Posts by Bryan

I will also repeat this point: (Demetrius Laco, On Textual and Exegetical Problems, col. 67, McOsker translation) [Man is said to be "by nature" a procurer of fo]od, since he does so by unperverted instinct; to be "by nature" susceptible to pain, since he is so by compulsion; "by nature" to pursue virtue, since he does so to his advantage; and we say that the first utterances of names were "by nature"...

So here we have acting "by nature" means acting:

[1] by our unperverted instinct (eg, pursuing food and speaking)

[2] by our compulsion (eg, avoiding pain)

and also,

[3] for our advantage!!! (ie, pursuing virtues, eg, property management)

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 (1417), fr. 13, col. 9 sup., David Sedley trans.)

"...these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false. For this reason, everybody can easily laugh when somebody gets another to assert that it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and then cites the riddle of the Covered Father, and others of the same kind."

What is the “Covered Father Riddle”? Also known as “the Megarian Riddle”?

It's often used as an example of a paradoxical situation in philosophical discussions about knowledge and truth. The riddle attempts to force one to admit they both know and do not know something.

This riddle presents a scenario where a father is covered with a blanket and his son is asked to admit that he does not know who is beneath the covering.

The paradox arises because if the son says he doesn't know who is under the blanket, it implies that he doesn't know who his father is, which is strange because he should know his own father.

Therefore it is an apparent paradox that the son simultaneously “does not know who” is under the blanket and “does know who” is under the blanket. Really the error is in the language, as the son in fact simultaneously “does not know who is under the blanket” and also knows “who” is under the blanket.

============

The riddle, known as the "Riddle of the Covered Father," may come from Diodorus Cronus (Διόδωροc Κρόνοc; died c. 284 BC).

Zeno of Citium was one of his pupils, and Epicurus was probably, in part, responding to him in this book.

Diodorus was also known for these other silly and better known "paradoxes":

The Horns paradox (ὁ Κερατίνηc): What you have not lost, you have. But you have not lost horns. Therefore, you have horns.

The Sorites paradox (ὁ Cωρείτηc): If you have a heap of sand and you remove one grain, it's still a heap. Continuing to remove grains one by one, at what point does it cease to be a heap?

Yes, for this I was mostly looking at DL 2.86-90: (Hicks trans.) Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. [87] The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.

[88] Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceeds from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. [89] The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. [90] For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.

If every Pleasure was fully condensed in time and also existed in the whole organism -- or [at least] in the most important parts of its nature -- then Pleasures would never differ from one another. (KD 9)

Another argument using negative assumptions, showing that the opposite is true. This statement is in part a response to the view of the Κυρηναϊκοί (Cyrenaics), following Ἀρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος (Aristippus of Cyrene), that (1) pleasures do not differ from one another, (2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and (3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged. This incorrect understanding leads to indiscrimination in choosing pleasures.

In reality, even though pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, pleasures are variable in duration (from momentary to continuous) and location (affecting different parts of the body, including the mind) and have different qualities. Therefore, discrimination is required in choosing pleasures.

κατЄπυκνοYτο “was fully condensed” sg imperf ind, from κατα·πυκνῶ–[καταπύκνειν]: to pack tightly, compress, fill up; consider κατά·πυκνος–κατάπυκνος–κατάπυκνον: thick, close together; ἡ καταπύκνωσις–[τῆς καταπυκνώσεως]: condensation, densification; from πυκνόω "to thicken, condense.” Consider ἡ πύκνωσις–πυκνώσεως: condensation, aggregation.

Consider «…πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν φάσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι – καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον εἶναι ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως ἅπαντα γίνεται πυκνώσει καὶ ἀραιώσει παρεξαλλαττούσης τὸν ἀέρα. (On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148, column 27, Fragment 6) …to those who assert that the condensation of clouds results in the formation of water – and believe this to be a sign that everything is made from a single nature through the processes of condensation and rarefaction affecting the air.»

The prefix "κατα-" formed a technical term that seems to have been associated with Έπίκουρος. It is used mockingly by Ἀθήναιος (Athenaeus), author of Δειπνοσοφισταί (Deipnosophistae, Dinner Sophists), saying «Έπίκουρος οὕτω ‘κατεπύκνου τὴν ἡδονήν’ – ἐμασᾶτ’ ἐπιμελῶς. Eἶδε τἀγαθὸν μόνος ἐκεῖνος οἶόν ἐστιν (Δειπνοσοφισταί 3.103b) Ἐπίκουρος in this way ‘condensed pleasure’ – he chewed attentively. He was the only one who knew what the good is.»

Ἀλκίφρων (Alciphron), in his fictional letters, uses the word in association with Έπίκουρος «Tοῖτο εἶναι ‘τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀόχλητον’ καὶ ‘τὴν καταπύκνωσιν τοῦ ἡδομένου’ (Τὰ Ἀλκιφρονεία 3.19.8) This is ‘the lack of disturbance of the flesh’ this is ‘the condensation of the pleasured.’»

I think it is a simple "putting the cart before the horse."

(Demetrius Laco, On Textual and Exegetical Problems, col. 67, McOsker translation) [Man is said to be "by nature" a procurer of fo]od, since he does so by unperverted instinct; to be "by nature" susceptible to pain, since he is so by compulsion; "by nature" to pursue virtue, since he does so to his advantage; and we say that the first utterances of names were "by nature"...

So here we have acting "by nature" means acting:

[1] by our unperverted instinct (eg, pursuing food and speaking)

[2] by our compulsion (eg, avoiding pain)

and also,

[3] for our advantage (eg, pursuing virtues)

Quote from Cassius

"The 'perfect' of a thing is a concept that we use to visualize what the 'best' of that thing would be, and by visualizing that concept of the 'best' of that thing, we can more easily work toward our target of approximating it. And even though we know from the start that the 'perfect' is not attainable for us, it still serves as a very valuable tool for us in calculating out actions, because there is no way we can hope to come close to a goal unless we start out knowing what the goal is."

Really, I think this is an excellent response! I would perhaps just want to add: the perfect is not *always* attainable for us. We are capable of feeling perfect/complete pleasure. If not in our whole body (περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα) at least in the mind, which is the most important part of the body (τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως).

Sincere question: how is

(1) My experience of having freewill means that I do have freewill.

more of a 'metaphysical' conclusion than

(2) My experience of my cat being soft means that my cat is soft.

Also what does 'metaphysical' mean, in a simple/general sense?

I am almost totally ignorant of modern ideas about determinism. I experience having free will and I am not sympathetic to arguments that are counter to repeated experience. It is not a matter of logic but simple immediate proof.

There is, as we know, also the fact that atoms would never have been able to make contact with each other without an uncaused swerve - in a void, heavy atoms are not able to catch up to lighter ones and and therefore unable to cause a collision.

Adding a bit to Cassius' mention of the Brazen bull, we also have Philodemus - On the Gods - Book 1 (P.Herc. 26, col. 19) “At times, both opposing elements seem to be independent origins; in one place, one element dominates and in another place, the other. They are inseparable, yet at times, they interact and intertwine, creating conflict and complexity. People see gods as responsible for all evils, creators of ongoing and future misfortunes throughout endless time, including what comes after death. If these elements were not connected, people would not fear the gods more than tyrants. They dread death as if, after life, they will be tortured in eternal retribution * by the gods, leading to both a fear of the gods as the doers of evil in the underworld, and also death as leading to fiery torment. Just as people feared Phalaris, thinking he would roast them in the bull, and [they also feared] the bull itself, as the place of the roasting -- in the same way, hearing any related word causes equal fear for both, and not less for either, even towards the source of the sound! Similarly, with the gods and death, we do not consider both a double evil, neither the direct nor the indirect threat. If we avoid extreme misery and mental harm by facing pain with a rational mind, we can overcome the worst; for with understanding, we shouldn't see death as a double or untamed evil.”

*in the Areopagus?

[ἀντι]κειμ[ἐνων]
[ἀ]νφο̣τ̣έρ̣ω̣[ν] ἄ̣λ̣[λοτε μὲ]ν̣ ἀνυπόθ[ετον]
[ὲκατ]έραν εἶν[αι ἀ]ρ̣χήν, ἐν ἰδίωι δ̣[ὲ]
[τόπ]ωι τὴν ἑτέρα[ν κ]α[ὶ] π̣άλιν ἐν ἰδίω[ι] τ[ὴν]
5[ἑτ]έ[ρ]αν, καὶ ἀδιαζε[ύκ]τ[ων] α̣λλήλων οὐ[δ]ε-
[τέ]ρ̣ας̣ ἡγεῖσθαι τὴ[ν ἑτέραν], ἄλλοτε δ̣' ἀ̣[ντέ-]
χ[ειν] ἐκατέρας καὶ συν[βαίνει]ν̣ ἀλλήλαι[σ],
[ὥστ' ἀν]τίτα[σιν] ἔχειν̣ [καὶ μὴ] ἄνευ π[λο-]
[κῆσ] εἶναι. τ[οὺσ] μὲν γὰρ θεοὺς ἀνθρώπους
10[ἡγο]ῦνται καὶ α[ἰ]τίους ἁ[πά]ν[τω]ν κυρίω[σ]
[κακῶν], κ̣αἰωνίων συμ[φορ]ῶν ὄντας τε κ[αὶ]
γενησομένους ποιητικοὺς ἐν τῶ(*)ι [ἀπ]ε̣ι̣-
[ρωι χ]ρόνωι δηλονότι καὶ τὸν μετὰ τὴν τ[ε-]
λ[ευ]τὴν συμπεριλαμβάνοντες, ὡς εἰ [μὴ]
15ἑ̣κ̣[άτε]ρον συνήπτε̣τ', οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐφ̣[ο-]
[β]οῦντο μᾶλλον τυράννων· τὸν δὲ θά-
[να]τον [φρίτ]τουσιν ὡς ἐν τῶ(*) Ἀρ̣ε̣[ίω]ι π[άγωι]
μ̣ε̣τὰ [τὸ] ζῆν ταῖς αἰ[ω]νί[οι]ς̣ ἀμ[οι]β̣αῖς β̣[α-]
[σανι]σ̣θ̣ησόμενοι πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε
20[τοὺσ] μὲν θεοὺς ὡς δραστικοὺς [τῶ]ν κακ̣[ῶν]
ε[ὐλ]αβεῖσθαι τῶν [καθ' ἅιδη]ν, τὸν δ̣ὲ Θάνα[τον]
[ὡς το]ὺ̣ς̣ ἐν τούτωι̣ π̣[υρω]θησ[ομέν]ους ἄξ̣[ον-]
[τα]. καθάπερ ἐφοβ̣οῦντ̣[ο] τότε τὸ[ν μ]ὲν Φά-
[λαριν] ὡς ἐν τῶ(*) ταύρω[ι κ]ατοπτήσοντ̣α̣,
25[τὸ]ν δὲ τα[ῦρον] ὡς ἐν αὐτῶι τῆς κατοπτ̣ή̣-
[σε]ω̣ς γ̣[ε]ν[ησο]μ̣έ̣νης [. κ]αὶ καθ' ὃν τ[ρό]πον
[τινὰ φθόγγ]ον ἐπα[ισθόμενοι τὴν τα-]
ραχὴν ἴσην ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων κ[οιν]ῶ̣ς [ὤ-]
τω̣ν ἔχ[ομ]ε̣ν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἥ[τ]τω κ̣[αὶ τ]ὴν [ἐφ' ὁ-]
30π{ρ}ο[τερου]οῦν, μείζ[ω] δ' ἐπὶ̣ τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ [π]ρὸς̣ τὸν
[φθόγγον, οὕτω] δὴ κἀν τοῖς [περὶ θεῶν]
[καὶ θανάτου] διττ̣ὸ̣ν κακὸν ο̣[ὐ διδο-]
[μεν οὔτ' αὐτό ο]ὔτε τὸ παρα[σ]κε̣υα[ζό]μ̣[ε-]
[νον ἐκείνοι]ς, ἀλλ' ἄν [τις ἐσχάτη]
35[ταλλιπωρία] τούτ̣ωι μὴ παρῆ(*) κ̣[αὶ φρε-]
[νῶν βλάβη], νοῦν κἀντίπαλ' ἀ[λ]γ̣η̣δ[ό-]
νος [ἄκ]η προσβαλόντες μετ̣α̣ν̣α̣-
σ̣τ̣ήσομ[ε]ν̣ τὰ χείριστα· σὺν νῶ̣ι̣ γ̣ὰρ οὐ
[τὸ]ν θάνατον κακὸν δι[ττὸν ἢ ἀνή-]
40μερον ἐχθ̣ρ̣ὸ̣ν̣ χρὴ [νομίσαι ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]

Quote from Kalosyni

I don't think of smelling a rose as a relief from pain, nor is eating dessert!

These are variations that we can experience, but do either increase our pleasure?

Quote from Kalosyni

...the areas of active pleasure in my body have been limited to specific places and to specific times. Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling [stimulative] pleasure.

That is true. Which is fortunate-- because such pleasure is only felt as a relief from pain.

This is also true: We feel total pleasure in most parts of our body, most of the time.

I know I'm on the younger side, but the areas of active pain in my body have been limited to specific places and to specific times. Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling pain (even if my elbow hurts all the time). By my interpretation of Epicurus and experience, this is the natural limit, which cannot be passed. The "active" pleasures are relief from the pain of want.

On the topic of adding something that is not there, there is another problem of removing what is there. This is my reservation regarding the scroll project -- they have already admitted that they do not care about Epicurean texts -- given this, will they even provide us, the public, all that is found? What if Philodemus says something that offends them? It is not written in stone -- so they could just brush away whatever they want. They are the providers of our gold plates and they can bowdlerize as they wish.

Quote from Kalosyni

On the Stoics (PHerc. 155, 339)

On a much lighter note, looking at the list Kalosyni shared, I realized I had never looked at On the Stoics -- and, now having seen it, I can also see why this has not found eager publishers. Philodemus points out the influence, which everyone admits, of Diogenes of Sinope upon Zeno of Citium. This allows him to point to the sordid details of the Cynics as the origins of Stoicism. The description of the Cynic lifestyle -- which Philodemus introduces with some apologies and a promise to move past quickly -- would be out of bounds for some times/cultures.

Epicurus - Book 28 (David Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 4 sup.) "...which instead of ignoring or doubting it, I now think I see vividly. For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we could count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic, in order that he should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes."

To apply a word to a thing we are looking for the inseparable qualities / fundamental distinguishing characteristics (συμβεβηκότα, coniuncta) not the separable qualities / circumstantial characteristics (συμπτώματα, eventa). A title for a nonphenomenal object (such as religion) is only incorrectly applied if its use (1) involves something that can proved to be untrue, or (2) is unhealthy.

(David Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 8 inf.) "As for those opinions which do not concern actions (by which I mean those which are not included among empirical opinions, but belong to the theoretical side), these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either (1) because some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false.

It seems the other version was made around seven years after the first -- and by then the papyrus had further broken down.

Giuseppe Casanova version is a bit more filled out (MS Gr. class. c. 1 94, Oxford):

Duke Databank has:

-πειν; νοητέον δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἕρμαρχον κ(αὶ) ἐπισπω-
μ̣[ένους π]νε̣ῦ[μ]α κ(αὶ) προϊεμένους τοὺς θεούς·

Which seems to mean “It must be understood, according to Hermarchus, that the gods draw in and send out air.”

This is the type of thing that I avoid - making up Greek words. (This is about P.Herc. 152 col. 13)

Thank you for the question!

It is still complicated and disorganized. Large parts of the available transcribed Papyri have not been translated. A few recent good publications have come from the Society of Biblical Literature. By way of Janko and Obbink, Oxford is still publishing. Bibliopolis has an English translation by Tsouna (link).

For those translations you mentioned above, I mostly relied on Walter Scott's Fragmenta Herculanesia, from 1885, (link) which has been helpful recently (and also is filled with many very amusing critiques of his colleagues), but this type of work is mostly just fussing over which Greek word is correct. I supplement with any recent articles I can find on whichever P.Herc. that I am looking at.

(Philodemus - On the Stable Conduct of the Gods - Book 3, P.Herc. 157 fr. 76) "...but the conviviality can reach such a level that one might drink excessively, babble incoherently, dance without shame, and engage in other such unrefined activities. As for the nature of love (ἔρως), it's not even right to speak of it as a virtue, given that the act of falling in love is found to be extremely harmful and chaotic. Love, after all, borders on madness."

(Numen is a difficult word, but we have basically):

"Indeed contact, by the unbreakable majesty if the gods, contact is the sensation of the body!"

Each of the senses of our body takes different data from direct contact with other matter. All senses perceive shape and magnitude, but in different ways.

(P.Herc. 19 col. 25a, Justin Barney trans.) So that, according to the analogy itself shape and magnitude are objects of discrimination common to these senses: the ratio which the shape and magnitude of color have with regard to color, those of body have the same ratio with regard to body.

(P.Herc. 19 col. 24a , Justin Barney trans.) we say that touch is able to distinguish both flavor and odor, because it happens that the things that produce them help to effect the unity of outline.

Now there is also "the sense of touch." With this meaning, of course it is restricted to its own domain (eg, "touching something" does not allow you to sense color or specific sounds).

(P.Herc. 19 col. 21a, Justin Barney trans.) …[the sense organ] takes up the outline and often not the thing itself. If then visible shape is nothing other than the outermost position of colors, and visible magnitude is nothing other than the ordered position of several colors, how is it possible that touch, which is incapable of apprehending colors themselves, is able to comprehend the outermost position of colors?