It’s a Michael Cacoyannis (Zorba the Greek) film (from the play by Euripides), and stars Irene Pappas as Clytemnestra (I don’t know the other actors). It has an 84% rating on Rotten Tomatoes. It seems pretty clearly a dark film (given its subject), which means I’ll probably refrain these days.
Posts by Pacatus
Regularly Checking In On A Small Screen Device? Bookmark THIS page!
-
-
This is the framed print on the wall above by desk. (The photo is not very clear,
nor does it capture the size.) But there it is, for daily inspiration. 
-
Cardinal utility was unusable because nobody could figure out how to measure/calculate “utils” (Don's hedons and dolors) as units of utility.
Relative preference is from the viewpoint of the individual. Given cost and resource constraints, how will a rational agent choose among the options (preferences) s/he faces? That, of course, is problematic of itself (including the whole notion of what “rational” means -- edit: in neoclassical economics it has to do with "efficiency" defined in terms of utility maximization -- Ugh!).
The purpose of the analysis is as a theoretical framework – to which empirical testing can be applied – for analyzing how people (consumers) generally make decisions.
Look, I am not defending neoclassical microeconomics. I had philosophical problems with it when I was in grad school, and left it behind. I’m just doing my best to give an explanation within a brief space. And just wanted to point out that, within economics as a social science, that notion of units of pleasure/happiness (cardinal utility) – whether hedons, dolors or utils – was really let go. (If you find a way to calculate such units, there is a Nobel prize awaiting you.
)And “the greatest good for the greatest number” has always seemed simplistic to me, at best. I think that social welfare is an idea worth addressing, but it is fraught with nuance and subject to broad, especially political, disagreement. I have offered thoughts on it here before. I am content to now think that my responses do not require me to eschew Epicurean philosophy at any turn (Dr. Boeri, and our discussions around his thesis, was most helpful for me on that).
-
-
I am wondering what exactly do we mean by logic,
Just thinking …
The above is a valid deductive inference (syllogism) because the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. But it only becomes true if, in fact, there was a man named Socrates.
I’m not sure how much the ancients knew of inductive logic?
-
Oh, no, no. Once your start down pain and pleasure "units" - dolors and hedons - you've left Epicurean philosophy and are talking Utilitarian philosophy.
I forgot this, and just wanted to say that, although Utilitarianism influenced neoclassical economics (efficient choice based on “marginal utility”), the notion of cardinal utility (“utils”) was dropped. Constrained choice, based on relative preference, became the model. And in no way am I advocating for that former utilitarian position.
-
Pleasurable as this discussion is, it is starting to remind me of the story in his Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein is discussing epistemology in the garden with another philosopher, and the man points to a tree and says: “That is, in fact, a tree. I know it’s a tree! I can say I know it's a tree!”
At that moment, Wittgenstein notices that a passerby has stopped and looks at them with a confused expression. And Wittgenstein says to him: “Don’t worry. This fellow’s not insane. We’re just doing philosophy.”
And I'm pretty sure we're not insane!
-
I think that, in broad strokes, is how life works. We may literally have infinite choices in each moment, but the choices we are most likely going to make in any given moment probably are constrained but our character, our philosophy of life, our social context, etc. Do I have the capacity to abandon my family and move to the woods? Will I choose to do that? Do I want to do that? No.
I'm not sure yet whether I disagree.
Do we choose? Yes.
Do we ever make choices that are not constrained by circumstance, resources, personal history, intellectual/emotional development, etc.? No.
That is why so-called "libertarian free will" fails: Given all those conditions, there is no basis to think I could have ever "chosen differently" in exactly the same case -- unless choice reduces to randomness, which I think not.
Does any of that change how I think of pleasurable alternatives, or variety in choice? No. But variety can be thought of (thinking "out loud" again) as simply loosening the choice constraints. And that offers more options for pleasure. (Though I still think that sometimes the activity of choosing itself -- which entails having alternatives -- can be pleasurable in itself.)
-
However, many other previous choices provide the choices you are offered. I don't think the choices you make "in the moment" are determined. There may be a higher probability of predicting what you'll based on your past behavior, current emotional state, previous choices, etc. But once a decision is made, those other branches are pruned, leading down a path to other decisions. The environment within which those other decisions are made is made by the choices you make now and in the future.
But that seems still a form of complex determinism -- just with branching chains of causation, each one sensitive to what came before: sensitivity to initial conditions. No choices are made sans some environmental conditions (why economists -- my background -- talk about "constrained choice").
-
Don :
So you are suggesting that my choices are always determined -- not by simple preference in the moment (an economist would say "at the margin"), but by unconscious elements? That seems both unnecessarily speculative and close to determinism, even if the determining causes are ones we are not (and perhaps cannot) be aware of.
+++++++++++++
I also want to add:
At some point, too much variety can cause anxiety over choice (“OMG, which among these thousands of toothpastes do I choose?!”), but to have some variety seems preferable to me – and on what basis could it be preferable other than it enhances pleasure? (Re the above: unless my preferences are determined.) Just as spice enhances the flavor of food – even if plain bread and water will assuage my pain. (“Variety is the spice of life.”) And sometimes pondering and choosing itself can be pleasurable.
The whole thing might hinge (just thinking “out loud”) on necessary versus unnecessary desires?
-
Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether a pleasure might bring some disturbance." Yes.
I am hungry. In the moment, I can choose to assuage that particular hunger with either a piece of grilled fish or a slice of roast chicken (examples chosen randomly). If neither choice is likely to cause me any real pain, and it seems to me that either will assuage my current pain just as well, and if tasting food is a pleasure (as well as eating to assuage hunger) then on what possible basis – other than one seeming more pleasant to me in the moment – would I make a choice?
In such a case, I think that fish-or-chicken choice represents the variety of pleasures. But that’s not something that I just shrug over and say “Meh. Either one.” I choose based on which taste I prefer (would enjoy the most) at that moment. To talk about “disturbance” in this case seems to me a bit complicated and clunky, and my initial response would be “Huh?”.
-
There are many kinds of meditation/contemplation – and they need not be mutually exclusive. I especially liked Kalosyni ‘s “enjoying the breath,” for example: it helped me move from an effortful “focus on the breath” to feeling the pleasure of just breathing.
With that said, Eoghan Gardiner has recently mentioned doing “lectio divina” using Epicurean texts. That might be similar to Don using the tetrapharmicon (in Greek).
Another is the Eastern Orthodox use of icons for visual meditation/contemplation. I think people have used images and busts of Epicurus for a long time. But, for me, Genevra Catalano’s artwork provides a new dimension in that regard. For example, I am using a copy of her “Elder Epicurus” on my computer screen (I hope that’s okay Eikadistes). But the one I’m really looking forward to is the larger version of her “A Day in the Garden” – a framed version of which (when it arrives) will hang on the wall in my “office,” facing where I sit every day. RE: "A Day In The Garden: Epicurus, Hermarchus, Leonteus, Themista, Hippoclides, Polystratus, and Alexandria" by Genevra Catalano (2023)
I have a copy on my computer as well, and I find that contemplating it brings me a feeling of peace/serenity. It will be the first thing that I see every day (after the coffee pot). And it will be available to me throughout the day – for nonverbal meditation/contemplation.
-
Far be it from me to ever disagree with Cassius!
I think Elemental Epicureanism is still sufficiently current as a next-step, and continuing, resource – and for reading off-line.
As for updating, I always thought that your Ante Oculos is worth updating for sure – and maybe moving it from just an e-book (which, for technical reasons, I have more difficulty reading these days) to a Kindle format. (Not trying to promote Kindle here – just that it is my most easily readable format these days.)
-
There’s pretty widespread agreement here about Emily Austin’s book as a fine introductory text for modern readers, and respect for Catherine Wilson’s efforts despite cogent criticism. And Hiram Crespo’s book, though perhaps more so-called “neo-Epicurean” (or “Epicurean/Humanist”?) I think is also a good modern introduction.
But where to go next among modern writers – a next step into a more intermediate-level book? DeWitt, I guess. But I want to suggest two for newer Epicureans who want to take that next step (in no real order):
Dimitriadis, Haris. EPICURUS and THE PLEASANT LIFE: A Philosophy of Nature Kindle Edition – November 30, 2022 - Revised and Expanded 2nd Edition.
And Cassius Amicus, ELEMENTAL EPICUREANISM: The Core Texts of Epicureanism, 2013.
Both are available on Kindle, and Cassius’ book, especially, can be a continuing resource.
-
In that context I would say you want to explain the differing aspects of "Pleasure" as fully as possible in understandable everyday English without use of foreign or very technical words.
Agreed. And I think both your and Don's posts could be slightly altered and combined to use just English instead of words like atarxia, aponia, kinetic, katastematic and the like (using such as tranquility/serenity, bodily ease and health, active pursuit of pleasure and lingering/stable enjoyment, etc. – though those might not be the best: just a quick off-the-top-of-my-head).
Anyway, your post really triggered a kind of “Aha!” moment in me – slow and stubborn learner that I am!
(But I still think my pulley metaphor was pretty good …
) -
Cassius: Your post #16 above is a powerfully well-crafted and articulate homily on pleasure, in response to Eoghan’s question – so much so that I’ve bookmarked it for myself.
The niggling concern I would have with stopping there, though, is that without the kind of “fleshing out” in Don ’s post #21 (which I’ve also bookmarked), especially the part I quote below, your post #16 could almost have been written by an Aristippian Cyrenaic* (even with your opening point that “tranquility and ataraxia are fully contained within the word pleasure, but ‘pleasure’ is not fully contained within tranquility or ataraxia”). Unless I glossed over something in my reading (not enough coffee yet
) …Don: “The health of the body and the tranquillity of the mind *is* katastematic pleasure. The "normal" functioning of freedom from pain in body and mind that has been discussed *is* katastematic pleasure. "Absence of pain" in the mind is literally ataraxia which Epicurus gives as an example of *a* katastematic pleasure. No matter what else is going on in our lives, we always have access to that health of the body and tranquility of the mind IF we allow it to happen, IF we have banished those fears, anxieties, worries that Epicurus taught stand in the way of experiencing *pleasure** in its all-encompassing joyful, delightful, calm, exciting, tranquil variations.”
Add Don ‘s statement, or something like it, to your homily (I mean that as a positive characterization!), and I think you have a pretty complete brief “epitome” – or at least a powerful opening summary – of the Epicuran telos.
++++++++++++++++
* At least of the kind Kurt Lampe discusses in his The Birth of Hedonism, where he attempts to correct some of the cruder interpretations of the Cyrenaics.
-
As so often seems to be the case, Kalosyni coined a particularly apt phrase for me: “A thought-changing way …” Yeah, well, it’s been that – to my benefit. And I relate it to Martin 's comment about perfection as opposed to the movement. And Cassius 's closing comments on pleasure and the normal state of being.
But big thanks to all!
-
What a helpful podcast all round! Itself a good place for a beginner to start. Kudos to all!
Just an immediate specific reaction:
I have heretofore found Lucretius a slog [and I generally don’t – as a mostly lyric poet – relate well to long didactic (or epic, narrative) poetry]. I’ve pretty much read most of Lucretius now – albeit in a slapdash, patchwork way, and with less memetic absorption than would be desired. But I found Joshua's commentary on the poem encouraging (and he knows far more about poetry per se than I ever hope to).
-
-
This is how I currently sort it:
Pleasure and pain are like opposite ends of a rope on a pulley: as one goes up, the other goes down. There is no neutral state.
The opposite of physical pleasure is ponos (pain, however mild or strong); the opposite of mental pleasure is tarache (disturbance). Aponia is the absence of pain; ataraxia, the absence of mental disturbance/dis-ease (e.g., anxiety).
Pleasures can be kinetic (e.g., orgasm) or katastematic (e.g., the lingering, contented afterglow). In the mental realm, suppose I suddenly conclude that an important check bounced: anxiety (tarache); then I realize that was an error and my finances are all in order: I relax, the anxiety abates, I rest in the satisfied realization (ataraxia).
So, on the one hand, I think that ataraxia can be episodic with tarache; on the other hand, I think a more enduring ataraxia can be cultivated – perhaps as a stable equanimity, rather like the Zen calm of a warrior in the turmoil of battle.
But it is not the apatheia of the Stoics: ataraxia is felt -- at least as a background felt-sense.
