Posts by Bryan

I know I'm on the younger side, but the areas of active pain in my body have been limited to specific places and to specific times. Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling pain (even if my elbow hurts all the time). By my interpretation of Epicurus and experience, this is the natural limit, which cannot be passed. The "active" pleasures are relief from the pain of want.

On the topic of adding something that is not there, there is another problem of removing what is there. This is my reservation regarding the scroll project -- they have already admitted that they do not care about Epicurean texts -- given this, will they even provide us, the public, all that is found? What if Philodemus says something that offends them? It is not written in stone -- so they could just brush away whatever they want. They are the providers of our gold plates and they can bowdlerize as they wish.

Quote from Kalosyni

On the Stoics (PHerc. 155, 339)

On a much lighter note, looking at the list Kalosyni shared, I realized I had never looked at On the Stoics -- and, now having seen it, I can also see why this has not found eager publishers. Philodemus points out the influence, which everyone admits, of Diogenes of Sinope upon Zeno of Citium. This allows him to point to the sordid details of the Cynics as the origins of Stoicism. The description of the Cynic lifestyle -- which Philodemus introduces with some apologies and a promise to move past quickly -- would be out of bounds for some times/cultures.

Epicurus - Book 28 (David Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 4 sup.) "...which instead of ignoring or doubting it, I now think I see vividly. For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we could count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic, in order that he should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes."

To apply a word to a thing we are looking for the inseparable qualities / fundamental distinguishing characteristics (συμβεβηκότα, coniuncta) not the separable qualities / circumstantial characteristics (συμπτώματα, eventa). A title for a nonphenomenal object (such as religion) is only incorrectly applied if its use (1) involves something that can proved to be untrue, or (2) is unhealthy.

(David Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 8 inf.) "As for those opinions which do not concern actions (by which I mean those which are not included among empirical opinions, but belong to the theoretical side), these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either (1) because some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false.

It seems the other version was made around seven years after the first -- and by then the papyrus had further broken down.

Giuseppe Casanova version is a bit more filled out (MS Gr. class. c. 1 94, Oxford):

Duke Databank has:

-πειν; νοητέον δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἕρμαρχον κ(αὶ) ἐπισπω-
μ̣[ένους π]νε̣ῦ[μ]α κ(αὶ) προϊεμένους τοὺς θεούς·

Which seems to mean “It must be understood, according to Hermarchus, that the gods draw in and send out air.”

This is the type of thing that I avoid - making up Greek words. (This is about P.Herc. 152 col. 13)

Thank you for the question!

It is still complicated and disorganized. Large parts of the available transcribed Papyri have not been translated. A few recent good publications have come from the Society of Biblical Literature. By way of Janko and Obbink, Oxford is still publishing. Bibliopolis has an English translation by Tsouna (link).

For those translations you mentioned above, I mostly relied on Walter Scott's Fragmenta Herculanesia, from 1885, (link) which has been helpful recently (and also is filled with many very amusing critiques of his colleagues), but this type of work is mostly just fussing over which Greek word is correct. I supplement with any recent articles I can find on whichever P.Herc. that I am looking at.

(Philodemus - On the Stable Conduct of the Gods - Book 3, P.Herc. 157 fr. 76) "...but the conviviality can reach such a level that one might drink excessively, babble incoherently, dance without shame, and engage in other such unrefined activities. As for the nature of love (ἔρως), it's not even right to speak of it as a virtue, given that the act of falling in love is found to be extremely harmful and chaotic. Love, after all, borders on madness."

(Numen is a difficult word, but we have basically):

"Indeed contact, by the unbreakable majesty if the gods, contact is the sensation of the body!"

Each of the senses of our body takes different data from direct contact with other matter. All senses perceive shape and magnitude, but in different ways.

(P.Herc. 19 col. 25a, Justin Barney trans.) So that, according to the analogy itself shape and magnitude are objects of discrimination common to these senses: the ratio which the shape and magnitude of color have with regard to color, those of body have the same ratio with regard to body.

(P.Herc. 19 col. 24a , Justin Barney trans.) we say that touch is able to distinguish both flavor and odor, because it happens that the things that produce them help to effect the unity of outline.

Now there is also "the sense of touch." With this meaning, of course it is restricted to its own domain (eg, "touching something" does not allow you to sense color or specific sounds).

(P.Herc. 19 col. 21a, Justin Barney trans.) …[the sense organ] takes up the outline and often not the thing itself. If then visible shape is nothing other than the outermost position of colors, and visible magnitude is nothing other than the ordered position of several colors, how is it possible that touch, which is incapable of apprehending colors themselves, is able to comprehend the outermost position of colors?

P.Herc. 4 has been around just as a place holder, I have never seen any text from it (except for the clips in this article). Hopefully they fully release what they have.

Quote from Pacatus

Using the metaphor of a two-humped bactrian camel?

I had not even thought of that! Given we are talking about "two similar causes" this could be a possibility.

This text has some great content, and is simpler than On the Senses:

"People see gods as responsible for all evils, creators of ongoing and future misfortunes throughout endless time, including what comes after death. If these elements weren't connected, people wouldn't fear the gods more than tyrants. They dread death as if, after life, they will be tortured in eternal retribution by the gods, leading to a fear of the gods as the doers of evil in the underworld, and death as leading to fiery torment. Just as people feared Phalaris, thinking he would roast them in the bull, and [they also feared] the bull itself, as the place of roasting -- in the same way, hearing any related word caused equal fear for both, and not less for either, even towards the source of the sound. Similarly, with the gods and death, we don't consider both a double evil, neither the direct nor the indirect threat. If we avoid extreme misery and mental harm by facing pain with a rational mind, we can overcome the worst; for with understanding, we shouldn't see death as a double or untamed evil. (P.Herc. 26, col. 19)"

Maybe even the largest. Philodemus' On the Stable Conduct of the Gods - Book I (P.Herc. 26) mentions Eudoxus of Cnidus who he says wrote On Solar Eclipses (Περὶ Ἀφανισμῶν Ἡλιακῶν).

Then he says "...since, of his contradictory arguments, Diogenes said that Eudoxus (Εὔδοξον) was the largest (μέγιστον) camel (κάμηλον)." (col. 21) "ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀντιλογικῶν δ' Εὔδοξο[ν ὁ Διο]γένης κάμηλ[ο]ν μέγι[στο]ν ἔλεγεν"

The only hint I have is that he quotes Eudoxus, who said "it is impossible to decide, if one hesitates (διστάσης) between two similar causes, whether this one or that is more responsible."

Do we have any ideas what this means? I suppose it could be a reference to being stubborn? This is another text I do not have in English (but there must be one).

I think the only aspect where there was some confusion was in the "list making" or "numbering." Epicurus was casual about "all the senses," others do not like this and wish to number them.

Epicurus to Herodotus [38b] (Hicks) Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

Hello! Welcome.

It is possible that you are thinking about this work: https://archive.org/details/Epicur…age/11/mode/2up

Given that there is a translation, I am going to abandon what little I started here and move on. Thanks again TauPhi.

I think that "the pictorial views of the mind" (phantastikai epibolai tes dianoias) is just a description of the the "visual stereotypes" (prolepseis), and thus they are used interchangeably.

We also have Philodemus On Home Economics (column 20, Tsouna translation):

"we must refer to the preconception that we possess about 'a good moneymaker,' ask in whom the content of that preconception is substantiated and in what manner that person makes money, and ascribe the predicate 'good moneymaker' [to whoever it may be in whom] those features are attested"

Regarding "meditation"(Bailey), "pleasant recollection" (Anderson), "thoughtful concern" (Cook) vs. "taking care of them" (Elli)...

I think everybody is correct! When alive we "care for / look after / attend to" those around us, and when they are gone we "care for / look after / attend to" our pleasant memories of them.

Quote from Cassius

It's a real challenge to think about where this goes in terms of how to convey the difference in meaning of words.

In a general sense, this was also a struggle at the time. Epicurus says, talking to Metrodorus (David Sedley translation, On Nature Part 28):

(Fragment 6, Column 1) "For it was so necessary to point out that we, by observing that those who speak the same language as us, in contrast to our own use of words, were assigning some unsuspected false connotation in addition to those meanings…

(fr. 13, col. 2) ...and you also used in those days to assign [names] without adapting certain conventional usages, in order that you should not make plain the principle that by assigning any name one expresses a particular opinion, and see and reflect upon the indiscriminate treatment of words and objects. (fr. 13, col. 3) And I too used to notice that you did not establish a difference between two sets of words and then say that you chose one set because it was better than choosing the other...

(fr. 13, col. 5 sup.) Perhaps , though, you might say that it is inappropriate to lengthen the discussion by citing these cases. Quite so, Metrodorus. For I do not doubt that you could cite many cases, from your own past observations, of certain people taking words in various ridiculous senses, and indeed in every sense in preference to their actual linguistic meanings, whereas our own usage does not flout linguistic convention, nor do we alter names with regard to the objects of perception.

(fr. 13, col. 5 inf.) ... not because] others transfer words from the class of that which is knowable to denote that which is unknowable, but because of their own errors, which we point out in our work On Ambiguity."

Quote from Pacatus

Zeno was Philodemus' teacher.

Yes, we have in Signs (P. Herc. 1065) Philodemus says "Zeno, in his discussions with us, used to set forth the arguments of our opponents, and he made use of the answers that have been given."

Interestingly Philodemus does concede familiarity of Zeno to a certain fellow-Epicurean named Bromius. Philodemus starts the second section of Signs saying "Bromius, however, used to say that Zeno expounded the beliefs of our opponents and the answers to them in the following way..."