I recall some old philosophical discussions of compatibilism that scrambled my brain. 
Basically, I take its foundation to be that although some things are determined beyond our control (and affect the range of available choices in any situation), we are still ethically responsible for our choices because – within those constraints – we do choose (even if those constraints can be mitigating factors, ethically speaking).
That's exactly the epicurean point of view, so far as I know, right?
I mean, Epicurus was not a compatibilist, he believed that we are free because the world is undetermined.
I think Epicurus thought that some things are determined and some are not (e.g. the "swerve"). Some things are up to us and some are not. If nothing at all is causally determined, then it all becomes random.
Just thinking "out loud" here, but strict determinism and strict randomness would have the same problems (both epistemologically and ethically).
“Free will” can be a fraught concept. What is generally called “libertarian free will” (which might be what most people mean) is incoherent.
The term I learned in economics is “constrained choice” – which I suspect is closer to another version of free will called “compatibilism”: Yes we choose. But our choices are constrained by our resources, by circumstances and our own abilities – some of which are determined (e.g. by evolution), and some of which result from our own (past) choices.
And strict determinism would mean that our (under that principle, illusory) perception that we do choose is also determined. So it would seem to be a vicious circle: “Why do you think it’s all determined?” “Because I believe determinism is correct.” “Why do you think that?” “Because it’s determined …”
Somehow, I uploaded only one of the two essays (albeit twice) I came across. The other is this one:
And Kalosyni I agree with you about not calling Eikas a sabbath, but I found the analogy intriguing. Do other philosophies have a similar day of festivity, outside of religion? 
Thank you Cassius ! And happy Eikas to you also -- and all here!
While doing some casual research on Eikas, I came upon the following two brief essays – in addition to discussions on here – which I enjoyed. The second one is, unfortunately, riddled with ads 
– but I was struck by the reference (quoting the SOFE folk) to Eikas as a kind of “sabbath.”
Kudos, Kalosyni ! Well-chosen images, well-read -- and a simple introduction to the pleasure/pain principle that would be hard to beat: neither too simplistic nor too complicated for the beginner. Well done!
Thanks! What I like about this one is the sense of a relaxed serenity.
I also really like Genevra's portrait of "Epicurus in the Garden" on page 114 of your book (paperback version arrived today! 
). Any chance you could add that one to the thread here? Many thanks!
"Why then, do I dwell at such length on pleasure? Because the fact that old age feels little longing for sensual pleasures not only is no cause for reproach, but rather is ground for the highest praise."
Well, I’m nearly ten years older than Cicero was when he died – so maybe he never experienced the sensual pleasure of knowing that your aging prostate still allows great relief when you first wake in the morning! 
With that bit of crudity aside – and recognizing that “sensual” pleasures were not the be-all / end-all for Epicurus – I still enjoy cooking and eating simple meals, the fruit of the grape, the touch of one I love … and many other sensual pleasures. Does the range of such pleasures diminish with age? Absolutely! But I don’t find that to be cause of either distress or celebration. Besides, you can still find other pleasures. 
Poor Cicero!
The modern ones are all jazz riffs on that ancient image.
And those few ancient images may well have been "riffs" themselves?
Just for curiosity, is the red fruit in "Epicurus Dines" pomegranate (perhaps) or tomatoes or ... ?
Tomatoes would be anachronistic, but -- as a poet of sorts -- I completely affirm anachronisms as a valid and vital part of artistic license! What is important is what the images (and, in poetry, also rhythms and word-sounds) evoke.
Interesting: Heraclitus was known as the weeping philosopher (grieving the state of the world), while Democritus was known as the laughing philosopher (with some argument over whether that was a mocking laughter at the state of the world, or – my preferred interpretation – trying to inject some cheer into the world, since cheerfulness was a main virtue for Democritus).
Perhaps, for Epicurus, a visage that captures at once his sadness at “what a mess the standard philosophers and religions had made of the world;” his sincere (serious) determination to right those wrongs as best he can, out of compassion for humanity; and a bit of a good-humored smile and twinkle in the eyes that reflect that compassion and kindness. At least, that’s the way I like to see it. And in that vein, I think that Genevra Catalano’s (Nate’s wife’s) rendering of the elder Epicurus (on the right of the three renderings I posted above) captures all of that the best. (The one on the left is by Allesandro Tomassi, and I posted it before with attribution; it reminds me of a person wise beyond his years that I briefly knew.)
Note: Catalano’s "Epicurus Dines" (also available on Etsy) shows a more pensive Epicurus.
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Democritus:
“Best is for a person to live a cheerful life as little distressed as possible.”
“A life without festivity is a long road without an inn.”
“cheerfulness”: Democritus’ Greek word was euthumia, which could also mean tranquility and contentment (cheerfulness is the predominant translation). Cheerfulness becomes a practice and a discipline that is seldom effortless.
I doubt that any one image can capture anything close to "the whole of the man." I use mostly the three below (in no particular order), depending on my mood or intuition of the moment:
Can we talk about pleasure versus displeasure in making lists? 
(Okay, bad joke.)
Every action you list, but for shunning by her family, is up to her – including refusing to argue back, even if that means walking away each and every time. (I’ve been in some very fraught and emotionally debilitating situations that I had to leave; hopefully, I would handle them better today – generally by being willing to leave sooner.) But I want to point out that 2. involves a question of self-honesty or pretense, and potentially damaging cognitive dissonance. So I don’t think that feigning accord is a sustainable option for anyone’s wellbeing.
With that said, I don’t see how the pleasure of staying with what you’ve implied are, essentially, an emotionally abusive family could possibly outweigh the pain – unless they desist from their behavior when Sally is around.
I think constantly in terms of "we" rather than "me". And, in the consideration of "we" I need to ask who would pay the price if I think only of me. So, for example, when practicing medicine I very clearly knew the agenda was to do what was appropriate for the patient, and not just beneficial to my pleasure.
So, are you really thinking in terms of “we” – which, by definition, also includes you (because “we” is relational)? Or are you saying that you think “constantly” only of others – and not yourself at all? (Rhetorical question: I don’t think you’re saying that at all.)
Does caring for others by practicing medicine (as opposed to practicing medicine just to enrich yourself) cause you to feel generally dissatisfied with your life? Does it displease you? I doubt it. Do mutually self-affirming and caring (loving) relationships bother you because the “we” includes you and your pleasure, as well as that of the other? I doubt it. Do you enjoy loving the people you love in those “we” relationships? I suspect so.
Epicurus extolled friendship. Friendship is a “we” relation. I think it’s foolish (and delusive) to imagine we can extend that “we relation” without bounds. Even if we’re thinking globally, we still act locally (and no one has a god’s-eye “view from nowhere”) – or else we likely end up flailing impotently. You may have a concern for all humanity, but you treat one patient at a time. But I also think it’s foolish to try to limit our concerns (for some of the “public goods” reasons I alluded to) to our own little band. So, we do recognize that we are necessarily and inescapably part of larger social “we” relations. And we inescapably end up weighing the effects of our choices on our nearer “we’s” relative to the larger “we’s”. (In your profession, maybe the word “triage” is sometimes applicable?)
Although ideals and other abstractions (like “virtue”) can be seductive, all our choices are always concrete:
“When it comes to shaping one’s personal behavior, all the rules of morality, as precise as they may be, remain abstract in the face of the infinite complexity of the concrete.”
—Hans Urs von Balthasar, Roman Catholic theologian
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Am I virtuous? I don’t know. Am I less kind and compassionate in my behavior than when I was steeped in idealist Christian/Kantian virtue-morality? It doesn’t seem so. Am I less concerned about “social justice” issues? I don’t think so (though, in my elder years, I am less directly active). Do I care if anyone thinks I’m not sufficiently virtuous/righteous/good? Not really. I just don’t think in those terms anymore. Do I “feel good” about my choices after (Hemingway)? Sometimes yes, sometimes no; when “no,” I try to ask why and amend – and do better next time. But that “feeling good” just is pleasure. Call it conscience if you wish; the feeling is the guide, the rationales (important as they are) come after.
Like TauPhi , I’m just a guy on the internet drawing on Epicurean philosophy – as best I understand it – to inform my own choices. I may understand it differently tomorrow. In the end, Epicurus – like all the Hellenistic schools – thought of philosophy as a process of therapy, not just an intellectual exercise.
From my perspective, that is actually the point. Don't dismiss those weeds too lightly. Are you able or willing to admit to yourself that doing what you felt was "right" was pleasurable to you. Feeling that you did the correct action *was* pleasurable. If you want to say that doing what you felt was right brought you a sense of satisfaction, I can see that. But satisfaction is a type of pleasure in long run.
Don : And that is an example of choosing a particular mental pleasure as outweighing any pains that might be involved. Does the Stoic feel displeasure/dissatisfaction – or displeased/disgusted with herself – in following her virtue-ideals? I sincerely doubt it. That does not mean that she might not experience great suffering in the instance (even unto death).
But (as I think has already been mentioned) the articulable “why” for such choices may come after an innate (evolutionary) urge to which we are responding – based on our survival needs as largely social animals.
In the social context, it is difficult to maximize the chances of living a life of wellbeing without some sort of social compact to neither harm nor be harmed. We can argue over whether such choices are (or “should be”) made out of long-term personal interest or some categorically-commanded virtue-ideal (or some evolutionarily embedded feeling-response we might call conscience) – but Epicureanism is certainly (to my view) affirming of policies that would come under the headings of social justice or social wellbeing (which does not necessarily imply some simplistic utilitarian formula). And that means making choices that take into account the wellbeing of others (not of our particular group) – and a weighing of choices, just as in a personal hedonic calculus. Also, some goods are public goods (e.g., public health efforts to prevent the spread of infectious disease), such that denying them to someone else may well cause me harm/ill-being (e.g., I , or people I care about, do get infected).
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Of course, it’s easy to sling judgments back and forth:
“You’re not enough of a virtuous person if you think that way! You’re just selfish – even when you’re doing something for others!”
“And you’re deluded if you think you get no – at least a priori – satisfaction from your virtue claims! When was the last time you berated yourself for being so good?!”
“What do you mean I’m evolutionarily wired for certain virtues? I have free will!”
“And what about sadists?! And masochists?!”
And on and on and on … 
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Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by the same door where in I went.
– Edward FitzGerald: The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám; Fifth Edition, Quatrain XXVII
O, now to let those arguments go by
as I hear the call of a gentler band:
I offer wine and laughter ere we die –
and, if you need, a free and open hand.
"Happy" carries so much semantic baggage in English it can get in the way.
Whilst I agree about the semantic difficulties with the word “happy/happiness,” I think that eudaimonia cannot be a strictly objective state – such that, say, you might claim that Pacatus is clearly in a state of eudaimonia/well-being, even though Pacatus might not be aware of that at all. So, I think there has to be a subjective element – such that I feel that state of well-being, which is a feeling of pleasure/pleasantness. And, semantic difficulties aside, I know when I feel happy, just as I know when I’m feeling enjoyment or contentment – they are all useful words in conventional discourse (where we don’t need to parse things so precisely, which itself might be off-putting to someone not steeped in the "academic" discourse). So, I use the phrase “happy well-being” for myself.
NOTE: I had a philosopher friend, who did his dissertation on the Nicomachean Ethics, who insisted the best rendering of eudaimonia was "flourishing" -- but that strikes me as even more problematic than "happy."
