Posts by Eikadistes

That's an excellent find, Don that I think definitely explains the discrepancy.

One thing I note is that the months of the ancient Greek Calendar had rotating numbers of days, so any fixed "x of Gamelion" date will always translate as a different date on the Julian calendar depending on your starting point. Since, as Don just demonstrated, Epicurus was, in fact, attesting to the Eikas-aligned celebration of his birthday on "the [earlier] tenth" it would be appropriate to celebrate it in correspondence with our own Eikas-day celebrations.

At the same time, we could approach this holiday as a "moving feast" like the Christian celebration Easter which can fall anywhere from March 22 and April 25 depending on the year and the movements of the moon. Celebrating Epicurus' birthday on the "proper", "moving" date could be a fun, educational exercise we can celebrate every year.

Based on the Calendar Don provided (above), I believe we are in the 2^nd year of the 700^th Olympiad, which started on June 29-30^th 2022. Today, November 24^th 2022 corresponds with the 148^th day of the ancient Greek year, meaning "today" is the final day of Maimakterion. This year also seems to have a second month of Poseideon before Gamelion, so the "early 10^th of Gamelion" (or Gamelion 20) falls 227 days after June 29-30^th is February 11-12^th 2023.

Last ancient Greek year (the 1^st year of the 700^th Olympiad; pictured above), the first month of Hekatombaion began on July 10-11^th 2021, and the “early 10th of Gamelion” (or Gamelion 20) fell 197 days after July 10-11^th. So, according to my calculations, last ancient Greek "year", Epicurus’ Birthday Eikas would have fallen on January 23, 2022.

In next corresponding ancient Greek year (the 3^rd year of the 700th Olympiad; seen above), the first month of Hekatombaion begins on July 18-19^th 2023, and the “early 10th of Gamelion” (or Gamelion 20) will fall 198 days after July 18-19^th. So, next ancient Greek calendar year, Epicurus’ Birthday Eikas will fall on February 1-2^nd, 2024.

So based on my calculations:

Epicurus’ Birthday Eikas 2022: January 23-24^th

Epicurus’ Birthday Eikas 2023: February 10-11^th

Epicurus’ Birthday Eikas 2024: February 1-2^nd

I think it is therefore appropriate to celebrate it on one of two days:

1. January 20^th, aligned with the modern celebration of the Twentiers

2. A "moving feast" like Easter, which will start Epicurus' Birthday Eikas (as I count) on February 10-11^th 2023.

I am partial to celebrating the "moving feast". It provides an opportunity for modern Epicureans to gain a better understanding of the Attic calendar that organized Epicurus' days. It also reinforces our relative feeling of their holidays. There is a slightly different feel between contemporary cultures that start their "week" on Monday instead of Sunday. There is a different feel to "beginning" a year in Summer instead of mid-Winter. This helps us look at time from the perspective of Epicurus and friends. It also provides an opportunity to focus on Epicurus.

Or we could just do the 20th to make it easy. Easter's moving date always was kind of weird growing up.

I am of the understanding that Epicurus’ birthday was January 11-12^th 341 BCE. Per Diogenes Laërtius, Epicurus was born “in the third year of the 109th Olympiad […] on the seventh day of the month of Gamelion”. The third year of the 109th Olympiad began on July 11-12^th of 342 BCE. The seventh day of the month of Gamelion is 184 days after the beginning of the third year of the 109th Olympiad; so, 184 days from July 11-12^th is January 11-12^th.

That still begs the question of should we celebrate Epicurus birthdate...

1. On the anniversary of his birthdate (per Diogenes) – Gamelion 7 – January 11/12^th?

2. On its customary celebration (per his Last Will) – Gamelion 10 – January 14/15^th?

3. On the modern Eikas-aligned birthday custom – January 20?

4. On the ancient Eikas-aligned birthday custom – Gamelion 20 – January 24/25^th?

I submit that Epicurus was born on January 11-12^th, and that we were recommended by Epicurus to continue a customary celebration of his birth on January 14-15^th. Though, it seems that later followers may have merged the celebration with Eikas, in which case, January 24-25^th (ancient) or January 20^th (modern) might be appropriate.

My vote is January 14-15^th per Epicurus pointing to Gamelion 10 in his will.

Hello, Michal Handzel! Your education as a historian of philosophy is very welcome here.

Incidentally, it was this article from which I found the "be like Epicurus" quote by Marcus Aurelius.

After some investigation, it seems that the original trilemma may have originated from the Skeptic Carneades in the 2nd-century BCE. This is proposed by Mark Larrimore in his introduction “Responding to Evils” in The Problem of Evil: A Reader. Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, pp. xviii-xxi. <https://archive.org/details/proble…00unse/mode/2up>

“It is customary to trace the trilemma to the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 BCE). As the skeptical character Philo says in a much-quoted passage from David Hume’s (1711-76) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,

Epicurus’ old questions are yet unanswered.

Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

The source of ‘Epicurus’ old questions’ is the early Christian theologian Lactanius’ (240 to ca. 320) The Wrath of God, written around 313. From Lactantius’ perspective, Epicurus was an atheist (and so he has been understood by Christians for centuries), but the Epicurean use of the trilemma is intended not to deny that there are gods, nor even that there is a god who is omnipotent and benevolent. It is a lesson about how to respond to evils. Epicurus clearly believed there were gods who natures we could know. They are in fact neither willing nor able to prevent evil, but this is not because they are malevolent. It is because they (wisely) know better than to become involved with things. The Epicurean argument therefore doesn’t stop at the difficulties with the Stoic (and later Christian) idea of a provident God, but goes on to articulate a view of the attitude of the gods to evils which we should emulate. The problem is not that the gods are not upset by evils, but that we are.

Was Epicurus in fact the originator of the questions? Lactantius wrote half a millennium after Epicurus, and the trilemma appears in no other fragments or discussions of Epicurus and the other two sources predate Lactantius. one reason to doubt whether the trilemma was actually formulated or used by Epicurus (although it may well have been used by later Epicureans) is that for the purpose just described, a trilemma is not an optimal means. A well-constructed trilemma doesn’t conclusively show anything: it induces paralysis. Each one of its three intuitively credible statements is compatible with the others taken singly – but not together – so it cannot tell you which one(s) to give up. The form of the trilemma makes it more likely that the question was of ancient skeptic provenance, perhaps the work of Carneades (214-129 BCE). [See Reinhold Glei, ‘Et invidis et imbecillus, Das angebliche Epikurfragment bei Laktaz, De ira Dei 13, 20-21,’ Vigiliac Christianae, 42 (1988), 47-58.] The trilemma was a form of argument perfected by the ancient skeptics.

It is in fact in Sextus Empiricus’ manual of skepticism, the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (ca. 200 CE) that the oldest extant version of the trilemma appears […] Sextus Empiricus’ conclusion is that since ‘whether god exists is not apprehensible,’

those who firmly maintain that god exists will be forced into impiety; for if they say that he takes care of everything, they will be saying that god is the cause of evils, while if they say that he takes care of some things only or even of nothing, they will be forced to say that he is either malevolent or weak, and manifestly these are impious conclusions. [The Sceptic Way: Sextus Empicirus’s outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. Benson Mates (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 175]

The goal of ancient skepticism is ataraxia, ‘An untroubled or tranquil condition of the soul.’ For the skeptic, the point of the trilemma is not that god is one way or the other – or not at all – but that in religious matters as in all others, it is best to avoid firmly maintaining anything.

The third ancient version of the argument is roughly contemporaneous with the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It is the only version to make explicit reference to Christian beliefs."

If God is good . . . and has knowledge of the future, and also has power to avert evil, why did he suffer the man, deceived by the devil, to fall away from obedience to the law, and so to die? For the man was the image and likeness of God, or even God’s substance, since from it the man’s soul took its origin. So if, ebing good, he had wished a thing not to happen, and if, having foreknowledge, he had been aware that it would happen, and if he had had power and strength to prevent it from happening, that thing never would have happened which under these three conditions of divine majesty it was impossible should happen. but . . . as that did happen, the very opposite is proved, that God must be assumed to be neither good nor prescient nor omnipotent: because inasmuch as nothing of that sort could have happened if God had possessed these attributes of goodness and prescience and omnipotence, it follows that it did happen because God is devoid of these qualities. [Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, ed. and trans. Ernest Evans, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), i. 97-9 (II.5). I am grateful to John G. Gager for this reference. See his ‘Marcion and Philosophy,’ Vigiliac Christianae, 26 (1972), 53-9.]"

How do we feel about sharing PDFs? ( Don, I'm looking for your input).

If so, we can add my digital collection to the list of available literature upon request:

Biblical Epicureanism:

Epicureanism and the Gospel of John by Fergus J. King (2020)

Paul and Philodemus - Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy (1995)

Philodemus and the New Testament Word (Supplements to Novum Testamentum) (2004)

St. Paul and Epicurus by Norman De Witt (1954)

Biographies of Epicurus

Epicurus and His Philosophy by Norman De Witt (1964)

Epicurus by Gassendi (1660)

Lives of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius translated by Stephen White (2021)

Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius translated by Pamela Mensch (2018)

De Rerum Natura

On the Nature of Things translated by Cyril Bailey (1910)

On the Nature of Things translated by Frank Copley (1977)

On the Nature of Things translated by H.A.J. Munro (1908)

On the Nature of Things translated by Martin Smith (1969)

Epicurus the Sage (comic book)

Epicurus the Sage Issue 1

Epicurus the Sage Issue 2

Original Epicurean Texts

Epicurus the Extant Remains by Cyril Bailey (1926)

On Methods of Inference by Philodemus edited by George Hadzsits (1941)

On Piety by Philodemus

Stoics and Epicureans by Robert Hicks (1910)

The Art of Happiness - Works of Epicurus translated by George K. Strodach (2012)

The Epicurus Reader - Selected Writings and Testimonia translated by Inwood and Gerson (1994)

The Epigrams of Philodemus: Introduction, Text, and Commentary

Other Literature

A Few Days in Athens by Francis Wright (1831)

A Life Worthy of the Gods - the Materialist Psychology of Epicurus by David Konstan (2008)

Epicurea by Hermann Usener (1887)

Epicureanism by William Wallace (1880)

Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity by Catherine Wilson (2008)

Epicureanism by Tim O'Keefe (2009)

Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729 (2016)

Epicurus and His Gods

Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition by Jeffrey Fish (2011)

Epicurus and the Singularity of Death by David B. Suits (2020)

Epicurus On Freedom by Tim O'Keefe

How To Be an Epicurean - The Ancient Art of Living Well by Catherine Wilson (2019)

Lucretius and Modernity: Epicurean Encounters by Jacques Lezra (2016)

Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism

Philodemus and Poetry - Poetic Theology and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus and Horace (1995)

Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics by R.W. Sharples (1996)

The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism (2009)

The Faith of Epicurus (1967)

The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus by Pamela Gordon (2012)

The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1 by Long and Sedley (1987)

The Philosophers of the Ancient World: An A-Z Guide by Trevor Curnow

The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy (2020)

The Swerve - How the World Became Modern by Stephen Greenblat (2012)

The Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum

An excerpt from “The Fixation of Satisfaction: Epicurus and Peirce on the Goal” by David B. Suits:

"The difference between kinetic and katastematic pleasure is mentioned without elaboration in Diogenes Laertius X.136. 'Kinetic' implies motion or change. Thus, kinetic pleasures are pleasurable changes. It is not that whenever there are changes, we take pleasure in them; rather, there is a kind of pleasure–kinetic pleasure–one of whose characteristics is that we experience a change of state. Whenever we undergo some pleasant change, such as satisfying a desire, the pleasure is of the kinetic type. If 'kinetic' refers to change, then 'katastematic' refers to non-change, or, we might say, a condition of satisfaction. Katastematic pleasure, then, is characterized by our remaining in a state. Or one could also say that kinetic pleasure are characterized by engagement in some activity, specifically some activity either away from something or towards something, either case implying a kind of struggle (although, as we will see later, the word 'struggle' is a bit too dramatic). Katastematic pleasure, on the other hand, are pleasures we take in, or because of, or during our relative inactivity–that is to say, in our not having to struggle away from anything or towards anything. I will elaborate on these ideas below. But we may as well admit at once that the distinction is vague.

If I have a headache, I take some aspirin, and not long thereafter I feel the pain receding. Eventually I am no longer in pain. Now, it is one thing to experience the headache's going away, when I am still in some pain, and another thing to be in a state without a headache at all. There is, then, the kinetic pleasure of the headache's going away, and there is the katastematic pleasure of not having a headache.

In addition, there are, I perceive, two kinds of katastematic pleasure. The distinction is hinted at now and again in the literature, but I want to make it explicit. (1) The headache has just now finally disappeared, an so I am in a state of relief from pain; I am in a state of having become satisfied. (2) It would usually be odd to say, some days later, that I am in a state of relief from the headache, and so katastematic pleasure of the second kind is a condition wherein I do not even consider the headache–I neither have a headache nor attend to the memory of it; I am in a state not unlike a person who never had a headache at all.

So it is also with mental disturbances. Suppose I am troubled in mind; I am worried about something–my job performance, perhaps. Now my attitude begins to change, either on account of my awareness of some change in the world (perhaps my employer praises me or gives me a raise), or in some change in my desires (perhaps I no longer care to please my employer). In any case, my anxiety recedes. This is one kind of kinetic pleasure. Once the anxiety has vanished, I am in a state of relief from that anxiety. This is a katastematic pleasure of the first sort–a state of having been satisfied. And eventually not only am I not concerned about my job, I am not even attending to having been relieved of the former anxiety, and so I have attained a katastematic satisfaction of the second kind: a state of not being anxious, but also of not having just been relieved of anxiety.

Epicurus's notions of pleasure in motion and pleasure in rest have their analogs in Peirce's concepts about doubt and belief. 'Thought in action [doubt] has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest [belief]; and whatever does not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself' (5.396). To adopt Epicurean terminology, we might say that kinetic thought has for its sole motive katastematic thought. In addition, belief (katastematic thought) involved the creation of some habit–a readiness for action–such that there can be variations of a habit without changing its nature: 'If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes' (5.398). Again, 'the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and ... whatever there is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but no part of it' (5.400). Those comments by Peirce are echoes of Epicurus: 'As soon as the feeling of pain produced by want it removed, pleasure in the flesh will not increase but is only varied'.

I suggest, then, that Epicurean katastematic pleasure is analogous to Peircean belief as habit. When doubt and inquiry have come to an end, we have attained the calm state of belief. But this state of mind is not nothing. That is, it is not simply the absence of doubt (which might also describe a dead person). Rather, it is the undisturbed working of habit–our going through our activities without concern of question.

I take Epicurus as claiming that our hedonistic goal is to attain the fixation of katastematic satisfaction of the second sort, in both body and mind. Satisfaction in the body is called aponia; satisfaction in the mind is called ataraxia. We are ideally to be like the gods, who are neither being relieved of pain, nor in a state of just having been relieved of pain. This is so, because the gods are not the sort to have been in pain in the first place." (Epicurus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance 142-144)

I recommend finding the full article and reading it. David Suits makes a compelling exploration of kinetic versus katastematic pleasure. Later in the book, several other authors make (unconvincing) arguments that katastematic pleasure is superior, that it is akin to tranquility, and that tranquility is synonymous with Stoical indifference, but this essay, in particular, seems to approach the distinction in a more reasonable light with respect to the source material.

I am currently reading Epicurus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance edited by Dane R. Gordon and David B. Suits. It contains a collection of essays that address a variety of Epicurean topics. Most of the essays have been informative and enjoyable. However, as I read (rather, as I trudged through) Lloyd Gerson's essay "Plotinus and Epicurean Epistemology", I was reminded that Idealistic philosophy is not only incapable of providing us with tools we can use to improve our lives, but that a celebrated translator, himself, is (as I concluded) unable to present the obfuscating philosophy in a digestible format. Lloyd Gerson specializes in metaphysics and Neo-platonism, and is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, best know for his translation of Plotinus' Enneads. I have included a picture below that summarizes my response to the 12-page essay:

Quote

"But in a top down approach, the relatively simple is identified with the intelligible, whereas in a bottom up approach the relatively simple is identified with the sensible. The top down approach identifies the relatively simple with the intelligible principles, soul, intellect, and the intelligible Forms, and ultimately, the One; the bottom up approach identifies the relatively simple with elements of some sort of the intelligible as in some way epiphenomenal or supervenient on the sensible. [...] That is, the confirming or 'witnessing' evidence adduced by Epicurus is unable to turn belief into true belief that is not merely accidentally true because there is nothing added to the original presentation that entails the truth of the belief. There is no belief that o, which added to the belief that p, entails q. [...] The second presupposition is that knowledge is essentially or primarily occurrent and self-reflexive. That is, 's knows p' if and only if 's knows that s knows p'. In the latter formulation, 's' must, of course, stand for the identical subject in both places if there is to be genuine self-reflexivity. [...] The former [possessing knowledge] is the dispositional state; the latter [having knowledge] is the occurrent state. In the occurrent state, one is in a mental state, namely, identity with the object of knowledge, and simultaneously aware that one is in that state. [...] All one could conceivably have is one putative state of knowing, call it 'A' and another putative state of being aware that the entity is in state 'A'. Call the second state 'B'. But 'A' and 'B' cannot be states of the identical subject. The easiest case is to make 'A' a switch in the 'on' position. Then 'B' must be another switch in, say, the 'on' position. But the subjects of each switch obviously cannot be identical. The first switch cannot both be in the 'on' and 'off' positions nor can it be 'twice' in the 'on' position. So, in addition to the problem about how there could be self-reflexivity in the material entity, there could be no infallibility either because there is no way to guarantee that 'B' will always correctly monitor the state 'A'. Thus, to put it simply, the fact that B 'reports' that 'A' is in the 'on' position does not entail that 'A' is truly in that position." (Plotinus and Epicurean Epistemology, 69-75)

By ZEUS that was a frustrating read. (Neo-)Platonists require the invention of an utterly abstract lexicon to even begin to explain their ideas. I can see how Christian churches were so willing to adopt this disconnected mysticism to justify their supernatural propositions.

What is the point of this philosophy? Has it ever helped anyone do anything?

Quote from Don

Quote from Cassius

Don or Nate, what about the varying translations of "natural" vs "physical"? What explains that variation and which do you think is best?

I'm interested to hear Nate's take.

Both are generally adequate, and, given the Greek (ΦYΣIΣ) and not Latin (NATVRA) source, “physical” works; however, “natural” in contemporary English vernacular expresses Epicurus’ nuance more appropriately than does “physical”. When we employ “natural”, we imply a contrast against the “supernatural”, which is an important criticism in Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus was responding to the supernatural propositions of metaphysicians, so invoking “nature” is appropriate. “Physical” can connote a contrast against “mental” or “spiritual” (within the context of contemporary English), which is inappropriate, because Epicurus sees “mental” and “spiritual” as being a subset of that which is “physical”, not an alternative to it. Additionally, there is an allusion with “physical” to Cartesian dualism, which implies that “the physical” is just one facet of reality. On top of that, it further reinforces the idea that contemporary “physics” is unable to deal with mental phenomena, and can only deal with actions between particles, whereas some “higher” knowledge is required to explain the complexities of a non-physical mind. I’ll take them both, but I prefer “nature”.

Quote from Godfrey

I'm curious if anyone has a fresh take on the Greek?

XXVI (26)

ALGOUN - AΛΓOYN - ἀλγοῦν - /aːl.'guːn/ the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (álgos, “pain”), meaning “suffering”, “illness”, “hardship”, “physical pain”.

ANAGKAIAI - ANAΓKAIAI - ἀναγκαῖαι - /aːnag.'kaɪ.jaɪ/ - the singular feminine form of ἀναγκαῖος (anagkaîos) from ἀνάγκη (anánkē, “necessity”) +‎ -ιος (-ios) meaning “necessary”.

APERGASTIKAI - AΠEPΓAΣTIKAI - ἀπεργαστικαὶ - /aːper.'gas.ti:kaɪ/ - related to ἀπεργαστικός (apergastikós, “fit for finishing”) meaning “produce”, “cause”, “lead to”.

BLABES - BΛABHΣ - βλάβης - /'bla.bεːs/ - the genitive singular inflection of βλάβη (blábi), “hurt”, “damage”) meaning “harm”, “injury”.

DOXOSIN - ΔOΞΩΣIN - δόξωσιν - /'dok.sɔːsiːn/ - related to δοκέω (dokéo, “expect”, “form an opinion”) sharing the same root δοξα (doksa) as Doxai (as in the Kuriai Doxai), meaning “thing desired”, “unnecessary desires”, “object of desire”, “desired objects”.

DYSPORISTON - ΔYΣΠOPIΣTΩN - δυσπορίστων - /dyːspo.'riːstɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of δυσπόριστος (duspóristos, “gotten with much labor”, “hard to come by” or “procure”) meaning “difficult to procure”, “hard to acquire”.

EKHOUSIN - EXOYΣIN - ἔχουσιν - /'eːkʰuːsiːn/ - the third-person plural present active indicative inflection of ἔχω (ékhō) meaning “possess”, obtain”, “attain”, “have”, “gain”.

EPANAGOUSIN - EΠANAΓOYΣIN - ἐπανάγουσιν - /eːpa.'na.guːsiːn/ - related to ἐπανάγω(epanágō, “stir up”, “excite”) meaning “lead”, “bring”, “create”.

EPITHYMION - EΠIΘYMIΩN - ἐπιθυμιῶν - /eːpiː'tʰyːmiːɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of επιθυμία (epithumía, “desire”, “yearning”, “appetite”, “wish”, “longing”) meaning “passion”, “striving”, “interest”, “desires”.

EUDIAKHUTON - EUYIAXYTON - εὐδιάχυτον - /eu̯.diː'a.kʰyːton/ - from the word εὐδιάχυτος (eudiákhutos, “easily diffused”, “easily relieved”) meaning “easily got rid of”, “easily dispelled”, “easily thrust aside”, “easily diffused”, “easily dissolved”.

OREXIN - OPEΞIN - ὄρεξιν - /'oːrek.siːn/ - an inflection of ὄρεξις (órexis) from ὀρέγω (orégō, “I stretch”) +‎ -σῐς (-sis) meaning “the thing desired”, “the craved object”.

SYMPLEROSIN - ΣYMΠΛHPΩΣIN - συμπληρῶσιν - /syːm.plεː'rɔːsiːn/ - from συν- (syn-, “with”, “together”) + πληρόω (pleróō, “to fill”, “to full”, “to finish”, “to complete”, “to fulfill”) meaning “gratified”, “fulfilled”, “satisfied”.

XXX (30)

ALGOUN - AΛΓOYN - ἀλγοῦν - /aːl.'guːn/ the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (álgos, “pain”), meaning “suffering”, “illness”, “hardship”, “physical pain”.

ANTHROPOU - ANΘPΩΠOY - ἀνθρώπου - /aːn.'tʰrɔ:puː/ - the genitive singular form of ἄνθρωπος (ánthropos) "human being”, “people” “man”, “humanity”, “mankind”.

DIAKHEONTAI - ΔIAXEONTAI - διαχέονται - /diːa.'kʰe.on.taɪ/ - an inflection of διαχέω (diakhéō, “to pour different ways”, “disperse”, “confound”, “run through”) meaning “dispelled”, “dissolved”, “defused”, “stamped out”, “dissipated”

DOXAN - ΔOΞAN - δόξαν - /'dok.san/ - the accusative singular of δόξα (dóxa) from which δόξαι (doxai, “doctrines”) is derived (as in the Kuriai Doxai or “Key Doctrines” of Epicurus), meaning “expectation”, “opinion”, “judgment”, and “belief”.

EPANAGOUSON - EΠANAΓOYΣΩN - ἐπαναγουσῶν - /eːpa.na.guː'sɔːn/ - related to ἐπανάγω (epanágo, “to stir up”) meaning “satisfied”, “gratified”, “fulfilled”, “indulged”.

EPITHYMION - EΠIΘYMIΩN - ἐπιθυμιῶν - /eːpiː'tʰyːmiːɔːn/- the genitive plural inflection of επιθυμία (epithumía, “desire”, “yearning”, “appetite”, “wish”, “longing”) meaning “passion”, “striving”, “interest”, “desires”.

GINONTAI - ΓINONTAI - γίνονται - /'giːnon.taɪ/ - related to γίγνομαι (gígnomai, “to come into being”, “be born”, “be produced”) meaning “arise”, “arising from”, “owing to”.

HYPARKHEI - YΠAPXEI - υπάρχει - /hyː'par.kʰeɪ/ - the third-person singular present inflection of the the verb υπάρχω (hupárkhō, “to begin”) from ῠ̔πο- (húpo-, “under”) +‎ ᾰ̓́ρχω (árkhō, “to begin”) meaning “origin” or “beginning”.

KENEN - KENHN - κενὴν - /ke.'nεːn/ the singular, feminine, accusative of κενός (kenós) meaning “empty”, “vain”, “fruitless”, “exhausted”, “void”, and “destitute”. The word κενὴν (kenén) describes an epistemological analogue to the physical “void” of κενῶν (kenón).

KENODOXIAN - KENOΔOΞIAN - κενοδοξίαν - /ke.no.dok.'siːan/ - from κενὴν (kenén) and δόξαν (dóxan) meaning “liability to vain imagination”, “vanity”, “vain opinions”, “groundless”, “illusory”, “vain fancies”, “empty imaginings”, “beliefs”, “senseless whims”.

PHYSIKON - ΦYΣIKΩN - φυσικῶν - /pʰyːsiː'kɔːn/- the genitive plural form of φυσικός (phusikós, “natural”, “physical”) describing “natural” desires.

PHYSIN - ΦYΣIN - φύσιν - /'pʰyːsiːn/ - a singular, nominative form of φῠ́ω (phúō, “grow”) +‎ -σῐς (-sis) meaning “nature”, “origin”, “birth”, “quality”, “property”.

SPOUDE - ΣΠOYΔH - σπουδὴ - /spuː'dεː/ - from σπεύδω (speúdō, “to make haste”) +‎ -η (-ē, verbal stem) meaning “insistent”, “pursued”, “effort”, “fulfilled”, “exertion”, “satisfied”.

SYNTELESTHOSIN - ΣYNTEΛEΣΘΩΣIN - συντελεσθῶσιν - /syːn.te.les.'tʰɔːsiːn/ - from συντελέω (sunteléo, “bring to an end”, “complete”, “finish”, “perpetrate”, “celebrate”, “hold”, “contribute”) meaning “satisfied”, “gratified”, “fulfilled”, “indulged”.

SYNTONOS - ΣYNTONOΣ - σὺντονος - /'syːn.to.nos/ - meaning “strained tight”, “intense”, “impetuous”, “eager”, “jerking”, “violent”, “vehement”, “severe”, “earnest”.

One other noteworthy point to mention Sid is that there is (a proposed) historical link between Advaita Vedanta and Mahāyāna Buddhism. The 6th-century Hindu philosopher Gauḍapāda (an early inspiration of Adi Shankara) was supposedly influenced by the teachings of the Mādhyamaka tradition of the Buddhist monk Nāgārjuna. While Mahāyāna Buddhism differs in many ways from Advaita Vedanta, they are much more closely related to each other than either of them are related to Epicureanism (or, for that matter, other materialist schools of ancient Indian thought).

The author proposes that Epicureanism “propounded the avoidance of all things that would cause pain in life” which contradicts Epicurus’ statement that “sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time […] For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.” The author seems to extrapolate an avoidant, escapist interpretation of Epicurean philosophy.

They gloss over Epicurus’ explicit recognition that “Hēdonē [and not ataraxia] is the Greatest Good” and then interprets Epicureanism as being a mild form of asceticism (like the "Middle Way" of Buddhism, of which I make additional criticism below). Note the incoherence of the author’s following statement: “Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism […] it [is] very different from hedonism”. As usual, the author equates the word “hedonism” with something gross and morally bankrupt, and implies that only a rejection of “true” hedonism can be considered justifiable.

I also find the following proposition dubious: “Today, [the stone inscription at Oinoanda] remains the only ancient philosophical text from the Greek and Roman world to have survived in its original form, according to Archaeology Magazine.” The author later contradicts this assertion when acknowledging that “Deciphered carbonized scrolls obtained from the library at the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum contain a large number of works by Philodemus, a late Hellenistic Epicurean, and even Epicurus himself, attesting to the school’s enduring popularity.”

I do agree, however, with his statement that “The philosophy is often misunderstood.”

The author goes on to propose that “Epicureanism rejects immortality”, which feels right to critical, modern eyes, however, it reduces the nuanced employment of “immortality” in Epicurean philosophy. The animal gods have become indestructible as described by Epicurus. The measurement of daily pleasure is also immortal. Friendship is an immortal good. Indeed, we do not have immortal lives, and we are not born again, however, like “the gods”, the idea of “immortality” is re-fashioned in Epicurean terminology, so the author slightly misses the mark on this point.

I also found another very common, very false comparison between Epicureanism and Buddhism, which, again, I emphasize, are on opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum: “The Epicurean way of life also resembles Buddhism in its temperateness, including the belief that great excess leads to great dissatisfaction.” This always indicates to me that the author does not have a thorough understanding of the nuances of either tradition, and, like many perennialists, chooses to find similarities between their philosophies-of-choice, regardless of their original, historical context.

Overall, the author repeats a number of common misconceptions about the philosophy, while mostly hitting the bullet points. This is a good article to demonstrate some of the widespread misunderstanding of Epicureanism.

Quote from Sid

Incidentally since we are comparing vs. Buddhism I’m just wondering has anyone looked at other non-dualistic teachings like Advaitha? It would be very interesting to compare I think, especially since Epicureanism stresses reliance on the senses, but radical Advaitha dismisses the entire concept of an external reality altogether .

All forms of Vedanta are at odds with Epicurean philosophy and inhabit opposite sides of the philosophical spectrum. Every historical iteration of Vedanta rejects other schools of ancient Indian philosophy that make similar claims to Epicureanism, such as Vaisheshika, which proposes a form of atomism, and the heterodox tradition of Charvaka, which proposes an atheistic form of hedonism. Incidentally, there are a number of similarities between Vedanta (especially Advaita Vedanta) and Platonism. Indeed, it is widely supposed that the neo-Platonists (such as Plotinus and his student Porphyry) had direct, historical influences from Indian philosophers that informed their Neo-Platonic positions.

“What a useful thing a pocket-map is!” I remarked.

“That’s another thing we’ve learned from your Nation,” said Mein Herr, “Map-making. But we’ve carried it much further than you. What do you consider the largest map that would be really useful?”

“About six inches to the mile.”

“Only six inches!” exclaimed Mein Herr. “We very soon got to six yards to the mile. Then we tried a hundreds yards to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a mile to the mile!”

“Have you used it much?” I enquired.

“It has never been spread out yet,” said Mein Herr: “the famers objected: they said it would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well”

(Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded)

Quote from waterholic

isn't determinism rejected by Epicurus? How can Epicureanism and determinism co-exist in Onfray's mind?

Link to the video

You are correct that Epicurus rejected strict determinism. A primary point of contention Epicurus had with Democritean atomism was his determinism. If you have not come across it yet, I recommend reading Karl Marx's doctoral dissertation "The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature" which addresses this point:

Full text of "Marx, Karl Doctoral Thesis The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature"

(Marx gets a few things wrong, but it is an interesting and somewhat surprising read)

Onfray positions himself in a long line of hedonists and materialists in general, but is not necessarily an Epicureanism in particular. However, based on your description, Onfray is not arguing for strict determinism, but rather, what we might call a compatibilist proposition, wherein determinism and indeterminism are not seen as being mutually exclusive.

While I try to avoid placing Epicurus within the buckets on modern philosophical categories, compatibilism might be the appropriate bucket in which to place him. Onfray seems to agree with Epicurus that "some [events] [...] happen by necessity and some by chance, and some are within our control" (Letter to Menoikeus).

Regarding "free will", we tend to look upon the concept with scorn, not because of the proposition of indeterminism, but because the concept of "free will" is a Christian form of (pseudo-)indeterminism that is contextualized within the domain of a Creator deity. The term "free will" is problematic for materialists, but not indeterminism, itself.

I always reflect that Epicurus wrote that "Pleasure is the Greatest Good", not "Painlessness", nor "Tranquility", nor "Indifference", nor "Emptiness", nor any facsimile of "Mokṣa", "Nirvāṇa", "Samādhi", "Satori", or "Kenshō". He had the vocabulary to express the proposition that "Painlessness is the Greatest Good", but he never, ever did so.

Pleasure IS the Greatest Good. We do not need to apologize for Pleasure as though it is a bad word that needs to be replaced with a euphemism to make it more palatable to the sensibilities of the masses.

I wish a few of those places were a little warmer!

Quote from Kalosyni

Quote from Don

I'm trying to think of ways to get away from the vessel metaphor.

Also I am wondering about getting entirely away from metaphors and just thinking about real life.

Epicurus never wrote that The Greatest Good is the Removal of Pain. He always identifies The Greatest Good as Pleasure. I think the concept of Removal of Pain is really only relevant with regards to the "limit" of Pleasure, and how to measure it. But anti-Pain is not the goal, just a measuring stick. Pleasure is the goal, and sometimes pain is necessary for a greater pleasure. Focusing on the Removal of Pain as a person's goal might lead them to miss out on rewarding challenges.

I like this definition of “god” as “(the being) the best among beings”. I’ve recently come to see how functional and non-abstract the word “god” can be employed in our casual vernacular. If I ask you whom the “God of Rock” or “God of Pop” is, we’ll probably come up with a few similar answer. We experienced the “Lord of the Dance” without being confused into believing that Michael Flatley was a Creator-deity. If a person walks by and someone remarks, “he is a god” or “she is a goddess”, we know they are commenting on some semblence of physical perfection. Similarly, the “God [of a human]” would be that human's prototype of the perfect person, thus, being a reflection of our inner ideals.

I am partial to an idea expressed by Xenophanes: “Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black; Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired […] But if horses or oxen or lion had hands or could draw with their hands and accomplish such works as men, horses would draw the figures of the gods as similar to horses, and they would make the bodies of the sort which each of them had”. Unsurprisingly, then, the god of the poor is a martyr, the god of the monarchs is kingly, the god of the pacifists is peaceful, and the god of the warriors is sacrificial (or some fascile thereof).

I am coming to appreciate how insightful Epicurus' observation was. There is a preconception of “god” because we can employ the phrase so easily with common language to express “the perfect version [of]”. Prior to getting subsumed by the theological rabbit hole, we already know what a “god” is and are comfortable assigning people we find extraordinarily skilled or admirable the designation of “[a] god” or “goddess”. For the sake of prudence and practical wisdom, it would be dysfunctional, or at least linguistically odd to assume that “[a] god” could be something other than “perfect”. How could the God of Rock make mistakes on a guitar? Why would the God of Dance trip over their own feet? Why would the God of Living Beings incite trouble or death that would threaten the lives of other beings? If there were a Creator that occasionally destroyed its creations, why would we identify that being as a "god"? That's just a bad Creator.