Posts by Onenski
Listen to the latest Lucretius Today Podcast! Episode 225 is now available. Cicero Argues That A Commitment To Virtue Is A Bar to Pleasure.
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Thanks for this thread, Cassius. I like and agree with D'Holbach, specially for his naturalism and skepticism of free will. Did you find something on the implications of determinism to moral life?
For example, contemporary proponents of free will skepticism (such as Derk Pereboom) recognize the elimination of desert and, therefore, the absence of justification of punishments, rewards, guilt, resentment, gratitude and pride (which I honestly consider positive for human societies).
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There are at least two versions of this Vatican Saying.
In one side, Usener, Bailey, Long and Sedley, Marcovich:
QuoteὉ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολαύσεως.
"The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment" [Bailey]
In the other side, Bignone, Arrighetti and Enrique Álvarez:
QuoteὉ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ>.
"The production of the greatest good and (the) release from evil (happens at) [the same time]." [Epicurus Wiki]
"The same time corresponds to the birth of the greatest good and the dissolution of evil." (Enrique Alvarez, translated)
Here's Alvarez's comments:
"Given the difficulty of finding a clear meaning to the text as it is offered in the codex, the sentence has raised several hermeneutical possibilities and various modifications have been proposed.
We have followed Bignone's interpretation (with which Arrighetti also agrees), who observes in the sentence a polemic on the question of pleasure against the Platonic point of view put forward in the Philebus, where Plato considers pleasure as a γένεσις ("process," "becoming") and, consequently, admits the existence of mixed pleasures, that is, of processes in which pleasure can occur mixed with pain. If, in the light of the Letter to Meneceus and KD3, we understand that the greatest good referred to in the sentence is pleasure, conceived by Epicurus as deprivation of pain, with the addition of <τοῦ κακοῦ> proposed by Bignone, VS42 would come to say that pleasure and pain cannot coexist at the same time; therefore, when the greatest good is generated (i. e. pleasure), the greatest evil (i. e. pain), dissipates.
Usener, whose criterion Bailey, Long and Sedley and Marcovich have followed, proposes to correct ἀπολύσεως ("dissolution", "elimination") by ἀπολαύσεως ("enjoyment"), interpreting the sentence as describing a type of pleasures whose enjoyment (ἀπόλαυσις) is simultaneous with their generation or development (γένεσις), i.e., those cases in which the genesis of pleasure coincides with its enjoyment, such as the exercise of philosophy (cf. VS27). Bailey cites precisely VS27."
What do you think, Don ? -
Thank you very much for your answer, Don!
I'm not sure if you shared Alvarez's work before or not, but (at the risk of repeating)
I don't remember, I think I shared it only in the chat of one of the zoom meetings. XD
By the way, today Joshua proposed a possible collection or list of texts about Epicureanism in languages different from English. Possibly Alvarez's thesis can be one of those texts.
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Hi, Don ! Today we were talking about this VS and I shared a philological question with Cassius , Joshua , Kalosyni and Steve.
I have a translation that follows a slightly different version (I think it's only one word) from that used by Bailey, Arrighetti, Long and Sedley, etc. It's this:QuoteΓελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.
This is Alberto Enrique Álvarez' translation (the Spanish guy who wrote a dissertation on the Vatican Sayings):
Quote"We must laugh as well as philosophize, manage the house and take care of the rest of our private affairs, and by no means express angry maxims when we declare the maxims of philosophy."
And these are some of his comments:
"The sentence has undergone numerous modifications. In our version we have opted, like Bollack, to keep the textual version of the manuscript, since it has a satisfactory sense and syntax, and in the conviction that, in this case, it is possible to keep the transmitted text without variants.
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This version [Bailey's version] recovers the importance of laughter as a vital mark of epicureanism; but, by replacing ὀργῆς ("anger", "wrath") by the adjective ὀρθῆς ("straight"), the axis of opposites laughter / wrath (γελᾶν / ὀργή) that articulates the sentence is lost, and the text is structured in such a way that the main syntactic units do not reflect contents of equal hierarchy. As we interpret it, from the main verb δεῖ ("it is necessary") two infinitives depend at the same syntactic level: γελᾶν ("to laugh") and λήγειν ("to stop"); and, in turn, dependent on γελᾶν ("laugh") and introduced by the preposition/temporal adverb ἅμα ("at the same time") we find φιλοσοφεῖν ("philosophize"), οἰκονομεῖν ("manage the house") and χρῆσθαι ("take care of").
Now, the philosophically relevant doctrine is exhausted in the infinitive group γελᾶν ("to laugh"), while the branch of λήγειν ("to cease") remains practically as an addition that has little to do with the previous clause and by itself possesses little philosophical entity.
In the version we offer, the sentence opposes laughter (γελᾶν) to anger and, in general, to violent passions (ὀργή) as philosophical-vital moods."
I don't know if his comments or the translation are correct. I think it can be interesting that you tell us your point of view. -
Cicero and others seem to infer that all true Epicureans will choose to spend their lives laying on the beach without a thought to (for example) a life as an artist or a scientist or a policeman or fireman.
What's his argument?
how do you explain the Epicurean analysis of choosing some pleasures over others in Epicurean terms without reference to nobility or other outside standards?
Which possible epicurean standards (or procedure) do you have in mind?
Are you looking for a foundation or justification of the standard(s) in question?
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But would Epicureans agree that there are no "preferable" people, activities, or ways to live, that we we ourselves can decide to be preferable?
I'll try to answer. Have you considered that maybe the "what" is less important than the "how"? I mean, possibly there's not a specific and universal activity or object to pursue that brings pleasure in general, but there's a way to do it or to get it: the virtuous one.
So far as we know, the virtous life is the best way to live a pleasurable life: prudently, safely, friendly, painlessly, etc. Virtue is sensible to context: it tells that you'll get a lot of pleasure with food if you're hungry, thay you'll get pleasure with water if you're thirsty, that you'll enjoy a videogame if you're bored, or that you'll enjoy reading a book if you're in the mood to do it.
Not everybody enjoys the same things evidently, but it's also true that not everyone is in the same circumstances or have the same background.
Maybe you will think that my answer is circular, because virtue is the instrument to maximize plesaure. So when I recommend a virtuous way to live I'm just saying that a pleasurable life is that with pleasure. My point is that Epicurus recommended a life with prudence, and I think now I understand why it's the source of pleasure: prudence indicates how you can maximize the pleasure (reduce pain) with any activity (even if you're in bed with kidney stones).
So my answer is: possibly that thing that can bring pleasure to everyone, no matter their context, age, education, etc., is virtue (specially prudence). A shepherd without prudence will waste his resources and time. The good news is that we don't need to be Epicurus, or Socrates, in order to have prudence.
I really hope this answer have some sense, because I'm not sure if I understood completely the question in dispute. -
The hypothetical scenario reminded me a quote by John Stuart Mill that probably you know: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."
For Mill there are special pleasures, like reading philosophy, listening to music, contemplate art, etc., that are superior to other pleasures (accesible only for animals). I understand his idea, but I reject it for similar reasons why I reject stoicism: I don't think there are intrinsically nobler people, nobler activities or nobler ways to live (or intrinsically pleasurable).
I do think there are standards to evaluate pleasures and pains among people but they're not necessary, but contingent. (After all, we are human beings, of course we share plasures and we share the absence of pain as a goal to achieve.) Cassius, I think you won't find an activity that brings pleasure in all contexts: human nature it's not about immovable truths but about change.
Finally, I know the Letter to Ideomeneus is beautiful and inspiring, but I really doubt Epicurus was really having pleasure in the previous moments of his death. So, if I had to give an answer, I'd prefer to live like the shepherd, but better I prefer to be me, in this place and this time. -
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HsiehKW I haven't had as chance to read up either but do you have a web link you recommend for the basics?
I found this:
A Brief Guide to Embodied Cognition: Why You Are Not Your Brainblogs.scientificamerican.comAnd a more detailer source is this:
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Happy Birthday, Charles! Joy and health for you. Have a nice day!
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This exercise also brings to light a problem with just accepting "Oh, Vatican Saying X is just identical to Principal Doctrine Y. Nothing to see here." Yes, they may be *almost* identical, but if they're not entirely, how does that affect our reading of each? Vat.gr.1950 is dated to 1300-1350 CE, so not as early as some of the earliest manuscripts for Diogenes Laertius which go back to the 12th c, I believe. How do the VS/PD correlations look in reference to the earliest Laertius manuscripts? Vat.gr.1950 is getting its versions from somewhere!
From Enrique Alvarez' dissertation I found this comment:
"VS13 presents σοφίας in the Codex Vaticanus version, probably due, as Bollack (1974: 430) conjectures, to a confusion with σοφία that the copyist had just written in the previous line; the substitution by φιλίας, following the text of Diogenes Laertius (Dorandi 2013: 820), has been unanimously accepted. This modification having been made, the sentence agrees with PD27."
Hope this helps! -
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*Admin. Edit by Kalosyni
Recently in both the podcast and in our Wednesday night meeting, some of Aristotle's views on virtue have come up, and it seems like it would be good to have a thread on it. I'm copying a post by Onenski over here (and if there are any others elsewhere to add in here, we can add them). The original post is here.
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As a note while editing this week's podcast, in the first ten minutes Don gives and excellent quote from Aristotle about how one becomes just by doing such things. My attention was distracted until the middle and by the time I realized what a good quote it was I was no longer sure where it came from, and I didn't follow up on it like I should have - it's an excellent example of how circular the standard non-Epicurean view of virtue really is.
I have some comments (about aristotelian virtue) that I hope contribute something to discussion.
- Aristotle famously established a connection between habits (ἔθος) and character (ἦθος) [a, seemingly, fake ethimological connection, but philosophically fruitful]. That's why it seems circular: you can only become just (as a character trait) by acting justly continuosly (so that you get the habit to be just). In this way, it's established the way we have to take in order to be virtuous.
- When you ask what (kind of thing) a virtue is, in Aristotle's ethics it's a psychological trait. Aristotle thinks that there are three kind of psychological things: dispositions (ἕξις), passions (πάθη) and capacities (δύναμις), according to NE II.5, 1105b20-30. From them, virtue it's neither a passion nor a capacity, it's an excellent disposition about actions and feelings. (What is an excellent disposition? That which it's in the middle term between two extremes, as Don recalled).
- So, the point it's not only what actions you do, but how you do them. Two people can battle, but for one to be courageous or coward it's important which feelings or attitudes one has. As Don observed it, it matters: when we act, where, in what mood, with which people and so on. Excellence it's not easy, it's rare, but valious.
Now, did Epicurus have a conception similar to Aristotle's? I'd like to suggest (and see what happens) that for him virtue is, at least, a disposition too (about actions and about how we feel). So, someone temperate it's someone who usually, for example, doesn't eat or drink more than what she needs, and who feels reasonably good by restraining her desires.
While in Aristotle the virtuous reach excellence just because virtue it's noble, in epicureanism the person follows virtue according to a calculus of pleasures and pains ("I won't eat that cake because I have heart problems", "I won't smoke because I've felt lung pain", or whatever). Virtue is another way to talk about the most pleasant way to live.
Hope all this has some sense and it helps at least a little.
See you, guys! -
As a note while editing this week's podcast, in the first ten minutes Don gives and excellent quote from Aristotle about how one becomes just by doing such things. My attention was distracted until the middle and by the time I realized what a good quote it was I was no longer sure where it came from, and I didn't follow up on it like I should have - it's an excellent example of how circular the standard non-Epicurean view of virtue really is.
I have some comments (about aristotelian virtue) that I hope contribute something to discussion.
- Aristotle famously established a connection between habits (ἔθος) and character (ἦθος) [a, seemingly, fake ethimological connection, but philosophically fruitful]. That's why it seems circular: you can only become just (as a character trait) by acting justly continuosly (so that you get the habit to be just). In this way, it's established the way we have to take in order to be virtuous.
- When you ask what (kind of thing) a virtue is, in Aristotle's ethics it's a psychological trait. Aristotle thinks that there are three kind of psychological things: dispositions (ἕξις), passions (πάθη) and capacities (δύναμις), according to NE II.5, 1105b20-30. From them, virtue it's neither a passion nor a capacity, it's an excellent disposition about actions and feelings. (What is an excellent disposition? That which it's in the middle term between two extremes, as Don recalled).
- So, the point it's not only what actions you do, but how you do them. Two people can battle, but for one to be courageous or coward it's important which feelings or attitudes one has. As Don observed it, it matters: when we act, where, in what mood, with which people and so on. Excellence it's not easy, it's rare, but valious.
Now, did Epicurus have a conception similar to Aristotle's? I'd like to suggest (and see what happens) that for him virtue is, at least, a disposition too (about actions and about how we feel). So, someone temperate it's someone who usually, for example, doesn't eat or drink more than what she needs, and who feels reasonably good by restraining her desires.
While in Aristotle the virtuous reach excellence just because virtue it's noble, in epicureanism the person follows virtue according to a calculus of pleasures and pains ("I won't eat that cake because I have heart problems", "I won't smoke because I've felt lung pain", or whatever). Virtue is another way to talk about the most pleasant way to live.
Hope all this has some sense and it helps at least a little.
See you, guys! -
Happy birthday, Twentier! I hope you have a great day! 🤗🎂
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It looks like the Vatican Sayings show simplified versions (or with a more common language in some cases) of some Principal Doctrines.
I share a comment that can be interesting from Enrique Álvarez' dissertation:
"In both cases [PD 5 and VS 5], we can see how the genre of the florilegium is effective in the transmission of doctrine at the price of rounding off and simplifying the contents. Thus, PD 5 has become an effective aphorism that is a reminder of the reciprocal implication of pleasure and virtue.Indeed, we understand that "this" (τοῦτο) in the last sentence refers to the doctrine taught by both members of the biconditional: if there is no pleasure there is no virtue and if there is no virtue there is no pleasure. As for SV5, we interpret that the compiler's purpose has been to express the Epicurean doctrine in the form of a simple argument having the form of the modus ponens, in this case, with negative premises: if one does not live with virtue, one does not live with pleasure; one does not live with virtue, therefore, one does not live with pleasure. τοῦτο, at the end of SV5 takes up the protasis of the first premise of the modus ponens, that is, sentence P of the form of reasoning: P then Q, and P; therefore Q." (El Gnomologium Vaticanum y la filosofía de Epicuro, 2016, p. 212)
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You're right, Don, there's not a Hartel manucript, I didn't read correctly.
Besides, the author, Alberto Enrique Álvarez from the Autonomous University of Madrid gives some reasons for the νοητὸν interpretation. One of them it's that at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus points out that philosophy is an immortal good. I add part of the Enrique's commentary:
"Undoubtedly, the usual structure of parallelisms and oppositions that constitutes many of the sentences, and even the phonetic similarity νοητόν / θνητόν, impel to the correction, which makes it possible to obtain in the text the pairs philosophy-mortal / friendship-immortal. However, these are not sufficient reasons to modify a manuscript whose writing and sense are clear.[...]
So there is no reason to attribute to philosophy the qualifier of mortal. Hartel's correction is not necessary. It imposes on the text a spirit of symmetry that neither the sense of the sentence nor the thought of Epicurus demand.
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As Bailey says, this is perhaps the greatest exaltation of friendship in Epicurus' work that remains to us; and, in the same sense, Cicero expresses himself, who assures us that Epicurus carried friendship to heaven with his praises (eam [i. e.,
amicitiam] Epicurus in caelum efferat laudibus). The fact of extolling friendship is understandable, because, as we have seen on several occasions, it guarantees security among men, which is one of the conditions of ataraxia, in such a way that it allows the wise, within human limits, to live as a god.
Now, what is not necessary is that the praise of friendship should entail the corresponding degradation of philosophy, especially when the role of wisdom in the happiness of the wise man is as relevant as that of friendship. That is why we maintain the qualifier "intellectual" that SV78 assigns to wisdom, refusing its modification by "mortal"." ("EL GNOMOLOGIUM VATICANUM Y LA FILOSOFÍA DE EPICURO", p. 460-463)
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Hi everybody,
A traditional translation of VS 78 is: "The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one." [Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.]
I just read a different translation (I found it in a PhD dissertation in Spanish). Probably, Don can say something about it. The author affirms that the original form of the Saying is:Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι νοητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.
But, he says, there was a correction in Hartel manuscript which changed νοητὸν (intelectual) for θνητὸν (immortal) (there's a footnote which refers to "Wotke y Usener 1888: 197"). Apparently, Long & Sedley (and Bailey) took that correction as well as most of editors.
In brief, the translation would be: "The noble soul ocuppies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these the one [wisdom] is an intelectual good, the other [friendship] immortal".
I think this can enrich our understanding of this VS, or at least add something to discussion.
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