Posts by Onenski

Quote from Kalosyni

Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind?

For me, another way to see it, Kalosyni ,

is that the fact that you believe in free will has an explanation that goes beyond your control. It means that you grew up in a certain context, with some genes, certain hormones, that you've had certain experiences, live in a certain cultural context, etc. that explain why you have that belief.

It doesn't mean that your are like a puppet that it's controlled by someone else, it means that even your desires and beliefs are the product of a chain of events prior to you. It also means that there's not a Self above your body who can make choices: you are your body and this body it's immerse in a natural world with laws and different levels of explanation.

It also means that we, human beings, don't have a very special ability, which suspiciously other animals don't have, to make choices out of nothing. Even our small choices have their context and explanation.

Unfortunately, debate on free will tends to focus on very local choices, not in the history of how your intention was formed. For some people is more important to prove that I made certain choice freely, without see any context of my history, than to see what brought me here to choose that thing.

Quote from Pacatus

Would that entail that there is no randomness in the system? That every event is perfectly predictable?

There's an important nuance to make. There can be unpredictability even under deterministic processes. In chaotic systems, which can be understood under deterministic functioning, we can't predict the results, but that doesn't mean they are random.

Quote from Godfrey

Aren't emergent properties a form of randomness?

That also apply to emergent complexity.

For relevant purposes randomness present in quantum mechanics it's not strong enough to produce relevant consequences to the functioning of neurons (which can be the first level of explanation of human behavior).

I've read these things in Sapolsky's book Determined (another recent book about this is Kevin Mitchell's Free Agents, this was suggested by Godfrey last Wednesday).

As I said up, I think this neuroscientific discussion can be enriching for epicurean philosophy, because as it's understood in the debate, Epicurus was a libertarian about free will. That means that, arguably, Epicurus thought that a deterministic world is incompatible with free will. But between those two options he defends the existence of free will, which imply that we live in an indeterministic world (that's why he defends the swerve).

Kevin Mitchell defends that the brain has evolved to work in an indeterministic way so that it can make choices that permits an adaptation to a very changeable world (like a quantum computer). Sapolsky, on the other side, defends that human behavior works in a deterministic way, so we're not morally responsible of what we do.

See you later, guys!

Thank you for your great comments, Cassius and Pacatus .

I recognize that one of the theses that Epicurus would not have renounced is precisely free will. And to deny it would be to move away from Epicurean philosophy.

Skepticism about free will, I think, is a personal position of mine, and it is perhaps the one that makes me wonder things like: if the study of nature pointed out that we do not have free will, would Epicurus accept it? Or couldn't it be that Epicurus was wrong about this question just as he was wrong about the size of the Sun? Or also, if what matters is practical life for ordinary people, then would it be valid for us to accept things like biases just because we feel it although they are unjustified?

There is a conflict (apparent or real), which D'Holbach recognized, between the study of nature and the belief in an exclusive capacity of human beings not to be subject to prior events, or just those that are convenient for attributing moral responsibility.

I recognize, Cassius, that for the moment it would be very hard for people to live without that belief. The same was said about the belief in God: that people would behave immorally, that one cannot trust in an atheist, or that life would become meaningless. One of my personal projects consists in thinking about a possible way of life that integrates free will skepticism and epicurean philosophy.

In any case, I don't want to be heterodox enough to say that Epicurus was wrong, or anything like that. I know that the purpose of the forum is to discuss Epicurean philosophy as closely as possible to its original sources, and that does not involve a defense of free will skepticism.

What may possibly be pertinent is to seek, over time, a stronger and more robust understanding of Epicurus' position vis-a-vis this kind of skepticism.

Quote from Pacatus

“Free will” can be a fraught concept. What is generally called “libertarian free will” (which might be what most people mean) is incoherent

That's exactly the epicurean point of view, so far as I know, right?

I mean, Epicurus was not a compatibilist, he believed that we are free because the world is undetermined.

Thank you, Cassius.

Thanks for this thread, Cassius. I like and agree with D'Holbach, specially for his naturalism and skepticism of free will. Did you find something on the implications of determinism to moral life?

For example, contemporary proponents of free will skepticism (such as Derk Pereboom) recognize the elimination of desert and, therefore, the absence of justification of punishments, rewards, guilt, resentment, gratitude and pride (which I honestly consider positive for human societies).

There are at least two versions of this Vatican Saying.

In one side, Usener, Bailey, Long and Sedley, Marcovich:

Quote

Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολαύσεως.

"The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment" [Bailey]

In the other side, Bignone, Arrighetti and Enrique Álvarez:

Quote

Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ>.

"The production of the greatest good and (the) release from evil (happens at) [the same time]." [Epicurus Wiki]

"The same time corresponds to the birth of the greatest good and the dissolution of evil." (Enrique Alvarez, translated)

Here's Alvarez's comments:

"Given the difficulty of finding a clear meaning to the text as it is offered in the codex, the sentence has raised several hermeneutical possibilities and various modifications have been proposed.

We have followed Bignone's interpretation (with which Arrighetti also agrees), who observes in the sentence a polemic on the question of pleasure against the Platonic point of view put forward in the Philebus, where Plato considers pleasure as a γένεσις ("process," "becoming") and, consequently, admits the existence of mixed pleasures, that is, of processes in which pleasure can occur mixed with pain. If, in the light of the Letter to Meneceus and KD3, we understand that the greatest good referred to in the sentence is pleasure, conceived by Epicurus as deprivation of pain, with the addition of <τοῦ κακοῦ> proposed by Bignone, VS42 would come to say that pleasure and pain cannot coexist at the same time; therefore, when the greatest good is generated (i. e. pleasure), the greatest evil (i. e. pain), dissipates.

Usener, whose criterion Bailey, Long and Sedley and Marcovich have followed, proposes to correct ἀπολύσεως ("dissolution", "elimination") by ἀπολαύσεως ("enjoyment"), interpreting the sentence as describing a type of pleasures whose enjoyment (ἀπόλαυσις) is simultaneous with their generation or development (γένεσις), i.e., those cases in which the genesis of pleasure coincides with its enjoyment, such as the exercise of philosophy (cf. VS27). Bailey cites precisely VS27."

What do you think, Don ?

Thank you very much for your answer, Don!

Quote from Don

I'm not sure if you shared Alvarez's work before or not, but (at the risk of repeating)

I don't remember, I think I shared it only in the chat of one of the zoom meetings. XD

By the way, today Joshua proposed a possible collection or list of texts about Epicureanism in languages different from English. Possibly Alvarez's thesis can be one of those texts.

Hi, Don ! Today we were talking about this VS and I shared a philological question with Cassius , Joshua , Kalosyni and Steve.
I have a translation that follows a slightly different version (I think it's only one word) from that used by Bailey, Arrighetti, Long and Sedley, etc. It's this:

Quote

Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.

This is Alberto Enrique Álvarez' translation (the Spanish guy who wrote a dissertation on the Vatican Sayings):

Quote

"We must laugh as well as philosophize, manage the house and take care of the rest of our private affairs, and by no means express angry maxims when we declare the maxims of philosophy."

And these are some of his comments:

"The sentence has undergone numerous modifications. In our version we have opted, like Bollack, to keep the textual version of the manuscript, since it has a satisfactory sense and syntax, and in the conviction that, in this case, it is possible to keep the transmitted text without variants.

[...]

This version [Bailey's version] recovers the importance of laughter as a vital mark of epicureanism; but, by replacing ὀργῆς ("anger", "wrath") by the adjective ὀρθῆς ("straight"), the axis of opposites laughter / wrath (γελᾶν / ὀργή) that articulates the sentence is lost, and the text is structured in such a way that the main syntactic units do not reflect contents of equal hierarchy. As we interpret it, from the main verb δεῖ ("it is necessary") two infinitives depend at the same syntactic level: γελᾶν ("to laugh") and λήγειν ("to stop"); and, in turn, dependent on γελᾶν ("laugh") and introduced by the preposition/temporal adverb ἅμα ("at the same time") we find φιλοσοφεῖν ("philosophize"), οἰκονομεῖν ("manage the house") and χρῆσθαι ("take care of").

Now, the philosophically relevant doctrine is exhausted in the infinitive group γελᾶν ("to laugh"), while the branch of λήγειν ("to cease") remains practically as an addition that has little to do with the previous clause and by itself possesses little philosophical entity.
In the version we offer, the sentence opposes laughter (γελᾶν) to anger and, in general, to violent passions (ὀργή) as philosophical-vital moods."

I don't know if his comments or the translation are correct. I think it can be interesting that you tell us your point of view.

Quote from Cassius

Cicero and others seem to infer that all true Epicureans will choose to spend their lives laying on the beach without a thought to (for example) a life as an artist or a scientist or a policeman or fireman.

What's his argument?

Quote from Cassius

how do you explain the Epicurean analysis of choosing some pleasures over others in Epicurean terms without reference to nobility or other outside standards?

Which possible epicurean standards (or procedure) do you have in mind?

Are you looking for a foundation or justification of the standard(s) in question?

Quote from Cassius

But would Epicureans agree that there are no "preferable" people, activities, or ways to live, that we we ourselves can decide to be preferable?

I'll try to answer. Have you considered that maybe the "what" is less important than the "how"? I mean, possibly there's not a specific and universal activity or object to pursue that brings pleasure in general, but there's a way to do it or to get it: the virtuous one.
So far as we know, the virtous life is the best way to live a pleasurable life: prudently, safely, friendly, painlessly, etc. Virtue is sensible to context: it tells that you'll get a lot of pleasure with food if you're hungry, thay you'll get pleasure with water if you're thirsty, that you'll enjoy a videogame if you're bored, or that you'll enjoy reading a book if you're in the mood to do it.
Not everybody enjoys the same things evidently, but it's also true that not everyone is in the same circumstances or have the same background.

Maybe you will think that my answer is circular, because virtue is the instrument to maximize plesaure. So when I recommend a virtuous way to live I'm just saying that a pleasurable life is that with pleasure. My point is that Epicurus recommended a life with prudence, and I think now I understand why it's the source of pleasure: prudence indicates how you can maximize the pleasure (reduce pain) with any activity (even if you're in bed with kidney stones).

So my answer is: possibly that thing that can bring pleasure to everyone, no matter their context, age, education, etc., is virtue (specially prudence). A shepherd without prudence will waste his resources and time. The good news is that we don't need to be Epicurus, or Socrates, in order to have prudence.

I really hope this answer have some sense, because I'm not sure if I understood completely the question in dispute.

The hypothetical scenario reminded me a quote by John Stuart Mill that probably you know: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."

For Mill there are special pleasures, like reading philosophy, listening to music, contemplate art, etc., that are superior to other pleasures (accesible only for animals). I understand his idea, but I reject it for similar reasons why I reject stoicism: I don't think there are intrinsically nobler people, nobler activities or nobler ways to live (or intrinsically pleasurable).

I do think there are standards to evaluate pleasures and pains among people but they're not necessary, but contingent. (After all, we are human beings, of course we share plasures and we share the absence of pain as a goal to achieve.) Cassius, I think you won't find an activity that brings pleasure in all contexts: human nature it's not about immovable truths but about change.

Finally, I know the Letter to Ideomeneus is beautiful and inspiring, but I really doubt Epicurus was really having pleasure in the previous moments of his death. So, if I had to give an answer, I'd prefer to live like the shepherd, but better I prefer to be me, in this place and this time.

See you tomorrow

I'll be there!

Quote from Cassius

HsiehKW I haven't had as chance to read up either but do you have a web link you recommend for the basics?

I found this:

A Brief Guide to Embodied Cognition: Why You Are Not Your Brain

blogs.scientificamerican.com

And a more detailer source is this:

Embodied Cognition (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Quote from Don

This exercise also brings to light a problem with just accepting "Oh, Vatican Saying X is just identical to Principal Doctrine Y. Nothing to see here." Yes, they may be *almost* identical, but if they're not entirely, how does that affect our reading of each? Vat.gr.1950 is dated to 1300-1350 CE, so not as early as some of the earliest manuscripts for Diogenes Laertius which go back to the 12th c, I believe. How do the VS/PD correlations look in reference to the earliest Laertius manuscripts? Vat.gr.1950 is getting its versions from somewhere!

From Enrique Alvarez' dissertation I found this comment:
"VS13 presents σοφίας in the Codex Vaticanus version, probably due, as Bollack (1974: 430) conjectures, to a confusion with σοφία that the copyist had just written in the previous line; the substitution by φιλίας, following the text of Diogenes Laertius (Dorandi 2013: 820), has been unanimously accepted. This modification having been made, the sentence agrees with PD27."
Hope this helps!

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*Admin. Edit by Kalosyni

Recently in both the podcast and in our Wednesday night meeting, some of Aristotle's views on virtue have come up, and it seems like it would be good to have a thread on it. I'm copying a post by Onenski over here (and if there are any others elsewhere to add in here, we can add them). The original post is here.

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(Copied Post)

Quote from Cassius

As a note while editing this week's podcast, in the first ten minutes Don gives and excellent quote from Aristotle about how one becomes just by doing such things. My attention was distracted until the middle and by the time I realized what a good quote it was I was no longer sure where it came from, and I didn't follow up on it like I should have - it's an excellent example of how circular the standard non-Epicurean view of virtue really is.

I have some comments (about aristotelian virtue) that I hope contribute something to discussion.
- Aristotle famously established a connection between habits (ἔθος) and character (ἦθος) [a, seemingly, fake ethimological connection, but philosophically fruitful]. That's why it seems circular: you can only become just (as a character trait) by acting justly continuosly (so that you get the habit to be just). In this way, it's established the way we have to take in order to be virtuous.
- When you ask what (kind of thing) a virtue is, in Aristotle's ethics it's a psychological trait. Aristotle thinks that there are three kind of psychological things: dispositions (ἕξις), passions (πάθη) and capacities (δύναμις), according to NE II.5, 1105b20-30. From them, virtue it's neither a passion nor a capacity, it's an excellent disposition about actions and feelings. (What is an excellent disposition? That which it's in the middle term between two extremes, as Don recalled).
- So, the point it's not only what actions you do, but how you do them. Two people can battle, but for one to be courageous or coward it's important which feelings or attitudes one has. As Don observed it, it matters: when we act, where, in what mood, with which people and so on. Excellence it's not easy, it's rare, but valious.

Now, did Epicurus have a conception similar to Aristotle's? I'd like to suggest (and see what happens) that for him virtue is, at least, a disposition too (about actions and about how we feel). So, someone temperate it's someone who usually, for example, doesn't eat or drink more than what she needs, and who feels reasonably good by restraining her desires.
While in Aristotle the virtuous reach excellence just because virtue it's noble, in epicureanism the person follows virtue according to a calculus of pleasures and pains ("I won't eat that cake because I have heart problems", "I won't smoke because I've felt lung pain", or whatever). Virtue is another way to talk about the most pleasant way to live.

Hope all this has some sense and it helps at least a little.
See you, guys!

Quote from Cassius

As a note while editing this week's podcast, in the first ten minutes Don gives and excellent quote from Aristotle about how one becomes just by doing such things. My attention was distracted until the middle and by the time I realized what a good quote it was I was no longer sure where it came from, and I didn't follow up on it like I should have - it's an excellent example of how circular the standard non-Epicurean view of virtue really is.

I have some comments (about aristotelian virtue) that I hope contribute something to discussion.
- Aristotle famously established a connection between habits (ἔθος) and character (ἦθος) [a, seemingly, fake ethimological connection, but philosophically fruitful]. That's why it seems circular: you can only become just (as a character trait) by acting justly continuosly (so that you get the habit to be just). In this way, it's established the way we have to take in order to be virtuous.
- When you ask what (kind of thing) a virtue is, in Aristotle's ethics it's a psychological trait. Aristotle thinks that there are three kind of psychological things: dispositions (ἕξις), passions (πάθη) and capacities (δύναμις), according to NE II.5, 1105b20-30. From them, virtue it's neither a passion nor a capacity, it's an excellent disposition about actions and feelings. (What is an excellent disposition? That which it's in the middle term between two extremes, as Don recalled).
- So, the point it's not only what actions you do, but how you do them. Two people can battle, but for one to be courageous or coward it's important which feelings or attitudes one has. As Don observed it, it matters: when we act, where, in what mood, with which people and so on. Excellence it's not easy, it's rare, but valious.

Now, did Epicurus have a conception similar to Aristotle's? I'd like to suggest (and see what happens) that for him virtue is, at least, a disposition too (about actions and about how we feel). So, someone temperate it's someone who usually, for example, doesn't eat or drink more than what she needs, and who feels reasonably good by restraining her desires.
While in Aristotle the virtuous reach excellence just because virtue it's noble, in epicureanism the person follows virtue according to a calculus of pleasures and pains ("I won't eat that cake because I have heart problems", "I won't smoke because I've felt lung pain", or whatever). Virtue is another way to talk about the most pleasant way to live.

Hope all this has some sense and it helps at least a little.
See you, guys!

It looks like the Vatican Sayings show simplified versions (or with a more common language in some cases) of some Principal Doctrines.
I share a comment that can be interesting from Enrique Álvarez' dissertation:
"In both cases [PD 5 and VS 5], we can see how the genre of the florilegium is effective in the transmission of doctrine at the price of rounding off and simplifying the contents. Thus, PD 5 has become an effective aphorism that is a reminder of the reciprocal implication of pleasure and virtue.

Indeed, we understand that "this" (τοῦτο) in the last sentence refers to the doctrine taught by both members of the biconditional: if there is no pleasure there is no virtue and if there is no virtue there is no pleasure. As for SV5, we interpret that the compiler's purpose has been to express the Epicurean doctrine in the form of a simple argument having the form of the modus ponens, in this case, with negative premises: if one does not live with virtue, one does not live with pleasure; one does not live with virtue, therefore, one does not live with pleasure. τοῦτο, at the end of SV5 takes up the protasis of the first premise of the modus ponens, that is, sentence P of the form of reasoning: P then Q, and P; therefore Q." (El Gnomologium Vaticanum y la filosofía de Epicuro, 2016, p. 212)

You're right, Don, there's not a Hartel manucript, I didn't read correctly.
Besides, the author, Alberto Enrique Álvarez from the Autonomous University of Madrid gives some reasons for the νοητὸν interpretation. One of them it's that at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus points out that philosophy is an immortal good. I add part of the Enrique's commentary:

"Undoubtedly, the usual structure of parallelisms and oppositions that constitutes many of the sentences, and even the phonetic similarity νοητόν / θνητόν, impel to the correction, which makes it possible to obtain in the text the pairs philosophy-mortal / friendship-immortal. However, these are not sufficient reasons to modify a manuscript whose writing and sense are clear.

[...]

So there is no reason to attribute to philosophy the qualifier of mortal. Hartel's correction is not necessary. It imposes on the text a spirit of symmetry that neither the sense of the sentence nor the thought of Epicurus demand.

[...]

As Bailey says, this is perhaps the greatest exaltation of friendship in Epicurus' work that remains to us; and, in the same sense, Cicero expresses himself, who assures us that Epicurus carried friendship to heaven with his praises (eam [i. e.,

amicitiam] Epicurus in caelum efferat laudibus). The fact of extolling friendship is understandable, because, as we have seen on several occasions, it guarantees security among men, which is one of the conditions of ataraxia, in such a way that it allows the wise, within human limits, to live as a god.

Now, what is not necessary is that the praise of friendship should entail the corresponding degradation of philosophy, especially when the role of wisdom in the happiness of the wise man is as relevant as that of friendship. That is why we maintain the qualifier "intellectual" that SV78 assigns to wisdom, refusing its modification by "mortal"." ("EL GNOMOLOGIUM VATICANUM Y LA FILOSOFÍA DE EPICURO", p. 460-463)

Hi everybody,
A traditional translation of VS 78 is: "The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one." [Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.]
I just read a different translation (I found it in a PhD dissertation in Spanish). Probably, Don can say something about it. The author affirms that the original form of the Saying is:

Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι νοητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.

But, he says, there was a correction in Hartel manuscript which changed νοητὸν (intelectual) for θνητὸν (immortal) (there's a footnote which refers to "Wotke y Usener 1888: 197"). Apparently, Long & Sedley (and Bailey) took that correction as well as most of editors.

In brief, the translation would be: "The noble soul ocuppies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these the one [wisdom] is an intelectual good, the other [friendship] immortal".

I think this can enrich our understanding of this VS, or at least add something to discussion.