Posts by Pacatus

In another thread, about infinite regress needing to be terminated in the concept of a causal god, Cassius said: “While not exclusively Zeno-derived, various thinkers used infinite regress arguments to argue for a divine unmoved mover. Epicurus rejected the premise structure: he held that matter and motion are eternal and self-sufficient, requiring no external initiator. The infinite past of atomic motion is simply given — there is no logical compulsion to terminate a causal chain at a god.” [My italics]

This intrigued me, and I thought maybe it could be expanded to a discussion of infinitism in epistemology from an Epicurean perspective (if anyone’s interested).

There are generally three major epistemological schools: foundationalism, coherentism and infinitism. The latter is partly an attempt to eliminate defeat by elements of Agrippa’s Trilemma: infinite regress, circularity and arbitrary assertion.

Foundationalism is subject to logical criticism from infinite regress and arbitrary assertion/truncation.

Coherentism is subject to logical criticism from circularity and question-begging.

Infinitism accepts infinite regress as nonproblematic, and is not subject to the other two criticisms.

Agrippa’s Trilemma (part of Agrippa’s “five modes”) has been employed extensively by Pyrrhonian Skeptics (beginning with Sextus Empiricus). I’ve never really considered infinitism, but – stirred by Cassius’ remarks – I’m now wondering if it is a viable alternative from an Epicurean viewpoint.

Here is an article on epistemological infinitism: https://iep.utm.edu/inf-epis/

Just in terms of contemplation tools, I conjured up, over time, this virtual version of a Roman lararium (a home shrine). The central figure is my paternal grandmother, Mae, flanked by images of Epicurus (Mae is likely the most Epicurean person I’ve known, and somewhat of a personal hero to me). The face at the bottom left is my “fractured” self. The rest is symbols and phrases that have some personal connection/meaning – they might not all be strictly Epicurean, but I think they mostly are. It’s all in Latin except for the Ἡδονή - Ἁρμονία - Ἐὐδαιμονίᾱ formula. At the moment, I have it set as my wallpaper, so it's the first thing I see when I open my Chromebook.

Kalosyni : Thanks for this thread, and the prompting blog.

For me, these days, it's mostly how (a) to abide in some serenity and ease in the midst of all the turmoil in the world (some of which directly affects people I know), (b) while appreciating my AFHB*, and (c) finding ways to enjoy each day, one day at a time.

One of my strategies (Vivian’s too) is to limit our news feed, and to watch more sports instead. Also, I now am spending more time, especially in the afternoon, just reading.

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“Attention-Fluid, Hypertexting Brain” (my more affirming version of ADHD – especially rejecting that last D).

The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset develops his perspectivist view, at least implicitly (been too long since I read him), from the existentialist dictum “existence precedes essence” – i.e., we can only posit some “essence” of things (if we are so inclined) from the perspective and influence of our existential circumstances. (Which, to me, means that such an existential perspective depends on αἰσθήσεις and πᾰ́θη – and our interpretation of such, from that perspective.)

Saying that “I” cannot be detached from my existential circumstances, Ortega offered a simple formulation: “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia.”

Quote from Todd

It is quite possible to arrive at this conclusion without any logical inconsistencies. For example, if you believe your telos to be removal of pain, then it would be perfectly consistent to see death as a shortcut to that end. In that case, death would not be merely a matter of indifference, but should actually be preferred over life, which will inevitably involve pain at times. The only inconsistency would be a failure to act on that conclusion.

In thinking on this from Todd, I recalled (from Kurt Lampe’s The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life) that the same logic was attributed to a later Cyrenaic philosopher, Hegesias. Lampe refers to “Hegesias’ pessimism,” arguing: “I suggest that Hegesias is very far from resigning himself to pessimism. To the contrary, he positively embraces it as one aspect of a radical but coherent existential choice.”

Here is a summary from Wiki: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegesias_of_Cyrene

This seems much at odds with earlier Cyrenaic philosophy, e.g., that of Aristippus and Aristippus the Younger (the Metrodidact). Lampe comments: “It is odd, of course, for Hegesias to declare pleasure the only complete good and then to make ‘living neither painfully nor distressingly’ his comprehensive end. We would expect him to follow the Metrodidact in aiming to ‘live pleasantly.’ However, on this point Hegesias agrees—at least superficially—with the Cyrenaics’ critics.”

I certainly can’t see this as consistent with Epicurus.

Reminds a bit of Emily Austin’s questioning whether modern Stoics are actually – Stoics. (Though she wasn’t as harsh as Bates.)

One might take Epicurus’ arguments for a “realist” view of the gods as suggestive, rather than “dogmatic.” I don’t know if that’s too much of a wrenching of what he said, but he was, in part, deconstructing any sort of Platonic idealism throughout.

For myself – though I dislike the term – I would have to hold to the “idealist” view of the gods: viz., mental projections that may or may not be helpful (like visualizing pitching “the perfect game,” to borrow from sports psychology – although pitching a “perfect game” is possible in baseball ).

Note: I view prolepsis as a kind of intuitive construct from experiences.

Quote from Bryan

false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα).

I was just rereading some of Jean-Marie Guyau, The Ethics of Epicurus, and found that his second chapter is “Fundamental Pleasure: the Stomach.” (The translator notes that the French word Guyau uses – ventre – is a broader concept than “stomach;” Wiktionary gives “belly.”)

In the chapter, he says:

“The pleasure of the stomach supports all sensible life, and consequently, following the Epicurean doctrine, is the ground of all good.”

I don’t think this adds any real content to the discussion here – it’s just an aside.

Quote from Don

I'll admit discussions of AI can raise my hackles.

I’ve been thinking about this (actually it’s been festering in my brain – along with Eikadistes’ plea to not use AI generated “art”). Really, it sometimes more than “raises my hackles.”

To call AI-generated “art” art is, to my mind, a lie. It’s not the notations on paper (or a screen) that makes Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony art: it’s the human genius that produced it. The poetry of, say, William Butler Yeats, is only art because of the complex human mind that produced it. The most perfect AI-generated painting in the style of a Picasso is still just – a forgery.

Although I think that online friendships between real people can be real friendships, the notion of being “friends” with a Siri or an Alexa or such is a delusion. A philosophical Garden “populated” by AI bots is a “brave new world” I wouldn’t want to be part of. A basketball game whose moves and outcome are AI generated, with CGI “players” – instead of the to and fro of real players – is not a game I would want to watch.

I’m not a total Luddite with regard to AI, as I noted. But I think we need to recognize that there are certain dehumanizing potential uses.

(I also would consult a real, live research librarian before relying on AI. )

Maybe that’s all crudely put, but I wanted to get it off my chest …

Quote from TauPhi

The book is archaic not only in language but the contents as well.

It is fun to read the cadences and phrasing of that 17th century English, as well as the contents.

Early Modern English - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I recall Hiram Crespo also using the word suavity in his book (Tending the Epicurean Garden).

Yes, unlike, say Plato or Aristotle, Epicurus’ ethics are derived from a proper understanding of nature. I might put it thus:

Φῠ́σῐς (φῠσῐολογίᾱ) ⇒ συμπερασματολογία [?] (logical inference*) ⇒ ἠθῐκός (ethics).

Nature as a whole (and our place in it) is the guiding ground, rather than human reason abstracted therefrom. And that natural sequence may be part of what the canon is about?

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* By “logical inference” here, I mean that Epicurus – as opposed to other schools – seems to have employed a kind of precursor to modern inductive reasoning (e.g., regarding atoms and the void), whereas the Stoics – e.g. Chrysippus – seem to have thought that their deductive syllogisms could yield empirical truth.

Bryan Wow!

Don : But isn’t the standard tripartite division physics, ethics and canon? What am I missing?

Quote from Cassius

n the case of Epicureans, I'd maintain you have to go all the way back to the classical period to find advocates for Epicurus whom the ancient Epicureans themselves would truly recognize as being part of their own school.

Just for my own edification, when (or with whom) does the classical period end? (No argument with your point.)

Quote from Cassius

The only reason why happiness or blessedness or anything else is desirable in the first place is BECAUSE is is a state or condition of pleasure.

I associate happiness exactly with pleasurableness/pleasantness (kinetic or katastematic experience). And I suspect most people really do, though they might not use those words. In philosophical discussion, I think it’s not difficult to point that out to them – unless they have some stubborn objection (is that not what even most Christians think they will experience in heaven?)

The question (or at least a question), I think, is the purpose of engaging, philosophically, with “the rest of the world” – or anyone for that matter. Perhaps some hints (and recognition of limits) –

As Epicurus has been said to have put it: "Vain is the word of that philosopher by which no malady of mankind is healed. For just as there is no profit in medicine unless it expels the diseases of the body, so there is none in philosophy either, unless it expels the suffering of the soul." [My italics. I think there is some question as to that attribution, though DeWitt accepts it?] That seems to me to be a pretty clear expression of purpose and intention, beyond just defending a particular philosophical corpus (“beyond,” not “to the exclusion of”) …

That does not mean compromise, as per VS29: “For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions …”

And VS79: “The man who is serene causes no disturbance to himself or to another.” I know that I need to strive for a more “contagious” serenity in philosophical (and other) discourse – something that I have failed at too many times in the past, as my old argumentative tendencies rear their heads (from some self-defensive fear?).

And from MFS’s translation of Diogenes of Oinoanda:

“Moreover, we have set up this inscription not for our own sake, but for your sake, citizens, as a means of salvation for you, as we announced at the opening of the whole discourse. And we do not consider that it (i.e. the inscription) will be useful to certain people and not useful to certain people, but that it will be useful to all. … [A]nd we contrived this in order that, even while [sitting] at home, [we might be able to exhibit the] goods of philosophy, not to all people here [indeed], but to those of them who are civil-spoken; and not least we did [this] for those who are called foreigners, although they are not really so.” [My bolds and italics]

And MFS in the preface: “Diogenes, with his philanthropic and cosmopolitan attitudes and motives and his evident tranquillity in the face of illness, old age, and death, is himself a fine advertisement for the efficacy of the “medicines” he prescribes, and we should do well to pay attention to his message at this time when the pursuit of wealth and power is rampant in many quarters, while philanthropy and cosmopolitanism often seem in short supply.” [My italics]

Quote from Cassius

Query: Does it make sense for a normal person to "empty the contents first" if there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain? Is emptying even possible or desirable?

Here is the passage from Ferguson-Smith:

“Then he realized that the cause of the flaw was the vessel itself, which by its own flaw corrupted within it all things, even good things, that entered it from without. He became convinced of this, partly because [20] he saw that the vessel was leaky and riddled, so that it could never possibly be filled, and partly because he observed that it contaminated with a foul flavor everything it had taken in.”

In footnotes, MFS says that the vessel is a metaphor for the mind, and that the leaky vessel is a metaphor for the mind that cannot be satisfied.

In an old thread on this (The Vessel Analogy At The Opening of Lucretius Book Six ) , Don said: “So it all comes back around to our recent thread on ataraxia and the work of removing fear, anxiety, the darkness and torments of the mind, and instead freeing our minds from the "gloomy sea of troubles" so we can float on the calm ocean of ataraxia and surf the waves of delightful kinetic pleasures!”

So (it seems to me), “emptying” would be limited to those “torments” (e.g. fear of the gods) via application of Epicurean philosophy – and not some Buddhistic “empty mind.”

As Don says later in the thread: “The image of cleaning and repairing the vessel as a metaphor for learning and internalizing the teachings of Epicurus with the resulting clean pot filled with clean liquid symbolizing the calm waters of ataraxia shows that ataraxia is not a sudden epiphany. It takes work to achieve and maybe even maintain.”

Does ἡ παιδεία (for Epicurus) refer to education in general (beyond certain technical matters, like grammar or, per Philodemus, household economics) – or to the particular programmatic content of what passed for a “proper education” for Greeks of the time (e.g., Homer)?