Posts by Bryan

I had not seen these articles before -- I enjoyed them, thank you for sharing Kalosyni!

Some good points:

(1) We benefit from embracing the excellence of the human form, gods in human form, and idols of gods in human form.

(2) We benefit from having high levels of tolerance and acceptance (although not in a way that risks our health and safety).

(3) We benefit from envisioning the life we want to live and working to make it a reality.

(4) We benefit by remembering and being grateful for the past and in this way we can always access goods and friendships that have past.

Excellent points about idiosyncratic idiots and honest martyrs!

Godfrey, absolutely! In a way this is my preparation for revisiting the rather difficult On Signs.

Don, regarding ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις et al., I know we have -ησις as a general suffix to form abstract nouns. But I feel that ἡ ῥῆσις "saying" "manner of speaking" must also part of the construction. I cannot quite tell right now if this is obviously there or if I am forcing it.

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 col. 1) ἰδιοτήτος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μὴ σοφῷ διε[φώ]νεις, οὐδέμ παρε[μ-]βάλλων [τοῦ π]ερὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεων κα[ὶ] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεων. ἐτίθεις δ[έ] τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθὺς διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως, καὶ τὴν κατ’ αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῶν πολ[λῶ]ν ἀπο[σ]ημαίνων, οὐ μό[νον] τὴν ἔν[νοιαν .

(Sedley trans, "fr. 11, col. 2") In your search for verbal individuality you were in conflict [as much] with the wise man as with the unwise, by including nothing about lack of confirmatory evidence and the presence of counter-evidence. You fixed some of your vocabulary directly with the same language, also representing the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive…

Epicurean Epistemological Terms:

1. Confirmation (ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις): Affirmative evidence. The evidence that supports or validates a specific claim or hypothesis; crucial for establishing truth or credibility.
2. Non-confirmation (ἡ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις): Lack of affirmative evidence. The absence of evidence to affirm or support a claim; important in scenarios where a statement or hypothesis cannot be substantiated. Disproves an idea about the perceptible.
3. Contradiction (ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις): Counter-evidence. The presentation of evidence that directly opposes or refutes a given claim or hypothesis, playing a key role in dialectical and critical discourse to test and challenge assertions. Disproves an idea about the imperceptible.
4. Non-contradiction (ἡ μὴ ἀντιμαρτύρησις): Lack of counter-evidence. The situation where no evidence exists that contradicts a claim, often leading to its tacit acceptance or the lack of opposition in argumentative processes.
5. Error (τὸ διημαρτημένον): The error or misalignment of terms. Always comes from the intrusion of opinion when a fact awaits [1] confirmation or [4] the absence of contradiction and then is [2] not confirmed or [3] contradicted.

Great job guys in dealing with this difficult content.

When I was a teen, living with my grandparents at that point , they were both diagnosed and died from cancer within three years. In each case, it was clear that it would have been better for both of them to have passed a few months before they did. Holding out as long as possible when death is very near anyway may not be the best choice.

Epicurus' final letter, unmixed wine, and bath with hot (thermos) water, are suggestive.

Some further notes on Book 28

Αἱ Πλάναι: “wanderings, errors”

1. We can use common words, but it is important to recognize that those words can contain errors.
2. To avoid retaining errors in the use of common words, we must perceive each object fully and we must align the basic and original meaning of a word to that fully perceived object. To keep from making mistakes with common words, we should really see things clearly and make sure the word's true meaning matches what we sense.
3. Errors arise when our ideas are misaligned with our sensations (i.e., our preconceptions, perceptions, and receptions). Mistakes happen when what we think does not fit with what we sense.
4. As much as possible, we should identify errors in the use of words by identifying the harmful behaviors that come from the error. We should try to spot mistakes in how words are used by looking at the harmful actions they lead to.

Data that is empirical (ἐπιβλητικός) is derived from impressions (φαντασίαι) that we perceive clearly through the focus (ἐπιβολαὶ) of our faculties (κριτήρια). These faculties are the [1] sense-organs (αἰσθητήρια) which we use to focus on something clear (τι ἐναργὲς), and the [2] intellect (διάνοια), which we use to focus on the clear thought of the subject (τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπίνοιαν).

I really enjoyed your introduction Cassius!

Joshua, you provided many great points throughout, but I particularly enjoyed "Epicurus did not say it would be sweet to be roasted alive" (21:30). Correct and well said!

This was a helpful discussion everybody -- Thank you!

Do you suppose it would be too idiosyncratic to preserve that spelling?

Quote from Bryan

I am struggling with #5.

Quote from Don

Sedley has περ̣[ίληψ]ιμ where you have μερίληψιν (Sedley pi π.., your mu μ..).

Thank you very much Don! That goes far to explain my struggle! Thank you! I have fully re-checked my transcription and found two additional errors.

LSJ gives us "comprehension" and "inclusion" for περίληψις, but I feel that "comprehension" is closer to the meaning of κατάληψις.  That would give us this tentative list:

1. ἡ ἀντίληψις (hē antílēpsis): Opposition, "Con-ception"
2. ἡ διάληψις (hē diálēpsis): Interruption, Distinction, Dialogue
3. ἡ κατάληψις (hē katálēpsis): Comprehension, Capture, "Perception"
4. ἡ λῆψις (hē lēpsis): Taking, Seizure, Reception
5. ἡ περίληψις (hē perílēpsis): Summary, Overview, Encirclement
6. ἡ πρόληψις (hē prólēpsis): Preconception, Anticipation, Stereotype
7. ἡ ὑπόληψις (hē hypólēpsis): Assumption, Hypothesis, Underestimation

As you say, the section is shredded, Sedley does not translate any of it -- I agree that a full and coherent statement cannot be gleaned from what remains. The topic seems to be that errors in opinions manifest practical consequences.

--------------------------

Don, what are your thoughts on "v final, followed by a labial, without exception becomes μ; followed by a guttural, in about 30% of cases becomes γ" (Sedley)

Epicurus, On Nature 28.10.1a (Sedley reconstruction) "πραγματικῶν θεωρημάτων ἐνδίξει καὶ τὴν μερίληψιν... τῆς δόξης... περὶ ταύτης τε τῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἐμβαλλούσης ὑπολήψεως. ὄντων δ' οὖν τοιούτων οἶον... τούτων κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν πραττόντων... τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς γιγνέσθω τῆς πραγματικῆς..."

Looking at that quote, which is very difficult, I wanted to revisit ἡ λῆψις "reception,"

A concave mirror (latuscula) reflects an image with the true right and left, because the image is reflected twice (elisa bis), or because it is given a twist by the mirror.

"Mirrors that have small sides that are curved in the same degree as our sides send back images, right to our right and unreversed. Either since the image is carried across from mirror to mirror, and then flies to us having been twice reflected, or since the image is turned round when it approaches as the curved shape of the mirror turns it towards us" (Melville, DRN 4.311)

"All mirrors with bent sides, which have a shape curved like our own torso, send back to us, for that very reason, an image with our right side on the right, either because the image is transferred from one part of the mirror to another and then, after being reflected twice flies back to us, or because the image, as it gets to the mirror, is reversed -- the curving shape of the surface leads it to spin about towards us." (Johnston)

From Bailey’s commentary, page 1219: “Robin suggests that with the metal mirrors of antiquity the curved effect may have been produced by a number of small flat mirrors placed together at an obtuse angle. This would account for the diminutive, the plural, and the genitive speculorum, but… there is no evidence for the fact and there would be no difficulty in the bending of a metal mirror. Smith takes latuscula to refer to the ‘little sides’ of a jointed mirror.”

Pictured below in a non-reversing mirror is Hammon ("Amen Ra"), who’s warm-at-night, cool-by-day “Water of the Sun” spring in Cyrenaica (Libya), Lucretius talks about in DRN 6.848.

Don, I fully agree with your points. "Happiness" is not incorrect, but well-being is better.

Great comments, thank you! This is some advice from Epicurus on happiness. This website itself is an example of his advice in practice.

"One must always make these arguments for the sake of beneficial outcomes and for those cultivating well-being."

(Epicurus, On Nature 28.13.6) "αἰεὶ δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἕνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους ποιητέον"

"We ought always to aim our discussions at the benefit of those who are sturdy disciples in the pursuit of happiness" (Sedley)

We also have:

(Herodotus Histories 1.30.2) Croesus found the opportunity to say, “My Athenian guest, we have heard a lot about you because of your wisdom and of your wanderings, how as one who loves learning you have traveled much of the world for the sake of seeing it, so now I desire to ask you who is the most fortunate man you have seen.” [3] Croesus asked this question believing that he was the most fortunate of men, but Solon, offering no flattery but keeping to the truth, said, “O King, it is Tellus the Athenian.” [4] Croesus was amazed at what he had said and replied sharply, “In what way do you judge Tellus to be the most fortunate?” Solon said, “Tellus was from a prosperous city, and his children were good and noble. He saw children born to them all, and all of these survived. His life was prosperous by our standards, and his death was most glorious: [5] when the Athenians were fighting their neighbors in Eleusis, he came to help, routed the enemy, and died very finely. The Athenians buried him at public expense on the spot where he fell and gave him much honor.

We do have:

(Diogenes Laertius 1.50) "There Croesus put the question, 'Whom do you consider happy?' and Solon replied, 'Tellus of Athens, and Cleobis and Biton,' and went on in words too familiar to be quoted here."

Tellus comes from the same root as telos (the end).

"The phrase medena pro tou telous makarize ("call no one blessed until his end") has remained a common proverbial expression, all the way to present-day, modern Greek. One can only assume that it was equally familiar to, and resonated powerfully with ancient Greeks." (Erik Anderson)

A more significant apparent paradox (this is my re-wording of a Sedley point): The establishment of the canon as (1) the senses, (2) the feelings, and (3) the anticipations is an empirical process – because belief in the truthfulness of sense-impressions proves in practice more useful than distrust of them. But only when we have empirically learned that they are reliable do we have a firm basis for making further empirical discoveries. Hence arises the apparent paradox that the criterion is both the product and the starting point of empirical reasoning.

It is ancient but fictional. Alciphron's fictional letters take inspiration from human nature and "fun-facts." I have never seen anybody try to be definitive about when Alciphron was writing -- it could be that he was even a contemporary of Epicurus, but he was probably a later writer.

If it was not ancient I would totally ignore it. It is funny to think somebody would have to "flee from land to land" just to avoid Epicurus' letters and his "Principal Doctrines about Nature" -- a messed up title for further comedic effect.

Of course, as you well know and correctly argue, Epicurus was not an ascetic. (Philodemus, On Wealth P.Herc. 163) "Among the followers of Epicurus, there are those who argue that poverty is fundamentally bad, employing specific arguments to this effect. Epicurus himself declares poverty is in numerous ways a form of evil, emphasizing that when it intersects with other adversities, it becomes intolerable."

Here is another translation: Alciphron, Letter of Courtesans, Letter 17, “Leontium to Lamia” (Allen Rogers Benner trans.)

Nothing is harder to please, it seems, than an old man just beginning to play at being a boy again. How that Epicures tries to manage me, scolding me for everything, suspicious of everything, writing me, well-sealed letters, chasing me out of his school garden! I swear by Aphrodite, that if he were an Adonis – he's already nearly eighty – I would not put up with him, a louse-ridden valetudinarian all wrapped up in fleeces in place of woolens. How long is a girl to endure this “philosopher”? Let him keep his Principal Doctrines about Nature and his distorted Canons, and let him allow me to be mistress of myself, as Nature intended, the object, neither of his anger nor his insolence. Such is the graybeard who is laying siege to me: I find him a real besieger, but not like your Demetrius, my Lamia: indeed, because of him it is possible to lead a virtuous life? He wants to be a Socrates, and to talk on and on and to feign ignorance, and he regards his his Pythocles an Alcibiades and counts on making me his Xanthippe.

And the end will be that I shall leave for some destination or other and flee from land to land rather than put up with his interminable letters. And now he has ventured upon the most terrible and intolerable conduct of all, and it is because I want advice as to what I ought to do that I have written to you.

You know that handsome Timarchus of the deme Cephisia.

I do not deny that my relations with the young man have been familiar for a long time – to you, Lamia, I must write the truth – and almost the first lesson in love, that I had was from him; for I lived next-door to him, and it he who robbed me of my virginity. From that time on, he has never ceased sending me all the good things, clothes, jewelry, Indian maidservants, Indian menservants. Of the rest, I say nothing. But even in the matter of the smallest delicacies, he anticipates the seasons, so that nobody may taste them before I do. So that's the kind of lover about whom our philosopher says, "Shut him out; don't let him come near you." And what sort of names do you think he calls the boy? –speaking, neither like a citizen of Athens nor like like a philosopher, but like a clown of… Cappadocia, the first that ever entered Greece. As for me, if the whole city of Athens were made up wholly of Epicuruses, by the goddess Artemis, I would not reckon them in the scales as balancing to Timarchus' arm, no, not even his finger.

What do you say, Lamia? Is it not all true? Am I not right? And do not, I beg of you by Aphrodite, do not let his answer enter your mind: "But he is a philosopher, he is distinguished, he has a host of friends." Let him take what I have to say, say, I: but let him save his lectures for other people. "Reputation" does not warm my heart at all: no, Demeter, give me what I want – Timarchus.

Furthermore, because of me, the lad has been compelled to abandon everything – the Lyceum, and his own youth, his young comrades, and his club life – and to live with the Master, and flatter him, and sing the praise of his windy Doctrines. But this Atreus says "Get out of my preserve and don't go near Leonion": as if Timarchus could not say, with better right, "On the contrary, don't you come near my girl.” And he, though still a youth, puts up with his rival, the latecomer, an old man, but the latter cannot abide the man with the juster claim.

What shall I do, Lamia? In heaven's name, I employ you. I swear by the Mysteries, as I hope for release from these calamities, that at the very thought of separation from Timarchus, I have at this moment, turned cold, and my hands and feet have begun to sweat, and my heart has turned upside down. I beg you, take me into your home for a few days, and I will make this dotard realize how great his blessings were when he had me in his house. And I'm sure he can no longer stand his suffering, he will promptly send ambassadors to me – Metrodorus and Hermarchus and Polyaenus. How often do you think, Lamia, I have gone to him privately and said, "What are you doing, Epicurus? Don't you know that you are being ridiculed for this by Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, in the Assembly, in the theater, in the company of other sophists?" But what can be done with him? He is shameless in his passion. Well, I shall be just about as shameless as he is, I shall not let my Timarchus go. Farewell.

Here is a gem I came across today from Epicurus on determinism:

P.Herc. 1056, Epicurus, On Nature 25.7.9 (Sedley trans.) “For this is a self-refuting kind of argument, and can never prove that everything is of the kind called ‘under compulsion.’ In fact, in disputing this very question he treats his opponent as if he were speaking nonsense by his own choice. And even if, as far as mere words go, he keeps on ad infinitum always saying that he is on the contrary doing it under compulsion, he is not reasoning it empirically, since he imputes to himself the responsibility for having reasoned correctly, and to his opponent the responsibility for having reasoned incorrectly.”

He did a great job of avoiding a violent death - which took so many of his peers.

I will also repeat this point: (Demetrius Laco, On Textual and Exegetical Problems, col. 67, McOsker translation) [Man is said to be "by nature" a procurer of fo]od, since he does so by unperverted instinct; to be "by nature" susceptible to pain, since he is so by compulsion; "by nature" to pursue virtue, since he does so to his advantage; and we say that the first utterances of names were "by nature"...

So here we have acting "by nature" means acting:

[1] by our unperverted instinct (eg, pursuing food and speaking)

[2] by our compulsion (eg, avoiding pain)

and also,

[3] for our advantage!!! (ie, pursuing virtues, eg, property management)