Posts by Eikadistes

I've completed translating Bailey's collection of 87 fragments. I've included the Greek (and also went back to the Vatican Sayings to do the same.) If nothing else, these are helpful exercises.

There are a number of other fragments, not included by Bailey I intend to add.

Quote from Don

I highly doubt the Garden had enough land to grow sufficient barley or wheat. That was likely purchased. Intriguing to consider.

Much of it was purchased with currency, but much of it was acquired through trade and good-will ... and other means. Usener fragments 184 and 185 (corresponding with Bailey 40 and 41) illuminate a lot of this. The employment of λήθω in the first fragment suggests to me that some of the provisions of grain were secured, to use a modern term, "under-the-table" or "off the top".

If Epicurus used as many resources as is alleged, he did not pay for it all (that's a big if).

Sweet Dreams or Space Ghosts? The Saga continues!

Quote from Cassius

A Death in no way exists for us; for that which has dissolved is imperceptible; and that which is imperceptible in no way exists for us. [see: Key Doctrine 2]

or at least:

B Death in no way exists for us; for that which has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us. [see: Key Doctrine 2]

It comes down to how we want to read το διαλυθέν αναισθητει

• το - (art. sing. acc.) a, the, and occasionally that which or what [is]

• διαλυθέν -(v. aor. pass. nom. sing.) to loosen, dissolve, divorce, discharge, break off, weaken

• αναισθητει - a declension of ἀναίσθητος from ἀν- (an-, “not”) +‎ αἴσθησις (aísthēsis, “sensation”) meaning without sense or feeling, without perception, not perceptible by sense.

I take the subject of the sentence to be "that which has dissolved", which is the atomized soul, so we're not talking about (as I read it) the experience of our friends dying, and what that means to us, we're exploring what it would mean for myself to be dead, or what death excludes.

So, I don't like the first translation (personally), because it seems redundant to say "Those who survive will no longer visually witness those who have died". It would be more prudent to express the idea that "Those who have died are definitely not experiencing an afterlife."

I should mention, I did the same with the Sayings of the Wise, taken as a whole (and not as individual pronouncements like in Proverbs). I think it provides some context to (for ex.) the latter of these two clauses: "And they will in a time of crisis serve a monarch; and they will thereupon exalt anyone after being corrected", though, that's just my take on it, with the humble resources available to me.

I've published a new translation of the Sententiae Vaticana of early Epicureans.

As I continue to polish them, I'm moving to the fragments.

Quote from Kalosyni

When I attended a Buddhist group, there were two younger men who committed suicide a few years apart. I partially point to and blame the passive nature of the Buddhist philosophy and the constant preaching of the "acceptance of what is". (and of course Buddhists don't say much about seeking pleasure).

We learned that the leaders of a local Nichiren Buddhist community were unanimously engaged in discouraging the target of spousal abuse from seeking legal support when they showed the leaders the bruises on their body. There is nothing noble about that. (To be fair, upon learning this, a regional leader in the organization admonished the local leaders for their failure to prioritize the safety of an individual. Nonetheless, it seems like supernatural religion lends itself to misinterpretation).

I've been documenting my discoveries on biblical passages that directly reference Epicureans, and I was tickled to find them having referred to Paul as a "seed picker [like of out a gutter]".

I should add, that one, I would bet, came from Epicureans, who used the analogy of "seeds" to refer to everything from the constituents of reality to the pieces of the soul to sex fluids.

Quote from Joshua

The Riddle of Epicurus

We'll go over this during our Nov. 3rd recording, so here are a few links;

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4583/4583-h/4583-h.htm

(control+F search 'epicur' to locate the passage)

And the New Epicurean article on the history of the dilemma;

https://newepicurean.com/derivation-of-…le-of-epicurus/

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I wanted to mention that I've recently com across a few scholars who suggested that this trilemma actually comes from a Skeptic (perhaps Carneades the Academic), and not Epicurus (Larrimore, Mark Joseph. The Problem of Evil: A Reader. Blackwell, 2001). Based on De Ira Dei David Hume attributes this argument to Epicurus: “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?“ (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 1779). While it comports with Epicurean theology, it does not correspond with any extant writings of Epicurus nor another Epicurean. I also note that Lactantius documented this material approximately 600 years after Epicurus was teaching in Athens. <https://twentiers.com/anger-of-god>

From Lactantius, On the Anger of God "You see, therefore, that we have greater need of wisdom on account of evils; and unless these things had been proposed to us, we should not be a rational animal. But if this account is true, which the Stoics were in no manner able to see, that argument also of Epicurus is done away. God, he says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? or why does He not remove them?² I know that many of the philosophers, who defend providence, are accustomed to be disturbed by this argument, and are almost driven against their will to admit that God takes no interest in anything, which Epicurus especially aims at; but having examined the matter, we easily do away with this formidable argument. For God is able to do whatever He wishes, and there is no weakness or envy in God. He is able, therefore, to take away evils; but He does not wish to do so, and yet He is not on that account envious. For on this account He does not take them away, because He at the same time gives wisdom, as I have shown; and there is more of goodness and pleasure in wisdom than of annoyance in evils. For wisdom causes us even to know God, and by that knowledge to attain to immortality, which is the chief good. Therefore, unless we first know evil, we shall be unable to know good. But Epicurus did not see this, nor did any other, that if evils are taken away, wisdom is in like manner taken away; and that no traces of virtue remain in man, the nature of which consists in enduring and overcoming the bitterness of evils. And thus, for the sake of a slight gain in the taking away of evils, we should be deprived of a good, which is very great, and true, and peculiar to us. It is plain, therefore, that all things are proposed for the sake of man, as well evils as also goods" (Chapter 13, translated by William Fletcher 1886).

Regarding part of that section, here is how White (2021) translates:

"119 Moreover, the wise man will both marry and have children, as Epicurus says in Perplexities and in On Nature; he will marry at a time suited to his circumstances in life, and some will refuse to do so. However, he will not chatter away over drink, says Epicurus in the Symposium. Nor will he participate in government, as in On Lives Book 1; nor will he be a tyrant. nor will he act like a Cynic, as in On Lives Book 2; nor will he go begging. But even if his sight is impaired, he will not take his own life, as he says in the same work. also the wise man will feel sorrow, says Diogenes in Selections Book 5; and he will go to court, and he will leave behind writings, but he will not deliver ceremonial addresses."

I'm re-visiting this.

Don do you have a copy of the original manuscript?

The error here is the original translators' rendering of the first three words of this sentence. Some render μηδὲ, which is very clearly the oppositional word "not", whereas others render μέν, which is not oppositional and may just be reinforcing the καί. This is the difference between "and will not marry" versus "and also will marry". This is a rather significant contention.

After citing this position to Epicurus' book Puzzles and On Nature, the following clause features the word δέ, which is another oppositional "but", denoting a change in direction from the last sentence. We have another future verb here ("will marry"), so that leads me to believe that the first sentence should be μηδὲ, that a wise person is "not" usually likely to marry. That seems consistent.

But then this phrase, which seems to sit by itself:

καὶ διατραπήσεσθαί τινας

There are no nominative or genitive words in this clause, so I'm assuming the subject is implied.

καὶ usually means "and" (or some other supportive conjunction)
τινας is a plural, indefinate, accusative pronoun, so it should have to be "them", right?

I'm also assuming that "them" is the recipient of the action in this sentence.

διατραπήσεσθαί is the action, and ugh ... I wish we had more examples.

So, breaking it down ... since there's only one example of it ... the root is διατρέπω, from δια- ("by, for, through") and τρέπω ("to turn, rotate, divert"). It ends in -esthai, so I assume this is the future, middle infinitive form. So, that leads me to interpret this word as "will turn away from".

Altogether, we've got "and will turn away from them."

So, regarding the pronoun "them" ... as far as I can tell, the only actual nouns that have been used so far (besides citing "Epicurus" and his books "Puzzles" and "On Nature") are "circumstances" and "of life". Otherwise, the concepts "wife", "children", and "marriage" are implied by verbs, but those nouns are not used by themselves. So the thing the wise person is turning away from ...

"and will turn away from [their family]" or "[the circumstance productive of family]."

Either way, as I'm now reading this, it seems like Epicurus was saying "Wise people don't start a family. Even if you find the right person, starting a family is still unwise."

One other discovery (I think) I've made is this:

By the Archonship of Sosistratus, beginning July of 270 BCE, Epicurus was already dead.

When he celebrated his 71st birthday in February of 270 BCE, he was still alive.

Most likely, Epicurus died in the Spring of that year.

I'm organizing the information here: https://twentiers.com/2024/10/27/dates-of-epicurean-works/

From Philodemus and the New Testament World:, approximations from Marcello Gigante:

While we can't date the more popular publications, Philodemus provides an unusually-well-documented list of Epistles, dated per each Archon. Clay preserves this list (51-54):

(forgive the formatting errors)

YEAR/S - Archon Name
- Epistle No. Common name (reference).

307/6 - Anaxikrates
The date of Epicurus' move to Athens, Diogenes Laertius, X.2.)

300/299 - Hegemachos
- No. 1. Peri phuseos Book XV (Arrighetti, p. 292).

296/5 - Nikias
- No. 2. Peri phuseos Book XXVIII (Arrighetti, p. 321).
- No. 3. A letter written eri Nikíov, Philodemos, On Epicurus II, fr. 1.7 (Vogliano, p. 59).

294/3 - Olympiodoros
- No. 4. A letter to a person unknown, from Philodemos, Праумаа XIV.11

292/1 - Philippos
- No. 5. A letter to Polyainos and Leonteus of Lampsakos on the Stoics in Athens, Pap.Herc. 176, fr. 5, XXIV. 14-15 (Vogliano, p. 50; Arrighetti, [67]).
- No. 6. To Themista of Lampsakos reporting on the young Pythokles, Philodemos, Пра MOTEiaL IV.8-10 (Arrighetti, [501).
- No. 7. To friends in Lampsakos on poverty, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXV.38 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 67; Arrighetti, [96]).

291/0 - Charinos
- No. 8. Letters sent to Polyainos, Charino magistratu, Seneca, Epistulae 18.9 (Arrighetti, [831).
- No. 9. A letter to Polyainos, Philodemos, On Epicurus, fr. 5.1 (Vogliano, p. 65; Arrighetti [841).
- No. 10. A letter to a person unknown, Philodemos, On Piety, Pap. Herc. 1098, X. 12 (Gomperz, p. 125; Arrighetti, [106] [lines 938-939 Obbink]).
- No. 11. To a person unknown, Philodemos, On Piety, Pap. Herc. 1077, X.1 (Gomperz, p. 105; Arrighetti, [107] [lines 840-841 Obbink]).
- No. 12. To Polyainos on poverty, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXIV.8 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 66; Arrighetti. (1081).
- No. 13. A letter to a person unknown, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXV.8 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 67; Arrighetti, [109]).

290/289 - Telokles
- No. 14. To Mithres, on a reversal of fortune, Philodemos, On Wealth XXXVI.9 (Tepedino Guerra, p. 67; Arrighetti, [791).

289/8 - Aristonymos
- No. 15. To Mithres, acknowledging a contribution to the school, Philodemos, Прааеа XXXIV.1 (Diano, p. 32; Arrighetti, [74]).
- No. 16. To Phyrson of Kolophon on the piety of a certain Theodotos. Philodemos. On Piety, Pap. Herc. 1098, XII. 15 (Gomperz, p. 127; Arrighetti, [93] [lines 797-801 Obbink]).

286/5 Diokles
- No. 17. A letter to Anaxarchos and Leontion, Pap. Herc. 176, fr. 5, XXV.31-32 (Vogliano, p. 51).

285/4 Diotimos
- No. 18. To Phyrson, Philodemos, Прауата XV.1-2 (Arrighetti, [94]).
- No. 19. If the name Diotimos is that of the archon; cf. No. 11. A Diotimos appears in Pap. Herc. 1780, VIII, fr. 1 [On Piety, lines 841-842 Obbink]. If he is Diotimos Euvóotov EnuaxiSns he cannot be the recipient of a letter from Epicurus; cf. W. Croenert, Kolotes und Menedemos, Leipzig 1906, pp. 82-83.

284/3 Isaios
- No. 20. To a person unknown, Philodemos, Прауратє XXXII. 14 (Diano, p. 19; Arrighetti, [110]).
- No. 21. To a person unknown, apparently on the education of the sons of Menoikeus, Phi- lodemos, adv. [Sophistas], fr. 16 (Sbordone 1947, p. 78; Arrighetti, [111]).

283/2 Euthios
- No. 22. On a setback of the Macedonians to a person unknown, Philodemos, On the Stoics, Pap. Herc. 339, V.9 (Arrighetti, [112]) [**Gli Stoici" VI.9 Dorandi].

281/0 Ourios
- No. 23. To Leonteus, Philodemos, Iayatr XXXII.15-16 (Diano, p. 19; Arrighetti, [68]).

279/8 Anaxikrates
- No. 24. To a person unknown, Philodemos, On the Stoics V.13, En'] 'Avatuk[p]á[rous (cf. Croenert [under No. 19], p. 54, n. 259) [*Gli Stoici" VI.13 Dorandil.

278/7 Demokles
- No. 25. To Kolotes of Lampsakos, possibly on the death of Metrodoros, Pap. Herc. 176, fr. 5, XXVIII.3-4 (Vogliano, p. 54 [cf. Gomperz in Hermes 5, 1871, pp. 387-388]; Arrighetti,[62]).
- No. 26. To Mithres, Philodemos, Maya XXIX. 17 (Diano, p. 15; Arrighetti, [75]).

274/3 Euboulos
- No. 27. To Idomeneus of Lampsakos, Philodemos, Прауцат XXVI.14 (Diano, p.12; Arrighetti, [601).
- No. 28. To Mithres on frugality, Philodemos.Прауатїа XXX.16-17 (Diano, p. 16; Arrighetti, [76]).
- No. 29. To a person unknown, asking for somebooks of Demokritos, Philodemos, adv. [Sophistas], fr. 13 (Sbordone 1947, p. 75; Arrighetti, [113]).

271/0 Pytharatos
- No. 30. To Mithres on his approaching death, Philodemos, Прауатеа XXXI.3-4 (Diano, p. 17; Arrighetti, [77])

I note that Epicurus maintained a correspondence with Mithres for over two decades.

I was wondering if anyone had come across any material related to dating Epicurus' works.

I found a few references from Sedley and Arrighetti:

Sedley, On Nature XXVIII 14-16

Arrighetti, La struttura dell’Epistola di Epicuro a Pitocle 127e

Quote from Cassius

The question is: To what extent does hearing someone say that they are "feeling no pain" automatically invoke an association that what they mean is that they are "stoned?"

I tend to use "stoned" when I want to express feeling "disoriented", closer to an anesthetized state of νάρκη (nárkē, from which we derive our word "narcotic"), meaning "torpor" or "numbness". In this regard, anything that numbs pleasure along with pain (I'm thinking of narcotics, not cannabinoids) might be painless, but also, pleasure-less, and that wordplay doesn't help us enjoy pleasure.

(As a regular user, I express the pleasant relief I feel as being "mellow"or "relaxed", as opposed "stoned" or "baked", which I would reserve for states that resemble drunkenness.)

Slang, however, is fluid, and not only can mean anything we want, not only does mean multiple things to different people, but has, throughout our own history been used in mutually contradictory ways: words like "stoned" have meant everything from stumbling intoxication to a mild buzz, and that difference is the difference between pleasant relief versus dangerous anesthetization.

Blue Öyster Cult speaks for me.

Seasons don't fear the reaper
Nor do the wind, the sun or the rain
We can be like they are...

Quote from Kalosyni

There isn't much on emotions in Epicurean texts.

Definitely check out Philodemus' On Anger. He has a lot to say about the spectrum of human emotion, particularly, a comparison of natural "anger" versus contemptuous "rage".

His treatise On Frank Criticism provides advice for guides and teachers to observe a student's temperament so that constructive criticism can be delivered and received most effectively.

In a few places throughout On Death, Philodemus describes the lamentation that can come from a sudden loss, and evaluates how healthy it is to ruminate versus reflect. This seems to echo KD40 as well as Vatican Saying 66, which recommends against indulging depression.

In the sagely sayings that Diogenes records, Epicurus is documented as having identified hatred, envy, and contempt, in particular, as being unhealthy emotions that must be overcome by reason. He also recognizes happiness, gratitude, and pity (in terms of feelings towards servants, as is written), and then cautions against romance, love (i.e. infatuation), and sexual arousal.

There's also a fair amount of discussion on fear. (Come to think of it, I should have started with this, because overcoming Fear of God and Fear of Death are expressed in KD1 and KD2). KD10 discusses the uselessness of physical pleasure if the mind is stunted by fear from the unknown, and then in KD12, follows up by identifying sympathy for myth as a primary source of fear.

I personally find a lot of useful tips as far as counsel goes for feeling shame, guilt, and worthlessness from economic insecurity. In particular, Bailey fragments 29, 37, 48, 85, and KD15. Nowhere does he explicitly mention those emotions by name, but that's how I read into those sayings.

Quote from Don

However, Raghunanan narrowing of αφθαρτον to "incorruptible" ie "not able to be corrupted, from a moral/ethical perspective" - with the understanding that the gods will eventually physically decay due to their being material compound beings is enticing.

It was for this reason that I went with "incorruptible" in my own translation.

Short of addressing the seeming tension between "gods having immortal quasi-bodies" and "all compound objects being subject to the forces of dissolution", I can, at least, say, confidently, that, at least, the gods are buttressed against moral corruption. Whether they are space ghosts who exist forever on an infinite timeline, or whether they are self-actualized animals who have advanced beyond their terrestrial biochemistry but still threatened, or whether they are just conceptual metaphors: all of those beings neither cause trouble to themselves nor cause trouble to others.