“The trouble may be cleared up by considering the terminology used by these two philosophers.”
Yes – as when the Stoics distinguish between pathe and eupathe, while the Epicureans treat pathe as such: signaling either pleasure or pain/disturbance (physical or mental).
The Epicurean division of aesthesis (sensus), pathe (adfectio) and prolepsis (intuitio) seems just, all round, more clear.
“Philodemus seems to make explicit the connection between affections and self-consciousness, and he identifies affections as ‘sense perceptions of themselves’ (ἑαυτῶν ἐπαισθήσεις, col. XII). This is underscored in col. XV, where Philodemus says that we have a perception of pleasure that is discrete from our perception of the object that produces it. In the same column, Philodemus makes another important claim: that “we also have a perception of (ἐπαισθάνεσθαι) the fact of seeing.”
And (although I could be wrong) I don’t see that “being aware of x” and “being aware that I am aware” and “being aware that I am also aware of the affect that being aware has upon me” necessarily leads to an infinite regression. Except in the most radically abstract application of logic.