Posts by Bryan

The Glossarium finally arrived. Although most of the work was completed by Usener, he never published the work. In fact it was not published until 1977 in Rome and (as far as I can tell) never published again. Therefore it is in an unfortunate position to be written in the late 1800's but still has a copyright. This is, I suppose, one reason for it's rarity.

There are some modern edits, for example I was very pleasantly surprised to see a full equivalence table for the old listing of the P.Hercs to the one in modern use. Up to this point when I saw "VH² I f.149" in Usener I had to do some digital digging in the Digital Corpus of Literary Papyri (in some cases unsuccessfully), but now we can look at the table as see that VH² I f.149 = P.Herc. 1005!

Mostly it is a dictionary of Epicurean terms. This idea itself cannot be copyrighted, we will have to form a digital dictionary of Epicurean terms.

In an effort to reconcile (DL 10.32) "All concepts have arisen from the senses" with (DND 1.43) "...gods exist, because nature herself has impressed a notion of them on the minds of all." I am thinking:

What has "nature used to impress a notion of gods on our minds" if not the very images of the gods that come from their bodies?

We also cannot forget that Philodemus discusses the actual physical processes by which the gods exist:

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.8.205: ^[Obbink] And having written another book On Holiness, in it too he makes clear that –not only that thing which exists indestructibly – but also (that which) continually exists in perfection as one and the same entity: are termed in the common usage "[unified] entities" – some of which [entities] are perfected out of the same elements, and others from similar elements.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.347: ^[Obbink] Its constitution out of things similar would obviously be a unified entity: for it is possible [for beings constituted] out of similarity for ever to have perfect happiness – since [unified] entities can be formed no less out of identical than out of similar elements ([and both kinds of entity] are recognized by Epicurus as [being] exactly the same things, for example in his book On Holiness.)

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.364: ^[Obbink] ...Therefore he was wont to say that nature brought all these things to completion alike – and that for the most part many things come about [when they are formed] from an aggregation of various similar particles…

Sedley is correct when he says "each of us has an innate propensity to imagine." We also have an innate ability to see -- but we have to actually look and see things to use that ability! So he goes too far by saying "By doing so, we are ipso facto giving a concrete realization to the prolepsis of god." We can give similar mental "realizations" to centaurs. The process Sedley is describing is actually how we form a hypolepsis (supposition) and unless it corresponds to an external body, it is an empty thought.

"For indeed, all concepts have arisen from the senses – according to [1] circumstance, [2] analogy, [3] similarity, or [4] synthesis – with reasoning also contributing something." (DL 10.32)

Given that all our ideas are necessarily built only from impressions of the outside world, I do not understand how the idealist interpretation is tenable. We need impressions from external physical objects to form our thoughts. By analogy to direct impressions we are able to "mentally contemplate invisible realities." (DL 10.59)

Additionally, if an idea synthesized in our mind does not accurately correspond to an external object, then it is an empty opinion.

If you imagine a centaur, you have synthesized your impressions from reality into something that no longer corresponds to reality. In this case, the centaur exists in your mind as a real impression because it moves your mind with the impression of a centaur, but that synthesis does not correspond to reality (again, an empty opinion).

DL 10.49, 50 (Mensch Trans.) "We must also believe that it is when something from the external objects enters us that we see and think of them; for external objects could not stamp in us the nature of their own color and shape through the air that is between them and us, nor by means of the rays of light or any sorts of currents that travel from us to them, but rather by the entrance into our eyes or minds (as their size determines) of certain rapidly moving outlines that have the same color and shape as the external objects themselves; the same cause explains how they present the appearance of a single, continuous object and preserve their mutual interconnection at a distance from the substratum, their corresponding impact on our senses being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the solid object from which they come."

"And whatever image we derive by focusing the mind or the sense organs, whether on the object's shape or its concomitant properties, this shape is the shape of the solid object and is due either to the continuous compacting or to the residue of the image. Falsehood and error always reside in the added opinion [when a fact is awaiting confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is subsequently not confirmed by virtue of an immovable opinion in ourselves that is linked to the imaginative impression, but distinct from it; it is this that gives rise to the falsehood]. For impressions like those received from a picture, or arising in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind, or by the other criteria, would not have resembled what we call the real and true things had it not been for certain actual things on which we had cast our eyes. Error would not have occurred unless we had experienced some other movement in ourselves that was linked to, but distinct from, the apprehension of the impression; and from this movement, if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, falsehood results; whereas if it is confirmed, or not contradicted, truth results. And to this view we must adhere, lest the criteria based on clear evidence be repudiated, or error, strengthened in the same way, throw all these things into confusion."

Do we know if Leonteus and Leontion were brother and sister? It makes sense they could be both named after their father, just as two of Epicurus' brothers took the names of his mother and father. If that is the case, then the two young Epicuruses of the next generation would have been cousins.

As a counter argument, we have Leontion called "Leontion of Athens" at DL 10.23.

Hello Julia, thank you for this input. I am almost completely ignorant regarding modern psychology. Before I read these posts again, I wanted to ask:

Given that the "changes in thinking" over the years are mostly due to cultural changes rather than physical changes -- if my forefather 2,000 years ago was raised in a similar cultural context that I grew up in (let's say we were both raised in a small, close-knit, and mostly isolated community with no television and no modern education) then it seems to me that he and I would have a strong tendency to have a similar way of thinking -- would you agree?

Yes this is not quite at Epicurus' expense, as Cicero is of course primarily attacking divination here.

Cicero, On Divination, 2.27.59: But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life?... if my book by Epicurus On Pleasure had been eaten – should I have thought that the yearly produce in the market will be more expensive?

Nos autem ita leues atque inconsiderati sumus, ut si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus?… si Epicuri De Voluptate liber rosus esset – putarem annonam in macello cariorem fore?

Cassius, I agree with most of DeWitt's thinking regarding the gods not being inherently immortal -- although they do maintain immortality (ἡ ἀθανασία) in practice.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.40.1138:

For the devout man preserves the immortality and the supreme blessedness of god (along with all those things connected to us) – but impious towards god is he who banishes either one. The man who deliberates without anger and without weakening of favor on [god's] preparations that [originate] from himself for both benefits and harms – this shows god to be in need of nothing from humans…

^[Obbink] For pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God (together with all the things included by us) – but impious is the person who banishes either [blessedness or immortality] where God is concerned. And the person who sees also that the good and ill (sent us by God) come without any unhealthy anger or benevolence – declares that God has no need of human things..

[ Ὅσιος ] γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[ασίαν] κα[ὶ τ]ὴν ἄκραν μακα[ριότητ]α τοῦ θ[ε]οῦ σῴ[ζων (σὺ]ν ἅπασι[ν] τ[οῖς συναπτομένοις ἡμῖν) – α]σεβὴς δὲ περ[ὶ θεό]ν ὃς ἑκά[τε]ρον [ἐξορ]ίζει μὲν. ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν χωρὶς ὀργῆ[ς καὶ] χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρασκε[υὰς] τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ] τῶν κακ]ῶν – ἀπο[φαί]νετ' [αὐτὸν τ]ῶν ἀνθρω[πείω]ν μηδ[ε]νὸ[ς προς]δεῖσθαι...

On subjectivity generally:

Plutarch, Against Kōlṓtēs, 1110B: Accordingly, Epicurus himself in the second book of his Reply to Theóphrastos, when he says that "colors are not intrinsic to bodies – but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye" is asserting by this reasoning that body is no more colorless than colored.

Plutarch, Against Kōlṓtēs, 1109E: Observe what, regarding the heat of the wine in the Symposium, Epicurus has [portrayed] Polýainos conversing with him, as he says "Do you deny, Epicurus, the thorough heating effect caused by wine?" (Someone interrupts) "it is not a universal fact that wine seems fully warming." (And a little later) "For the universal fact does not seem to be that 'wine is warming' – but that a certain quantity for a certain person may be said to be warming."

Quote from Julia

This might also be why the geometricians were so happy to adopt the idea of a plane of ideal forms – they might have experienced such a plane...

Good point! I wanted to add this, (DRN 4.962, Melville translation):

"And those pursuits which most we love to follow, the things in which just now we have been engaged -- the mind being thus the more intent upon them -- these are most often the substance of our dreams. Lawyers argue their cases and make laws, generals fight battles, leading troops to war, sailors pursue their struggles with the wind, and I ply my own task and seek the nature of things always, and tell them in our native tongue. All other pursuits and arts seem thus in dreams to hold the minds of men with their illusions."

Trying to bring it all together, here are my notes so far. Perhaps over-produced. Please point out any errors you notice, they are certainly there.

Wow that is a great video TauPhi, thank you. Smith seems like a great guy. Smith clearly wants it all dug up, but the Turks in charge have reservations.

Thank you for doing these!

In case this is new to anyone, I wanted to point out that there is a very good recording of this book (https://www.amazon.com/Audible-Nature-Gods/dp/B0CND98MNG), which is free if you already have an Audible membership. The performer has an amusing pompous tone and does a good job.

Apropos to the Anselm discussion:

^{[P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 11-16]} And you, Sir, should consider it a great blessing to have rightly grasped the best of all that exists which we are able to conceive – and you should marvel at this understanding (διάληψιν) and you should revere it with freedom from fear.

^[Chilton] You, my friend, must know that the most blessed gift is to have a clear perception of things; that is absolutely the best thing that we can conceive of here below. Admire this clear apprehension of the spirit, revere this divine gift.

^[Grenfell] But do you, sir, consider that the most blessed state lies in the formation of a just conception concerning the best thing that we can possibly imagine to exist; and reverence and worship this idea.

^{[col. 1, lines 11-16]} σὺ [δ', ὦ] ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώ[τα]τ̣ον μέν τι νόμιζε τὸ [διε]ι̣ληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ [παν]άριστον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι [δια]ν̣οηθῆναι δυνάμε[θα], κα[ὶ θ]αύμαζε ταύτην [τὴ]ν δ[ι]άληψιν καὶ σέβου [ἀδ]ε[ί]ᾳ τοῦ̣το.

Taking διανοηθῆναι in the middle voice, but a passive construction is also possible (with no real change in meaning).

Thank you TauPhi! I was surprised yesterday to see Plato mentioned in the Chilton translation. It is a shame the mention of Plato in this text is just speculation by Diels.

[Chilton trans.] ...a marvel not less unlikely than those which Plato imagined.

Excellent! Thank you very much TauPhi!

Quote from Joshua

Words that start with Χαπ- seem to be exceedingly rare.

Very good point, the fact that "Χαπ-" does not seem to even exist as the beginning of any word should have been my clue that one letter probably needs to change!

Quote from Don

Grenfell has χαριέστερον.

It is interesting that Grenfell comments on the ος/ον change but says nothing about χαρ/χαπ.

Χαριέστερον must be the answer. Thank you both!

-----

I see Grenfell translates it as "more taste on his part"

I think I will go with "more refined" for the moment:

"Indeed, possibly such a person at times is more refined than other laymen, but still not in this way at all does the firmness of piety exist."

I mentioned the difficulty with the translation of Oxyrhynchus 215. I wanted to show a bit about what I was talking about: Early on, we have the word Chapiésteros, Χαπιέστε[ρο]ς. This is not a word I have been able to find anything about. This may be the only preserved instance of the word, a Hapax legomenon. This, of course, makes figuring out the meaning difficult.

^{[col. 1, line 1-11]} ...nor whenever, by god, it is spoken again like this by the common people "I fear all the gods whom I revere and to them I wish to sacrifice all things and to dedicate to them." ^{[line 11-16]} Indeed, such a person possibly at times is Chapiésteros than other laymen -- but still, not in this way at all does the firmness of piety exist.

^{[col. 1, line 11-16]} Χαπιέστε[ρο]ς μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ [ὁ τ]οιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιω[τῶ]ν ἐστιν, ὅμως δὲ οὐ[δὲ] ταύτῃ πω τὸ βέβαιον [εὐ]σεβείας ὑπάρχει.

¹⁰[τ]αθύειν καὶ τούτοις
[ἀν]ατιθέναι”. χαπιέστε-
[ρο]ς μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ
[ὁ τ]οιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιω-
[τῶ]ν ἐστιν,

Quote from Cassius

Velleius: For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modeled and built by God?

The "eyes of the mind" seems to correspond to criterion #4: "the image-based focus of the mind."

D.L. 10.31: Therefore, in The Canon, Epicurus affirms that the criteria of truth are [1] the sensations and [2] the preconceptions and [3] the feelings, and the Epicureans (also affirm) [4] the image-based focus of the mind.

I'll throw the full quote in here as well:

D.L. 10.31: Therefore, in The Canon, Epicurus affirms that the criteria of truth are [1] the sensations and [2] the preconceptions and [3] the feelings, and the Epicureans (also affirm) [4] the image-based focus of the mind.

Ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι, λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι [1] τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ [2] προλήψεις καὶ [3] τὰ πάθη, οἱ δ᾽ Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ [4] τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας.

Great conversation all around! I may be misunderstanding your point, waterholic -- but per Epicurus the atoms are colorless and perception of color is relative.

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Hēródotos, D.L. 10.44: He says, moreover, that there is no quality at all for the atoms except for shape (τὸ σχῆμα), dimension (τὸ μέγεθος), and weight (τὸ βάρος) – that color varies with the position of the atoms, he states in his Twelve Elementary Principles.

Plutarch, Against Kōlṓtēs, 1110B: Epicurus himself in the second book of his Reply to Theóphrastos, says that "colors are not intrinsic to bodies – but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye."