Posts by TauPhi

Thank you Don and Cassius

I stumbled on this today while working on something else. And it reminded me of initial conversation in this thread:

Quote from Bryan

This is a physical sense that stems from contact -- impressions of particles entering your body -- just like all the other senses. We can only form propositions after we have this sense/contact.

In some circumstances you may focus on being physically touched by the images of trees that are around you, at other times you may focus on being physically touched by circumstances in a way that produces a sense of guilt (or lack of guilt) or a sense of justice (or lack of justice), at other times you may focus on being being physically touched by the images of the gods.

Just as we have an innate ability to sense trees with our eyes, we have an innate ability to sense gods with our mind.

It's from Catherine Wilson's 'Epicureanism: A Very Short Introduction':

"According to the account given in Cicero’s dialogue on this topic, the Epicureans believed that the gods were not perceived by the senses but by the intellect, via images arising from the ‘innumerable atoms’ that compose thoughts and dreams. While some commentators appear to believe, on the basis of a problematic preposition in Cicero’s text, that these images flow from the gods, in the manner of the ordinary idola emitted from solid objects, this does not seem to be what Epicurus had in mind. Rather, the texts suggest that our thoughts flow to the gods on account of the images."

I don't want to make this topic even more complicated, but I'm curious about the direction of the images' flow. Can someone confirm if the images flow from the gods or to the gods according to Epicurus?

Quote from Joshua

The pursuit of "meaning" is itself meaningless, in exactly the same way that repenting of "sin" is meaningless. Meaning isn't real, sin isn't real, the thetans of Scientology aren't real. Don't allow yourself to be made distressed by things that aren't real!

Be careful Joshua . If you add to this: '...and try to live your life in a way that's subjectively worth living, nonetheless.' you might accidentally get yourself invited to the next Annual Absurdism Convention as a panelist taking part in a discussion titled: 'What to do with 42 when you ask about life, the universe and everything'. You may also get a free t-shirt, an instant coffee and a stale doughnutoutttut... eh, donut.

Welcome! UnPaid_Landlord

Quote from Little Rocker

I'll be curious at some point to find out what you take Absurdism to be and why it intrigues you because I've been thinking about it some in the Epicurean context.

Ha! You're not the only one. Now there are at least three of us here thinking about Absurdism. I don't know exactly what's the link, but I always found Absurdism interesting. Maybe Epicureanism and Absurdism are like moths and fire or peanut better and jelly or something... probably not.

Anyway, if someone wants 10 mins introduction to Absurdism in humorous yet surprisingly insightful way, follow the link. (warning: Parental Advisory Explicit Content)

Welcome! UnPaid_Landlord

Quote from Little Rocker

I'll be curious at some point to find out what you take Absurdism to be and why it intrigues you because I've been thinking about it some in the Epicurean context.

Ha! You're not the only one. Now there are at least three of us here thinking about Absurdism. I don't know exactly what's the link, but I always found Absurdism interesting. Maybe Epicureanism and Absurdism are like moths and fire or peanut better and jelly or something... probably not.

Anyway, if someone wants 10 mins introduction to Absurdism in humorous yet surprisingly insightful way, follow the link. (warning: Parental Advisory Explicit Content)

Quote from Little Rocker

I suppose the question is whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων). You could think the Epicureans were taking it as an additional criterion from a straightforward reading of the Letter to Herodotus itself. See DL X 38, and especially 51 (τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων). But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?

Image perceptions of the mind are 'senses at the distance', so to speak. According to Epicureans every object (most likely with the exception of singular atoms and the void - but let's not go there right now) emits images - εἰδωλα. That's why we have two ways of detecting objects:

1) direct contact - eidolas do not make any difference as we have exposure to the objects themselves. In this scenario, the senses are criterion of truth (take precedence) for image perceptions of the mind, which in simpler terms, makes the 4th criterion irrelevant.

2) indirect contact - we get the truth about objects by their eidolas sent to us at the distance (this is the example of a round tower in Epicurean terms). In this scenario, the 4th criterion is crucial and it is considered a full-fledged criterion of truth (equal to the other canonical three criteria) allowing us to know the truth about objects outside of direct sensations.

The answers to your questions Little Rocker are probably something like that:

Quote from Little Rocker

whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων).

Yes, most likely and probably he reserved the three canonical criteria for 'perfect conditions of getting to the truth' without complications arising from 'suspension of belief' due to eidolas' possible distortions resulting from the distance between the observer and the object.

Quote from Little Rocker

But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?

The ability to know truth about our surroundings outside of the direct contact.

I've listened to the latest one on YouTube without any problems and firstly, it's a very good one. Thanks Joshua and Cassius . Secondly, it's great that you utilize that platform. I'm sure the podcast will reach much broader audience now.

Well, I thought, why not to check the remaining two as well?

I didn't see anything wrong with the canonics one.

Physics one is my favourite of the three but I have few suggestions:

- there are two very similar questions about these topics: shapes of the atoms, the swerve, and nature of atomic motion - please consider removing 3 repetitive ones

- in the question about the number of different shapes of the atoms (the first one on the topic) two answers may be correct: 'uncountable' is set as the correct one but I don't see how 'finite' is wrong

- in question 12 (if I remember correctly) there's a typo in one of the answers. 'atoms and either' probably should be 'atoms and ether'

I checked out the Ethics one. My suggestions/observations:

- in question about fears change 'which irrational fears' to '... fear(s)'. Otherwise you already suggest more than one fear which makes majority of options apparently incorrect

- there are 2 questions in a row about categories of desires which are almost identical

- these are followed by another asking about how many categories there are. The correct answer is set to 4. If I'm wrong, ignore this one, but I always thought there are 3: natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary and empty ones

Quote from Bryan

We have Epicurus' words on the issue. Epicurus tells us exactly what the anticipations are in PD 24:

Quote from Cassius

Lining the two sources up like that is a reminder of DeWitt's view that the reference to "the Epicureans generally" adding a fourth criteria was arguably a mistake.

These two comments makes me realise I may understand less about Epicurean criteria of truth than I previously thought... and previously I thought: 'Damn, what did those crazy Epicureans smoke?'

Bryan , can you explain why do you think PD 24 is about anticipations? To me, it is about every criteria of truth except anticipations. The way I see it, it's about all momentary (that is right here, right now) criteria: senses, feelings and image perceptions of the mind. Anticipations are different to these because they are not only 'right here, right now'. They are lasting (they create permanent mental imprints).

For that reason, I don't think the fourth criterion is a mistake. It's linked with other 'momentary' criteria and it serves similar function there to 'properties' and 'accidents' which are linked with 'permanent' anticipations.

Please don't hesitate and point out flaws in my thinking as I really would like to confidently say one day: 'Hey, I get it now. Those Epicureans were not as crazy as I thought.'

What follows is an excerpt from a publication from 1923 by my favourite Epicurean scholar Adam Krokiewicz. It comes from a journal called 'Przegląd Humanistyczny'. I did my best to translate it as accurately as possible and provided some comments to make it easier to digest as the fragment is rather dense. For the sake of completeness, I also attached the original text in Polish and left the source information at the bottom. I hope it helps with the discussion on prolepsis and images.

[*] TauPhi's clarification (might not be precise): Accidents and attributes are understood as philosophical concepts:
accidents - secondary characteristics that are not essential to a thing's identity and may change over time.
attributes - characteristics or qualities associated with a particular substance (substance understood as an essential quality that make up the core of an object or thing, and is often used to refer to physical matter). Attributes can be both physical or non-physical in nature.

Please see more detailed explanation here: https://www.philosophos.org/metaphysical-t…ssence-accident

Original text and source:
"Epikur rozróżniał trzy kryterja prawdy, wrażenia - αἰσθἡσεις, wyobrażenia typowe - προλἡψεις i uczucia - πάθη, tudzież dwie zdolności podmiotu poznającego, a mianowicie bierną - postrzegania, względnie czucia na bodźce zewnętrzne, i czynną - rozumowania. Trzy kryterja Epikura przedstawiają trzy automatyczne i bierne, trzy niezależne od woli ludzkiej rezultaty bodźców zewnętrznych, czyli wizerunków - εἰδωλα, przyczem wrażenia i uczucia mają charakter momentalnej teraźniejszości w przeciwieństwie do trwałych wyobrażeń typowych. Trwałym wyobrażeniom typowym odpowiadają ze względu na moment teraźniejszości tak zwane przynależności - τά συμβεβηκότα i przypadłości - τά συμπτὠματα, mające swoiste narzuty, w gruncie rzeczy takie same wizerunkowe narzuty umysłu - φανταστικαὶ ἐπιβολαὶ τῇς διανοίας, jakie mają doraźne wrażenia i uczucia. Świadoma i poznawcza wola ludzka nawiązuje dopiero do wyobrażeń typowych, utrwalonych w nazwach zewnętrznych przedmiotów, działających swemi wizerunkami na zmysły i umysł człowieka. Umysł ludzki może dzięki swej czynnej zdolności rozumowania uświadomić sobie na podstawie nazw i związanych z niemi wyobrażeń typowych przypadłości poszczególnych przedmiotów, wyłuskać z nich na mocy obserwacji - περίπτωσις, ustosunkowania - ἀναλογία, podobieństwa - ὁμοιότης i związku - σύνθεσις rodzajowe, coraz to ogólniejsze przynależności owych przedmiotów i w ten sposób poznać obok ich zasadniczo niejawnej natury - φύσις, która się składa z przynależności, także ich do czasu niejawną przypadłość generalną i nieuchronną, naprzykład to, że człowiek, jako człowiek, jest śmiertelnym. Na opisanym przebiegu rozumowania polega tak zwana indukcja epikurejska."

SOURCE: Adam Krokiewicz 'O szczęściu epikurejskim' - Przegląd Humanistyczny Year II; Volumes I and II; 1-6.1923; pages 260-261

Quote from Cassius

what is even more certainly true is that having a "sense of humor" (and having the good sense to know when humor is appropriate and when it is not") ought to be considered an essential requirement in participating in an Epicurean community.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2.17.46: Hic quam volet Epicurus iocetur, homo non aptissimus ad iocandum – minimeque resipiens patriam.

Epicurus may make a joke of this if he likes, although humor was never his strong point – an Athenian without the "Attic salt!"

Sense of humour should be strictly prohibited! Laughter makes faces wrinkle, bellies hurt and moods swing. And it's contagious. Now excuse me, I have to go back to my serious life. I have to drag myself to yet another pointless walk and get tired again and listen to those annoying birds chirping and having this awful summer breeze in my wrinkleless face. Ahhh, Wednesdays.

Phillip Mitsis (ed.) - Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism (2020)

I learned a lot from this one. It's one of the first I've read on Epicureanism and I definitely don't regret it. It's not about practical application of the philosophy but it's very informative on Epicureanism as a philosophy and it covers pretty much all aspects of it.

Simple and effective; informative but not overwhelming; visually attractive without any bloat. I love it Cassius . Brilliantly done.

I'm with Don on this one. I have nothing against the fundamentals as they are all in line with Epicurean physics as we know it, but please consider changing introductory sentence:

'The Elementary Principles of Nature below are as set forth by Epicurus and summarized in English by Norman Dewitt in his book “Epicurus And His Philosophy.”'

This statement is misleading. The elementary principles are set forth by Norman Dewitt and are based on Epicurean physics. Dewitt didn't just summarize these - he compiled the list. Until we know otherwise, we can't claim that Epicurus set these twelve fundamentals forth.

Also a technical remark - the links to each of the principles are currently broken.

Oh, common Joshua . The moment I saw your yellow river I burst into laugh because this came to my mind instantly.

Quote from Little Rocker

I can see the benefits of your approach, but I wonder whether Epicurus builds a bit more content into the prolepsis than that. It seems to me like the prolepsis for the gods in Letter to Menoeceus 123-4 is that 1) they exist and that 2) they are 'blessed and indestructible,' which offers at least some kind of skeletal conceptual structure.

I don't think what you're describing as 'the prolepsis for the gods' above is the Epicurean prolepsis. It's already active reasoning based on prolepsis. I'll try to explain it the best I can (while simultaneously pretending I know what I'm talking about, which might not be the case).

The criteria of truth (sensations, anticipations and feelings) are all automatic and passive - independent of our will. Our mind, having active ability to reason, can take these passive criteria and work out more and more general properties of things (even if those things can be only indirectly reasoned about - like the gods above). That's why Cassius' explanation that the prolepsis can't provide any conclusions seems to be correct. Conclusions of any nature are the result of active reasoning of the mind.

I hope I got this right but I probably should have gone back and refresh my knowledge on Epicurean induction first. No guarantees, but maybe that can help a bit.

Quote from Kalosyni

I was wondering what would happen if something went wrong with a launch on a mission heading to the space station, and it accidently sent the rocket out past the proper earth orbit sending them out into the solar system.

In that case I wholeheartedly recommend you watch a film called 'Aniara'. It's a brilliant sci-fi film dealing with exactly that problem. It's not an optimistic film, though.

Quote from Kalosyni

...and whether or not they are supplied with a pill to take in a worst case scenario (lost in space).

Maybe but I guess talking to each other in a similar fashion would probably be much more satisfying way to deal with a problem like that:
- Hey, Joe. I think we're lost.
- Yeah. You may be right, Matt. Let's open the window to make sure.
- Splendid idea, Joe. It's been a pleasure getting lost with you.
- The pleasure is all mine, Matt.

After reading Don's and Cassius' posts I started to suspect there was something wrong with my post #18. And now I think I know what went wrong.

It looks like I made a serious blunder by calling DeWitt a fanboy. By 'fanboy' I meant 'someone who is very enthusiastic' but now after short investigation I realised 'fanboy' is often used in a derogatory way (which I was not aware of). It was absolutely not my intention to offend or ridicule DeWitt and his book. I only wanted to point out that his book should not be taken for granted as it's not always reliable source of information due to his sometimes far-fetched conclusions which are the result of him being very enthusiastic about Epicurus.

English is not my first language so I don't have a perfect command of it and boo-boos like that happen sometimes. I apologise for that. I have edited my post #18 and changed 'fanboy' to 'enthusiast' and have left a short explanation for the change. I would never deliberately belittle anyone who puts hard work in sharing his passions with others and I hope the rest of my post #18 shows clearly that I'm grateful for the work of all the people mentioned there.

Quote from Don

PS: Some may say that I have hubris to even question Usener or Bailey or even DeWitt, and maybe that's true. I would defend myself by saying that I'm not questioning Usener, Bailey, etc al. on a whim. I find a troubling number of their citations lacking in relevance to their assertions.

You're not alone, Don . I think DeWitt's book is a good introductory book that can spark the interest in Epicureanism in people. At least that seems to be the idea behind the book and Dewitt accomplished what he aimed for. However, when someone invests any time in the study of Epicureanism, it becomes very clear very quickly that DeWitt wrote his book not as a scholar but more as an enthusiast [originally I used word 'fanboy' which may suggest derogatory intentions which is not what I intended - TauPhi] of Epicurus. With all due respect to his work, he doesn't seem to have problems drawing conclusions out of thin air to make Epicureanism what he wants Epicureanism to be instead of presenting it for what it was, to the best of available resources.

As far as Bailey and Usener are concerned, their work is not perfect either but I'm very grateful for the amount of work they put in their research and publications.

One way or the other, it's great all these people decided to pursue their interests and now we can benefit from their beautiful, imperfect work and try to make more sense where possible by making our own mistakes on the way. Hubris or no hubris, studying stuff is so much fun, isn't it?