Posts by Eikadistes

While we can't date the more popular publications, Philodemus provides an unusually-well-documented list of Epistles, dated per each Archon. Clay preserves this list (51-54):

(forgive the formatting errors)

YEAR/S - Archon Name
- Epistle No. Common name (reference).

307/6 - Anaxikrates
The date of Epicurus' move to Athens, Diogenes Laertius, X.2.)

300/299 - Hegemachos
- No. 1. Peri phuseos Book XV (Arrighetti, p. 292).

296/5 - Nikias
- No. 2. Peri phuseos Book XXVIII (Arrighetti, p. 321).
- No. 3. A letter written eri Nikíov, Philodemos, On Epicurus II, fr. 1.7 (Vogliano, p. 59).

294/3 - Olympiodoros
- No. 4. A letter to a person unknown, from Philodemos, Праумаа XIV.11

292/1 - Philippos
- No. 5. A letter to Polyainos and Leonteus of Lampsakos on the Stoics in Athens, Pap.Herc. 176, fr. 5, XXIV. 14-15 (Vogliano, p. 50; Arrighetti, [67]).
- No. 6. To Themista of Lampsakos reporting on the young Pythokles, Philodemos, Пра MOTEiaL IV.8-10 (Arrighetti, [501).
- No. 7. To friends in Lampsakos on poverty, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXV.38 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 67; Arrighetti, [96]).

291/0 - Charinos
- No. 8. Letters sent to Polyainos, Charino magistratu, Seneca, Epistulae 18.9 (Arrighetti, [831).
- No. 9. A letter to Polyainos, Philodemos, On Epicurus, fr. 5.1 (Vogliano, p. 65; Arrighetti [841).
- No. 10. A letter to a person unknown, Philodemos, On Piety, Pap. Herc. 1098, X. 12 (Gomperz, p. 125; Arrighetti, [106] [lines 938-939 Obbink]).
- No. 11. To a person unknown, Philodemos, On Piety, Pap. Herc. 1077, X.1 (Gomperz, p. 105; Arrighetti, [107] [lines 840-841 Obbink]).
- No. 12. To Polyainos on poverty, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXIV.8 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 66; Arrighetti. (1081).
- No. 13. A letter to a person unknown, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXV.8 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 67; Arrighetti, [109]).

290/289 - Telokles
- No. 14. To Mithres, on a reversal of fortune, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXVI.9 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 67; Arrighetti, [791).

289/8 - Aristonymos
- No. 15. To Mithres, acknowledging a contribution to the school, Philodemos, Прааеа XXXIV.1 (Diano, p. 32; Arrighetti, [74]).
- No. 16. To Phyrson of Kolophon on the piety of a certain Theodotos. Philodemos. On Piety, Pap. Herc. 1098, XII. 15 (Gomperz, p. 127; Arrighetti, [93] [lines 797-801 Obbink]).

286/5 Diokles
- No. 17. A letter to Anaxarchos and Leontion, Pap. Herc. 176, fr. 5, XXV.31-32 (Vogliano, p. 51).

285/4 Diotimos
- No. 18. To Phyrson, Philodemos, Прауата XV.1-2 (Arrighetti, [94]).
- No. 19. If the name Diotimos is that of the archon; cf. No. 11. A Diotimos appears in Pap. Herc. 1780, VIII, fr. 1 [On Piety, lines 841-842 Obbink]. If he is Diotimos Euvóotov EnuaxiSns he cannot be the recipient of a letter from Epicurus; cf. W. Croenert, Kolotes und Menedemos, Leipzig 1906, pp. 82-83.

284/3 Isaios
- No. 20. To a person unknown, Philodemos, Прауратє XXXII. 14 (Diano, p. 19; Arrighetti, [110]).
- No. 21. To a person unknown, apparently on the education of the sons of Menoikeus, Phi- lodemos, adv. [Sophistas], fr. 16 (Sbordone 1947, p. 78; Arrighetti, [111]).

283/2 Euthios
- No. 22. On a setback of the Macedonians to a person unknown, Philodemos, On the Stoics, Pap. Herc. 339, V.9 (Arrighetti, [112]) [**Gli Stoici" VI.9 Dorandi].

281/0 Ourios
- No. 23. To Leonteus, Philodemos, Iayatr XXXII.15-16 (Diano, p. 19; Arrighetti, [68]).

279/8 Anaxikrates
- No. 24. To a person unknown, Philodemos, On the Stoics V.13, En'] 'Avatuk[p]á[rous (cf. Croenert [under No. 19], p. 54, n. 259) [*Gli Stoici" VI.13 Dorandil.

278/7 Demokles
- No. 25. To Kolotes of Lampsakos, possibly on the death of Metrodoros, Pap. Herc. 176, fr. 5, XXVIII.3-4 (Vogliano, p. 54 [cf. Gomperz in Hermes 5, 1871, pp. 387-388]; Arrighetti,[62]).
- No. 26. To Mithres, Philodemos, Maya XXIX. 17 (Diano, p. 15; Arrighetti, [75]).

274/3 Euboulos
- No. 27. To Idomeneus of Lampsakos, Philodemos, Прауцат XXVI.14 (Diano, p.12; Arrighetti, [601).
- No. 28. To Mithres on frugality, Philodemos.Прауатїа XXX.16-17 (Diano, p. 16; Arrighetti, [76]).
- No. 29. To a person unknown, asking for somebooks of Demokritos, Philodemos, adv. [Sophistas], fr. 13 (Sbordone 1947, p. 75; Arrighetti, [113]).

271/0 Pytharatos
- No. 30. To Mithres on his approaching death, Philodemos, Прауатеа XXXI.3-4 (Diano, p. 17; Arrighetti, [77])

I note that Epicurus maintained a correspondence with Mithres for over two decades.

I was wondering if anyone had come across any material related to dating Epicurus' works.

I found a few references from Sedley and Arrighetti:

Sedley, On Nature XXVIII 14-16

Arrighetti, La struttura dell’Epistola di Epicuro a Pitocle 127e

Quote from Cassius

The question is: To what extent does hearing someone say that they are "feeling no pain" automatically invoke an association that what they mean is that they are "stoned?"

I tend to use "stoned" when I want to express feeling "disoriented", closer to an anesthetized state of νάρκη (nárkē, from which we derive our word "narcotic"), meaning "torpor" or "numbness". In this regard, anything that numbs pleasure along with pain (I'm thinking of narcotics, not cannabinoids) might be painless, but also, pleasure-less, and that wordplay doesn't help us enjoy pleasure.

(As a regular user, I express the pleasant relief I feel as being "mellow"or "relaxed", as opposed "stoned" or "baked", which I would reserve for states that resemble drunkenness.)

Slang, however, is fluid, and not only can mean anything we want, not only does mean multiple things to different people, but has, throughout our own history been used in mutually contradictory ways: words like "stoned" have meant everything from stumbling intoxication to a mild buzz, and that difference is the difference between pleasant relief versus dangerous anesthetization.

Blue Öyster Cult speaks for me.

Seasons don't fear the reaper
Nor do the wind, the sun or the rain
We can be like they are...

Quote from Kalosyni

There isn't much on emotions in Epicurean texts.

Definitely check out Philodemus' On Anger. He has a lot to say about the spectrum of human emotion, particularly, a comparison of natural "anger" versus contemptuous "rage".

His treatise On Frank Criticism provides advice for guides and teachers to observe a student's temperament so that constructive criticism can be delivered and received most effectively.

In a few places throughout On Death, Philodemus describes the lamentation that can come from a sudden loss, and evaluates how healthy it is to ruminate versus reflect. This seems to echo KD40 as well as Vatican Saying 66, which recommends against indulging depression.

In the sagely sayings that Diogenes records, Epicurus is documented as having identified hatred, envy, and contempt, in particular, as being unhealthy emotions that must be overcome by reason. He also recognizes happiness, gratitude, and pity (in terms of feelings towards servants, as is written), and then cautions against romance, love (i.e. infatuation), and sexual arousal.

There's also a fair amount of discussion on fear. (Come to think of it, I should have started with this, because overcoming Fear of God and Fear of Death are expressed in KD1 and KD2). KD10 discusses the uselessness of physical pleasure if the mind is stunted by fear from the unknown, and then in KD12, follows up by identifying sympathy for myth as a primary source of fear.

I personally find a lot of useful tips as far as counsel goes for feeling shame, guilt, and worthlessness from economic insecurity. In particular, Bailey fragments 29, 37, 48, 85, and KD15. Nowhere does he explicitly mention those emotions by name, but that's how I read into those sayings.

Quote from Don

However, Raghunanan narrowing of αφθαρτον to "incorruptible" ie "not able to be corrupted, from a moral/ethical perspective" - with the understanding that the gods will eventually physically decay due to their being material compound beings is enticing.

It was for this reason that I went with "incorruptible" in my own translation.

Short of addressing the seeming tension between "gods having immortal quasi-bodies" and "all compound objects being subject to the forces of dissolution", I can, at least, say, confidently, that, at least, the gods are buttressed against moral corruption. Whether they are space ghosts who exist forever on an infinite timeline, or whether they are self-actualized animals who have advanced beyond their terrestrial biochemistry but still threatened, or whether they are just conceptual metaphors: all of those beings neither cause trouble to themselves nor cause trouble to others.

Click your user icon in the upper-right corner:

Logout is at the bottom.

Quote from Cleveland Okie

Should I try to create and post Epicurean memes on social media?

I would love to see more Epicurean memes. I post a fair amount in the gallery here, and you'll find plenty on Epicurean memes for hedonistic beings (@EpicureanMemes) on Facebook, and a handful on the r/Epicurean_Philosophy page on Reddit. The more, the merrier!

Quote from Cleveland Okie

I ran a search for "Epicurean" to see if there are any such blogs on Substack, and all of the ones I could find with the word "Epicurean" in the title were food blogs!

Hiram shares his essays from the Society of Friends of Epicurus on Substack <https://hiramcrespo.substack.com> ultimately hosted at <https://societyofepicurus.com>. There are a number of sites out there that provide educational resources, but I am unfamiliar with other blogs that regularly publish essays. The Lucretius Today podcast definitely fills that audio void!

We're heeding caution this time around.

I may drop off the grid sometimes Wednesday or Thursday.

Quote from Cassius

Would "readily" work?

I sense unease with the adverb "easily" ... and I share that unease.

As a haiku, I tried to chew on "boldly" as a meaningful tweak:

Fear not God nor death;
The good is easy to get,
The bad, boldly met.

That's not a correct translation, but it rings to me because the Epicurean capacity to endure pain goes part and parcel with fearlessness (of boldness, or courage). It is definitely not easy to mechanically lessen the physical intensity of the sensation of severe, unmanageable pain, but it is relatively easy (by comparison) to embolden an internal spirit of confidence through reflection.

I just wanted to throw in this rhyme for the sake of preference (its origin is unknown to me).

But, if we're gonna end with "easily endured" ...

... it's begging to be rhymed with "easily procured".

There is currently a DNS issue with CloudFlare (from what I can tell) that is preventing users from accessing their website http://www.shapeways.com. It may just be temporary.

Those look great!

I was moved by a similar spirit and painted this plastic, 3-D print coin/pendant:

Quote from Kalosyni

Thank you!  Don for explaining the ancient Greek words used, very helpful.

Reason I was asking was that I thought that perhaps "terrible" was refering to "unnatural and unnecessary" - and that came out of my idea that "the pains from the unnatural and unnecessary are easy to avoid" - but looks like I was way off on that.

And as you are saying, the correct translation is: "the terrible is easily endured".

One thing I'll note is that EYEKKAPTEPHTON is used in opposition to TAΓAΘON (which, as Don has demonstrated in the past, can appropriately be expressed as "The Good", which is Pleasure), so in this case, "the terrible" or "bad", I think, is referring to the general feeling of Pain.

It is never too early, nor late late to preserve the health of one's soul.

Quote from Matteng

In positive psychology, a distinction is made between hedonistic, happiness(Pleasure) and Eudaimonia. Do I understand it correctly that Eumonia happiness is also hedonistic happiness at its core?

Most of the Hellenistic philosophers can be described as "Eudaimonic" in their ethics. Overwhelmingly, they agreed that "happiness" (being the general translation with which we are largely comfortable) was the goal in life. Their definitions of "happiness", however, (and how to obtain it) differed drastically, so the word was employed in differing, technical ways.

We might prefer to call Socrates "pre-Hellenistic", but, as per Plato's dialogues, he (and Plato) discuss eudaimonia often. For them, it was a function of temperance (in particular, I would argue, self-restraint, or self-denial). Socratic happiness strikes me as tending toward asceticism. From this, Plato argues that a eudaimonic person has an organized soul, in accordance with the Form of the Good, so this sort of happiness is highly abstract (and I question if it can actually be felt).

Aristotle saw eudaimonia as "excellence", exemplified by a Man of Action, an engaged, public figure (typically male; he wasn't convinced that females were intellectually capable of pursuing philosophical excellence). The excellent Aristotelian can be evaluated as a function of their moral adherence to the Golden Mean, and the utility they provide to their polis. For Aristotle, a person could not enjoy excellence without engaging in a reputable, profitable occupation. Simply clearing one's mind of anxiety, and enjoying simple pleasures of life was not enough.

Epicurus, of course, thought this was all malarky. Eudaimonia for the Epicureans was "pleasure", pure, unadulterated, unapologetic pleasure, fearlessness of the mind, and painlessness of the flesh. The happy Epicurean was not limited by political duties or occupational obligations. Of course, nature compels a happy person to be practical, have integrity, and treat others with decency, so he was not alien to civic engagement. However, having a prosperous career was not seen as being necessary to happiness, and politics was seen as being (usually) anti-thetical.

Pyrrho (the Skeptic) said this was all nonsense. Eudaimonia for him was a kind of epistemological "tranquility" and was only attainable by suspending all alleged judgments, having concluded that no dogma can be justified. He doesn't trust sensation, pleasure, or, for that matter, the possibility of reliable knowledge through logical inference. His type of eudaimonia strikes me as being unpleasant, or, perhaps, cold, unfeeling, and unrewarding. That bring me to the Stoics.

For the Stoics, eudaimonia is "virtue", cold, calculated virtue (I don't think they'd like the "cold" description, so forgive my clear, Epicurean bias). The happy life of the Stoics may not be a pleasurable life, but is definitely a life in which one's behavior is governed by the conclusions of logical propositions, and never by the pleasurable or painful consequences of actions.

Of all of these philosophers, few equated "happiness" with "physical pleasure". Largely, happiness was associated with prosperity or self-denial, and usually not "feeling happy".

"We found a network of brain regions that, when damaged, are linked to higher religious fundamentalism. This functional network was lateralized to the right hemisphere and overlaps with the locations of brain lesions associated with specific neuropsychiatric and behavioral conditions. Our findings shed light on neuroanatomy that may influence the emergence of religious fundamentalism, offering implications for understanding the relationship between brain networks and fundamentalist behavior." <https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2322399121>

Here is a summary of the otherwise locked study: https://www.psypost.org/new-study-link…Ub6_uTkIvaMO67Q

Quote from Cassius

don't necessarily want to derail this thread with another discussion with fine points on "the gods," but is it your view at this point that you do not think Epicurus held the gods to have any physical existence whatsoever ("....though, those deities are simply inspiring mental objects") or am I misreading your intent there?

I shouldn't say "simply" because our discussions have revealed that the topic of Epicurean theology is anything but simple. Perhaps "primarily", "most immediately", or "at least" would be better. At least, I consider the "divine nature" to be a mental construct that provides humans with ethical utility. Therein, one's "god" is, and the collection of human "gods" are, at least, personal expressions of the common notion of divinity that almost all human beings seem to share.

Do these conceptions of divinity correspond with non-terrestrial, quasi-animals that dwell in the void between world systems, whose non-compound bodies respirate with quasi-blood? Perhaps. But even if a human being could triangulate the position of a god in space, by definition, the god would be too well hidden or protected or discrete to allow itself to be discovered, or examined like a specimen. So, those gods, as "extraordinary extra-terrestrials", are somewhat theoretical.

Indeed, Epicureans spent a lot of time contemplating the various ways in which the universe could contain a being that is both "alive" yet "immortal". The Kathegemones dedicated treatises to the topic, so I hesitate to dismiss it solely on the argument that: (1) compounds cannot be immortal, (2) all living beings are compounds, (3) "the gods" are living beings, (4) "the gods" cannot be immortal. Ancient Epicureans seemed to have had a lot more to say about this than just that.

I'm not sure exactly how to deal with that. I wish we had more extant texts.

But the icons in ancient peoples' dreams that some have called "gods", are, at least, immediate, concrete, reproducible, inspiring, and we can discuss them in meaningful ways with sensuous vocabulary. The thought of a divine being stimulates a positive mental response the same way that a massage stimulates positive sensations in one's nerves. We observe this sort of internal stimulation in people across the world, and we have been making this observation since before written history. If we want to meaningfully discuss "the gods", we can, at least, start there.

Right off the bat, I appreciate that you describe your outline as a philosophical exercise. As far as our sense of Epicurean spirituality goes, writing an outline is a key practice.

Epicurus would agree with your theological rejection of supernatural deities; however, he positively affirms that natural deities do exist (though, those deities are simply inspiring mental objects). Now, if our definition of theism identifies the divine as being responsible for creation, for maintaining natural forces, and for interfering with the development of human history, then Epicurus could reasonably be called an "atheist". However, Epicurus wrote against the atheism of his time, and positively recommends to his pupils that they consider the divine nature to be blessed and imperishable (though the spiritual objects of the masses are incoherent).

I absolutely identify with your position on theology. But I think that the way Epicurus discussed religion was less in terms of abstract metaphysics, and more in terms of cultural anthropology. In which case, "god-belief" is just a natural, human practice, like wolves howling at the moon. Certainly, the moon will never respond to howling: but that's not why wolves howl.

Your discussion of one's own death is very much so Epicurean in approach. Epicurus describes death as ANAIΣΘHTEI from from ἀν- (ἀn-, “without”) + αισθητός (aisthetós, “perceptibility”, “sensibility”) meaning “devoid of sensation”, “unconsciousness”, “no sense-experience”, “absence of sensation”, “lacks awareness”, “no feeling”, “no perception”. Contextualizing death as the absence of sensation is exactly how Epicurus saw it. I think the only discrepancy here is that Epicurus did not associate the decision-making faculty of the mind with the prefrontal cortex in a human skull.

I can see why you would both propose both physical determinism and moral nihilism: if one supposes that freedom, choice, and responsibility are illusions, then one would have to admit that we lack any kind of moral agency. Democritus would sympathize with you here, but not Epicurus. Epicurus rejects determinism, not only because it violates his principle of particles' unpredictable swerving, but also in an ethical sense, because the belief in determinism can be measurably paralyzing and unhealthy. Even if most of our thoughts and actions are just dominoes in a line of falling particles, the belief in determinism just surrenders whatever small bit of control we do have over our imaginations, even if its only memorizing data, or intentionally daydreaming.

As far as the moral nihilism goes, we treat this proposition with suspicion because, overwhelmingly, pleasure can be equated with physical health. Most things that are physically healthy are inherently pleasurable, whereas physically destructive behaviors tend to be painful. Since Epicurus identifies pleasure with The Good and pain with that which is terrible, and since the feelings of pleasure and pain come from Nature, we reason that good and evil are grounded in nature. Nature compels us to pursue pleasure (to be healthy), and we suffer when we reject these natural compulsions. There may not be an absolute Ten Commandments to which all human beings are held, but there are natural, behavioral tendencies that reinforce an organism's ability to thrive.

Overall, your perspective on fear of death aligns with Epicurean philosophy insofar as recognizing it as being an irrational source of anxiety. He might question your proposition that death is harmful; surely, dying is harmful, but once the process of dying has finished, and death is the case, there is neither pleasure nor pain, good nor evil, because those things require consciousness. Still, the general, thanatological position that fear of death is unhealthy and irrational is on point.

I appreciate your list of ways in which to pursue a better life. Epicurus proposed a number of conclusions at which you have arrived. I think the biggest thing I see as being (in my humble opinion) a contradiction, is the tension between "responsibility impossibilism", "moral nihilism" and your thoughtful list of helpful habits. I maintain, from an Epicurean position, that the fact that we are concerned with ethics in the first place, that we hold ourselves responsible for choice and avoidance, and that we pursue education are evidence that we have at least a little bit of control, and that the choices that we make are subject to our own moral evaluation.

Quote from Cassius

The point is that the other philosophers, typified by Plato with his cave, allege that the senses "lie" to you and that they are therefore unreliable sources of information about how to live.

I'm terribly near-sighted, and I like to use the example of eyesight.

Without glasses, everything is dangerously blurry: precisely as it should appear to someone with an elongated eyeball. If I saw the world "as it really is" (i.e. "not blurry"), then my senses would be lying to me, leading me to believe that my eyeball is round. But it doesn't, because it isn't.

Evaluating sensory data is like asking a toddler a question about your physical appearance: the toddler doesn't know how to manage that delicate, social interaction; they will probably blurt out the first, unfiltered impression they have, without any thought as to the implications.

There is also a strong contrast here, not only against Plato, but also, against Democritus. Both philosophers would have seen near-sightedness as evidence that the senses are unreliable, and that the objects of perception are just illusions that come from a more fundamental reality.