Posts by Pacatus
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I have read chunks of Sextus (I have two translations in paperback, both of which, unfortunately, have such small print that I now have difficulty reading them – even with my bifocals; if I had to make a recommendation, I’d recommend Benson Mates’ translation over Annas and Barnes). I have also read a number of the neo-Pyrrhonians, such as Machuca and Fogelin. Adrian Kuzminski's Pyrrhonism is by far the best introduction in terms of scholarship accessible to the lay reader.
“Pyrrhonan agnosticism” (perhaps a less confusing rendering for the modern ear) can lend itself to ataraxia in some cases (especially about so-called “nonevident matters” – perhaps to anyone who tends to experience disturbance (tarache) whenever their beliefs are (and “must not be!”) challenged. But it is clearly (to me) insufficient on at least two counts:
- Agonisticism about, for example, judgmental and punitive gods does not seem sufficient to alleviate fear. After all, “maybe” … And it could lead to an absurdity such as Pascal’s wager. And that is also tied to irrational fear of death.
- Suppose one experiences some ataraxia vis-a-vis letting go of some previously hard-held belief, via epoche. One still needs a pragmatic canon for living. Pyrrhonism is, for me, sorely deficient in that regard – resorting to a handful of little more than platitudes. Epicureanism provides such a canon.
And that suggests that any such ataraxia is likely difficult to sustain. And it also suggests that ataraxia is insufficient as a telos.
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Note: I remain agnostic about whether there are any such beings as “gods.” I am not agnostic about rejecting supernaturalism. Nor am I agnostic about what happens after death – when I am no longer. Thank you, Epicurus!
This is an overlong and somewhat rambling post perhaps. Just based on my past, (fairly extensive – as a lay schlock) reading and understanding of the Pyrronians.

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I suspect you're right. And it's also tied to particular socio-economic cultures. Perhaps the vast majority of people in the world are not susceptible.
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I have started it. Thus far, Shawcross does a good job of dismantling the slanders against Epicureanism as a philosophy of gluttony and self-indulgent licentiousness – caricatures that are carried over in modern notions of what it means to be an “epicurean.” He also explains the trichotomy of desires well, which he clearly holds as key to “the art of enough” as something much more (and more profound) than just “settling.”
To my mind (thus far), he commits two errors:
(1) He uses the word “hedonism” in just the modern caricatured sense, rather than explaining what it meant to Epicurus (or even the Cyrenaics). One who is already familiar can mentally bypass that error in reading, but it’s still deceptive.
(2) He appears (again, thus far) to commit what might be called the “ataraxic error” (which we have seen often enough). Whether he continues down that road I don;t know yet.
With that said, he clearly is trying to advocate for Epicurean philosophy as the best antidote to the modern ills of consumerism, in terms of “not-enoughness.” And that Epicurus’ “art of enough” is the key to a rich life of enjoyment and well-being.
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Note: I dislike all those pinched-lip renderings of Epicurus, even those that I have on my computer.

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As I checked it out, I stumbled on this: The Art of Enough: Epicurus and Modern Life by Andrew Shawcross. Haven't read it, but might take a look.
THE ART OF ENOUGH: Epicurus and Modern LifeTHE ART OF ENOUGH: Epicurus and Modern Lifewww.amazon.com -
From the article:
Epicurus classes freedom from disturbance as a pleasure: “Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures” (DL 10.136). It is part of the pleasure that is “the beginning and end of the blessed life.”
Sextus defines quietude simply as “an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul” (Outlines I.10), and he sets it against pleasure. In his chapter on the Cyrenaics he says that the Sceptic’s End is “‘quietude,’ which is the opposite of their End,” because “the man who positively affirms pleasure to be the End undergoes perturbations” (Outlines I.215). If the two words meant the same thing, Epicurus’s goal would be the opposite of itself. [My bold and underline]
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I recall from past discussions here that, in addition to being a katastematic pleasure, it was also proffered (initially by Don as I recall) that ataraxia is also instrumental to enjoying other pleasures – e.g., that it is difficult to enjoy a good meal if your mind is in turmoil.
Either way, ataraxia is not the end but is one aspect of hedone. And the eudaimonic life is a life of well-managed pleasure (both physical and mental) versus pain (both physical and mental).
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I suggest (following from Kalosyni ‘s post from above) that there is no inherent “superiority” in being either an extrovert or an introvert.* Both have their strengths and weaknesses. Extroverts are the vast majority in the population, and some might consider that to be the “norm” – but that might just be a bias based on statistics.
In addition to the deeper analysis offered by Kalosyni , I have also had the difference described in terms of personal energy: an extrovert tends to gain energy from being with others, as opposed to time alone; an introvert is the opposite, storing up energy in alone time, whilst expending it when being engaged with others. That does not mean that an introvert does not enjoy other people.
I am an introvert who also has extrovert friends, and that analysis resonates with my experience. And I thank Kalosyni for the insights in her post as well.
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* I want to add that I don't think anyone here was suggesting that.
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They are suggesting the possibility of a "true world" outside of this one and there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to accept such speculation - and plenty of reason not to do so
Yes. Absolutely. But it can take time, education and effort (and often some kind of therapy) to unravel conditioning (often fear-baesd) that begins at very early age, and becomes subconsciously embedded (I have before compared it to a long, slow, multifaceted hypnosis.) Some people are able to extricate themselves earlier than others. I was a slow learner.

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the source of so much confusion and worse.
In a word: Idealism. Michael Onfray in his Hedonist Manifesto pretty much lays it all back on Plato -- And Plato's successors (e.g. Christianity, Kant):
"There is only this: the real, matter, life, and living. Platonism declares war on all of it, looking to punish anyone who celebrates the drive for life."
And: "Unlike Plato, whose rigorous curriculum at the Academy was designed to orient the soul upward and away from the coarse earth, Epicurus would have us breathe the air about us more deeply and touch the earth more fully."
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Note: Onfray is a bit of a utilitarian, though.

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The kind of expectations *I* have is that people do their best and I expect people to understand what they are doing.
I'm not going to swing back into the AI debates. I will just say that only a little critical observation of society -- including business and politics -- suggests those expectations are at least a bit naïve.
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I’m sure that this has been discussed before, but it just struck me again in terms of Epicurean criteria of truth …
The Greek word for “truth” here is ἀλήθεια, which stems from the adjective ᾰ̓ληθής – which attaches the negating ἀ to λῆθος: concealment or hiddeness. Thus “truth” is that which is unconcealed, or has been revealed.
Elli puts it thus in a wonderful essay:
ἀλήθεια — alētheia: truth as the unveiling of what escapes oblivion; the presence that resists forgetfulness [“When Science Returns to the Hellenic Worldview: Empathy and Consciousness Redeemed”]
It strikes me that this understanding of truth – as ἀ - λήθεια – ties in well with Epicurus’ Canon of truth, i.e. that which is uncovered or revealed by αἴσθησῐς, πᾰ́θος and πρόληψῐς. That which cannot be concealed or veiled by idealistic or supernaturalistic conceptions: the truth of experience will out.
Anyway, that’s a nuance which struck me. As I said, it likely has been discussed here before (and maybe I just forgot
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I brought up Maslow's heirarchy of needs which then led to my commenting that perhaps Epicurus had reached a sense of fulfilling his "self-actualization" through his study of physics
What if we reframed Maslow’s “needs” (re the chart below) as Epicurean desires? Which might fall under the category of (1) "natural and necessary,” which (if any) under (2) “natural but not necessary,” and which (if any) under (3) “unnatural” (Emily Austin’s “corrosive”)?
Just as a quick pass, I’d put the first three of Maslow’s levels under (1). I think I’d relegate at least the “status” part of the fourth level to (3).
And what if we simply replaced “self-acualization” and "fulfillment" with eudaimonia?
Really just thinking “out loud” here …

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Godfrey Thanks for making us aware of Oberg’s book. I’m nearly a third through it.Good stuff.



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I don’t know if that word pleasure (and pain as well) scares people. Or if some adverse reaction stems from years of social enculturation and “programming” (e.g., from family, religion, education).* Or if they just don’t understand the breadth of Epicurus' application of those terms. Or maybe some people (especially in academia) feel easier parsing the Greek and Latin, almost as a deflection from “that word.”** (I recall Emily Austin having to battle with her publisher to get the word in the title of her book. And her introductory chapter on what pleasure is, is excellent.)
Maybe it just takes repetition, and that repetition coming at it from slightly different angles – I think that has been the case for me. And why I go back to reread such as Austin – I’ve read it all twice now (some things thrice), and will likely do so again. I still need that repetition at the basic level; maybe I get a slightly different “angle” on it each time. A process of absorption.
I doubt there are any “magic answers.” And I doubt – given the power and ubiquity of that aforementioned enculturation – we’ll ever be as popular as the Stoics.
Just my ramblings on the questions you raise. Just keep doin’ the good work.

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* I had to struggle with that a bit too, even though I had “intellectually” seen through at least most of it. Being here helped with that immensely (even if I’m a slow learner – or just innately stubborn
).** I want to be very, very clear that I see none of the longstanding members here, who do deep research, do it for that reason! It, too, can be a pleasure – as well as valuable for all of us.
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embracing pleasures of both types - pleasures of action or pleasures of state or whatever those words mean - and choosing among those pleasures by applying a a common sense analysis of whether they will bring us more pleasure or more pain.
This seems to me to be a balanced and common-sense approach.
I didn’t read the policy thread as forbidding any and all discussion of kinetic/katastematic pleasure (or aponia/atarxia). They’ve been batted around on here since I’ve been here – often helpfully.
But it seems as if the various arguments (using that word in a technical, not a pejorative sense) about trying to parse strict distinctions are unlikely to ever be settled to any general satisfaction.
But pleasure (broadly construed) as the guiding foundation – as opposed to, say, only ataraxia for the Pyrrhonians – and a common sense estimation of pleasure/pain outcomes, is settled (for Epicureans). And feelings of satisfaction or contentment are just also pleasures (and, perhaps contra Aronsen, as you’ve quoted her, I think the Cyrenaics would have seen them as “kinetic” as well).
As for duration: Is taking the time to enjoy the pleasure of tasting good food (instead of scarfing it down) necessarily of less duration than moments of satisfaction in between bites? Or perhaps a few moments of contentment after a meal – before delving into that novel you’ve been reading? And then perhaps taking a bit of time to rest your eyes between chapters? I suspect it’s all rather fluid – and that attempts to decide some relative “superiority” are generally misguided (e.g., the Cyrenaics on the one hand, and the Pyrrhonians on the other – Epicurus seems more balanced).
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I agree with you about exegesis itself. Nor do I disagree with your exegesis. Nor am I attempting any eisegesis on the texts.
I am simply saying that I personally cannot relate to the concept of blessedness (nor any kind of god-likeness) in my life. Even as I (I think) understand your explanation (exegesis), which I am not disputing. And I don’t believe that I, personally, am losing out on anything there.
Thank you for your patience.

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For this reason, Seneca elsewhere explains that whereas the goal of Epicureanism is “a mind immune to feeling”, this “unfeelingness” is actually the opposite of what the Stoics desire.
Wow! I've always had respect for Robertson as one of the better translators of Stoicism for the modern world. But that is so egregiously wrong. He clearly did not do his due diligence on that.
