Posts by Bryan

We do have:

(Diogenes Laertius 1.50) "There Croesus put the question, 'Whom do you consider happy?' and Solon replied, 'Tellus of Athens, and Cleobis and Biton,' and went on in words too familiar to be quoted here."

Tellus comes from the same root as telos (the end).

"The phrase medena pro tou telous makarize ("call no one blessed until his end") has remained a common proverbial expression, all the way to present-day, modern Greek. One can only assume that it was equally familiar to, and resonated powerfully with ancient Greeks." (Erik Anderson)

A more significant apparent paradox (this is my re-wording of a Sedley point): The establishment of the canon as (1) the senses, (2) the feelings, and (3) the anticipations is an empirical process – because belief in the truthfulness of sense-impressions proves in practice more useful than distrust of them. But only when we have empirically learned that they are reliable do we have a firm basis for making further empirical discoveries. Hence arises the apparent paradox that the criterion is both the product and the starting point of empirical reasoning.

It is ancient but fictional. Alciphron's fictional letters take inspiration from human nature and "fun-facts." I have never seen anybody try to be definitive about when Alciphron was writing -- it could be that he was even a contemporary of Epicurus, but he was probably a later writer.

If it was not ancient I would totally ignore it. It is funny to think somebody would have to "flee from land to land" just to avoid Epicurus' letters and his "Principal Doctrines about Nature" -- a messed up title for further comedic effect.

Of course, as you well know and correctly argue, Epicurus was not an ascetic. (Philodemus, On Wealth P.Herc. 163) "Among the followers of Epicurus, there are those who argue that poverty is fundamentally bad, employing specific arguments to this effect. Epicurus himself declares poverty is in numerous ways a form of evil, emphasizing that when it intersects with other adversities, it becomes intolerable."

Here is another translation: Alciphron, Letter of Courtesans, Letter 17, “Leontium to Lamia” (Allen Rogers Benner trans.)

Nothing is harder to please, it seems, than an old man just beginning to play at being a boy again. How that Epicures tries to manage me, scolding me for everything, suspicious of everything, writing me, well-sealed letters, chasing me out of his school garden! I swear by Aphrodite, that if he were an Adonis – he's already nearly eighty – I would not put up with him, a louse-ridden valetudinarian all wrapped up in fleeces in place of woolens. How long is a girl to endure this “philosopher”? Let him keep his Principal Doctrines about Nature and his distorted Canons, and let him allow me to be mistress of myself, as Nature intended, the object, neither of his anger nor his insolence. Such is the graybeard who is laying siege to me: I find him a real besieger, but not like your Demetrius, my Lamia: indeed, because of him it is possible to lead a virtuous life? He wants to be a Socrates, and to talk on and on and to feign ignorance, and he regards his his Pythocles an Alcibiades and counts on making me his Xanthippe.

And the end will be that I shall leave for some destination or other and flee from land to land rather than put up with his interminable letters. And now he has ventured upon the most terrible and intolerable conduct of all, and it is because I want advice as to what I ought to do that I have written to you.

You know that handsome Timarchus of the deme Cephisia.

I do not deny that my relations with the young man have been familiar for a long time – to you, Lamia, I must write the truth – and almost the first lesson in love, that I had was from him; for I lived next-door to him, and it he who robbed me of my virginity. From that time on, he has never ceased sending me all the good things, clothes, jewelry, Indian maidservants, Indian menservants. Of the rest, I say nothing. But even in the matter of the smallest delicacies, he anticipates the seasons, so that nobody may taste them before I do. So that's the kind of lover about whom our philosopher says, "Shut him out; don't let him come near you." And what sort of names do you think he calls the boy? –speaking, neither like a citizen of Athens nor like like a philosopher, but like a clown of… Cappadocia, the first that ever entered Greece. As for me, if the whole city of Athens were made up wholly of Epicuruses, by the goddess Artemis, I would not reckon them in the scales as balancing to Timarchus' arm, no, not even his finger.

What do you say, Lamia? Is it not all true? Am I not right? And do not, I beg of you by Aphrodite, do not let his answer enter your mind: "But he is a philosopher, he is distinguished, he has a host of friends." Let him take what I have to say, say, I: but let him save his lectures for other people. "Reputation" does not warm my heart at all: no, Demeter, give me what I want – Timarchus.

Furthermore, because of me, the lad has been compelled to abandon everything – the Lyceum, and his own youth, his young comrades, and his club life – and to live with the Master, and flatter him, and sing the praise of his windy Doctrines. But this Atreus says "Get out of my preserve and don't go near Leonion": as if Timarchus could not say, with better right, "On the contrary, don't you come near my girl.” And he, though still a youth, puts up with his rival, the latecomer, an old man, but the latter cannot abide the man with the juster claim.

What shall I do, Lamia? In heaven's name, I employ you. I swear by the Mysteries, as I hope for release from these calamities, that at the very thought of separation from Timarchus, I have at this moment, turned cold, and my hands and feet have begun to sweat, and my heart has turned upside down. I beg you, take me into your home for a few days, and I will make this dotard realize how great his blessings were when he had me in his house. And I'm sure he can no longer stand his suffering, he will promptly send ambassadors to me – Metrodorus and Hermarchus and Polyaenus. How often do you think, Lamia, I have gone to him privately and said, "What are you doing, Epicurus? Don't you know that you are being ridiculed for this by Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, in the Assembly, in the theater, in the company of other sophists?" But what can be done with him? He is shameless in his passion. Well, I shall be just about as shameless as he is, I shall not let my Timarchus go. Farewell.

Here is a gem I came across today from Epicurus on determinism:

P.Herc. 1056, Epicurus, On Nature 25.7.9 (Sedley trans.) “For this is a self-refuting kind of argument, and can never prove that everything is of the kind called ‘under compulsion.’ In fact, in disputing this very question he treats his opponent as if he were speaking nonsense by his own choice. And even if, as far as mere words go, he keeps on ad infinitum always saying that he is on the contrary doing it under compulsion, he is not reasoning it empirically, since he imputes to himself the responsibility for having reasoned correctly, and to his opponent the responsibility for having reasoned incorrectly.”

He did a great job of avoiding a violent death - which took so many of his peers.

I will also repeat this point: (Demetrius Laco, On Textual and Exegetical Problems, col. 67, McOsker translation) [Man is said to be "by nature" a procurer of fo]od, since he does so by unperverted instinct; to be "by nature" susceptible to pain, since he is so by compulsion; "by nature" to pursue virtue, since he does so to his advantage; and we say that the first utterances of names were "by nature"...

So here we have acting "by nature" means acting:

[1] by our unperverted instinct (eg, pursuing food and speaking)

[2] by our compulsion (eg, avoiding pain)

and also,

[3] for our advantage!!! (ie, pursuing virtues, eg, property management)

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 (1417), fr. 13, col. 9 sup., David Sedley trans.)

"...these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false. For this reason, everybody can easily laugh when somebody gets another to assert that it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and then cites the riddle of the Covered Father, and others of the same kind."

What is the “Covered Father Riddle”? Also known as “the Megarian Riddle”?

It's often used as an example of a paradoxical situation in philosophical discussions about knowledge and truth. The riddle attempts to force one to admit they both know and do not know something.

This riddle presents a scenario where a father is covered with a blanket and his son is asked to admit that he does not know who is beneath the covering.

The paradox arises because if the son says he doesn't know who is under the blanket, it implies that he doesn't know who his father is, which is strange because he should know his own father.

Therefore it is an apparent paradox that the son simultaneously “does not know who” is under the blanket and “does know who” is under the blanket. Really the error is in the language, as the son in fact simultaneously “does not know who is under the blanket” and also knows “who” is under the blanket.

============

The riddle, known as the "Riddle of the Covered Father," may come from Diodorus Cronus (Διόδωροc Κρόνοc; died c. 284 BC).

Zeno of Citium was one of his pupils, and Epicurus was probably, in part, responding to him in this book.

Diodorus was also known for these other silly and better known "paradoxes":

The Horns paradox (ὁ Κερατίνηc): What you have not lost, you have. But you have not lost horns. Therefore, you have horns.

The Sorites paradox (ὁ Cωρείτηc): If you have a heap of sand and you remove one grain, it's still a heap. Continuing to remove grains one by one, at what point does it cease to be a heap?

Yes, for this I was mostly looking at DL 2.86-90: (Hicks trans.) Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. [87] The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.

[88] Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceeds from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. [89] The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. [90] For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.

If every Pleasure was fully condensed in time and also existed in the whole organism -- or [at least] in the most important parts of its nature -- then Pleasures would never differ from one another. (KD 9)

Another argument using negative assumptions, showing that the opposite is true. This statement is in part a response to the view of the Κυρηναϊκοί (Cyrenaics), following Ἀρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος (Aristippus of Cyrene), that (1) pleasures do not differ from one another, (2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and (3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged. This incorrect understanding leads to indiscrimination in choosing pleasures.

In reality, even though pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, pleasures are variable in duration (from momentary to continuous) and location (affecting different parts of the body, including the mind) and have different qualities. Therefore, discrimination is required in choosing pleasures.

κατЄπυκνοYτο “was fully condensed” sg imperf ind, from κατα·πυκνῶ–[καταπύκνειν]: to pack tightly, compress, fill up; consider κατά·πυκνος–κατάπυκνος–κατάπυκνον: thick, close together; ἡ καταπύκνωσις–[τῆς καταπυκνώσεως]: condensation, densification; from πυκνόω "to thicken, condense.” Consider ἡ πύκνωσις–πυκνώσεως: condensation, aggregation.

Consider «…πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν φάσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι – καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον εἶναι ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως ἅπαντα γίνεται πυκνώσει καὶ ἀραιώσει παρεξαλλαττούσης τὸν ἀέρα. (On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148, column 27, Fragment 6) …to those who assert that the condensation of clouds results in the formation of water – and believe this to be a sign that everything is made from a single nature through the processes of condensation and rarefaction affecting the air.»

The prefix "κατα-" formed a technical term that seems to have been associated with Έπίκουρος. It is used mockingly by Ἀθήναιος (Athenaeus), author of Δειπνοσοφισταί (Deipnosophistae, Dinner Sophists), saying «Έπίκουρος οὕτω ‘κατεπύκνου τὴν ἡδονήν’ – ἐμασᾶτ’ ἐπιμελῶς. Eἶδε τἀγαθὸν μόνος ἐκεῖνος οἶόν ἐστιν (Δειπνοσοφισταί 3.103b) Ἐπίκουρος in this way ‘condensed pleasure’ – he chewed attentively. He was the only one who knew what the good is.»

Ἀλκίφρων (Alciphron), in his fictional letters, uses the word in association with Έπίκουρος «Tοῖτο εἶναι ‘τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀόχλητον’ καὶ ‘τὴν καταπύκνωσιν τοῦ ἡδομένου’ (Τὰ Ἀλκιφρονεία 3.19.8) This is ‘the lack of disturbance of the flesh’ this is ‘the condensation of the pleasured.’»

I think it is a simple "putting the cart before the horse."

(Demetrius Laco, On Textual and Exegetical Problems, col. 67, McOsker translation) [Man is said to be "by nature" a procurer of fo]od, since he does so by unperverted instinct; to be "by nature" susceptible to pain, since he is so by compulsion; "by nature" to pursue virtue, since he does so to his advantage; and we say that the first utterances of names were "by nature"...

So here we have acting "by nature" means acting:

[1] by our unperverted instinct (eg, pursuing food and speaking)

[2] by our compulsion (eg, avoiding pain)

and also,

[3] for our advantage (eg, pursuing virtues)

Quote from Cassius

"The 'perfect' of a thing is a concept that we use to visualize what the 'best' of that thing would be, and by visualizing that concept of the 'best' of that thing, we can more easily work toward our target of approximating it. And even though we know from the start that the 'perfect' is not attainable for us, it still serves as a very valuable tool for us in calculating out actions, because there is no way we can hope to come close to a goal unless we start out knowing what the goal is."

Really, I think this is an excellent response! I would perhaps just want to add: the perfect is not *always* attainable for us. We are capable of feeling perfect/complete pleasure. If not in our whole body (περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα) at least in the mind, which is the most important part of the body (τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως).

Sincere question: how is

(1) My experience of having freewill means that I do have freewill.

more of a 'metaphysical' conclusion than

(2) My experience of my cat being soft means that my cat is soft.

Also what does 'metaphysical' mean, in a simple/general sense?

I am almost totally ignorant of modern ideas about determinism. I experience having free will and I am not sympathetic to arguments that are counter to repeated experience. It is not a matter of logic but simple immediate proof.

There is, as we know, also the fact that atoms would never have been able to make contact with each other without an uncaused swerve - in a void, heavy atoms are not able to catch up to lighter ones and and therefore unable to cause a collision.

Adding a bit to Cassius' mention of the Brazen bull, we also have Philodemus - On the Gods - Book 1 (P.Herc. 26, col. 19) “At times, both opposing elements seem to be independent origins; in one place, one element dominates and in another place, the other. They are inseparable, yet at times, they interact and intertwine, creating conflict and complexity. People see gods as responsible for all evils, creators of ongoing and future misfortunes throughout endless time, including what comes after death. If these elements were not connected, people would not fear the gods more than tyrants. They dread death as if, after life, they will be tortured in eternal retribution * by the gods, leading to both a fear of the gods as the doers of evil in the underworld, and also death as leading to fiery torment. Just as people feared Phalaris, thinking he would roast them in the bull, and [they also feared] the bull itself, as the place of the roasting -- in the same way, hearing any related word causes equal fear for both, and not less for either, even towards the source of the sound! Similarly, with the gods and death, we do not consider both a double evil, neither the direct nor the indirect threat. If we avoid extreme misery and mental harm by facing pain with a rational mind, we can overcome the worst; for with understanding, we shouldn't see death as a double or untamed evil.”

*in the Areopagus?

[ἀντι]κειμ[ἐνων]
[ἀ]νφο̣τ̣έρ̣ω̣[ν] ἄ̣λ̣[λοτε μὲ]ν̣ ἀνυπόθ[ετον]
[ὲκατ]έραν εἶν[αι ἀ]ρ̣χήν, ἐν ἰδίωι δ̣[ὲ]
[τόπ]ωι τὴν ἑτέρα[ν κ]α[ὶ] π̣άλιν ἐν ἰδίω[ι] τ[ὴν]
5[ἑτ]έ[ρ]αν, καὶ ἀδιαζε[ύκ]τ[ων] α̣λλήλων οὐ[δ]ε-
[τέ]ρ̣ας̣ ἡγεῖσθαι τὴ[ν ἑτέραν], ἄλλοτε δ̣' ἀ̣[ντέ-]
χ[ειν] ἐκατέρας καὶ συν[βαίνει]ν̣ ἀλλήλαι[σ],
[ὥστ' ἀν]τίτα[σιν] ἔχειν̣ [καὶ μὴ] ἄνευ π[λο-]
[κῆσ] εἶναι. τ[οὺσ] μὲν γὰρ θεοὺς ἀνθρώπους
10[ἡγο]ῦνται καὶ α[ἰ]τίους ἁ[πά]ν[τω]ν κυρίω[σ]
[κακῶν], κ̣αἰωνίων συμ[φορ]ῶν ὄντας τε κ[αὶ]
γενησομένους ποιητικοὺς ἐν τῶ(*)ι [ἀπ]ε̣ι̣-
[ρωι χ]ρόνωι δηλονότι καὶ τὸν μετὰ τὴν τ[ε-]
λ[ευ]τὴν συμπεριλαμβάνοντες, ὡς εἰ [μὴ]
15ἑ̣κ̣[άτε]ρον συνήπτε̣τ', οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐφ̣[ο-]
[β]οῦντο μᾶλλον τυράννων· τὸν δὲ θά-
[να]τον [φρίτ]τουσιν ὡς ἐν τῶ(*) Ἀρ̣ε̣[ίω]ι π[άγωι]
μ̣ε̣τὰ [τὸ] ζῆν ταῖς αἰ[ω]νί[οι]ς̣ ἀμ[οι]β̣αῖς β̣[α-]
[σανι]σ̣θ̣ησόμενοι πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε
20[τοὺσ] μὲν θεοὺς ὡς δραστικοὺς [τῶ]ν κακ̣[ῶν]
ε[ὐλ]αβεῖσθαι τῶν [καθ' ἅιδη]ν, τὸν δ̣ὲ Θάνα[τον]
[ὡς το]ὺ̣ς̣ ἐν τούτωι̣ π̣[υρω]θησ[ομέν]ους ἄξ̣[ον-]
[τα]. καθάπερ ἐφοβ̣οῦντ̣[ο] τότε τὸ[ν μ]ὲν Φά-
[λαριν] ὡς ἐν τῶ(*) ταύρω[ι κ]ατοπτήσοντ̣α̣,
25[τὸ]ν δὲ τα[ῦρον] ὡς ἐν αὐτῶι τῆς κατοπτ̣ή̣-
[σε]ω̣ς γ̣[ε]ν[ησο]μ̣έ̣νης [. κ]αὶ καθ' ὃν τ[ρό]πον
[τινὰ φθόγγ]ον ἐπα[ισθόμενοι τὴν τα-]
ραχὴν ἴσην ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων κ[οιν]ῶ̣ς [ὤ-]
τω̣ν ἔχ[ομ]ε̣ν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἥ[τ]τω κ̣[αὶ τ]ὴν [ἐφ' ὁ-]
30π{ρ}ο[τερου]οῦν, μείζ[ω] δ' ἐπὶ̣ τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ [π]ρὸς̣ τὸν
[φθόγγον, οὕτω] δὴ κἀν τοῖς [περὶ θεῶν]
[καὶ θανάτου] διττ̣ὸ̣ν κακὸν ο̣[ὐ διδο-]
[μεν οὔτ' αὐτό ο]ὔτε τὸ παρα[σ]κε̣υα[ζό]μ̣[ε-]
[νον ἐκείνοι]ς, ἀλλ' ἄν [τις ἐσχάτη]
35[ταλλιπωρία] τούτ̣ωι μὴ παρῆ(*) κ̣[αὶ φρε-]
[νῶν βλάβη], νοῦν κἀντίπαλ' ἀ[λ]γ̣η̣δ[ό-]
νος [ἄκ]η προσβαλόντες μετ̣α̣ν̣α̣-
σ̣τ̣ήσομ[ε]ν̣ τὰ χείριστα· σὺν νῶ̣ι̣ γ̣ὰρ οὐ
[τὸ]ν θάνατον κακὸν δι[ττὸν ἢ ἀνή-]
40μερον ἐχθ̣ρ̣ὸ̣ν̣ χρὴ [νομίσαι ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]

Quote from Kalosyni

I don't think of smelling a rose as a relief from pain, nor is eating dessert!

These are variations that we can experience, but do either increase our pleasure?

Quote from Kalosyni

...the areas of active pleasure in my body have been limited to specific places and to specific times. Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling [stimulative] pleasure.

That is true. Which is fortunate-- because such pleasure is only felt as a relief from pain.

This is also true: We feel total pleasure in most parts of our body, most of the time.

I know I'm on the younger side, but the areas of active pain in my body have been limited to specific places and to specific times. Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling pain (even if my elbow hurts all the time). By my interpretation of Epicurus and experience, this is the natural limit, which cannot be passed. The "active" pleasures are relief from the pain of want.

On the topic of adding something that is not there, there is another problem of removing what is there. This is my reservation regarding the scroll project -- they have already admitted that they do not care about Epicurean texts -- given this, will they even provide us, the public, all that is found? What if Philodemus says something that offends them? It is not written in stone -- so they could just brush away whatever they want. They are the providers of our gold plates and they can bowdlerize as they wish.

Quote from Kalosyni

On the Stoics (PHerc. 155, 339)

On a much lighter note, looking at the list Kalosyni shared, I realized I had never looked at On the Stoics -- and, now having seen it, I can also see why this has not found eager publishers. Philodemus points out the influence, which everyone admits, of Diogenes of Sinope upon Zeno of Citium. This allows him to point to the sordid details of the Cynics as the origins of Stoicism. The description of the Cynic lifestyle -- which Philodemus introduces with some apologies and a promise to move past quickly -- would be out of bounds for some times/cultures.

Epicurus - Book 28 (David Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 4 sup.) "...which instead of ignoring or doubting it, I now think I see vividly. For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we could count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic, in order that he should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes."

To apply a word to a thing we are looking for the inseparable qualities / fundamental distinguishing characteristics (συμβεβηκότα, coniuncta) not the separable qualities / circumstantial characteristics (συμπτώματα, eventa). A title for a nonphenomenal object (such as religion) is only incorrectly applied if its use (1) involves something that can proved to be untrue, or (2) is unhealthy.

(David Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 8 inf.) "As for those opinions which do not concern actions (by which I mean those which are not included among empirical opinions, but belong to the theoretical side), these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either (1) because some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false.