Posts by Bryan

Quote from Bryan

I am struggling with #5.

Quote from Don

Sedley has περ̣[ίληψ]ιμ where you have μερίληψιν (Sedley pi π.., your mu μ..).

Thank you very much Don! That goes far to explain my struggle! Thank you! I have fully re-checked my transcription and found two additional errors.

LSJ gives us "comprehension" and "inclusion" for περίληψις, but I feel that "comprehension" is closer to the meaning of κατάληψις.  That would give us this tentative list:

1. ἡ ἀντίληψις (hē antílēpsis): Opposition, "Con-ception"
2. ἡ διάληψις (hē diálēpsis): Interruption, Distinction, Dialogue
3. ἡ κατάληψις (hē katálēpsis): Comprehension, Capture, "Perception"
4. ἡ λῆψις (hē lēpsis): Taking, Seizure, Reception
5. ἡ περίληψις (hē perílēpsis): Summary, Overview, Encirclement
6. ἡ πρόληψις (hē prólēpsis): Preconception, Anticipation, Stereotype
7. ἡ ὑπόληψις (hē hypólēpsis): Assumption, Hypothesis, Underestimation

As you say, the section is shredded, Sedley does not translate any of it -- I agree that a full and coherent statement cannot be gleaned from what remains. The topic seems to be that errors in opinions manifest practical consequences.

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Don, what are your thoughts on "v final, followed by a labial, without exception becomes μ; followed by a guttural, in about 30% of cases becomes γ" (Sedley)

Epicurus, On Nature 28.10.1a (Sedley reconstruction) "πραγματικῶν θεωρημάτων ἐνδίξει καὶ τὴν μερίληψιν... τῆς δόξης... περὶ ταύτης τε τῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἐμβαλλούσης ὑπολήψεως. ὄντων δ' οὖν τοιούτων οἶον... τούτων κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν πραττόντων... τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς γιγνέσθω τῆς πραγματικῆς..."

Looking at that quote, which is very difficult, I wanted to revisit ἡ λῆψις "reception,"

A concave mirror (latuscula) reflects an image with the true right and left, because the image is reflected twice (elisa bis), or because it is given a twist by the mirror.

"Mirrors that have small sides that are curved in the same degree as our sides send back images, right to our right and unreversed. Either since the image is carried across from mirror to mirror, and then flies to us having been twice reflected, or since the image is turned round when it approaches as the curved shape of the mirror turns it towards us" (Melville, DRN 4.311)

"All mirrors with bent sides, which have a shape curved like our own torso, send back to us, for that very reason, an image with our right side on the right, either because the image is transferred from one part of the mirror to another and then, after being reflected twice flies back to us, or because the image, as it gets to the mirror, is reversed -- the curving shape of the surface leads it to spin about towards us." (Johnston)

From Bailey’s commentary, page 1219: “Robin suggests that with the metal mirrors of antiquity the curved effect may have been produced by a number of small flat mirrors placed together at an obtuse angle. This would account for the diminutive, the plural, and the genitive speculorum, but… there is no evidence for the fact and there would be no difficulty in the bending of a metal mirror. Smith takes latuscula to refer to the ‘little sides’ of a jointed mirror.”

Pictured below in a non-reversing mirror is Hammon ("Amen Ra"), who’s warm-at-night, cool-by-day “Water of the Sun” spring in Cyrenaica (Libya), Lucretius talks about in DRN 6.848.

Don, I fully agree with your points. "Happiness" is not incorrect, but well-being is better.

Great comments, thank you! This is some advice from Epicurus on happiness. This website itself is an example of his advice in practice.

"One must always make these arguments for the sake of beneficial outcomes and for those cultivating well-being."

(Epicurus, On Nature 28.13.6) "αἰεὶ δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἕνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους ποιητέον"

"We ought always to aim our discussions at the benefit of those who are sturdy disciples in the pursuit of happiness" (Sedley)

We also have:

(Herodotus Histories 1.30.2) Croesus found the opportunity to say, “My Athenian guest, we have heard a lot about you because of your wisdom and of your wanderings, how as one who loves learning you have traveled much of the world for the sake of seeing it, so now I desire to ask you who is the most fortunate man you have seen.” [3] Croesus asked this question believing that he was the most fortunate of men, but Solon, offering no flattery but keeping to the truth, said, “O King, it is Tellus the Athenian.” [4] Croesus was amazed at what he had said and replied sharply, “In what way do you judge Tellus to be the most fortunate?” Solon said, “Tellus was from a prosperous city, and his children were good and noble. He saw children born to them all, and all of these survived. His life was prosperous by our standards, and his death was most glorious: [5] when the Athenians were fighting their neighbors in Eleusis, he came to help, routed the enemy, and died very finely. The Athenians buried him at public expense on the spot where he fell and gave him much honor.

We do have:

(Diogenes Laertius 1.50) "There Croesus put the question, 'Whom do you consider happy?' and Solon replied, 'Tellus of Athens, and Cleobis and Biton,' and went on in words too familiar to be quoted here."

Tellus comes from the same root as telos (the end).

"The phrase medena pro tou telous makarize ("call no one blessed until his end") has remained a common proverbial expression, all the way to present-day, modern Greek. One can only assume that it was equally familiar to, and resonated powerfully with ancient Greeks." (Erik Anderson)

A more significant apparent paradox (this is my re-wording of a Sedley point): The establishment of the canon as (1) the senses, (2) the feelings, and (3) the anticipations is an empirical process – because belief in the truthfulness of sense-impressions proves in practice more useful than distrust of them. But only when we have empirically learned that they are reliable do we have a firm basis for making further empirical discoveries. Hence arises the apparent paradox that the criterion is both the product and the starting point of empirical reasoning.

It is ancient but fictional. Alciphron's fictional letters take inspiration from human nature and "fun-facts." I have never seen anybody try to be definitive about when Alciphron was writing -- it could be that he was even a contemporary of Epicurus, but he was probably a later writer.

If it was not ancient I would totally ignore it. It is funny to think somebody would have to "flee from land to land" just to avoid Epicurus' letters and his "Principal Doctrines about Nature" -- a messed up title for further comedic effect.

Of course, as you well know and correctly argue, Epicurus was not an ascetic. (Philodemus, On Wealth P.Herc. 163) "Among the followers of Epicurus, there are those who argue that poverty is fundamentally bad, employing specific arguments to this effect. Epicurus himself declares poverty is in numerous ways a form of evil, emphasizing that when it intersects with other adversities, it becomes intolerable."

Here is another translation: Alciphron, Letter of Courtesans, Letter 17, “Leontium to Lamia” (Allen Rogers Benner trans.)

Nothing is harder to please, it seems, than an old man just beginning to play at being a boy again. How that Epicures tries to manage me, scolding me for everything, suspicious of everything, writing me, well-sealed letters, chasing me out of his school garden! I swear by Aphrodite, that if he were an Adonis – he's already nearly eighty – I would not put up with him, a louse-ridden valetudinarian all wrapped up in fleeces in place of woolens. How long is a girl to endure this “philosopher”? Let him keep his Principal Doctrines about Nature and his distorted Canons, and let him allow me to be mistress of myself, as Nature intended, the object, neither of his anger nor his insolence. Such is the graybeard who is laying siege to me: I find him a real besieger, but not like your Demetrius, my Lamia: indeed, because of him it is possible to lead a virtuous life? He wants to be a Socrates, and to talk on and on and to feign ignorance, and he regards his his Pythocles an Alcibiades and counts on making me his Xanthippe.

And the end will be that I shall leave for some destination or other and flee from land to land rather than put up with his interminable letters. And now he has ventured upon the most terrible and intolerable conduct of all, and it is because I want advice as to what I ought to do that I have written to you.

You know that handsome Timarchus of the deme Cephisia.

I do not deny that my relations with the young man have been familiar for a long time – to you, Lamia, I must write the truth – and almost the first lesson in love, that I had was from him; for I lived next-door to him, and it he who robbed me of my virginity. From that time on, he has never ceased sending me all the good things, clothes, jewelry, Indian maidservants, Indian menservants. Of the rest, I say nothing. But even in the matter of the smallest delicacies, he anticipates the seasons, so that nobody may taste them before I do. So that's the kind of lover about whom our philosopher says, "Shut him out; don't let him come near you." And what sort of names do you think he calls the boy? –speaking, neither like a citizen of Athens nor like like a philosopher, but like a clown of… Cappadocia, the first that ever entered Greece. As for me, if the whole city of Athens were made up wholly of Epicuruses, by the goddess Artemis, I would not reckon them in the scales as balancing to Timarchus' arm, no, not even his finger.

What do you say, Lamia? Is it not all true? Am I not right? And do not, I beg of you by Aphrodite, do not let his answer enter your mind: "But he is a philosopher, he is distinguished, he has a host of friends." Let him take what I have to say, say, I: but let him save his lectures for other people. "Reputation" does not warm my heart at all: no, Demeter, give me what I want – Timarchus.

Furthermore, because of me, the lad has been compelled to abandon everything – the Lyceum, and his own youth, his young comrades, and his club life – and to live with the Master, and flatter him, and sing the praise of his windy Doctrines. But this Atreus says "Get out of my preserve and don't go near Leonion": as if Timarchus could not say, with better right, "On the contrary, don't you come near my girl.” And he, though still a youth, puts up with his rival, the latecomer, an old man, but the latter cannot abide the man with the juster claim.

What shall I do, Lamia? In heaven's name, I employ you. I swear by the Mysteries, as I hope for release from these calamities, that at the very thought of separation from Timarchus, I have at this moment, turned cold, and my hands and feet have begun to sweat, and my heart has turned upside down. I beg you, take me into your home for a few days, and I will make this dotard realize how great his blessings were when he had me in his house. And I'm sure he can no longer stand his suffering, he will promptly send ambassadors to me – Metrodorus and Hermarchus and Polyaenus. How often do you think, Lamia, I have gone to him privately and said, "What are you doing, Epicurus? Don't you know that you are being ridiculed for this by Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, in the Assembly, in the theater, in the company of other sophists?" But what can be done with him? He is shameless in his passion. Well, I shall be just about as shameless as he is, I shall not let my Timarchus go. Farewell.

Here is a gem I came across today from Epicurus on determinism:

P.Herc. 1056, Epicurus, On Nature 25.7.9 (Sedley trans.) “For this is a self-refuting kind of argument, and can never prove that everything is of the kind called ‘under compulsion.’ In fact, in disputing this very question he treats his opponent as if he were speaking nonsense by his own choice. And even if, as far as mere words go, he keeps on ad infinitum always saying that he is on the contrary doing it under compulsion, he is not reasoning it empirically, since he imputes to himself the responsibility for having reasoned correctly, and to his opponent the responsibility for having reasoned incorrectly.”

He did a great job of avoiding a violent death - which took so many of his peers.

I will also repeat this point: (Demetrius Laco, On Textual and Exegetical Problems, col. 67, McOsker translation) [Man is said to be "by nature" a procurer of fo]od, since he does so by unperverted instinct; to be "by nature" susceptible to pain, since he is so by compulsion; "by nature" to pursue virtue, since he does so to his advantage; and we say that the first utterances of names were "by nature"...

So here we have acting "by nature" means acting:

[1] by our unperverted instinct (eg, pursuing food and speaking)

[2] by our compulsion (eg, avoiding pain)

and also,

[3] for our advantage!!! (ie, pursuing virtues, eg, property management)

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 (1417), fr. 13, col. 9 sup., David Sedley trans.)

"...these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false. For this reason, everybody can easily laugh when somebody gets another to assert that it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and then cites the riddle of the Covered Father, and others of the same kind."

What is the “Covered Father Riddle”? Also known as “the Megarian Riddle”?

It's often used as an example of a paradoxical situation in philosophical discussions about knowledge and truth. The riddle attempts to force one to admit they both know and do not know something.

This riddle presents a scenario where a father is covered with a blanket and his son is asked to admit that he does not know who is beneath the covering.

The paradox arises because if the son says he doesn't know who is under the blanket, it implies that he doesn't know who his father is, which is strange because he should know his own father.

Therefore it is an apparent paradox that the son simultaneously “does not know who” is under the blanket and “does know who” is under the blanket. Really the error is in the language, as the son in fact simultaneously “does not know who is under the blanket” and also knows “who” is under the blanket.

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The riddle, known as the "Riddle of the Covered Father," may come from Diodorus Cronus (Διόδωροc Κρόνοc; died c. 284 BC).

Zeno of Citium was one of his pupils, and Epicurus was probably, in part, responding to him in this book.

Diodorus was also known for these other silly and better known "paradoxes":

The Horns paradox (ὁ Κερατίνηc): What you have not lost, you have. But you have not lost horns. Therefore, you have horns.

The Sorites paradox (ὁ Cωρείτηc): If you have a heap of sand and you remove one grain, it's still a heap. Continuing to remove grains one by one, at what point does it cease to be a heap?

Yes, for this I was mostly looking at DL 2.86-90: (Hicks trans.) Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. [87] The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.

[88] Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceeds from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. [89] The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. [90] For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.

If every Pleasure was fully condensed in time and also existed in the whole organism -- or [at least] in the most important parts of its nature -- then Pleasures would never differ from one another. (KD 9)

Another argument using negative assumptions, showing that the opposite is true. This statement is in part a response to the view of the Κυρηναϊκοί (Cyrenaics), following Ἀρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος (Aristippus of Cyrene), that (1) pleasures do not differ from one another, (2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and (3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged. This incorrect understanding leads to indiscrimination in choosing pleasures.

In reality, even though pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, pleasures are variable in duration (from momentary to continuous) and location (affecting different parts of the body, including the mind) and have different qualities. Therefore, discrimination is required in choosing pleasures.

κατЄπυκνοYτο “was fully condensed” sg imperf ind, from κατα·πυκνῶ–[καταπύκνειν]: to pack tightly, compress, fill up; consider κατά·πυκνος–κατάπυκνος–κατάπυκνον: thick, close together; ἡ καταπύκνωσις–[τῆς καταπυκνώσεως]: condensation, densification; from πυκνόω "to thicken, condense.” Consider ἡ πύκνωσις–πυκνώσεως: condensation, aggregation.

Consider «…πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν φάσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι – καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον εἶναι ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως ἅπαντα γίνεται πυκνώσει καὶ ἀραιώσει παρεξαλλαττούσης τὸν ἀέρα. (On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148, column 27, Fragment 6) …to those who assert that the condensation of clouds results in the formation of water – and believe this to be a sign that everything is made from a single nature through the processes of condensation and rarefaction affecting the air.»

The prefix "κατα-" formed a technical term that seems to have been associated with Έπίκουρος. It is used mockingly by Ἀθήναιος (Athenaeus), author of Δειπνοσοφισταί (Deipnosophistae, Dinner Sophists), saying «Έπίκουρος οὕτω ‘κατεπύκνου τὴν ἡδονήν’ – ἐμασᾶτ’ ἐπιμελῶς. Eἶδε τἀγαθὸν μόνος ἐκεῖνος οἶόν ἐστιν (Δειπνοσοφισταί 3.103b) Ἐπίκουρος in this way ‘condensed pleasure’ – he chewed attentively. He was the only one who knew what the good is.»

Ἀλκίφρων (Alciphron), in his fictional letters, uses the word in association with Έπίκουρος «Tοῖτο εἶναι ‘τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀόχλητον’ καὶ ‘τὴν καταπύκνωσιν τοῦ ἡδομένου’ (Τὰ Ἀλκιφρονεία 3.19.8) This is ‘the lack of disturbance of the flesh’ this is ‘the condensation of the pleasured.’»

I think it is a simple "putting the cart before the horse."

(Demetrius Laco, On Textual and Exegetical Problems, col. 67, McOsker translation) [Man is said to be "by nature" a procurer of fo]od, since he does so by unperverted instinct; to be "by nature" susceptible to pain, since he is so by compulsion; "by nature" to pursue virtue, since he does so to his advantage; and we say that the first utterances of names were "by nature"...

So here we have acting "by nature" means acting:

[1] by our unperverted instinct (eg, pursuing food and speaking)

[2] by our compulsion (eg, avoiding pain)

and also,

[3] for our advantage (eg, pursuing virtues)

Quote from Cassius

"The 'perfect' of a thing is a concept that we use to visualize what the 'best' of that thing would be, and by visualizing that concept of the 'best' of that thing, we can more easily work toward our target of approximating it. And even though we know from the start that the 'perfect' is not attainable for us, it still serves as a very valuable tool for us in calculating out actions, because there is no way we can hope to come close to a goal unless we start out knowing what the goal is."

Really, I think this is an excellent response! I would perhaps just want to add: the perfect is not *always* attainable for us. We are capable of feeling perfect/complete pleasure. If not in our whole body (περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα) at least in the mind, which is the most important part of the body (τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως).

Sincere question: how is

(1) My experience of having freewill means that I do have freewill.

more of a 'metaphysical' conclusion than

(2) My experience of my cat being soft means that my cat is soft.

Also what does 'metaphysical' mean, in a simple/general sense?

I am almost totally ignorant of modern ideas about determinism. I experience having free will and I am not sympathetic to arguments that are counter to repeated experience. It is not a matter of logic but simple immediate proof.

There is, as we know, also the fact that atoms would never have been able to make contact with each other without an uncaused swerve - in a void, heavy atoms are not able to catch up to lighter ones and and therefore unable to cause a collision.