"Happiness" is not incorrect, but well-being is better.
For myself, I find "happiness" to be fine -- and something I understand (for myself). If I want to clarify, I say "happy well-being." I don't think that's entirely redundant.
"Happiness" is not incorrect, but well-being is better.
For myself, I find "happiness" to be fine -- and something I understand (for myself). If I want to clarify, I say "happy well-being." I don't think that's entirely redundant.
People, were talking the late 1700s here. Grammar is not what it used to be.
Absolutely. Not to flog a trivial point to death, but Latin also has/had comparative and superlative forms of perfectus:
https://www.latin-is-simple.com/en/vocabulary/adjective/6667/?h=perfectus
I haven’t gone back through the thread, so I might be rehashing a bit. My last impression was that “perfect” is generally taken as an absolute abstract ideal, an attachment to which could easily deter one from pragmatically seeking the attainable “merely good” or “good enough.” But then I recalled the words from the preamble to the U.S. Constitution: “in order to form a more perfect union.” It turns out that “perfect” has not necessarily been confined to that absolute sense –
“A few usage guides still object to the use of comparison words such as more, most, nearly, almost, and rather with perfect on the grounds that perfect describes an absolute, yes-or-no condition that cannot logically be said to exist in varying degrees. The English language has never agreed to this limitation. Since its earliest use in the 13th century, perfect has, like almost all adjectives, been compared, first in the now obsolete forms perfecter and perfectest, and more recently with more, most, and similar comparison words: the most perfect arrangement of color and line imaginable. Perfect is compared in most of its general senses in all varieties of speech and writing. After all, one of the objectives of the writers of the U.S. Constitution was ‘to form a more perfect union.’” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/perfecter
And : https://strategiesforparents.com/is-it-correct-…-perfect-union/
And Wiktionary includes the understanding of “excellent” for the Latin “perfectus”: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/perfectus#Latin. Similarly from https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=perfect.
Just for interest …
"The 'perfect' of a thing is a concept that we use to visualize what the 'best' of that thing would be, and by visualizing that concept of the 'best' of that thing, we can more easily work toward our target of approximating it. And even though we know from the start that the 'perfect' is not attainable for us, it still serves as a very valuable tool for us in calculating out actions, because there is no way we can hope to come close to a goal unless we start out knowing what the goal is."
I like that. I would see it then as an "ideal" not in the sense of Platonic idealism but more like:
Ideal
2: one regarded as exemplifying an ideal and often taken as a model for imitation
3: an ultimate object or aim of endeavor : GOAL
Epicurus’ living as a god?
Or a telos -- a la eudaimonia?
From the review cited by Kalosyni in post #50:
“To be clear, Mitchell does not believe our choices are absolutely free from any prior causes. We are all constrained by our genes, our histories, our psychological traits, and our developed characters. Instead of radical metaphysical freedom, Mitchell persuasively develops a more modest conception of free will that entails the evolved ability to make real choices in the service of our goals—that is, to act for our own reasons.”
Thus, Mitchell is not advocating for so-called “libertarian free will.”
From the review cited by Don in post #60:
“Organisms are not passively driven by outside signals, they interpret them, they are “meeting the world halfway, as an active partner in a dance that lasts a lifetime” (p. 217). This is the kind of academic poetry that blows my mind.” Mine too!
“Ultimately, he thinks the question of free will is a red herring and takes a pragmatic view: ‘If free will is the capacity for conscious, rational control of our actions, then I am happy in saying we have it’ … Rather than all-or-none, we have degrees of freedom, and not all people are equal in that regard.”
Thus, we can recognize mitigating circumstances with regard to personal and ethical responsibility -- without denying responsibility altogether.
The same happen with belief in free will.
The word “belief” has become increasingly suspect for me over the years. If someone means what appears to me to be the case, or makes sense, based on my experience and observation and study, then fine (emphasis on “appears”). But that is all I will ever mean by it.
I don't believe hard determinism can be reconciled with Epicureanism, but to be fair lets say it can. You would need to tackle the swerve, because as long as the swerve exists a cause or set of causes can lead to a number of effects or none at all, thus determinism cannot exist. Without the swerve you effectively render epicurean physics Democritean.
The Epicurean swerve is an event in an otherwise causal universe (and one in which, as you pointed out, there can be multiple causes for any identifiable effect, and multiple effects from any identifiable cause). Therefore, it seems to me, it does not entail a universe of total indeterminism either.
I will go to dinner tonight (our weekly dinner out) with the (possibly erroneous) assumption that I will make a choice of what to eat – constrained, surely, by the menu, my wallet, my personal tastes and preferences of the moment, etc. – but, nevertheless what seems like a choice, considering all such factors. Whether those factors are rooted in determinism or indeterminism. If that is an illusion, it is a deeply embedded one (and very pervasive across centuries and different cultures of humanity – some survival function?). I will still act as if I am actually doing some intentional hedonic choice and avoidance decision-making.
Nor does it matter if I am a compatibilist in the sense described by Dennett. That makes more sense to me in terms of my day-to-day engagement with circumstantial reality – but if it’s incorrect, it’s incorrect.
I want to add that I do not think of “justice” in any metaphysical sense. If someone wants to torture children (to take a deliberately harsh example), I will act to prevent that – without considering their motivations, or even the practical Epicurean social compact to “neither harm nor be harmed” (it does not matter that the child, or her parents, may not be signatory to that compact). In that sense, whilst I affirm the Epicurean idea of social justice, I am – at bottom – more of a moral non-cognitivist (let’s say that Epicurean philosophy here might provide some cognitive “fencing” around that).
Since I obviously have been interested in this discussion, thank you Onenski for bringing it to us.
But, again, this is a metaphysical question.
Following TauPhi , I would suggest that any "answers" to that question would, perforce, remain thoroughly speculative, even if intellectually interesting. Empiricism, always subject to evidentiary change (even Kuhnian paradigm shifts), cannot address such metaphysical questions.
The idea of Free Will Skepticism it's not that people don't make choices. The idea is that those choices are not independent of prior causes (in fact, that they are constrained totally, even if we don't see it).
I guess I would not call that “choice” but the illusion of choice. At the very least, it would seem a highly idiosyncratic usage, applying the term to behaviors that are “constrained totally.”
The same for "intentional agency" -- unless intentionality (itself a kind of choice?) is not totally constrained.
I can understand that the corruptions of religious thinking have caused this area of discussion to require lots of hedging.
Agreed. We have a lot of focus on defining our terms here, for clear understanding, and maybe it would have been better for me to say "This is what I mean, in practical terms, by a reasonable version of free will." Or something like that.
Sam Harris' book "Free Will" published in 2012
VS09. Necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.
VS40. He who asserts that everything happens by necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that everything happens by necessity; by his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity.
++++++++++++++++++++
The full pdf of Daniel Dennett’s (to my mind, quite cogent and devastating) refutation of Harris can be downloaded here: https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/…/rifp.2017.0018. Interestingly, Dennett mentions Lucretius’ “swerve.”
Here is an interesting case where Dennett challenges Harris’ claim to have no control over his desires:
Harris: “And there is no way I can influence my desires – for what tools of influence would I use? Other desires?”
Dennett: “Yes, for starters.”
+++++++++++++++++++++
Because of the confusions among various understandings of “free will” (which Dennett addresses) I prefer the term “constrained choice” or “constrained agency” – that is, although facing causal/situational constraints (including endogenous ones, such as native intelligence or ability), nevertheless we have positive agency. That seems to be a version of “compatibilism.”
Why are we so uncomfortable with words that Christians have appropriated?
I can only answer for myself, Nate. Sometimes, I can, fairly readily, re-translate; sometimes with a bit of labor that seems worthwhile. But, sometimes, it seems an arduous process (for me) that I just don’t need to engage in – effort better spent elsewhere.
An old example: When I was a Christian, I used to argue with other Christians about the meaning of the word “sin” – which, neither in the Hebrew nor the Greek, meant “evil” or “immoral.” It meant error, a missing of the mark – sometimes due to personal fault, sometimes just not. The notion that “sin” was something worthy of just retributive punishment (eternal condemnation in hell) – as opposed to some form of restorative/remedial justice – seemed just daft to me: an aberrational understanding grafted onto the word. But, at some point, it seemed that I was just pounding my head on a wall – and, since leaving the fold, I have no need to consider the word further. Kudos to those who are still fighting the good fight.
Kudos to those who are still fighting the good fight over such things outside that Christian context, with other words. Kudos to you on that score (and others, like Don). But sometimes, my own baggage is such that I don’t feel the need. Better for me to move on.
Some of us see Epicureanism more as a philosophy, some as more religious in nature – some of us have a foot in both camps (as do I: I tilt toward the philosophical, which seems the safer space for me, but have some affinity for the more religious view). Some of have more missionary interests; some of us are just trying to put the teachings into practice in our own lives as best we are able, given our personal situations – both as individuals and as part of wider communities, family and the like. None of those have to be polar, let alone adversarial, positions (though they can become so.)
There will be disagreements among us – some of them strongly felt, some of them sharply stated. None of us are immune from error (especially me, stubborn though I am); but none of us need shrug off our convictions. Some of us tend (at least sometimes) to learn more from debate than simple study; some less so. Argument among friends can be valuable and valued – among entrenched adversaries, generally useless (and sometimes erstwhile friends become such adversaries, irreparably so).
I have in the past relished such argument. But, as I’ve gotten older (slow learner!), I’ve realized that, more often than not, it has a corrosive effect on both my emotional and physical well-being. So, this year, I told myself I would swear off. Thus far, I have been less than successful at restraining my entrenched tendencies (and reacting unwisely to old indoctrinations). And I appreciate being called out on that, by friends, when I fail. I will try to do better. I will strive to be more pacatus: peaceful – outwardly and inwardly. Simply expressing my thoughts, and listening to others. (Still stubborn, though … )
Welcome Ataraktosalexandros.
As if reality is wrong because it doesn't match his model, and because of this it's become one of my main gripes with current scientific culture as well.
That was – and so far as I am able to tell, still is – true in spades for the neoclassical economics I spent so many hard hours learning way back when. Even with the post-Keynesian-institutionalist and behavioral economics correctives, the old models are still the mainstream – and realism eschewed.
Pacatus it would not be appropriate for me to speak for or about Elayne's reasons for leaving other than to say that she posted about pursuing her own initiatives, and to say that she would always be welcome back.
Understood!
I went back to this old thread, which Cassius had recommended to me way back (well, “way back” for me ). Discussion of the Society of Epicurus' 20 Tenets of 12/21/19
The discussion is wide-ranging, but I think there is a lot of food-for-thought on what criteria one “must” accept to be called “an Epicurean” – and by whom? I want to disassociate my suggestions from anything like that. I especially appreciated Elayne’s and Elli’s and Cassius’ comments in that thread. (I’ve always been particularly attracted by Elayne’s takes. What happened to her?)
EDIT: Oh! I see that Cassius has already linked that thread.