Posts by Pacatus

From the article Don referenced: “It seems to me that the only people who really want to live forever are those who are unable to find joy in the lives they’re living now.”

Daniel Klein, in his book Travels With Epicurus, addresses these issues from a personal perspective (often with congenial self-deprecating humor) as he enters his 70s – eschewing both the frantic (and often cosmetic) “forever-youngness” of some of his friends and the countervailing attempt by some to grind toward a longevity that promises a severely diminished quality of life, by paradoxically foregoing enjoyment now. Klein may not always be a “strict” Epicurean, but I thoroughly enjoyed (and related to) his book – through two readings now.

Don How does tagathon relate to telos?

Artists' renderings can certainly evoke a mood. Here is a painting of Zeno of Citium (I couldn't find the artist) and Genevra Catalano's Epicurus:

Quote from Don

There seem to be SO MANY specific Greek and Latin words that get chopped down to just "happy" in English.

An interesting anecdote on translation: I read once that Martin Buber’s and Franz Rosenzweig’s translation of the Torah from Hebrew into German was much longer than the original – because they wanted to capture all the nuances of the highly polysemous Hebrew! No "chopping down" for them!

Quote from Don

"In the Latin Vulgate, each of these blessings begins with the word beātī, which translates to "blessed" (plural adjective). The corresponding word in the original Greek is μακάριοι (makarioi), with the same meaning. Thus "Blessed are the poor in spirit" appears in Latin as beātī pauperēs spīritū. The Latin noun beātitūdō was coined by Cicero to describe a state of blessedness and was later incorporated within the chapter headings written for Matthew 5 in various printed versions of the Vulgate."

I recalled having seen English translations that rendered μακάριος as “happy” – including in the beatitudes. The two I found are Young’s Literal Translation (1898) and the Good News Translation by the American Bible Society (1976).

"Beatitudo" from Wiktionary: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/beatitudo.

Quote from Bryan

"Happiness" is not incorrect, but well-being is better.

For myself, I find "happiness" to be fine -- and something I understand (for myself). If I want to clarify, I say "happy well-being." I don't think that's entirely redundant.

Quote from Don

People, were talking the late 1700s here. Grammar is not what it used to be.

Absolutely. Not to flog a trivial point to death, but Latin also has/had comparative and superlative forms of perfectus:

https://www.latin-is-simple.com/en/vocabulary/adjective/6667/?h=perfectus

perfectus - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

I haven’t gone back through the thread, so I might be rehashing a bit. My last impression was that “perfect” is generally taken as an absolute abstract ideal, an attachment to which could easily deter one from pragmatically seeking the attainable “merely good” or “good enough.” But then I recalled the words from the preamble to the U.S. Constitution: “in order to form a more perfect union.” It turns out that “perfect” has not necessarily been confined to that absolute sense –

“A few usage guides still object to the use of comparison words such as more, most, nearly, almost, and rather with perfect on the grounds that perfect describes an absolute, yes-or-no condition that cannot logically be said to exist in varying degrees. The English language has never agreed to this limitation. Since its earliest use in the 13th century, perfect has, like almost all adjectives, been compared, first in the now obsolete forms perfecter and perfectest, and more recently with more, most, and similar comparison words: the most perfect arrangement of color and line imaginable. Perfect is compared in most of its general senses in all varieties of speech and writing. After all, one of the objectives of the writers of the U.S. Constitution was ‘to form a more perfect union.’” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/perfecter

And : https://strategiesforparents.com/is-it-correct-…-perfect-union/

And Wiktionary includes the understanding of “excellent” for the Latin “perfectus”: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/perfectus#Latin. Similarly from https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=perfect.

Just for interest …

Quote from Cassius

"The 'perfect' of a thing is a concept that we use to visualize what the 'best' of that thing would be, and by visualizing that concept of the 'best' of that thing, we can more easily work toward our target of approximating it. And even though we know from the start that the 'perfect' is not attainable for us, it still serves as a very valuable tool for us in calculating out actions, because there is no way we can hope to come close to a goal unless we start out knowing what the goal is."

I like that. I would see it then as an "ideal" not in the sense of Platonic idealism but more like:

Ideal

2: one regarded as exemplifying an ideal and often taken as a model for imitation

3: an ultimate object or aim of endeavor : GOAL

Definition of IDEAL

of, relating to, or embodying an ideal; conforming exactly to an ideal, law, or standard : perfect; existing as a mental image or in fancy or imagination only;…

www.merriam-webster.com

Epicurus’ living as a god?

Or a telos -- a la eudaimonia?

From the review cited by Kalosyni in post #50:

“To be clear, Mitchell does not believe our choices are absolutely free from any prior causes. We are all constrained by our genes, our histories, our psychological traits, and our developed characters. Instead of radical metaphysical freedom, Mitchell persuasively develops a more modest conception of free will that entails the evolved ability to make real choices in the service of our goals—that is, to act for our own reasons.”

Thus, Mitchell is not advocating for so-called “libertarian free will.”

From the review cited by Don in post #60:

“Organisms are not passively driven by outside signals, they interpret them, they are “meeting the world halfway, as an active partner in a dance that lasts a lifetime” (p. 217). This is the kind of academic poetry that blows my mind.” Mine too!

“Ultimately, he thinks the question of free will is a red herring and takes a pragmatic view: ‘If free will is the capacity for conscious, rational control of our actions, then I am happy in saying we have it’ … Rather than all-or-none, we have degrees of freedom, and not all people are equal in that regard.”

Thus, we can recognize mitigating circumstances with regard to personal and ethical responsibility -- without denying responsibility altogether.

Quote from Onenski

The same happen with belief in free will.

The word “belief” has become increasingly suspect for me over the years. If someone means what appears to me to be the case, or makes sense, based on my experience and observation and study, then fine (emphasis on “appears”). But that is all I will ever mean by it.

Quote from Onenski

I hope it's evident that I don't pretend to have the last word, and of course I don't intend to change the viewpoints of anybody. I just think that I could add something to this thread with my understanding of this debate in order to make it richer.

Totally!

Quote from DavidN

I don't believe hard determinism can be reconciled with Epicureanism, but to be fair lets say it can. You would need to tackle the swerve, because as long as the swerve exists a cause or set of causes can lead to a number of effects or none at all, thus determinism cannot exist. Without the swerve you effectively render epicurean physics Democritean.

The Epicurean swerve is an event in an otherwise causal universe (and one in which, as you pointed out, there can be multiple causes for any identifiable effect, and multiple effects from any identifiable cause). Therefore, it seems to me, it does not entail a universe of total indeterminism either.

Quote from DavidN

Secondly affirming the consequent fallacy, again just because B does not mean A.

An oldy but goody:

1. If all swans are white, only white swans are observed;
2. Only white swans are observed;
3. Therefore, all swans are white.

—Until black swans were discovered in Australia.

I will go to dinner tonight (our weekly dinner out) with the (possibly erroneous) assumption that I will make a choice of what to eat – constrained, surely, by the menu, my wallet, my personal tastes and preferences of the moment, etc. – but, nevertheless what seems like a choice, considering all such factors. Whether those factors are rooted in determinism or indeterminism. If that is an illusion, it is a deeply embedded one (and very pervasive across centuries and different cultures of humanity – some survival function?). I will still act as if I am actually doing some intentional hedonic choice and avoidance decision-making.

Nor does it matter if I am a compatibilist in the sense described by Dennett. That makes more sense to me in terms of my day-to-day engagement with circumstantial reality – but if it’s incorrect, it’s incorrect.

I want to add that I do not think of “justice” in any metaphysical sense. If someone wants to torture children (to take a deliberately harsh example), I will act to prevent that – without considering their motivations, or even the practical Epicurean social compact to “neither harm nor be harmed” (it does not matter that the child, or her parents, may not be signatory to that compact). In that sense, whilst I affirm the Epicurean idea of social justice, I am – at bottom – more of a moral non-cognitivist (let’s say that Epicurean philosophy here might provide some cognitive “fencing” around that).

Since I obviously have been interested in this discussion, thank you Onenski for bringing it to us.

Quote from Onenski

But, again, this is a metaphysical question.

Following TauPhi , I would suggest that any "answers" to that question would, perforce, remain thoroughly speculative, even if intellectually interesting. Empiricism, always subject to evidentiary change (even Kuhnian paradigm shifts), cannot address such metaphysical questions.

Quote from Onenski

The idea of Free Will Skepticism it's not that people don't make choices. The idea is that those choices are not independent of prior causes (in fact, that they are constrained totally, even if we don't see it).

I guess I would not call that “choice” but the illusion of choice. At the very least, it would seem a highly idiosyncratic usage, applying the term to behaviors that are “constrained totally.”

The same for "intentional agency" -- unless intentionality (itself a kind of choice?) is not totally constrained.

Quote from Cassius

I can understand that the corruptions of religious thinking have caused this area of discussion to require lots of hedging.

Agreed. We have a lot of focus on defining our terms here, for clear understanding, and maybe it would have been better for me to say "This is what I mean, in practical terms, by a reasonable version of free will." Or something like that.

Quote from Kalosyni

Sam Harris' book "Free Will" published in 2012

VS09. Necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.

VS40. He who asserts that everything happens by necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that everything happens by necessity; by his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity.

++++++++++++++++++++

The full pdf of Daniel Dennett’s (to my mind, quite cogent and devastating) refutation of Harris can be downloaded here: https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/…/rifp.2017.0018. Interestingly, Dennett mentions Lucretius’ “swerve.”

Here is an interesting case where Dennett challenges Harris’ claim to have no control over his desires:

Harris: “And there is no way I can influence my desires – for what tools of influence would I use? Other desires?”

Dennett: “Yes, for starters.”

+++++++++++++++++++++

Because of the confusions among various understandings of “free will” (which Dennett addresses) I prefer the term “constrained choice” or “constrained agency” – that is, although facing causal/situational constraints (including endogenous ones, such as native intelligence or ability), nevertheless we have positive agency. That seems to be a version of “compatibilism.”

Quote from Nate

Why are we so uncomfortable with words that Christians have appropriated?

I can only answer for myself, Nate. Sometimes, I can, fairly readily, re-translate; sometimes with a bit of labor that seems worthwhile. But, sometimes, it seems an arduous process (for me) that I just don’t need to engage in – effort better spent elsewhere.

An old example: When I was a Christian, I used to argue with other Christians about the meaning of the word “sin” – which, neither in the Hebrew nor the Greek, meant “evil” or “immoral.” It meant error, a missing of the mark – sometimes due to personal fault, sometimes just not. The notion that “sin” was something worthy of just retributive punishment (eternal condemnation in hell) – as opposed to some form of restorative/remedial justice – seemed just daft to me: an aberrational understanding grafted onto the word. But, at some point, it seemed that I was just pounding my head on a wall – and, since leaving the fold, I have no need to consider the word further. Kudos to those who are still fighting the good fight.

Kudos to those who are still fighting the good fight over such things outside that Christian context, with other words. Kudos to you on that score (and others, like Don). But sometimes, my own baggage is such that I don’t feel the need. Better for me to move on.