Posts by Eikadistes

Without going to deep into doctrines, here's a brief historical sketch:

In general, Theravada Buddhist are a doctrinally-conservative group who follow a trend of Buddhism that recommends a withdrawn life of monasticism. Monks and nuns are typically separated like the Catholic Church. It's sort of like ... if the only expression of the Catholic tradition were the Desert Fathers who withdrew into contemplation. This form is found predominately in Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia, where Buddhism first spread under Emperor Ashoka.

Mahayana Buddhism is sort of our "Protestant" catch-phrase for everything from deity-worshipping Chinese Buddhists (Buddhism processed through Confucianism, among other philosophies, and Taoism) to Zen Buddhism (Buddhism processed through Taoism and Shinto) in Japan. Depending on your preferred scholar, we may also group Tibetan Buddhism into the group of Mahayana, though, it often gets its own designation.

Vajrayana, Tibetan, or Tantric Buddhism is what American teenagers were admiring in the 1960s, when they weren't stuck on the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (see: "Tomorrow Never Knows" by the Beatles for an example of Tibetan Buddhism). This form is highly related to early Indian Buddhism, and was the first form of Buddhism to migrate Northward. This form later influenced Mongolian Buddhism (Tantra processed through Tengriism).

Then we have, what I'll personally call, our "Western Buddhism". While "Western" is a poor adjective to describe anything in comparative cultural studies, I think we'll find a markedly different version of Buddhism that was evangelized through modern market economies to consumer societies that offer a highly eclectic form of Buddhism. I almost want to call it Eclecticism instead of Buddhism, and Siddhartha's teachings aren't as important as later Buddhist scholars.

Learning about ancient Indian philosophy helped me understand the context of Christian politics better. It also helped me, ultimately, understand and accept Epicurus' theism without getting stuck on contemporary vocabulary.

It fascinated me that the vocabulary of Sanskrit recognizes two general classes of religious expression: the insiders, those who use the national historical texts as the basis of intellectual engagement, and the outsiders, those who do not. The first category includes atheists, non-theists, agnostics, polytheists, and theists as well as monists, dualists, and pluralists, as well as deontologists, logicians, ethicists, mystics, physicians ... you name it, "Hinduism" hosts it.

Of the second category, or the cultural outsiders, we find an equal range of diversity, atheists, non-theists, agnostics, polytheists, and theists as well as monists, dualists, and pluralists. Categorical divisions are determined according to a sense of national unity versus decentralization, not doctrines or positions along the philosophical spectrum.

Imagine, conversely, living in ancient India, and only having vocabulary at-hand to express "the amalgamation of Academics, Skeptics, Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Cynics members of the 'Hellenic' religion" (versus how we put "the amalgamation of Vaisheshika, Vedanta, Yoga, (etc.) as members of the 'Hindu' religion").

Anyway, breaking down these individual propositions made it easier to see how Epicurus could be a critic of common religious beliefs, bemoan the popular superstition, reject all forms of supernaturalism, ground all phenomena in a scientific framework, and yet still work with the concepts of God and the Soul.

It is a useful historical point of study to supplement Epicureanism, particularly (in the same way we use Democritean atomism as a point of comparison) as a contrast to the deterministic forms of atheistic Indian atomism, as well as the non-atomistic form of Indian hedonism, as well as the religious form of theistic atomism.

It also helps illuminate the thought-patterns of Gassendi and other neo-Epicureans of the Renaissance.

It also further shows how the basic propositions to which Siddhartha Gautama was responding were the same propositions that were being considered in ancient Greece: Is the nature of reality a unity, a duality, or something else? Is the experience of the world more real than the world itself? The propositions the Buddha taught are very much so the same propositions that Epicurus rejected, as represented by ancient Greek Skepticism.

Surely, there are multiple points of agreement between Siddhartha and Epicurus. They agreed on withdrawing from popular society. They agreed that suffering is undesirable and we should strive to overcome it. They agreed that conventional superstitions are insubstantial and intellectually bankrupt. They were suspicious of social means by which to acquire wealth. They saw empty speculation as a source of suffering. They entertained a form of atomism. At the same time, these attitudes were also shared by Siddhartha's non-"Hindu", Indian contemporaries, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Ajita Kesakambalī, Makkhali Gośāla, Pūraṇa Kassapa.

The important comparison to draw here is not necessarily Epicurus and Buddhism as much as it is Epicurus versus Heterodox Indian Traditions (Buddhism being one of several). They share a common suspicion of the predominant philosophical context in which they arise, and offer reforms to what they see as formal misunderstandings. I think most comparisons that can be found between Epicureanism and Buddhism are largely superficial, and can, to some degree or another, be found in nearly every ancient Hellenistic and Indian school of thought.

Beyond being "outsiders", the doctrines vary so greatly, the contrast is stark.

Buddhism shares enough in common with Pyrrhonism that we might not say Epicureanism is the Black to Buddhism's White, but we might say that Epicureanism is the Black to Buddhism's Very Light Grey.

Of the ancient Indian philosophies of Ājīvika, Ajñana, Buddhism, Chārvāka, Jainism, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Samkhya, Vaisheshika, Vedanta, and Yoga, we'll find the closest companion to Epicureanism in Chārvāka. Early Buddhism is most closely related to the Indian school of Ajñana, from which Pyrrhonism developed, so, in general, I don't think that comparisons between early Buddhism and Epicurean philosophy are helpful. They are dissimilar and historically unrelated.

In terms of physics, Epicureanism shares the atomism of Ājīvika and Vaisheshika (though, both traditions propose a deterministic physics) as well as the materialism of Chārvāka.

It uniquely shares the ethics of Chārvāka, whereas every other tradition devalues hedonism.

We find the most similarity between Epicurean epistemology and Chārvāka, which justifies the criterion of direct physical and mental perceptions, without inference, comparison, or speculation. It is most dissimilar from Ajñana, which rejects all criteria of knowledge, followed closely thereafter by early Buddhism, which avoids making any certain claims.

Epicurean theology is comparatively unique. Epicurus would have been opposed to the atheism of Ājīvika, Chārvāka, Nyāya, and Vaisheshika, as well as the agnosticism of Ajñana and Buddhism, as well as the immanent dualism and mysticism of Samkhya and Yoga, and also the divine idealism of Mīmāṃsā and Vedanta. The Jain universe of multiple, physical deities (the Tirthankaras), is the closest ancient Indian theology that in any way resembles Epicureanism. There is not, to my knowledge, any significant historical link between the two at any point in time.

As far as ancient Indian philosophies go, early Buddhism overwhelmingly contradicts Epicurean philosophy. They are at the opposite ends of the epistemological spectrum, propose completely different goals in life, and are only barely physically compatible if, for no other reason than early Buddhism's refusal to provide any hard answers on physics.

Whereas Epicureanism is most similar to Chārvāka and, to an extent Ājīvika and Vaisheshika, early Buddhism shares intellectual similarities with Ajñana and Prryhonian Skepticism, and the meditative practices with Vedanta and Yoga. Buddhism's propositions are much closer to Epicurus' opponents than to Epicurus in any meaningful way.

"The point which Epicurus discusses after sensation is what he called by the technical term of προλήψις, anticipation or preconception. It is explained asa general idea stored up, a right opinion, a conception, or the memory of what has been more than once presented to us from without. When we apply a name to an object we can only do so by means of a previous conception corresponding to the name: and that conception is ultimately an image derived from the senses. Epicurus, in explaining these "anticipations,” says: “In the case of every term of speech the primary ideas it conveys must be seen (by the mental eye) and not stand in need of demonstration: otherwise we shall have nothing to which to refer the point in question. These preconceptions are not in any true sense innate. They are products of observation. Their value lies in being common to the mass of mankind, and so affording a basis of argument. In the case of any dispute, in which general terms are employed, the first question is: What clear and distinct idea can we attach to it? And this does not mean, can I define it—can I substitute one set of general terms for another? But can I really put it before my intellectual vision distinctly? Epicurus, like Bishop Berkeley, reduces general ideas to the individual images which do duty for them in the imagination. He wants us to realize our ideas in a concrete case as the true test of our having them. And here, perhaps, is a fundamental fallacy of Epicureanism. It holds that truth is identical with what is clearly and distinctly conceived. It substitutes imagination for thought. Unlike Spinoza, who contrasts the imperfect conception of the imagination with the adequate knowledge of understanding, Epicurus abides by what is easily and satisfactorily presented to the mind under a pictorial or semi-sensuous aspect. Now, imagination most easily reproduces the phenomena familiar to us of bodies in motion. [...] A word only existed as the symbol of a mental image: and therefore it must present its credentials in the shape of a prolepsis, i.e. a clear and distinct image, conveyable, not in the general terms of a definition, but in the precise and particular language of a description. Can the conception be realized as an image? If it can, it is a safe and satisfactory basis of argument : if it cannot, it must be dismissed. A curious example of this dislike to generalities, to definitions and divisions, is seen in the contest which the Epicureans carried on against mathematics. If we believe Cicero, Epicurus declared the whole of geometry to be false : and he couples the remark with an expression of surprise as to whether Polyænus, who had a considerable mathematical reputation, had put the whole science aside after he became a disciple of Epicurus. We may be sure he did not; and the very conjunction of the two statements suggests that Epicureanism rather expressed a view of the nature and method of geometrical truth, than a doubt as to its scientific value. What the Epicureans principally objected to, we infer, were the principles—the axioms, postulates, and definitions: though others of them, like Zeno the Sidonian, went further, and urged that there were points involved in the demonstrations which had not been explicitly accepted in the preliminary principles. Now, the definitions of geometry have the defect that they cannot be represented in any distinct image. No man can conceive an image of a geometrical line, or point, or surface; the only image which can be raised to meet these terms is that of a physical line or surface, which is evidently quite unsatisfactory for the purposes of mathematics. Even if we go a step further, we can say that the general conception of a circle or a triangle corresponding to the definitions of Euclid is such as can only be realized in special and individual instances ofthesefigures. We need not particularly care for the abuse which, according to an ancient mathematician, they lavished on the proof of the proposition of the 1st Book of Euclid, as demonstrating what was palpable even to a donkey.) The main ground of their attack on the mathematical sciences was, that if they started from false premises (i.e.not in accordance with facts), they could not be true [...] The 'imaginative impressions on the intellect' are contrasted with the sensations in such a way as to render it more probable that we should understand by them the images which present themselves to the intellect (in the Epicurean description of it), and not to the senses. In other words, they represent the impressions derived from the spectra or idola, which are too delicate to affect the senses, but can act upon the mind." (Wallace, Epicureanism, 220-225)

Quote from Cassius

Thank you. What is this Nate?

These are translations of the Kuriai Doxai taken from William Wallace's book Epicureanism (1880). Like De Witt, he cites a number of them based on his personal translations from available sources, but in no particular order. He usually refers to the Doxai as "the Articles", but also uses "catechism" as a synonym (which I found to be really interesting).

Fundamental Articles

William Wallace

As presented in Epicureanism (1880)

1. “The blessed and incorruptible has no toil or trouble of its own, and causes none to others. It is not subject either to anger or favour.” (110)

2. “Death is nothing to us. That into which dissolution brings us has no feeling or consciousness, and what has no consciousness is nothing to us. (110)

3. Undocumented by Wallace

4. Undocumented by Wallace

5. “It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely,and well, and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well, and justly, without living pleasantly.” (155)

6. Undocumented by Wallace

7. “It was not because sovereignty and dominion were intrinsically good that men sought for fame and glory in society, but in order to fence themselves round from their men.” (158)

8. “No pleasure is evil in itself, but the objects productive of certain pleasures may lead to annoyances many times greater than the pleasure.” (150)

9. Undocumented by Wallace

10. Undocumented by Wallace

11. Undocumented by Wallace

12. Undocumented by Wallace

13. Undocumented by Wallace

14. When safety on the side of man has been tolerably secured, it is by quiet and by withdrawing from the multitude that the most complete tranquility is to be found.” (163)

15. “Riches, according to nature, are of limited extent, and can easily be procured; but the wealth craved after by vain fancies knows neither end nor limit.” (146)

16. Undocumented by Wallace

17. Undocumented by Wallace

18. “When once the pain arising from deficiency has been removed,the pleasure in the flesh admits of no further augmentation, but only of variation: and similarly the limit of the pleasure of the mind is reached, when the causes of our principal mental fears have been removed.” (144)

19. Undocumented by Wallace

20. “[T]he flesh takes the limits of pleasure to be endless,and an endless time would be needed to provide it; but the mind, having learned the limit and the end of the flesh, and having cast away fears about the distant future, has made for us life perfect and adequate, and we no longer need infinite time. And yet it has not been an exile from pleasure,and when the time comes to depart from life, it closes with no sense of having fallen short of felicity .” (149)

21. “He who has understood the limits of life, knows how easy to get is all that takes away the pain of want, and all that is required to make our life perfect at every point. In this way he has no need of anything which implies a contest.” (146-147)

22. Undocumented by Wallace

23. Undocumented by Wallace

24. Undocumented by Wallace

25. Undocumented by Wallace

26. Undocumented by Wallace

27. Undocumented by Wallace

28. Undocumented by Wallace

29. Undocumented by Wallace

30. Undocumented by Wallace

31. “Natural Justice is a contract of expedience, so as to prevent on man doing harm to another.” (162)

32. “Those animals which were incapable of forming an agreement to end that they neither might injure nor be injured are without either justice or injustice. Similarly, those tribes which could not or would not form a covenant to the same end are in a like predicament.” (162)

33. “There is no such thing as an intrinsic or abstract justice” (162)

34.“Injustice is not in itself a bad thing: but only in the fear arising from anxiety on the part of the wrong-doer that he will not always escape punishment.” (162)

35. Undocumented by Wallace

36. Undocumented by Wallace

37. Undocumented by Wallace

38. Undocumented by Wallace

39. Undocumented by Wallace

40. Undocumented by Wallace

“Parisian Epicureans of the early seventeenth century included Gabriel Naudé, Elio Diodatai and François de la Mothe le Vayer, and, on the periphery, the storywriter Cyrano de Bergerac, and the playwright Moliére.” (The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism 268)

“The general view of Cyrano [de Bergerac] that he was a disciple of Gassendi, may require no correction, but he went far beyond Gassendi in the daring of his Epicurean naturalism.” (Kors, Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-172973)

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Nate, when I read your lines, I thought to myself "that's what attracts me to Christianity!" Because it really sounds like a lot of fun (and pleasure )- to meet up with like-minded friends, discuss philosophical issues and generally enjoying a day off. And I found myself asking: "What if I can have the same, but without the religious doctrines on it?" It sounds like a dream to me! Even so, wouldn't it make sense to adapt the Christian worldview- at least parly- in order to experience this pleasure, or will it have more pain in the long run?

Most American Christians cannot identify Clement of Alexandria. You'd have a better time as an intellectual Christian discussing Christian theology in a secular philosophy classroom with other students than at local Bible study. Your average Christian reads at an 8th-grade level and have absolutely no interest "discussing philosophical ideas", especially whenever those ideas pose a challenge to the stability of their "like-minded" social environment.

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That's a shame :(. But why are there then so many adult Christians?

There are so many Christian adults for the same reason there are so many Muslim adults in Iraq and Communist adults in China. Religious affiliation is a reflection of one's social environment. My thesis is that the form of "religion" that is mostly practiced by American Christians (specifically) is a social phenomenon, not an intellectual one.

I also think that the "Christian" label in America is often employed as a synonym for "anti-Communist" with absolutely no indication whatsoever as to whether or not that person is familiar with the history of 1st-century Palestine.

Matt nailed it. "Christianity" to most people is a fun social club they visit every few Sundays. It's that "good feeling" that requires no further analysis. It's not the writings of Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, nor the ecumenical councils of Imperial Rome, nor the theological debates among Messianic Jewish sects, nor the influences of Hellenistic philosophy that colored the vocabulary of most of the New Testament, nor the wars of the medieval period, nor the tension between the institutions and the scientific findings that they inadvertently facilitated ... it's a gold cross on your neck, familiar smiles in the sanctuary, a fish on your bumper, and coffee and donuts on your day off. It's the equivalent of emotionally dissimilar teenagers grouping themselves by the clothes they wear and the music to which they listen.

It's not the kind of thing I'd hope for a human adult trying living their best life.

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“One wise man is not wiser than another.” (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 29)

It was totally a cult.

However, like the word "God", the word "cult" has been de-contextualized from its origins. As far as Epicureanism goes, it checks all of the boxes. Veneration of a figure-head who is treated with reverence? Check. Small following of a subversive ideology? Check. Sayings, rituals, and celebrations according to a personality, institution, or system? Check.

Hiding abuse beneath the guise of authority? Non-existent. Punishments for non-compliance? Absolutely not. A membership fee or pyramid-scheme structure? Negative. Requirements to cut ties with family? The opposite is true.

So, just like the counter-intuitive answer this materialist has to the question of divinity (he's a theist ... just a materialist theist, contrary to modern definitions of "theism") the answer to the question of "Is Epicureanism a Cult?" is, as I see it at the moment, a resounding "Yes". However, as a "cult", it is also the total opposite of something like Scientology.

Never. It requires that we willfully accept ignorance.

Source: the character Cypher from the movie The Matrix, a troubled, weak individual who prefers the ignorance of a "blissful" life in the Matrix as opposed to confronting his problems and improving the real world.

There are a few inconsistencies we can flesh out.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

Even if that pleasure is real- which seems very difficult to implement for me-, I would be so shocked about the waste of my life that the only possible answer for me would be to reject such a machine.

The true waste of life is an existence where happiness is controlled by a machine. Rejecting necessity is a worthy goal (and is literally the plot of The Matrix and the theme of most of Rage Against the Machine's songs, which is tight).

“[T]here is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.” (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 9)

Quote from smoothiekiwi

But then, which role does the machine take? It controls my world, it controls my life, my happiness and unhappiness, so it's God. When I become plugged in, the machine becomes my own, personal God; she controls every aspect of my experience.

A god, according to Epicurean sources, is either (1) an animal who has perfected their existence to such an existent that they have become incapable of being troubled, destroyed, or inconvenienced, or (2) mental images that inadvertently enter our minds, which alert us to the the possibility of living a better natural life. A machine cannot be a god because it is neither an organism living a perfect existence, nor an image that only interacts with the rest of us accidentally, inadvertently, and randomly, through dreams. A machine feels no pleasure, no pain, and has no sense of prudence. Furthermore, the entire existence of the machine is, literally, designed to interfere with human beings. An entity that troubles others is unworthy to be venerated as a god. Rather, it sounds like just another troublesome obstacle, like a destructive force of nature (but, in this case, artificial), not a path to growth and satisfaction.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

In that case, the whole Epicurean argument- which states that there can't be any omnipotent God-, doesn't work. It's like applying Scepticism to a world in which in has (by whatever means) been proven that truth exists. Or Christianity to a world where it has been proven for certain that there can't be a God.

The Epicurean argument is alien and ineffective to a world where it has been proven that there is a God; but because this machine is God itself, we have to employ other philosophical traditions in order to determine if we should surrender to a God.

This speculation, that a monotheistic entity exists, is an example of what Epicurus would call a "liability to vain imagination", a "groundless", "illusory", or "vain fancy", an "empty imagining" or a "senseless whim". In other words, it is a proposition that is neither based on sensory data, internal feelings, or mental anticipations, but, rather, is a pure product of the imagination. To entertain an idea would be as fruitless as testing for the existence of elves and faeries. Surely, like the Skeptics, we could devote thousands of pages to refuting every idea under the sun. However, in Epicurean philosophy, prudence is the greater virtue, and a speculation that does not lead to practical wisdom is empty.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

So tl;dr- such a "bliss machine" doesn't destroy the hedonistic argument, simply because the hedonistic argument never claimed to know the ultimate truth. It's designed to live everyday life, not to answer every possible philosophical question. And, as Don already stated, this mind experiment is- and will stay for the foreseeable future- a mind experiment. In case that someone discovers a perfect experience machine which provides only natural pleasures without any drawbacks, let me know- I would love to try it out

There is a fundamental difference between painlessness due to maximizing the enjoyment of a natural life versus sedation due to an emotional withdrawal from the challenges of a natural existence. The "bliss machine" is a form of sedation. In fact, I think in this case, a thought experiment isn't even necessary. Just look at alcoholism and opiate abuse throughout "advanced" countries. There is a possibility of abusing "bliss". There is no possibility of abusing "painlessness" if we look at it honestly, because we cannot achieve "painlessness" through any other means besides fulfilling our potential as human beings. We couldn't enjoy exercise or companionship connected to a machine. The machine does not require that we act sensibly, with decency and dignity. It just requires our submission.

X (10)

"EΙ TA ΠΟΙΗTΙΚA TΩΝ ΠEΡΙ TΟΥΣ AΣΩTΟΥΣ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ EΛΥE TΟΥΣ ΦΟΒΟΥΣ TΗΣ ΔΙAΝΟΙAΣ TΟΥΣ TE ΠEΡΙ ΜETEΩΡΩΝ ΚAΙ ΘAΝATΟΥΚAΙ AΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ ETΙ TE TΟ ΠEΡAΣ TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ [ΚAΙ TΩΝ AΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ]* EΔΙΔAΣΚEΝ ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΟTE EΙΧΟΜEΝ Ο TΙ ΜEΜΨAΙΜEΘA AΥTΟΙΣ ΠAΝTAΧΟΘEΝ EΚΠΛΗΡΟΥΜEΝΟΙΣ TΩΝ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ ΚAΙ ΟΥΔAΜΟΘEΝ ΟΥTE TΟ AΛΓΟΥΝ ΟΥTE TΟ ΛΥΠΟΥΜEΝΟΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ Ο ΠEΡ EΣTΙ TΟ ΚAΚΟΝ."

“If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our desires, we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter.” Yonge (1853)

“If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind—the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain—if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should not have any reason to censure such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasure to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.” Hicks (1910)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky and death and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires <and of pains>, we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full with pleasures from every source and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.” Bailey (1926)

“If the practices productive of the pleasures of profligates dispelled the fears of the mind about celestial things and death and pains and also taught the limit of the desires, we should never have fault to find with profligates, enjoying pleasures to the full from all quarters, and suffering neither pain nor distress from any quarter, wherein the evil lies." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute were able to drive away from their minds their fears about what is above them and about death and pain, and to teach them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find fault with the dissolute; for they would fill themselves with pleasure from every source and would be free from pain and sorrow, which are evil.” Geer (1964)

“If the causes of the pleasures of the dissipated released mental fears concerning celestial phenomena and death and distress, and in addition taught the limit of desires, we should never have any reason to reproach them [i.e. the dissipated], since they would be satisfying themselves with pleasures from all directions and would never have pain or distress, which constitutes the bad.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If the things that beget pleasure in dissolute individuals could dispel their minds' fears about the heavens, death, and pain, and could still teach them the limits of desires, we would have no grounds for finding fault with the dissolute, since they would be filling themselves with pleasures from every source and in no way suffering from pain or grief, which are evil.” O'Connor (1993)

“If the things which produce the pleasures of profligate men dissolved the intellect's fears about the phenomena of the heavens and about death and pains and, moreover, if they taught us the limit of our desires, then we would not have reason to criticize them, since they would be filled with pleasures from every source and would contain no feeling of pain or distress from any source—and that is what is bad.” Inwood (1994)

“If the things which debauched men find pleasurable put an end to all fears (such as concerns about the heavenly bodies, death, and pain) and if they revealed how we ought to limit our desires, we would have no reason to reproach them, for they would be fulfilled with pleasures from every source while experiencing no pain, neither in mind nor body, which is the chief evil of life.” Anderson (2004)

“If those elements that are productive of the pleasures of the debauched released them from the mental apprehensions aroused by natural phenomena, fear of death, and <obsessive anticipation of> pain; if, in addition, they formed their characters in such a way that they knew when to set a limit to their desires, we would then never have anything to censure them about: indeed, they would then be fully actualizing all the pleasures and in no way would they have either what is painful or what is productive of grief in them—and it is this latter condition <which they would be avoiding> that is morally bad.” Makridis (2005)

“If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that's what is bad).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If the things that produce the debauchee's pleasures dissolved the mind's fears regarding the heavenly bodies, death, and pain and also told us how to limit our desires, we would never have any reason to find fault with such people, because they would be glutting themselves with every sort of pleasure and never suffer physical or mental pain, which is the real evil.” Strodach (2012)

“If the objects that afforded pleasure to profligate men actually freed them from mental fears, namely those that relate to celestial phenomena and death and pain, and also taught them to limit their desires, we would never have any occasion to find fault with such men, since they would then be filled with pleasures from all sides and would be free of all pain and grief—that is, of all that is bad.” Mensch (2018)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute released our minds from fear of celestial things and death and pain, and if they taught us the limit of desire, then we would have nothing to reproach in them, since they would then be replete with pleasures from every source and devoid of pain or sorrow from any source, which are precisely what is bad.” White (2021)

Κυρίας Δόξας

Tiziano Dorandi

As presented in a Greek edition of The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, pages 814-824 (2013)

(1) τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. (ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ καθ’ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένων, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς.)

(2) ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

(3) ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν 1635 ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.

(4) οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.

(5) οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦἡ δέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐ ζῇ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως †ὑπάρχει†· οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.

(6) ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τ’ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

(7) ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν.

(8) οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.

(9) εἰ κατεπύκνου πᾶσα ἡδονὴ τ<όπ>ῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.

(10) εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐθαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

(11) εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ

αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας.

(12) οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ’ ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους· ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.

(13) οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

(14) τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ, εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

(15) ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

(16) βραχέα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει.

(17) ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.

(18) οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται. τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἥ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις, ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ.

(19) ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

(20) ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασε, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθημεν· ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐδὲ ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν, ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεφεν.

(21) ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

(22) τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ἐφ’ ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν· εἰ δὲ μή, πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστά.

(23) εἰ μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδ’ ἃς ἂν φῇς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν κρίνῃς.

(24) εἴ τιν’ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμενόμενον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμενόμενον ἅπαν ἐν

ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν < . . . > οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον· ὡς τετηρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

(25) εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

(26) τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ’ ἀλγοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρωθῶσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλ’ εὐδιάχυτον τὴν ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δυσπόριστοι ἢ βλάβης ἀπεργαστικαὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι.

(27) ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

(28) ἡ αὐτὴ γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμένην.

(29) τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ <ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ> οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ’ ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι. (φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαίας ἡγεῖται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀλγηδόνος ἀπολυούσας, ὡς ποτὸν ἐπὶ δίψους· φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ ὑπεξαιρουμένας δὲ τὸ ἄλγημα, ὡς πολυτελῆ σιτία· οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ’ ἀναγκαίας, ὡς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις.)

(30) ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, μὴ ἐπ’ ἀλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ σύντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὗται γίνονται καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν.

(31) τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

(32) ὅσα τῶν ζῴων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλλ<ηλ>α μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

(33) οὐκ ἦν τι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς μετ’ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ’ ὁπηλίκους δήποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.

(34) ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς.

(35) οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρᾳ τι ποιοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἂν μυριάκις ἀπὸ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ. μέχρι

γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει.

(36) κατὰ μὲν κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό, συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δήποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ

δίκαιον εἶναι.

(37) τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων, ἔχει τὸ ἐν τοῦ δικαίου χώρᾳ εἶναι, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ 1780 πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει. κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν.

(38) ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια. ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια, ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων· ὕστερον δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν.

(39) ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο, τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε· ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμεικτος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξηρείσατο ὅσα τοῦτ’ ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν.

(40) ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορούντων παρασκευάσασθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐβίωσαν μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἥδιστα τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα ἔχοντες, καὶ πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οὐκ ὠδύραντο ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφήν.

It's also a good way to arm yourself with a vocabulary to call your opponent's argument as ZERO, rather than, as American media has shown me, waste your time giving your moronic opponent's utterly vacuous statement the benefit of being a real idea worthy of consideration and genuine reflection. A Skeptic could write a thousand books refuting the most moronic ideas that have ever been proposed by the least functional, least observant people who have lived; a more prudent philosopher would see no need to refute utterly vacuous ideas, and only consider those that currently hold dominion over people who are susceptible to such manipulation. If all "ideas" are void, and only gain substance if they connect with pre-existing natural impulses, then we don't have to waste time supposing that we live in a cave of ideas ... we live in reality and we assume reality to be real, and an idea that does not comport to this reality cannot have come from the substance of the reality, itself, rather, it comes from nothing, void. It is a consequence of a person directing their attention toward something that literally does not exist. Otherwise, they would be engaging a real thing with real consequences. In this case, they are accepting a vain hypothesis as being as definite as the heat of a flame, and it is obvious to everyone who has not swallowed the intellectual kool-aid of "the Logic".

In an Epicurean dictionary, the only word that could exist (since all Epicurean observations refer to real objects that host real existence, as opposed to imaginary speculations) to refer to an idea that was acquired from somewhere besides nature is, literally "the infinite spatial void of nothingness". Epicurus recognizes that the most FRANK description of a "delusion", "illusory opinion", "vain excuse", was, truly, "empty space". A proposition that does not correspond with the Kanon of raw, external stimulations, internal emotions, and pre-rational mental impressions can neither be considered, nor is it worth consideration, like void, which can neither act, nor be acted upon. It is the least "real" "thing" there is.

Quote from Don

He's the one who decided to use the same word to describe both the structure of the universe (atoms and *void*) and a category of desires. Just saying.

I strongly agree that Epicurus' employment of an inflection of the ancient Greek word for "spatial void" to signify "groundless desire" is significant. I see this stylistic device, among few others, as an unmistakable, poetic signature of a unique mind who re-appropriated tired, traditional connotations for the sake of providing fresh observations.

While he re-defines "pleasure", it was not such a drastic leap for the Hellenistic mind to make (unlike, herein, I argue, is the case with "kenos" / "kenon" / "kenen") because "hedone" still referred to "pleasure", just a more stable, fulfilling type of "pleasure" than they may have been used to supposing. Herein, Epicurus is completely re-defining the idea of a "destructive desire". It's not just [1] a "distraction", "addiction", "obsession", "self-destructive pursuit", or "wasted energy", rather, it is [2] "void", "space", "NULL", "literally, within the category of those things which do not exist". The former meaning [1] connects the notion of a "destructive desire", inherently, with desire, itself; with "pleasure". Desire, necessarily, was seen as being a destructive thing. Thus, from an Epicurean vantage point, the word one [2] should describe a destructive desire differently than the pleasure that entices desire, itself, and, rather, needs to be re-defined within a larger context. The destructiveness of desire has nothing to do with the feeling of desire, but rather, with the intellectual vacuity to which by which it may be motivated. If a desire has no natural meaning, no healthy purpose, then it cannot be connected with the natural canon, with raw sensation, honest feeling, and natural anticipations. It must be connected with some kind of fallacious "Logic" that have been mistaken for those original apprehensions impressed upon the mind.

Quote from Don

So, the common thread of κενός is void, empty, not able to be filled.

I found it to be clever that Epicurus links the idea of conceptual meaninglessness, vanity, superficiality, bankruptcy, uselessness, brokenness, and worthlessness with the physical void, emptiness, space. Thus, he reinforces the idea that those ideas which are not in accordance with the canon are much like space: literally non-existent.