Their contention is that if we knew the position of every atom and the physical laws that pertained to them, it would be possible to accurately know what would happen next ad infinitum.
Would that entail that there is no randomness in the system? That every event is perfectly predictable?
Now I want to hear from Martin! 
Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind?
Including believing and saying “There’s no such thing as free will.” Or that there is. Or believing that Epicureanism is a better philosophy than Stoicism, and why; or vice versa.
Or can we say "free will" = a individual's ability to choose.
For me, that’s just what it is -- even in the face of constraints that limit our choices and how we are able choose.
"Your "virtue" is the handmaiden of pleasure no matter what you say, buddy!"
My favorite! 
As I’ve probably noted before, I do not tend to absorb knowledge as well through listening as reading. Others are the opposite. And “concretizing” a verbal discussion into written text can have its own problems. With that said, it would be tragic had I missed this podcast (and a couple of others that I’ve listened to so far) because of my own limitations in that regard.
With that said: (1) I was reminded – especially by Dr. Glidden’s remarks on the fact that our prolepseis can be mistaken, coupled with their place in the canon – of the distinction by the Pyrrhonians between “criteria for truth” (which they found suspect – at least with regard to certain knowledge about “nonevident matters”) and “criteria for agency.” That latter may be uncertain, but can be the best evidence we have to make choices and act upon. It strikes me that, based on Dr. Glidden’s analysis, the prolepseis might fall into that second category.
And (2) the question of “cognitive” versus “noncognitive” is something that I’ve encountered in moral theory. Moral cognitivism is (at the base level I can comprehend) the idea that we can derive proper moral views via thinking and reason (as well a some sort of cognitive validation of articulated rule-based moral creeds). Moral noncognitivism is the idea that we first react emotively – for example visceral repugnance in the face of cruelty to a child. We may try to articulate cognitive reasons for that response (perhaps so that we might convince others), but it is that response itself that drives the very process.
I tend toward moral noncognitivism (again, at the base level I understand it), but it strikes me that prolepsis might explain why so many of those noncognitive (or precognitive) reactions seem to be observed across diverse cultures generally – and why people who have opposite reactions (e.g. enjoying such acts of cruelty) tend to get diagnosed as “pathological.”
Just, really, thinking “out loud” …
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Note: I take “cognitive” here to mean generally what is given as the first definition in Merriam-Webster: “1: of, relating to, being, or involving conscious intellectual activity (such as thinking, reasoning, or remembering).”
Yes! I only want to add that VS40 is employing deductive logic (here a kind of reductio ad absurdum) in a way that illustrates one of the things deductive logic is good at: illustrating incoherent thinking. However, it is possible to construct a valid deductive syllogism that leads to an empirical falsity (i.e. the syllogism is valid, but not sound).
Empirical arguments (e.g. from the senses, feelings and prolepseis) depend largely on inference from revealed facts: inductive logic. Although none of that was formalized in Greek thinking of the time, Epicurus seems (to me at least) to have been a kind pf precursor on that path.
That’s a good post, and I generally agree. But –
Just like Epicurus’ natural physicalism, a fundamental understanding of how (let alone if) we choose seems basic. Under strict determinism, those who (for example) follow Epicurus and those who follow (say) the Stoics are simply determined to do so – without any actual choice based on study and reflection.
The same for strict randomness: those who are Epicureans and those who are Stoics are just so – randomly (even if they think they have reasonably chosen).
So I do think these are important philosophical questions. (And, as I hope I have made clear, I reject both those polar extremes.)
I recall some old philosophical discussions of compatibilism that scrambled my brain. 
Basically, I take its foundation to be that although some things are determined beyond our control (and affect the range of available choices in any situation), we are still ethically responsible for our choices because – within those constraints – we do choose (even if those constraints can be mitigating factors, ethically speaking).
That's exactly the epicurean point of view, so far as I know, right?
I mean, Epicurus was not a compatibilist, he believed that we are free because the world is undetermined.
I think Epicurus thought that some things are determined and some are not (e.g. the "swerve"). Some things are up to us and some are not. If nothing at all is causally determined, then it all becomes random.
Just thinking "out loud" here, but strict determinism and strict randomness would have the same problems (both epistemologically and ethically).
“Free will” can be a fraught concept. What is generally called “libertarian free will” (which might be what most people mean) is incoherent.
The term I learned in economics is “constrained choice” – which I suspect is closer to another version of free will called “compatibilism”: Yes we choose. But our choices are constrained by our resources, by circumstances and our own abilities – some of which are determined (e.g. by evolution), and some of which result from our own (past) choices.
And strict determinism would mean that our (under that principle, illusory) perception that we do choose is also determined. So it would seem to be a vicious circle: “Why do you think it’s all determined?” “Because I believe determinism is correct.” “Why do you think that?” “Because it’s determined …”
Somehow, I uploaded only one of the two essays (albeit twice) I came across. The other is this one:
And Kalosyni I agree with you about not calling Eikas a sabbath, but I found the analogy intriguing. Do other philosophies have a similar day of festivity, outside of religion?
Thank you Cassius ! And happy Eikas to you also -- and all here!
While doing some casual research on Eikas, I came upon the following two brief essays – in addition to discussions on here – which I enjoyed. The second one is, unfortunately, riddled with ads 
– but I was struck by the reference (quoting the SOFE folk) to Eikas as a kind of “sabbath.”
Kudos, Kalosyni ! Well-chosen images, well-read -- and a simple introduction to the pleasure/pain principle that would be hard to beat: neither too simplistic nor too complicated for the beginner. Well done!
Thanks! What I like about this one is the sense of a relaxed serenity.
I also really like Genevra's portrait of "Epicurus in the Garden" on page 114 of your book (paperback version arrived today! 
). Any chance you could add that one to the thread here? Many thanks!
"Why then, do I dwell at such length on pleasure? Because the fact that old age feels little longing for sensual pleasures not only is no cause for reproach, but rather is ground for the highest praise."
Well, I’m nearly ten years older than Cicero was when he died – so maybe he never experienced the sensual pleasure of knowing that your aging prostate still allows great relief when you first wake in the morning! 
With that bit of crudity aside – and recognizing that “sensual” pleasures were not the be-all / end-all for Epicurus – I still enjoy cooking and eating simple meals, the fruit of the grape, the touch of one I love … and many other sensual pleasures. Does the range of such pleasures diminish with age? Absolutely! But I don’t find that to be cause of either distress or celebration. Besides, you can still find other pleasures. 
Poor Cicero!
The modern ones are all jazz riffs on that ancient image.
And those few ancient images may well have been "riffs" themselves?
Just for curiosity, is the red fruit in "Epicurus Dines" pomegranate (perhaps) or tomatoes or ... ?
Tomatoes would be anachronistic, but -- as a poet of sorts -- I completely affirm anachronisms as a valid and vital part of artistic license! What is important is what the images (and, in poetry, also rhythms and word-sounds) evoke.
