go to school, or apprentice with a professional, or take a risk investing in a business, or start their own with modest resources. Every one of them could provide the name of a general physician ... because they had one.
All of those things fulfilled their natural and necessary desires. They weren't just privileges, or luxuries. None of those things were pursued for entertainment, or to diversify their pleasures. Those were rungs on the ladder of meeting their ability to gain employment, make money, eat food, and grow. In the modern era, access to education and technology are as much a necessity as food and water. Or maybe not? Maybe that's up for debate? ... you can infer where I stand.
I observe that my role as a civilian, consumer, and taxpayer (which at least used to provide safety) is being re-oriented toward legally-indentured-servitude. We know it now. I'm living it. This isn't speculation. We will not buy a home. I cannot participate in the market. My vote has never counted. Owning a car is about to become a luxury. We will be leasing our next vehicle. I am going without healthcare next year so my wife gets her life-necessary meds. By the way, our insulin just tripled in price. We can no longer save money. We're skipping groceries. My education and experience cannot guarantee employement. The majority of the population is now leasing their living needs, and not from life, but from other individual members of our society who have measurably violated the pact to neither harm nor be harmed among other members of their society. We are being affected by measurably psychopathic personalities who do not recognize our role as moral, human agents. All of this is a violation of pacts that were put in place by my grandparents to preserve our future. I'm pissed, and politically active, because the peaceful pact to neither harm nor be harmed is being politically violated, and nothing less than a political response is appropriate to satisfy my natural and necessary desires. Me do anything less right now seem like Stoic surrender to apathy.
Everyone around me seems surprised that I'm angry. "Trust God" they tell me. "Things have a way of working themselves out" they say. Well, not in Gaza. Not in Kashmir. Not in the projects. Santa Claus tends to prefer neighborhoods with property values. God helps some people win Super Bowls, but gives kids cancer. There are limits to happiness. After all, as Epíkouros observed, "a person cannot become wise with every physical condition, nor in every cultural context" (10.117). Those limits were not set by measles and hurricanes. People did that. People who are our neighbors, who have measurably violated the pacts my grandparents formulated to secure a peaceful society. People are withholding education in a technologically advanced society. People are proliferating our streets with weapons of war. People are responsible for these problems, because of violations.
Fear of being dead, death, and dying is one thing, but fear of losing your life, or losing the life of a friend as a result of betrayal, wrath, or a violation of justice is another thing. Hermarkhos attests that the creation of law, in the first place, is a necessary act for wise people to prevent future harm. So we need to engage law as though it is as real as a rainstorm. Epíkouros explains that society, in the first place, naturally developed because it is advantageous to individuals, so a stable society is part of the prescription Nature provides for humans. Furthermore, he explains that all individuals, in all societies cannot became wise and enjoy pure pleasure, because, if for no other reason, you don't have time to study nature. A variety of severe, physiological conditions eliminate the possibility of uninterrupted pleasure. I think it is fair to propose that ataraxia is an impossibility for anyone living in a warzone right now, and no amount of spiritual rearrangement is going to prevent bombs from continuing to drop, and spiritual confusion is not the problem, the bombs are.
I don't know. While I'm afraid I'll never be able to provide my family with the basic living necessities that previous generations have defined as requirements for our society, I think, when I take a breath, and just accept that my life will look more like my great-great grandparents, than anyone living ... I think, then, I calm down, I lose my fear, and I just respond to situations rationally, to the best of my ability, with the hope that I'm learning from my mistakes, and growing, despite failure. In that regard, I'm more motivated by the pleasure of hope and confidence than the fear of death.
I don't really have a point. That was mostly pontificating. Overall, great paper!
I believe that this suggestion only comes once in Book 5 (translated by Munro):
146 Illud item non est ut possis credere, sedes
147 esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis.
148 tenvis enim natura deum longeque remota
149 sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur;
"This too you may not possibly believe, that the holy seats of the gods exist in any parts of the world: the fine nature of the gods far withdrawn from our senses is hardly seen by the thought of the mind..."
Just that much might paint a picture of the gods living in deep space, however...
150 quae quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
151 tactile nil nobis quod sit contingere debet;
152 tangere enim non quit quod tangi non licet ipsum.
"...and since it has ever eluded the touch and stroke of the hands, it must touch nothing which is tangible for us; for that cannot touch which does not admit of being touched in turn."
Lucretius, as earlier Epicureans (I'll explain below and provide examples) ties in the notion that the "homes" of the gods are "untroubled", not by physical distance from weather and climate, but through physical disengagement from the bulky, terrestrial particles that comprise terrestrial matter. Epicurean authors always provide the analogy of the tiniest "mental particles".
I think the other stanzas reinforce this interpretation. In Book 2:
646 omnis enim per se divom natura necessest
647 inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur
648 semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe;
"For the nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme of repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns...".
In this sense, I believe the "removal" of the gods refers to their disposition, not their location.
Here again, in Book 3:
18 ... sedesque quietae,
19 quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis
20 aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina
21 cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether
22 integit et large diffuso lumine ridet:
..."their tranquil abodes which neither winds do shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by sharp frosts harms with hoary fall: an ever-cloudless ether overcanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely round" (Ibid.).
I maintain, based on "On the Form of a God" by Dēmētrios of Lakonía, and from fragments by Apollodoros (the "Tyrant of the Garden") that the description of the "tranquil abodes" avoiding weathering by terrestrial forces is a description of the image of their homes in our mind. We would never imagine a perfect being to live in a dark tower, silhouetted by lightning, nor, likewise, imagine a flourishing humanoid in the deep, cold, dark, emptiness of the metakosmios.
Here's how I justify it in my paper:
Apollódōros the scholarch infers that “the dwellings” of the fearless gods, unruffled by ferocious winds and falling stars “have to be far away from the forces in our world” (Ibid., Col. 9). He stipulates that the security of these “locations” may not be preserved as a result of “distance” so much as a result of physical disengagement “from the hindering factors that clash against each other”. Epíkouros concurs that “it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it” (On Piety, Col. 3.3-7). For “even if the things which generate” divine images were “as far away as anyone could wish”, the mundane images of people stored in memory would still combine with the preconception of “blessedness” and form the image of gods who “appear” to “transcend” any amount of “intervening distance” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). Memory, itself “transcends” the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of minute, mental motes, “having changed each time for producing a thought” (On the Form of a God 12). Dēmḗtrios explains that “the memories people retain of” visual impressions were first “received as children” (Ibid., 11), and despite decades of disruption, those representations can be reproduced continuously. Through contemplation, a supplicant summons a memory of blessedness and transforms the mind into a holy menagerie, capable of hosting a variety of divine forms. After extensive consideration, Apollódōros concludes that the “dwellings” of “the gods” must be constructed “from some of their” own, finely-grained “elements”, repurposed through an act of contemplation (On Gods III, Col. 10).
Good morning!! I'm very interested in the science of the Epicurean philosophy and would love to learn a little Latin as well. I live in the Bible belt of America, North Carolina so superstition is strong down here.
Florida, here. I feel you. 
Also, prepare to learn some ancient Greek because we'll bombard you with it.
Happy Thanksgiving! Have a toast to the health of the belly.
I'm totally good with the pleasures of the stomach, but the thrust of many of these quotes makes the belly appear to be more important than any other part of the body
Well, it might be.
I was just thinking about this the other day. I was asking myself, "If I had to take a basic math test, would I score better with a stomach virus? Or with heartbreak?" I'm not sure if the answer would be the same for everyone, but I decided that I could manage with heartbreak (or turmoil better). With a stomach virus, I'd feel incapable of mustering the focus to apply critical thought. With heartbreak, through extreme focus, I can make the numbers make sense. I was thinking back to when I took the SATs, and I do well on those kind of tests, and I was a psychiatric mess when I took it. But when, back in the day, I'd suffer a hangover, I could barely focus on my name, let alone algebra.
I'm also thinking in terms of the value of digestive processes versus intellectual faculties for growing organisms. Depressive thoughts can mislead you, but a stomach ache is as honest as your eyes. It will never give you severe pain without a concerning, physical cause. Sometimes the mind hypes itself up. At that, we have the Epicurean Doctrine about the infinite desires of the mind, because, without a sharp intellect, the mind doesn't self-regulate. But the stomach won't let you trick yourself. You can't just shove something down that makes you sick the way you can repress bad memories ... well, maybe to a degree, but I think you see what I mean, in general.
I'm eagerly anticipating evidence.
"And therefore, [when] this [proposition is] definitely, in fact, [unconfirmed, then] one must withhold a judgment, so that neither is the criteria [of the kanṓn] being confuted against the [self-evident] clarity [of nature], nor is the [evidence] being neglected [so that] similarly everything [that] is [otherwise capable of] being validated is [now] being confounded." (Ep. Her. 10.52)
I have anticipated you Fortune and I have entrenched myself against all your secret attacks. I have not and will not give myself up as captive to you or to any other circumstance. When it is time for me to go, I will spit contempt upon those who vainly cling to life, and I will leave life crying aloud in glorious triumph that I have lived well.
I also want to say that the "spitting contempt" part just doesn't make sense from an Epicurean standpoint - at least in my mind. The Epicurean would be too busy either: enjoying a last taste of something pleasurable, or busy remembering an event that was one of the best moments of life.
The original manuscript shows the verb προσπτύσαντες (prosptúsantes, or “embracing“) as opposed to the nearly-identical verb προπτύσαντες (proptúsantes, or “spitting on“). Metródōros either means to “embrace the great inevitability” or “spit upon great fear“. I'm with you in preferring the former.
The fact that Epicurus influenced thinkers as divergent as Jefferson and Marx blows my mind.
No doubt! Once I saw a few Lucretian callbacks in Shakespeare, I began compiling a list of other writers who make explicit or indirect mention of either Epicurean Philosophy or De Rerum Natura (usually the latter, having been received from Latin): Bacon, Bergson, Byron, Chaucer, de Bergerac, Darwin, Deleuze, Descartes, Diderot, d’Holbach, Dryden, Einstein, Erasmus, Frederick II, Freud, Gassendi, Goethe, Halley, Hitchens, Hobbes, Horace, Hume, Kant, La Mettrie, Leo X, Locke, Lovecraft, Machiavelli, Milton, Montaigne, Newton, Nietzsche, Pope, Rousseau, Sagan, Santayana, Shakespeare, Spenser, Spinoza, Stevenson, Tennyson, Thomsen, Virgil, Voltaire, Whitman, and Wordsworth.
Eikadistes Yes, thank you. I understand your reply, but can you address my use of the Internet description of divine simulacra:
"Ancient Philosophy (Epicureanism): In Epicurean philosophy, "divine simulacra" (or eidola) were believed to be fine atomic emanations that constantly stream from the "quasi-bodies" of the gods and strike human perception. Perceiving these simulacra was a way for humans to form a concept (prolepsis) of the gods, who were seen as models of perfect happiness and imperturbability, but who did not actively intervene in human affairs."
I respectfully believe that the original quote creates a misconception about the nature of "divine simulacra" by mistakenly equating the words "eidola" with "divine images": eidola are not necessarily "divine", most are just the mundane images we see throughout the day with our eyes. I have not found "eidola" to be exclusively linked with "god images" in the original texts, so far as εἴδωλᾰ (eídōla) is employed by Epíkouros in the Epistle to Herodotos, as well as the context in which eídōla are discussed by Philódēmos in his treatise On Piety , as well as the way that Lucretius fluidly employs simulacra throughout De Rerum Natura (I'll cite each Lucretius' examples).
We inherit simulacra from Lucretius, who employed it as an approximation for the Greek eídōla. It is translated by H. A. J. Munro (whom I consider to be reliable) as "images" (1.1060, 2.24, 3.433, 6.420), "representations" (2.110), "mimicry" (2.324) and "idols" (1.123, 5.62, 5.308, 6.80). Lucretius also compares the concept of simulacra as "representations" against imago or "pictures" (2.112). Munro personally inflects simulacra as "idols" instead of "images" when referring to the "pictures of the gods", however, both divine images ("of the gods") and non-divine images (of normal stuff) are constituted of simulacra as is preserved in the language that Lucretius uses.
He pays particular attention to these the visual-mental act of forming internal images in Book Four of De Rerum Natura, using declensions of the word simulacra several dozen times. A number of scholars have found it helpful to loosely equate the "films" of the "images" (eídōla and simulacra) with the contemporary concept of photons, generally speaking, the physical particles of light that we perceive. These particles (eídōla or simulacra), as the authors describe in high resolution, physically travel from an external body, through the air, and collide with our eyes, creating an impulse that travels through a perceptual relay, creating an internal cascade that yields an internal representation that is apprehensible by the human intellect, experienced by the "mind's eye".
These stanzas in Book Four corresponds with notions expressed by Epíkouros in the Epistle to Herodotos (10.46-51). Lucretius means to faithfully represent Epíkouros' teachings in Latin verse, so his neologisms and descriptions of the fact that "things open to sight many emit bodies" corresponds with the Hegemon describing that the "impinging [of images occurs] on account of a certain thing from the outside[that enables] us to observe and to consider" (10.49). In each case, the authors consistently explain that the images that human beings reproduce as visual representations in the mind are limited to real forms that have been physically observed in nature. For example, a culture cannot create the myth of a centaur without having some knowledge of a horse.
It is important to mention that in both Ep. Her. (49-51) and DRN 4, the authors do not discuss the formation of "divine" images, or delineate them as images originating from a special class of beings. Philódēmos, however, provides a high resolution description in On Piety, and compares the formation of "numerically-distinct" images that reflect a "singular", body in one's external environment versus "sublimated" streams of "compatible" images that form in the imagination from a variety of visual inspirations. Philódēmos explicitly categorizes "the images of the gods" as being the latter, images formed in the imagination from a variety of sources. By contrast Epíkouros and Lucretius only ever refer to the eídola and simulacra of everyday objects like architecture and animals. Our conception of "the form of a god" or "the gods" is necessarily conditioned by the visible particles that have previously emanated from human forms, whether those forms are the bodies of our friends, statues of the gods, or drawings of superheroes.
Given this, I want to (respectfully) caution against translators who interpret the "the images of the gods" as "a special class of 'god' particles that originate from 'god'-bodies that exist as animal-beings in a specially-privileged 'god'-biome in outer space that physically exists 'external' of the human mind". I want to caution against translators who interpret "images traveling through space" to mean "...through the vacuum of deep, outer space" rather than simply "...traveling from a Google Search page, through the two feet in front of your computer screen, into your eyeball."
I think it is really important to consider Philódēmos' delineation of images into the two categories of things that truly correspond with singular, unitary, external objects versus things that only exist as constructions within the human imagination (which is not to lessen the value of their existence as "real" things, just not things that "truly" correspond with singular, unitary objects, independent of the mind). Without considering Philódēmos, I think translators inductively project the manner in which normal images (like a horse) form onto the ways in which "divine" images form, as though the gods are like horses, but in a god barn, somewhere on a god farm, beyond our universe.
I mean all of this as respectfully as I am a total amateur when it comes to linguistics.
And then can you address my question earlier, if divine simulacra stream from those "quasi-bodies" of the gods (in the quote above) does Epicurus consider that the simulacra comes from the gods.?
"Quasi-bodies" comes from Cicero's character Velleius — Cassius , here's an example of where I think Cicero is misleading us into an exaggerated conception without explicitly making a "false" statements. When it comes to this topic, I personally want to avoid Cicero's input, and focus strictly on what Epíkouros and Philódēmos have to say about the formation of internal images. The notion of "quasi-bodies", here again, makes it sound like "the gods" are space ghosts made of aether, and that their simulacra are traveling from deep space like x-rays from a quasar. From my humble understanding, the "quasi-bodies" of Velleius should properly refer to "the physical representation that is being physically stored in our physical, human memory" and, further, that this intellectual representation in memory was formed by seeing mundane people in everyday life. Men may think of Aphrodite as having those features that appeal to their subjective sense of arousal based on their experiences with women whom they have found to be attractive. The gods are pristine physical specimens (as per cultural standards of beauty) — the men are ripped like body builders, the women are soft and voluptuous (...here again, with everyone, I want to emphasize, context aside, that we treat Marvel superheroes eerily similarly with the way gods were depicted).
In summation, based on the above sources, I want to suggest that thinking of simulacra as "emanating from external gods" only makes sense in terms of observing stone statues, or in terms of retrieving visual constructions from memory. I don't think the gods are space radios.
And if Epicurus does consider it so, if the gods are indeed influencing mankind's actions in a passive sort of way, isn't this opposite from being indifferent, as I thought Epicurus declared?
While I want to reinforce, as Diogénes writes, that Epíkouros "only" saw the gods as being "apprehensible" through a directed act of "contemplation" by the "intellect" (10.139), even if we are to consider "the gods" to be a class of space ghosts who broadcast dreams through radio waves ... one way of the other, "the gods'" are indifferent and unconcerned with our happiness. The "indifference" of the gods is part of their definition. They are untroubled. They have no stress, no concern, no anxiety, no fear of death, and, therefore, no bio-chemical compulsion to stick out their necks to protect temporary, fragile, extra-terrestrial forms of life (in this case, us, Earthlings). They have so many better things to do than straighten out American healthcare (for example), or ensure that human life is improved through a proliferation of universal, scientific literacy, or mitigate the impact of climate change ... regardless of whether they are space ghosts or comic books.
(I really want to emphasize the "reality" of fictional super-people. The "spirit of Christmas" is a total, mythic fabrication ... that has a measurable, socio-economic impact on our culture. The "spirit of Christmas" is indifferent to its socio-economic impact, as are the images of the gods).
I hope this helps! I'm also throwing a few of my own ideas out there for general consideration. Cicero is an exceptional source, but also, a biased one. He was a laywer... he had an agenda, and that agenda was not to produce a neutral, historical survey of competing thoughts. He meant to discredit his opponents by tearing holes in their arguments. It behooved him to exxagerate.
That's awesome! Very cool idea.
