Posts by Bryan

Quote from Don

By definition, if they are inter-cosmic - literally between world-systems - there is nowhere for them to live! A cosmos is a world-system - ours has Earth at the center surrounded by the orb of the heavenly stars and wandering planets. There is no world in the metakosmos/intermundia - it is literally "between" worlds... No planet, no stars, no world.

I certainly agree that the world, in Epicurean terms, is analogous to the modern idea of the "visible universe."

Would you agree that, although there is a finite about of matter and space in world-systems, there is an infinite amount of matter and space outside of (ie between) world-systems?

TauPhi, something that comes to mind is that, as Lucretius says, even things in the same room with us might as well be miles away unless we look at and, to some extent, focus on them.

"...our minds and intelligence straining fixedly towards these images, comes to understand what is the blessed and eternal nature." (Velleius the Epicurean via Cicero DND 1.19.49)

I agree that Epicurus would not have thought laws necessary for interactions between Epicureans and that he wished to have very many people become Epicureans.

It is clear, however, that he had a realistic sense of the dangers posed by other people and supported the existence of laws.

These comments by Hermarchus (by way of Porphyry's On Abstinence from Eating Animals 1.7-12) are good to keep in mind:

The Arguments of the Epicureans, from Hermarchus  7. ...The ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards each other, though the similitude of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordinance, will promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most would admit this to be evident. For none of those legal institutes which were established from the first, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are adapted to be transmitted, [from one generation to another] became lawful through violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the rabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of utility, of which they had only an irrational sensation, and which they had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude of the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for the ignorance of what is beneficial than the dread of the punishment ordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and prevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were similarly capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would be no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as are prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For a survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to the avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction of punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is beneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that which is right.

9. Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary manslaughter should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed, but also that they might prevent many things of this kind from taking place, which happen, in reality, involuntarily. For neither is this advantageous through the same causes, by which men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. Since, therefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from a cause which is unstable, and which cannot be guarded against by human nature; but others are produced by our negligence and inattention to different circumstances; hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an involuntary noxious deed without punishment, but, through the fear of penalties, prevented the commission of numerous offences of this kind. I also am of opinion, that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which receive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications, were introduced by those ancient legislators, who first very properly instituted these things for no other reason than that they wished to prevent men as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the vulgar everywhere require something which may impede them from promptly performing what is not advantageous [to the community]. Hence those who first perceived this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment of fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, though proclaiming those not to be pure who in any way whatever had slain a man, unless they used purifications after the commission of the deed. For that part of the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined, acquired a becoming mildness, certain taming arts having been from the first invented for the purpose of subduing the irrational impulses of desire, by those who governed the people. And one of the precepts promulgated on this occasion was, that men should not destroy each other without discrimination.

10. Those, however, who first defined what we ought to do, and what we ought not, very properly did not forbid us to kill other animals. For the advantage arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, since it is not possible that men could be preserved, unless they endeavoured to defend those who are nurtured with themselves from the attacks of other animals. At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most elegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from slaughter because it was useful to the public safety, they also reminded the rest of the people in their mutual associations of what was the consequence of this abstinence; in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their kindred, they might preserve that communion which greatly contributes to the peculiar safety of each individual. But it was not only found to be useful for men not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing injurious to those who were collected together in the same place, for the purpose of repelling the attacks of animals of another species; but also for defense against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a certain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter of men, for these reasons, viz. in order that there might be a communion among them in things that are necessary, and that a certain utility might be afforded in each of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of time, however, when the offspring of mankind, through their intercourse with each other, became more widely extended, and animals of a different species were expelled, certain persons directed their attention in a rational way to what was useful to men in their mutual nutriment, and did not alone recall this to their memory in an irrational manner.

11. Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other, and who, through an oblivion of past transactions, prepared a more imbecile defence. But in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting to them, in consequence of now perceiving, in a greater degree, the advantage arising from an association with each other. For the destruction of every thing noxious, and the preservation of that which is subservient to its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. And hence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the above-mentioned particulars was forbidden, but that the other was not prohibited. Nor must it be said, that the law allows us to destroy some animals which are not corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any other way injurious to our life. For as I may say, no animal among those which the law permits us to kill is of this kind; since, if we suffered them to increase excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the number of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted to human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but if they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which is sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by employing their strength, in consequence of participating of this through an innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment which springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through this cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in order that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we may be able easily to subdue, may be left. For it is not with horses, oxen, and sheep, and with all tame animals, as it is with lions and wolves, and, in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that, whether the number of them is small or great, no multitude of them can be assumed, which, if left, would alleviate the necessity of our life. And on this account, indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others, we take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate to our use.

12. On this account, from the above-mentioned causes, it is similarly requisite to think, that what pertains to the eating of animals, was ordained by those who from the first established the laws; and that the advantageous and the disadvantageous were the causes why some animals were permitted to be eaten and others not. So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men respecting those who establish the laws, are full of a certain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible that this thing can take place in any other way than that in which the other utilities of life subsist, such as those that are salubrious, and an innumerable multitude of others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in many particulars, both of a public and private nature. For certain persons do not perceive those legal institutes, which are similarly adapted to all men; but some, conceiving them to rank among things of an indifferent nature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary opinion, think that such things as are not universally profitable, are every where advantageous. Hence, through this cause, they adhere to things which are unappropriate; though in certain particulars they discover what is advantageous to themselves, and what contributes to general utility. And among these are to be enumerated the eating of animals, and the legally ordained destructions which are instituted by most nations on account of the peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, however, that these institutes should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the same place as those did by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible to make a certain compact with other animals in the same manner as with men, that we should not kill them, nor they us, and that they should not be indiscriminately destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice as far as to this; for this extent of it would be attended with security. But since it is among things impossible, that animals which are not recipients of reason should participate with us of law, on this account, utility cannot be in a greater degree procured by security from other animals, than from inanimate natures. But we can alone obtain security from the liberty which we now possess of putting them to death.

Quote from Cassius

The point that even the gods require some form of activity to maintain their deathlessness would likely be a significant part of Epicurean theology, giving us another useful thing to consider as points of emulation. We too have to act properly to sustain our happiness just as they do - there's no supernatural state that "hands it to us free" for men or gods.

Or stated in the way that the death argument is made in Lucretius (if even Epicurus and Scipio had to die, we should not be offended that we too die), then the analogy would be something like: If even the gods must act properly to maintain their happiness, who are we to complain that we must do the same? We should emulate the gods not only in the result of being happy, but also in the process of getting there, with both gods and men acting property to perpetuate our happiness.

Yes I agree with you completely, including some uncertainty about the positive use of Homoeomeria - whether the atoms with which the gods easily form themselves are (1) all exactly the same kind of atom or (2) just within a class of atoms that is kindred to them. The effect and the appearance is the same either way.

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Throwing this in as well.

(Gaius Cotta via Cicero NDN 1.114) "Nevertheless, I fail to understand how this so-called blessed deity remains unafraid of destruction, given he is relentlessly bombarded and disturbed by an everlasting stream of atoms, and considering that images constantly emanate from him."

Nec tamen video quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, cumque ex ipso imagines semper afluant.

(Aetius "Pseudo-Plutarch" Placita Philosophorum 1.7.34) "In the judgment of Epicurus, all the Gods are anthropomorphites, or have the shape of men; but they are perceptible only by reason, for their nature admits of no other manner of being apprehended, their parts being so small and fine that they give no corporeal representations. The same Epicurus asserts that there are four other natural beings which are immortal: of this sort are (1) atoms, (2) the vacuum, (3) the infinite, and (4) the similar parts; and these last are called Homoeomeries and likewise elements." (Goodwin trans.)

"Ἐπίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν πάντας τοὺς θεούς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντας τούτους θεωρητοὺς διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως: ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἄλλως τέσσαρας φύσεις κατὰ γένος ἀφθάρτους τάσδε, [1] τὰ ἄτομα [2] τὸ κενὸν [3] τὸ ἄπειρον [4] τὰς ὁμοιότητας: αὗται δὲ λέγονται ὁμοιομέρειαι καὶ στοιχεῖα."

Philodemus makes similar statements that the gods are "constituted by similarity" in his books on the gods. Epicurus argued against Homoiomereia as the constitution of objects in world systems -- and objects in world systems are corruptible in part by the intrusion of matter that is alien to the constitution of that object.

The finite amount of matter that is bound up in world systems has its natural equilibrium (isonomia) in the infinite amount of matter that freely exists in the spaces between the worlds!

(Cicero, DND 1.37.105) "Nor should there ever cease to be an addition of like bodies from the infinite." "Neque deficiat unquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio"

By taking up the matter that is similar to them and excluding what is alien, the gods easily but actively continue their existence.

Cassius, the quotes you shared from DeWitt really are superb.

Calling the gods immortal does not seem inconsistent with DeWitt's interpretation, because whether the gods are (1) immortal due to their composition or (2) immortal due to their activities, they are still immortal either way.

Thank you TauPhi! I just purchased a copy from AbeBooks, so I have a copy being shipped from the Netherlands (the ebay version may still be available for someone else here).

I also sent an email to Claudio Vergara to see about access to his digital version.

Thank you, TauPhi, for pointing this out. I have never seen this. Do we have a PDF? Or a place it can be purchased? I have been looking but cannot find it yet.

I just started this (which has the typical PDF-to-text issues), so before I spend too much time cleaning it up I wanted to ask if we have the original full text in Unicode.

Here is my working translation of that bit (the subjects are capitalized).

"for you the crafty Earth sends up
sweet flowers- for you the Surfaces of the sea sparkle-
and the calmed Sky shines with spread out light.
just as the springtime Appearance of the day is revealed
and, once set free, the productive Air of the west-wind is lively:
first the Birds of the air signify you, goddess, and your
arrival, overwhelmed in their hearts with your power."

1. Divine Origin Theory. Words are given to humans directly by a divine entity or through a supernatural act.
2. Intentionalist Theory: Word meanings are shaped by what the individual speaker intends to communicate, regardless of conventional language norms.
3. Constructivist Theory: Words are a constructed tool, deliberately invented and developed by humans to meet their communication needs.
4. Conventionalist Theory: Words are products of social conventions and agreements among members of a language community over time.
5. Naturalist Theory: Words have a natural basis. Humans, like other animals, naturally produce specific sounds in response to specific circumstances, leading to a natural foundation for each language. While cultural and social factors have influenced language development, there is a core link between words and their meanings that is rooted in human nature.

Epicurus and Metrodorus originally took a fully conventionalist view of language. By 296 BC, (when On Nature, Book 28 was written) Epicurus came to see that humans naturally created relationships between objects and words, just as animals naturally create a relationship between their circumstances and their vocalizations. Therefore, language is not purely conventional. There is, for any group of people in any environment, a natural connection between their words and the objects that they label.

I had not seen these articles before -- I enjoyed them, thank you for sharing Kalosyni!

Some good points:

(1) We benefit from embracing the excellence of the human form, gods in human form, and idols of gods in human form.

(2) We benefit from having high levels of tolerance and acceptance (although not in a way that risks our health and safety).

(3) We benefit from envisioning the life we want to live and working to make it a reality.

(4) We benefit by remembering and being grateful for the past and in this way we can always access goods and friendships that have past.

Excellent points about idiosyncratic idiots and honest martyrs!

Godfrey, absolutely! In a way this is my preparation for revisiting the rather difficult On Signs.

Don, regarding ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις et al., I know we have -ησις as a general suffix to form abstract nouns. But I feel that ἡ ῥῆσις "saying" "manner of speaking" must also part of the construction. I cannot quite tell right now if this is obviously there or if I am forcing it.

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 col. 1) ἰδιοτήτος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μὴ σοφῷ διε[φώ]νεις, οὐδέμ παρε[μ-]βάλλων [τοῦ π]ερὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεων κα[ὶ] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεων. ἐτίθεις δ[έ] τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθὺς διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως, καὶ τὴν κατ’ αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῶν πολ[λῶ]ν ἀπο[σ]ημαίνων, οὐ μό[νον] τὴν ἔν[νοιαν .

(Sedley trans, "fr. 11, col. 2") In your search for verbal individuality you were in conflict [as much] with the wise man as with the unwise, by including nothing about lack of confirmatory evidence and the presence of counter-evidence. You fixed some of your vocabulary directly with the same language, also representing the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive…

Epicurean Epistemological Terms:

1. Confirmation (ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις): Affirmative evidence. The evidence that supports or validates a specific claim or hypothesis; crucial for establishing truth or credibility.
2. Non-confirmation (ἡ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις): Lack of affirmative evidence. The absence of evidence to affirm or support a claim; important in scenarios where a statement or hypothesis cannot be substantiated. Disproves an idea about the perceptible.
3. Contradiction (ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις): Counter-evidence. The presentation of evidence that directly opposes or refutes a given claim or hypothesis, playing a key role in dialectical and critical discourse to test and challenge assertions. Disproves an idea about the imperceptible.
4. Non-contradiction (ἡ μὴ ἀντιμαρτύρησις): Lack of counter-evidence. The situation where no evidence exists that contradicts a claim, often leading to its tacit acceptance or the lack of opposition in argumentative processes.
5. Error (τὸ διημαρτημένον): The error or misalignment of terms. Always comes from the intrusion of opinion when a fact awaits [1] confirmation or [4] the absence of contradiction and then is [2] not confirmed or [3] contradicted.

Great job guys in dealing with this difficult content.

When I was a teen, living with my grandparents at that point , they were both diagnosed and died from cancer within three years. In each case, it was clear that it would have been better for both of them to have passed a few months before they did. Holding out as long as possible when death is very near anyway may not be the best choice.

Epicurus' final letter, unmixed wine, and bath with hot (thermos) water, are suggestive.

Some further notes on Book 28

Αἱ Πλάναι: “wanderings, errors”

1. We can use common words, but it is important to recognize that those words can contain errors.
2. To avoid retaining errors in the use of common words, we must perceive each object fully and we must align the basic and original meaning of a word to that fully perceived object. To keep from making mistakes with common words, we should really see things clearly and make sure the word's true meaning matches what we sense.
3. Errors arise when our ideas are misaligned with our sensations (i.e., our preconceptions, perceptions, and receptions). Mistakes happen when what we think does not fit with what we sense.
4. As much as possible, we should identify errors in the use of words by identifying the harmful behaviors that come from the error. We should try to spot mistakes in how words are used by looking at the harmful actions they lead to.

Data that is empirical (ἐπιβλητικός) is derived from impressions (φαντασίαι) that we perceive clearly through the focus (ἐπιβολαὶ) of our faculties (κριτήρια). These faculties are the [1] sense-organs (αἰσθητήρια) which we use to focus on something clear (τι ἐναργὲς), and the [2] intellect (διάνοια), which we use to focus on the clear thought of the subject (τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπίνοιαν).

I really enjoyed your introduction Cassius!

Joshua, you provided many great points throughout, but I particularly enjoyed "Epicurus did not say it would be sweet to be roasted alive" (21:30). Correct and well said!

This was a helpful discussion everybody -- Thank you!

Do you suppose it would be too idiosyncratic to preserve that spelling?

Quote from Bryan

I am struggling with #5.

Quote from Don

Sedley has περ̣[ίληψ]ιμ where you have μερίληψιν (Sedley pi π.., your mu μ..).

Thank you very much Don! That goes far to explain my struggle! Thank you! I have fully re-checked my transcription and found two additional errors.

LSJ gives us "comprehension" and "inclusion" for περίληψις, but I feel that "comprehension" is closer to the meaning of κατάληψις.  That would give us this tentative list:

1. ἡ ἀντίληψις (hē antílēpsis): Opposition, "Con-ception"
2. ἡ διάληψις (hē diálēpsis): Interruption, Distinction, Dialogue
3. ἡ κατάληψις (hē katálēpsis): Comprehension, Capture, "Perception"
4. ἡ λῆψις (hē lēpsis): Taking, Seizure, Reception
5. ἡ περίληψις (hē perílēpsis): Summary, Overview, Encirclement
6. ἡ πρόληψις (hē prólēpsis): Preconception, Anticipation, Stereotype
7. ἡ ὑπόληψις (hē hypólēpsis): Assumption, Hypothesis, Underestimation

As you say, the section is shredded, Sedley does not translate any of it -- I agree that a full and coherent statement cannot be gleaned from what remains. The topic seems to be that errors in opinions manifest practical consequences.

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Don, what are your thoughts on "v final, followed by a labial, without exception becomes μ; followed by a guttural, in about 30% of cases becomes γ" (Sedley)

Epicurus, On Nature 28.10.1a (Sedley reconstruction) "πραγματικῶν θεωρημάτων ἐνδίξει καὶ τὴν μερίληψιν... τῆς δόξης... περὶ ταύτης τε τῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἐμβαλλούσης ὑπολήψεως. ὄντων δ' οὖν τοιούτων οἶον... τούτων κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν πραττόντων... τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς γιγνέσθω τῆς πραγματικῆς..."

Looking at that quote, which is very difficult, I wanted to revisit ἡ λῆψις "reception,"