Posts by Eikadistes

I'm curious about the phrasing you got. I might have it wrong and need to review.

In KD35, I have "Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι κινοῦντα..."

I based my translation of Book 10 on this text from Perseus.

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"Who that is wise practices that which the laws forbid, knowing that they will escape notice? A simple-minded accusation is easy to pass." (Usener 18, from Against Kolṓtēs.)

Epíkouros stops short of saying, 'don't ever break the law'.

This reflection seems poignant in times of lawlessness and collapse, when "someone establishes a law" that "no longer possesses the nature of the just" (KD 37), or when many "things appear not to fit the definition of what is considered to be just" (KD 38).

When this is the case, I think the wise person would continue using comparative analysis to determine which options are most profitable (including potential law-breaking). In the case of betraying a friend versus breaking the law, the suffering one commits to the soul is greater with betrayal:

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"And so the wise tortured on a rack [suffer] no [more] pain than the torture of a friend, and in defense of them will die. For if one betrays a friend everything through one’s life will become frustrated by doubt and strained" (Vatican Sayings 56-57)

Quote from Cassius

I wonder if our much younger members here see any of this and whether they have any comment on whether they think the claimed renewed interest in Catholicism is overblown. Eikadistes ? Charles ?

I do not believe that we are on the brink of a 'Fifth Great Awakening' of American Christianity. If anything, the general trend right now is a line from Catholicism to astrology.

I think it's political context. I can think of a handful of minor tweaks that would radically change the tone of this entire dialogue. Imagine if J. D. Vance converted to the Orthodox Church. Imagine if Pope Francis elected an Israeli to the Papacy. Imagine if Jeffrey Epstein was born Catholic.

It looks like its primarily a compilation of Epicurean core texts and related texts. (It looks like the editor had a similar intention in mind as did I with The Hedonicon). Klavan also includes a few interesting selections of Newton, Hume, Adams, Jefferson, and Maxwell.

I don't love the following description by Pseudo-Ploútarkhos, but as is translated by Goodwin, it presents "burden" (usually translated as "weight" or "mass") as "gravity:

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Those bodies acknowledge these three accidents, figure, magnitude, and gravity. Democritus acknowledged but two, magnitude and figure. Epicurus added the third, to wit, gravity; for he pronounced that it is necessary that bodies receive their motion from that impression which springs from gravity, otherwise they could not be moved. (Book 1, Chapter 3)

I don't know if that's accurate about Dēmókritos because Pseudo-P. was writing something like 800 years or so after him, so his (whomever he was) reviewing these ideas is like me writing a biography about Genghis Khan, and then people in 3800 CE using me as a source; too-far removed.

Still, I found the phrasing interesting. Just an anecdote.

I've been wondering lately if there might be an innate correspondence between the three qualities and the atomic motions, being falling, recoiling (10.44), and swerving. Epíkouros writes to Hēródotos that the βάρους (bárous) "burden" (so I'm translating to avoid any modern ideas) justifies why any one particle falls (10.61). I don't find it being directly expressed, but I imagine that the μεγέθους (megéthous) "magnitude" partially determines the manner in which any two particular rebound off of each other, as the case when particles of different, atomic sizes collide.

I've never been conceptually satisfied with my own model of "the swerving", but I toy with the idea that the particular σχήματος (skhēmatos) "scheme" of a particle results in a swerve ... I personally imagine the schemes as being like the different shapes in Tetris and the rotating blocks skipping spaces when you turn them as being a crude example of a kind of lateral swerve.

That may be totally off, but it's also a concept for which we have the least, thorough documentation. just to note those instances, so far as I know, we've got Philódēmos' On Signs (36.12-13), Cicero's On Ends of Good and Evil (where a character dismisses the swerve as an "arbitrary fiction"), Diogénēs of Oìnóanda's inscription in refuting Dēmókritos (fr. 54, col. 3, no. 6), and Lucretius (Book II). So, anyway ... I've been thinking "Tetris" lately with regards to the unpredictable wiggle.

Quote from wbernys

Quote from Eikadistes

Someday, I would like to fatten-up The Hedonicon with the works of Philódēmos

Certainly would be awesome. I mainly want Torquatus (And Velleius) speech included and some of the english to be more clear and a little less archaic (PD6 in hedonicon is a example where i struggled to understand it). Got the best of Epicurus by classic caves. Like that the most.

That's really perceptive, and I appreciate you noting that one, in particular, because of all of the Doctrines, I find 6 to be unquestionably the most mis-translated, due to the language. You're right, it does need an update, though I caution that other translators are making compromises.

(This might warranty another thread, but...)

Compared against any other doctrine, Six has been translated with more difference than any. You'll find the most differences with each translators treatment of 6. I found that each translator makes some compromise at some point in negotiating with (what seems to me to be) unique phrasing, so, the awkward phrasing that you notice is definitely intentional with that one at this point.

Of all available translators, I personally find Makridis (2005) to have rendered a translation of Doxa 6 that seems to reflect the semantics most authentically, so I used that more as a model:

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“This <human ability to lead a good life> originally became possible by nature and for the sake of imparting courage in human beings <who were then living in a pre-social condition.> And this is the natural origin and principle on which all authority—be it even kingship—is based. And it is from the same <natural propensities> that a human being is able also to arrange a good and pleasant life.”

I like him because he adds some commentary, particularly noting "kingship" as being a translators addition, not authentic vocabulary. The rest seem content to invoke modern political language:

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“As for the assurance of safety from the attacks of men, by virtue of the nature of political dominion and kingly power this is a good thing, no matter by whose aid one is able to procure it." - De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 79 (1954)

“Political rule and kingly power being what they are, it is a good thing to feel secure in human relations no matter through whose agency one is able to attain this." - De Witt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“The natural good of public offce and kingship is for the sake of getting confdence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.” - Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“That natural beneft of kingship and high offce is (and only is) the degree to which they provide security from other men.”- Anderson (2004)

“It is a natural beneft of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage.” - Saint-Andre (2008)

“In order that men might not fear one another, there was a natural beneft to be had from government and kingship, provided that they are able to bring about this result.” - Mensch (2018)

“There was some natural good in leadership and kingship for the purpose of establishing mutual confdence among people, any time someone is thereby able to do so.” - White (2021)

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There's this trend you'll notice them doing where they present two, parallel, sociopolitical words ("political rule and kingly power", "public office and kingship", "kingship and high office", "leadership and kingship", "leadership and kingship"), but those words are not in the original text. Instead, we find a few "to be's" a few infinitives, and frustratingly ambivalent pronouns.

This is a great one to dive into the language for personal study.

To mention a point that Don always champions, the Doctrines should be taken as a whole. While KD6 seems awkward on its own, it makes a lot more sense when you contextualize it against KD5 (you've gotta be peaceful and practical about pleasure), and KD7 (fame usually isn't practical).

That said, thanks again, and I'll definitely review for the sake of fluidity.

Quote from m.dango

I have a lot of reading to do! 😅

Great call on Living for Pleasure! Professor Austin pops in here every now and then. The crew here with LucretiusToday podcast interviewed her about the book. You can find it here.

Someday, I would like to fatten-up The Hedonicon with the works of Philódēmos, which comprises a large volume of existing Epicurean literature, but, in the meantime, you can find those works in the library at TWENTIERS.COM, along with some attempts at rescuing fragments.

Welcome! Here, you will do well to tarry ... and all that.

Quote from ReiWolfWoman

Would it be extraneous to friendship and community and pleasure, and therefore a search for an unnecessary (and natural or unnatural) goal?

Not at all.

I also don't mean to imply that any of the Greeks (besides Pýrrhōn), or Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley or Kant were inspired by Indian philosophies; they just provide interesting parallels. Maybe some were of which I am not aware, but primarily Pýrrhōn, the neoplatonists, and transcendentalists.

Quote from Cassius

They are arranged in chronological order?

Yeah, I think I got their birth year right, more-or-less.

These are by no means precise, just a general overview of some relevant comparisons:

Again, just a rough sketch, mixed with some loose parallels with Indian philosophy.

Note that some of those thinkers did not (and would not) use the words I provided for their own philosophies. (Fichte in particular wouldn't like the words I used for him, but he can deal with it). The Indian philosophies are pure approximations. I only mention them because the Transcendentalists were heavily influenced by the recently-translated Upanishads and Gita. (Perhaps mistranslations in some cases, but translations, nonetheless).

If a lot of it sound similar, it's because it is. The German Transcendentalists were directly inspired by the same branches of Indian philosophy that inspired Roman Neoplatonists. They also provide an example of a continuation of a Greek re-branding of Indian ideas (as with Pýrrhōn).

Quote from Cassius

George Berkeley is relevant to this discussion

I think in a survey of the history of philosophy, Berkeley is one of the best examples of an Idealist. Whereas, for Plátōn, the world of matter that traps souls in cages in not made of mind.

Quote from Eikadistes

the monistic Idealism of Advaita Vedanta, and of George Berkeley (e.g. "If a tree falls in a forest...") suggests that the stuff of existence is literally composed of mind. Both traditions entertained the idea that we are but ideas in the mind of God. Plátōn would have disagreed with this kind of "Idealism", as did Kant. Something else is real besides just thinking.

To my knowledge, Kant isn't arguing for either. In fact, now that I'm thinking about it again, Kant's notion of "noumena" (which is typically I typically correlate with "Idealism") may actually be closer to the particles of Demokritos, both of whom suggest that either the material particles, or Kant's "thing-in-itself" are outside of the domain of human knowledge to completely understand.

So, in this regard, though he's part of a trend of "German Transcendental Idealists" insofar as viewing the "true" nature of reality as being something transcendental to the human intellect and more fundamental than the observations that are being reviewed, "Idealist" may not be a good label for Kant, unlike his contemporaries and those whom he influenced.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant identifies "material Idealism" as the opponent to his "transcendental idealism". Of the "material idealists", he refutes both the "problematic idealism" of Descartes (whom history typically calls a "dualist") and the "dogmatical idealism" of Berkeley (whom history typically calls a "monist"). The varieties of Vedanta provides analogues for these two ideas. In describing and refuting these two forms of Idealism, Kant writes:

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Idealism—I mean material idealism—is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either (1) doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the problematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, “I am.” The second is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself impossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard space as a property of things in themselves; for in that case it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental æsthetic. Problematical idealism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself possible only under the previous assumption of external experience.

He then affirms of his philosophy that: "This doctrine I call Transcendental Idealism." However, he adds that it is "realist in the transcendental sense". I understand that to mean that Kant definitely believed in an objective reality that exists beyond sense perception. He adds the nuance that the purely empirical description of the world fails because concepts like "matter" and "space" and "time" are themselves mental constructs that are different that reality-by-itself.

This ^^^^ is why I want to suggest that it might be helpful to contrast his propositions against Dēmókritos, with the except of particle physics. It might be fair to say that Dēmókritos believed the that the particles were like the "thing-in-itself", unknowable, separate from propositions in the mind of people. Kant, I think, would say that "particles" are also constructs in the mind. (Now that I'm thinking about it, this presents an interesting parallel with a Buddhist doctrine).

So, I think, even thought Kant refers to his philosophy as a flavor of "Idealism", he criticizes the other idealists of his era much more dismissively (I think) than the empiricists.

Quote from Cassius

ReiWolfWoman tells us:

My background in Epicurus is that I was first exposed to him in an undergrad philosophy class

I'm curious about others' experience with undergraduate Philosophy programs.

The program at Florida Gulf Coast University was built around Aristotle. One professor called him "the smartest person who ever lived". The senior thesis class at the college was inspired by Alasdair MacIntyre, a virtue ethicist and modern Aristotelian. Besides this, they offered supplemental surveys of existentialist and post-structuralist thinkers, and a section on Socratic rhetoric.

My last day before dropping out was funny. I'll never forget it: that last class featured a discussion about Georges Bataille (existentialist) masturbating in front of his mother's corpse. I don't remember how much that class cost per credit hour, but however much it was, it was too much.

The Garden was not mentioned once at any point in my formal education. I didn't receive a direction, or find anything that couldn't have been found in a public library or a bookstore. ... meanwhile, extended cousins in Rome shared with me that Epicuro was part of their childhood curriculum. I'm curious about others' experiences with Epicurean Philosophy in the education system.

Our friend Leonidas from the Garden of Athens has taken the time to translate the Timeline of Epicurean Philosophy hosted at Twentiers into Greek! You can find his translation ΟΙ ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΕΙΟΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΤΗΤΑ ("THE EPICUREANS IN ANTIQUITY") here.

I'm hoping to keep an open dialogue about future opportunities to collaborate.

My eyes are melting so I added a dark mode plugin (bottom-right corner).

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Also, my bad (upon reflection) for demonstrating my point with mythic narratives.

Read the citation Cassius shared for a proper, Epicurean defense.

Quote from LAMAR__44

Why then wouldn’t this be me living again?

The future animal that looks like you will have different friends.

To be the same, you'd also need the same context, the same culture, the same language, the same fashion, the same laws, the same relationships, the same experience that guarantees an identical existence. As animals, we're defined by our development, not a permanent prototype.

I'm thinkin' ... maybe, like, Toy Story? Sure, millions of toy cowboys named Woody were produced, but Andy only loves one Woody, and there's only one Woody who loves Andy. In the words of the great Randy Newman, "Some other folks might be a little bit smarter than I am, maybe stronger to. But none of them will ever love you the way I do. Just me and you, boy. And as the years go by, our friendship will never die. You've gotta see it's our destiny. You've got a friend in me."

Hmm ... maybe that's it. Love. (Of course, "friend" and "love" are the same word in Greek.) Friendship doesn't die with friends, so your memories are another crucial piece of you.

I'm also thinking of Annihilation with Natalie Portman in it. I'm not going to spoil if any readers haven't seen it (go see it!), but, in a nutshell ... a thing that looks like you in every way is not you. Or ... at least so my personal viewership gathered from that eery narrative.

Also, quick thought experiment. I'm thinking Rick & Morty here (adult cartoon). So, we have a mad scientist. He wants to trick your family. He makes a bunch of indistinguishable robot clones that (to others) are like you in every way. It lives with your family for years, and begins evolving functional relationships that allow for improvisation and development. The mad scientist, hoping not to alert your family, switches you in the night, and induces selective amnesia in you. You awaken. Your family notices that you have gestures, habits, and a vocabulary that reflects you at a younger age, not the version of you that has developed and grown with them. So ... who are you? I have to think that you are the victim of the mad scientist, not the form of you that can be reproduced. Even if everyone externally recognizes the robot clone as you, the robot clone is other than the scientist's victim.

Quote from LAMAR__44

Essentially, it argues that the universe could not be eternal

This point is consistent with Epicurean physics, which teaches that each kósmos is temporary.

In the Epistle to Herodótos, Epíkouros describes the creation of a kósmos: "concerning the intercepting of the amalgamations out of [the] beginning of these [cosmic cycles] during the generation of a kósmou" (10.77). Likewise, each kósmos has an inevitable end.

Lucretius elaborates on the life cycle of a kósmos. He writes that "the chiefest members and parts of the world are destroyed and begotten anew, I may be sure that for heaven and earth as well there has been a time of beginning and there will be a time of destruction. " (5.245)

However, "the All is not destined to be destroyed into non-being".

We can further flesh out what constitutes a kósmos and what constitutes "the All" beyond our own kósmos. Epíkouros defines this for Pythoklēs: "[The] kósmos is a slice of heaven, encompassing both glowers [stars], [the] earth, and all [observable] phenomena, [and] containing [a] partition away from the infinite". Generally, that definition covers (at least) anything the JWST can measure. "The All", then, is everything in addition to the aforementioned. He further writes in the case of "intercosmic [space] — I mean the [spatial] distance between [each] of the kósmōn, within permeable space, and not [as] in large, sterile, and empty [space]" (10.88-89).

(I caution anyone from directly translating kósmos as either "world" or "universe". These are ancient concepts that do not directly correspond to our own, technical definitions.)

Quote from LAMAR__44

we can’t have an infinite past, because this would require an actual infinite set to be constructed through successive addition of finite elements, since the past is just previously present moments added onto each other. And in the same way you can’t count and reach infinity, only keep counting infinitely, you can’t have an infinite past.

I may not understand this correctly, so I apologize in advance. I'm speaking personally here, but I disagree with this on the premise of Karl Popper's delineation between verification versus falsifiability. Verification says that we have to experimentally verify things for statements to be true. Karl Popper says this is limited. Let's use the proposition that all swans are white. You don't need to capture and record every single swan. You just need to find one black swan.

We don't need to map infinity (which would be logistically impossible, as it keeps stretching every way), all we need to do is find a point where "the All" begins. When you find that, please let us know. I guarantee that you will be awarded a Nobel Prize in Physics.

In a fashion, the above process is loosely related to how Epíkouros argues. Here is a familiar approach to his reasoning. 'I observe A to be the case. If A were not the case, then B would be the case. Since we do not observe B, then A is the case'. In this regard, Epíkouros might argue that "If 'the All' has a beginning, then we'll find a beginning. Or, perhaps we'll find an end. Thus far, no compounds have ever popped into existence in front of our eyes without a preceding cause, and, likewise, reality has never collapsed into pure nothingness while we were in it, so the notion that the intercosmic void (in which kósmoi develop) has a hard beginning, or a hard end has not been observed, and would contradict the fact that every compound anyone has ever observed comes from something else.

Quote from LAMAR__44

Another way to reframe the argument is that for you to reach the present moment, you’d have to first wait for an infinite number of past moments to occur, which is analogous to waiting for an infinite time to pass, or walking an infinite distance and eventually getting to the end.

This strikes as a sort of modern analogue to the Eleatic argument by Zeno and others that we receive as the old "Tortoise and the Hare" story. (I just realize that Cassius mentioned this above, so I know apologize for the redundancy). The Eleatics set out to prove that motion was impossible through the concept of infinite divisibility. So they argue, to get from A [start] to Z [finish] you have to pass through B [mid point]. To then get from B from Z, you have to get to C, ad infinitum. Thus, to get to Z [finish], you have to pass through an endless series of mid-points, and you can't.

We Epicureans disqualify this entire argument by simply walking to Z. You can.

Likewise, skeptical speculation aside, we know we exist because we feel things, so we have to assume that our existence, which is real, comes from a previous state, because, observably, things have never popped into existence like in I Dream of Jeanie. If compounds could randomly pop into existence without a preceding cause, then we might have observed it by now.

I'm about to talk out of my league ( Martin), but just writing from a philosophical perspective, even if contemporary particles are modeled as 0-dimensional points that condensed from a hot soup of early universe, or some kind of intersection between energetic fields, or that space is a continuum of entangled particles, or that cosmology eventually finds a sort of Moment Zero, the way humans study nature, as soon as we identify Moment Zero, we'll start looking for Moment -1.

Like I said though, if anyone finds some kind of Moment Zero to "the All" itself, please let us know! Epicureans take observational evidence very, very seriously. But, here again, it might be better not to use ancient categories to organize the concepts we derive from modern observations.

I have yet to find Xenophanes in the extent works of Epíkouros, Metródōros, Hermarkhos, Polyainos, Polystratos, Karneiskos, Dēmētrios of Lakonia, Zēnon, Philódēmos, or either Diogénēs.

Lucretius does allude to Xenophanes (but not by name) somewhere around Book 1 Line 715 in describing the philosopher who supposed the world to be composed of "earth with water" (as opposed to particles, or water like Thales, or fire like Herakleitos, etc.).

I personally love Xenophanes' notion that gods look like believers in the mind of believers. Epicureans would loosely agree with Xenophanes here. As Philódēmos writes, through a process of ὑπερβάσεως (hyperbáseōs) “transposition” (On Piety, Col. 12.9, 324-5), transposed formations have been ἀποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms. Just like centaurs (in being horse + human) a god is (blessedness + human), and that suggests to me that a rational being on another planet would perceive a god to be a blessed example of their species.

It's a loose connection, and I think the Epicureans were making an inference from the fact that the human form contains a rational intellect, and that is a pre-requisite for a blessed being (because anything irrational is going to have a painful life), so I do not believe that Epicureans would agree that a conceptual triangle, or a cow could, in any way, actually qualify as a god. Plus, realistically, and practically, Xenophanes mixes the notion of human happiness with a triangle, so....

It definitely holds for the comment about different human cultures, such as Ethiopians and Thracians. I maintain that part of Epíkouros' theology is an anthropology of religion triggered by Alexander's expansion to India, so the knowledge that Indians, and Persians (etc.) have god-like concepts supports part of Xenophanes' statement about Africans and Europeans.