Posts by Bryan

I'll throw this in as well:

Plato, Philebus 21c: (Socrates) And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that you ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it, and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be that of a man, but of some mollusc (τινος πλεύμονος) or some other shell-fish like the oyster.

Note "Πλεύμων" which is the term Epicurus used for Nausiphanes.

Quote from Twentier

what do you make of Erik Anderson's translation of U56 that renders ΣTOIXEIΩΣEIΣ ΔΩΔEKA as "Doctrine of the Elements (12 Books)"?

Thank you for asking this question!

Quote from Don

Yeah, I'm not seeing this as "12 volumes" but rather as a summary of something with 12 items.

I agree. Thank you for your comments here Don. my guess is one book about 12 principles, but I have no further evidence beyond what you have already provided.

Quote from Don

There's no way to tell what those 12 basics were (other than the 1, 2, or 3 stated there

Sad but true. Still, I cannot help but appreciate the efforts of those who try to make a list (because I am not so bold).

Placita means "pleasing things,” or “preferred things” but in a philosophical context, it means "tenets," "opinions," or "views." Τὰ Ἀρέσκοντα (Ta Areskonta) literally means "the preferred things" or "things that are pleasing." This matches the meaning of "Placita." The transition from "the pleasing things" to "tenets" or "opinions" makes sense in a philosophical context, where what pleases or satisfies intellectual criteria becomes a tenet or an accepted view. An expanded name may possibly have been (from Ps. Plutarch) Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν δογμάτων "Regarding the physical theories preferred by philosophers." The authors in the Loeb edition say, “In all probability, therefore, the lost original work had the title Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων, On the Placita (the Latin equivalent is De placitis).”

I will add some related quotes from the authors of this Loeb edition:

“The original treatise is incompletely preserved and has to be reconstructed from evidence in two main authors (with further assistance from a third). Diels had produced his reconstruction in two column and was thus unable to provide a single authoritative text. For this reason it was never translated into any modern language, with the exception of a double column Italian version (Torraca, I dossografi greci).”

“The name of the author of the compendium can be deduced from cross-references in Theodoret. Three times the bishop refers by name to the sources for the information he has on the doctrines of the philosopher, on one occasion also adding the titles of the works he used.”

“No ancient author with the name Aetius is known who can plausibly be connected with the compendium. As for the date of the work, the latest time of the composition, i.e., its tempus ante quem, is furnished by Ps. Plutarch’s Epitome, which from the evidence of the Christian apologist Athenagoras, must have been completed by about AD 150. For the earliest time of composition, i.e., its tempus post quem, we have to use the evidence of its content. The last philosopher to be mentioned is the Peripatetic philosopher Xenarchus of Seleucia, whose death occurred in the final years BC.”

“The Placita shows evidence of the beginnings of the Middle Platonist movement, which is to be dated to the period 50 BC to AD 50”

“As for the place of composition, the work itself gives no clues of any kind. Alexandria has been suggested, but this is no more than an educated guess. All that can be said is that the author must have had access to a considerable body of information on the doctrines of ancient philosophers.”

Placita (Loeb Classical Library) https://a.co/d/hibjlEJ

Aëtiana V: An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita With a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts (Philosophia Antiqua, 153) (English, Greek and Latin Edition) https://a.co/d/767F1uL

Quote from Cassius

And yes that is part of what I need on the "all sensations are true part - the sensations are always "true" but the opinions about what the sensations mean certainly are not always true.

Yes, errors in our thinking come from internal processes rather than external sources. This is despite the fact that our thoughts are triggered by external images impacting the mind. While our understanding starts with external stimuli, it is how our mind handles these stimuli internally that can lead to mistakes.

[Epicurus DL X 51b] (Yonge) "And, on the other side, error could not be possible, if we did not receive some other motion also, a sort of initiative of intelligence connected, it is true, with direct representation, but going beyond that representative. These conceptions being connected with direct perception which produces the representation, but going beyond it."

(Epicurus Book 28, Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 6 inf.) "I also frequently reflected that if, when I raised difficulties which someone might have turned against us, he should claim that what used to be assimilated from ordinary language was the same as used to be practiced in the written work, many might well conclude that in those days false opinion was represented in that language, whether through an empirical process, an image-based process, or a theoretical process, or through a non-empirical process, not following one of our current divisions, but simply arising from an internal movement; but that now, because the means of expression is adapted to additional ends, discrimination provides a lead towards the truth. However, let no one ever try to get even with you by linking with you any trace of this suspicion; but [turn] to the entire faculty of empirical reasoning…

Quote from Bryan

(Aetius 4.8.10) “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus say that sensation and thought arise in the soul from images that approach from outside, for neither of these can occur to anyone without the image falling upon him.”

(Aetius 4.9.5 - 6) “Epicurus says that every sensation and every impression is true, but of the opinions some are true and some false; and sensation gives us a false picture in one respect only, namely with regard to objects of thought; but the impression does so in two respects, for there is impression of both sense objects and objects of thought. Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and Heraclides say that the particular sensations of their own object occur in accordance with the matching sized of the pores, each of the sense objects corresponding to each sense.”

“In 2020 the editors of the present volume produced for the first time a complete reconstruction and edition of the text in a single column based on all the ancient evidence. This edition is the basis for the text and translation produced for the Loeb Classical Library.”

I wanted to share these quotes from Harvard's new (2023) translation of Placita.

Aetius, Placita. Text and translation by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia:

(1.3.16) “Epicurus, the son of Neocles, the Athenian, who philosophized in the line of Democritus, said that the principles of the things that exist are bodies that are observable by reason, not containing any void, ungenerated, indestructible, unable to be crushed or have their parts modified or be qualitatively altered. These bodies are observable by reason; and they move with the void and throughout the void. The void itself is unlimited in size, and the bodies are unlimited in number. The bodies possess these three characteristics, shape, size, weight. Democritus stated that there were two, size and shape, but Epicurus added to these a third, weight. “For it is necessary,” he says “that the bodies are moved by the blow caused by weight, since they will otherwise not be moved.” The shapes of the atoms are inconceivably many, but not unlimited in number. They cannot have the form of a hook or a trident or bracelet, for these shapes are easily crushed, whereas atoms are impassible and unable to be crushed. They have their individual shapes, which observable by reason. The term atom is used, not because it is a smallest particle, but because it cannot be cut, being as it is impassible and not containing any void. As a result, when he speaks of an atom, he means what is uncrushable and impassible, not containing any void. That there is such a thing as an atom is clear. For there are elements that always exist, that is to say figures <without void>, and the unit.”

(1.5.4) “Metrodorus,* the teacher of Epicurus says that it is equally absurd that a single stalk should have sprung up on a large plain and that a single cosmos should have done the same in the Infinite. That the kosmoi are infinite in their multiplicity is clear from the fact that the causes are infinite in number. For if the cosmos is limited, while all the causes from which the cosmos originated are infinitely many, then necessarily the kosmoi are infinitely many. After all, where the causes are without limit, there the products [or: effects] are infinite in number or without limit also. These causes are either the atoms or the elements.”

*Metrodorus of Chios, not Metrodorus of Lampsacus

(1.7.25) “Epicurus says that the gods are human in form and are all observable by reason only because of the fine particles of which the nature of their images consists. The same philosopher says there are four other classes of natures that are indestructible: the indivisibles, the void, the infinite, and the similarities; these natures are called homoiomereiai (things with like parts) and elements.”

(1.8.2-3) “Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics say that demons are psychic beings; the heroes too are souls that have been separated from their bodies; and they (sc. the demons) are good if the souls are good, but wicked if the souls are wicked. But Epicurus admits none of these as demonic.”

(1.12.5) “Epicurus says that the bodies are inconceivably many [or: inconceivable in number], and that the first bodies, which are simple, possess heaviness. He also says that they atoms at one time move perpendicularly, at another time with a serve. But the bodies that move upward do so through impact or rebounding.”

(1.15.9) “Epicurus and Aristarchus say that the bodies in the dark do not have color.”

(1.18.3) “Leucippus, Democritus, Demetrius, Metrodorus, and Epicurus say that the atoms are infinite in number, and the void infinite in size.”

(1.20.2) “Epicurus says that all these terms are to be used interchangeably: void, place, and space.

(1.22.1-6) “Epicurus says [time] is a concomitant, that is an accompaniment of motions [or changes].”

(1.23.4) “Epicurus says there are two kinds of motion, that which occurs perpendicularly and that which occurs through rebounding.”

(1.29.3) “Epicurus says that chance is a cause that is unstable in relation to persons, times and places, <and that all things occur> by necessity, through choice, and by chance."

(2.1.5) “Epicurus says that the distance between the kosmoi is unequal.”

(2.2.5) “Epicurus, however, says that it is possible that the kosmoi are like a ball, but that it is possible that they make use of other shapes as well.”

(2.3.1-2) “All other philosophers say that the cosmos is ensouled and administered by providence. But Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus say that it is constituted out of atoms by an unreasoning natural force.”

(2.4.13) “Epicurus says that the cosmos is destroyed in a multitude of ways, for example as an animal and as a plant and in numerous other ways.”

(2.7.3) “Epicurus says that of some kosmoi the limit is rare but of others it is dense, and of these limits some are in motion, while others are unmoved.”

(2.13.14) [at the end of the section regarding the substance of planets and stars] “Epicurus does not reject any of these views, holding fast to what is possible.”

(2.20.14) “Epicurus says that [the sun] is an earthy concentration inflamed by the fire in its cavities in the manner of a pumice stone or sponge.”

(2.21.5) “Epicurus says that [the sun] is the size that it appears, or just a little larger or smaller.”

(2.22.4) “Epicurus says that all the above-mentioned shapes [of the sun] are possible.”

(3.4.3 & 5) “Epicurus says that [clouds] accumulate from atoms; and that hail is formed in round shapes and rain gradually acquires its form in its lengthy descent.”

(3.15.6 & 11) [of earthquakes] “Metrodorus says that no body that is in its proper place moves, unless one were actually to push it forward or drag it down; therefore, the earth does not move either, as it is located in its natural place, though some places collapse because of the trembling… Epicurus says that it is possible that the earth moves when it is thrown upward and as it were struck from beneath by thick and humid air that lies beneath it; but it is also possible that, as it is full of holes in its nether parts, it is shaken by the wind that is dispersed through its cavernous hollows.”

(4.3.11) “Epicurus says that it is a mixture of four ingredients, namely of a fiery quality, an aerial quality, a pheumatic quality, and of a fourth quality that is nameless; this last, for him, is the perceptive part. Of this the pneuma brings about movement, the air rest, the warm component the perceptible warmth of the body, while the anonymous component bring about the perception in us humans, for perception is not present in any of the elements that have names.”

(4.4.7) “Democritus and Epicurus say that the soul is bipartite, having the rational part established in the breast, and the irrational part diffused through the whole compound of the body.”

(4.5.6) “[Definitions of the regent part in accordance with top-down division between head and chest (or brain and hear) and subsidiary top-down division of locations in head or chest…]

(4.7.4) “Epicurus, Democritus, and Aristotle say that the soul is mortal, perishing together with the body.”

(4.8.2) “Epicurus: ‘Sense/sensation is the bodily part that is the faculty, and the sensory recognition that is the activity”

“τὸ μόριόν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις, καὶ τὸ ἐπαίσθημα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνέργημα.”

ἡ αἴσθησις = τὸ μόριόν = ἡ δύναμις; & τὸ ἐπαίσθημα = τὸ ἐνέργημα

(4.8.10) “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus say that sensation and thought arise in the soul from images that approach from outside, for neither of these can occur to anyone without the image falling upon him.”

(4.9.5 - 6) “Epicurus says that every sensation and every impression is true, but of the opinions some are true and some false; and sensation gives us a false picture in one respect only, namely with regard to objects of thought; but the impression does so in two respects, for there is impression of both sense objects and objects of thought. Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and Heraclides say that the particular sensations of their own object occur in accordance with the matching sized of the pores, each of the sense objects corresponding to each sense.”

(4.9.12) “Epicurus says that the pleasures and pains actually belong with the sense objects.”

(4.9.20) “And Epicurus [says] that the wise man is knowable only to another wise man"

(4.13.1) “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus believe that the visual sensation is the result of the penetration of images.”

(4.14.2) “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus say the reflections in mirrors come about through the manifestations of the images, which move away from us but arise on the mirror that sends them back.”

(4.19.4 - 5) “Epicurus says voice/sound is a stream sent out from entities that speak, reverberate, or make noises. This stream is broken up into small particles of the same shape (“of the same shape” is said of globular with globular, and of irregular and triangular with what is of the same kind). When these fall upon the ears, the perception of voice results. This is clear from a comparison with the skins that let out water and the fullers who blow air into garments. Democritus says that the air too is broken up into corpuscles of the same shape, and these roll along with the small particles of voice/sound, “for jackdaw sits beside jackdaw” and “God always brings like to like.”* Thus on beaches the same pebbles are seen in the same spots, the rounds ones in one place and the elongated ones in another. Also in the case of people using sieves, similarly shaped things gather together to the same place, so that beans and lentils are separate.

* “the first of these quotes is a proverb, the second a quotation from Homer.”

(4.23.1 -3) [On bodily affections and whether the soul experiences pain along with these] “The Stoics say that the affections are in the places that have been affected, but the sensations of them are in the ruling part. Epicurus says that both the affections and the sensations are in the places that have been affected, for the ruling part is free from affection. Strato says that both the affections and the sensations exist together in the ruling part, not in the affected places.”

(5.1.2) “Xenophanes and Epicurus reject divination”

(5.5.1) “Pythagoras, Epicurus, and Democritus say that the female releases semen as well as the male, for she has concealed testicles.* For this reason she also has desire for sexual intercourse.”

* “This refers to the ovaries.”

(5.16.1) “Democritus and Epicurus say that the embryo is nourished in the womb through the mouth. For this reason as soon as it is born it moves with its mouth to the breast. For, they say, in the womb too there are nipples and mouths though which it is fed.”

(5.19.5) “Democritus and Epicurus say that the living beings have come into being first in a composition of elements lacking in form, with the aid of the life-generating moisture.”

(5.20.2) “Democritus and Epicurus <do not include> the heavenly beings as living beings.”

Quote from Don

There's obviously some matter in that space between worlds but not enough to have a world, otherwise the gods would be *in a cosmos*.

My view is there is an infinite amount of matter in the universe and an infinite amount of matter between worlds, while there is a finite amount of matter within worlds.

Aetius, Placita -- Text and translation by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia:

(1.5.4) "“Metrodorus,* the teacher of Epicurus says that it is equally absurd that a single stalk should have sprung up on a large plain and that a single cosmos should have done the same in the Infinite. That the kosmoi are infinite in their multiplicity is clear from the fact that the causes are infinite in number. For if the cosmos is limited, while all the causes from which the cosmos originated are infinitely many, then necessarily the kosmoi are infinitely many. After all, where the causes are without limit, there the products [or: effects] are infinite in number or without limit also. These causes are either the atoms or the elements."

*Metrodorus of Chios, not Metrodorus of Lampsacus

(1.7.25) “Epicurus says that the gods are human in form and are all observable by reason only because of the fine particles of which the nature of their images consists. The same philosopher says there are four other classes of natures that are indestructible: the indivisibles, the void, the infinite, and the similarities; these natures are called homoiomereiai (things with like parts) and elements.”

(2.2.5) “Epicurus, however, says that it is possible that the kosmoi are like a ball, but that it is possible that they make use of other shapes as well.”

I believe that DeWitt is technically correct given the narrow modern view of vision. I do wish to add, as we all already know, that Epicurus clearly emphasized visualization of mental images. If "cow" is the object of consideration, he did not want you to just think about the word "cow" and the definition of a cow, and the logic involved in making cow a distinct class, etc., he wanted you, to the best of your ability, to focus on your mental vision of a cow.

For some contrast, I will share Bailey's comments "There do exist divine being or gods: they are innumerable as are the created things which perish and immortal even as created things are mortal. They are, as is proved by their 'idols' which visit us, like in figure to men. In constitution they are eternal in form but composed of transient matter: this matter, which is all 'alike' and contains no alien elements, comes from the innumerable atoms moving in the void between the worlds: in everlasting succession the atoms stream into the 'forms' of the divine being and unite there for the moment to constitute their body. Then they fly off again in the union in which they have now joined, thus forming the continuous succession of like 'idols', which are perceived by the mind and our direct source of knowledge of the existence of the gods."

(Aetius 4.13.1) “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus believe that the visual sensation is the result of the penetration of images.”

The translations that I shared in the Epicurean Politics thread came from the Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, Volume 23, September 1920. (Given those parts of the text are just Philodemus speaking, and do not quote or mention Epicurus, I do not expect them to be Usener. )

v.23 (1919-1920) - Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences - Biodiversity Heritage Library

The Rhetorica Of Philodemus; Volume 23 https://a.co/d/84LUcGM

Quote from Kalosyni

Possibility of transcription error? Perhaps it was originally plural.

It seems the use between the plural and the singular was very casual, just as we still have the casual essential similarity of singular and plural in many statements ("one may say.../people may say"), ( "an animal acts in order to... /animals act in order to... "). Understating one cow goes a long way towards understanding cows generally.

Quote from Kalosyni

The various translations into English would add in a whole other dimension

I had never thought of that, but I agree. I have only seen this type of mapping with primary sources but it really would be great to have this as "the tip of the iceberg" with translations following chronologically, possibly divided by language!

Quote from Kalosyni

you can see how all stems from one manuscript.

Yes, although, unfortunately, in this case it is "Omega" which really only exists by way of the widely accepted idea that Q and O came from the same source.

Quote from Don

To me the "flaming ramparts of the world" are exactly the outer shell of our cosmos/world-system described by other philosophers of the time. The outer shell - the outer wall/ramparts - are on fire. That's what makes the stars shine. 2:1144 also uses the "ramparts/walls of the world" moenia mundi

Accepting, as we do, the significance that the "walls" can be little more than currents/pressure and, even if more substantial, can and will breakdown into the infinite space beyond them, I must agree that we have the typical high tolerance for various possibilities:

(DL X 88) "A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion, it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or three-cornered or any kind of shape" (Bailey)

"A world is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating [and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, a boundary whose dissolution will bring about the wreck of all within it] in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible : they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned. (Hicks)

I think these quotes are related. Allow me to add them to the mix:

Philodemus On Rhetoric (Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς) translated by Hubbell

“But if philosophers do not enter politics, yet they help their native land by teaching the young to obey the laws; nay more, by teaching them to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.” (2.154, fr. 13)

“The philosophers are not vexed if people, like foolish sheep or cattle, attend to an inferior, but are satisfied that what they say, particularly about the attitude of the common people, shall please the few; and in action they are most blameless, nor do they, as slaves of all, try to rule everything for themselves. For they do not expect to satisfy their wants at the expense of the public.” (1.237, col.)

“The philosophers of our school agree with οἱ πολλοί on a question of what is just and good, differing from them only in this that they arrive at their conclusions by logic as well as by feeling, and never forget these conclusions, but always compare the chief good with things indifferent. They do differ from οἱ πολλοί about the means to attain happiness, and do not think that offices, power, conquests and the like are proper means to the end.” (1.254, col. 21)

“Some things are just or unjust by nature and never change, others vary according to locality and condition. Laws which are not of this nature, but are established for various reasons ought to be obeyed, or if the philosophers do not think that they can live well under these laws they ought to leave the country. They can be social to a high degree by observing those principles which make for likeness and not for differences; we can do this without being observed as well as with publicity, with pleasure and not under compulsion, steadily and not in an uncertain fashion.” (1.258, col. 24)

“The philosopher does not choose his profession for the same reason that one chooses military or political power. The latter with a slowly acting mind is willing to accept any power, while the former by syllogisms and memory of resemblance and difference, and a consideration of consequences, and especially by the use of his sharpness of intellect, rejects everything that does not tend toward happiness, and shares in them only as he uses the necessary arts for the tasks that arise… The philosopher… in every matter uses his keen mind, with which he is able to see when the ambition or idleness of men goes wrong, and neglects everything which is not useful for happiness.” (2.30, col. 20)

“Why is it more disgraceful to be silent and permit Isocrates to speak than to live in a city and allow Manes to dig, or to stay on land and allow the Phoenician trader to be tossed by the waves, or to pass one’s life in safety as a private citizen and allow Themistocles to enjoy the perils of a general?” (2.55, col. 40)

The "grant" is mostly a joke.

Quote from Kalosyni

It almost seems like we need a flowchart showing how we got to what we have available in English to us now.

Such a chart must exist. For example, here is Butterfield's mapping of Oblongus and Quadratus.

Title: Photographic Preservation of DRN's Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus

Applicant:

Introduction: DRN's Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus, held by the University of Leiden since 1690, are seminal works of immense historical and academic value. Currently, only limited pages of these manuscripts are available in digital format. This project aims to create a comprehensive digital archive of both codices, ensuring their preservation and accessibility for future scholarly work.

Objectives:

1. To photograph all pages of Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus in high resolution.
2. To create a digital archive of these manuscripts, facilitating global access for researchers and scholars.
3. To preserve the physical integrity of these historical documents by reducing the need for physical handling.

Methodology:

• Secure permission from the University of Leiden for access to the manuscripts.
• Plan a visit to the University of Leiden, ensuring all necessary equipment and logistics are in place for high-quality photographic documentation.
• Employ professional-grade photographic equipment to capture detailed images of each page.
• Post-process the images for clarity, archival quality, and digital accessibility.

Budget:

• Travel and accommodation in Holland for the project team: $3,000
• Photographic equipment rental/purchase: $2,000
• Post-processing software and hardware: $1,000
• Miscellaneous expenses (transport, meals, etc.): $500
• Total: $6,500

Conclusion: The successful completion of this project will ensure that DRN's Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus are preserved digitally for future generations, supporting ongoing academic research and preserving these treasures of human knowledge.

Quote from Don

Correct. Unfortunately, I've been unable to locate a digitized copy of B online

As far as I know, we are in a similar state for DRN's Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus (the University of Leiden has held both since 1690). Pictures of a few pages of each are available, but not the whole of either. A weekend in Holland with access and a quality camera could solve the issue! There is the "Codex Vossianus oblongus phototypice editus" from 1908 which was a similar attempt, but I have never seen any version of it available.

Do we have the shell idea in the Epicurean texts? Certainly the Stoics do think that— their world-system is singular, finite and bounded. But with Epicurus we have air flows, pressure, gravity (of a sort), infinite world-systems and infinite unbounded space.

Quote from Don

By definition, if they are inter-cosmic - literally between world-systems - there is nowhere for them to live! A cosmos is a world-system - ours has Earth at the center surrounded by the orb of the heavenly stars and wandering planets. There is no world in the metakosmos/intermundia - it is literally "between" worlds... No planet, no stars, no world.

I certainly agree that the world, in Epicurean terms, is analogous to the modern idea of the "visible universe."

Would you agree that, although there is a finite about of matter and space in world-systems, there is an infinite amount of matter and space outside of (ie between) world-systems?

TauPhi, something that comes to mind is that, as Lucretius says, even things in the same room with us might as well be miles away unless we look at and, to some extent, focus on them.

"...our minds and intelligence straining fixedly towards these images, comes to understand what is the blessed and eternal nature." (Velleius the Epicurean via Cicero DND 1.19.49)

I agree that Epicurus would not have thought laws necessary for interactions between Epicureans and that he wished to have very many people become Epicureans.

It is clear, however, that he had a realistic sense of the dangers posed by other people and supported the existence of laws.

These comments by Hermarchus (by way of Porphyry's On Abstinence from Eating Animals 1.7-12) are good to keep in mind:

The Arguments of the Epicureans, from Hermarchus  7. ...The ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards each other, though the similitude of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordinance, will promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most would admit this to be evident. For none of those legal institutes which were established from the first, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are adapted to be transmitted, [from one generation to another] became lawful through violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the rabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of utility, of which they had only an irrational sensation, and which they had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude of the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for the ignorance of what is beneficial than the dread of the punishment ordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and prevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were similarly capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would be no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as are prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For a survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to the avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction of punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is beneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that which is right.

9. Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary manslaughter should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed, but also that they might prevent many things of this kind from taking place, which happen, in reality, involuntarily. For neither is this advantageous through the same causes, by which men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. Since, therefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from a cause which is unstable, and which cannot be guarded against by human nature; but others are produced by our negligence and inattention to different circumstances; hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an involuntary noxious deed without punishment, but, through the fear of penalties, prevented the commission of numerous offences of this kind. I also am of opinion, that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which receive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications, were introduced by those ancient legislators, who first very properly instituted these things for no other reason than that they wished to prevent men as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the vulgar everywhere require something which may impede them from promptly performing what is not advantageous [to the community]. Hence those who first perceived this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment of fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, though proclaiming those not to be pure who in any way whatever had slain a man, unless they used purifications after the commission of the deed. For that part of the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined, acquired a becoming mildness, certain taming arts having been from the first invented for the purpose of subduing the irrational impulses of desire, by those who governed the people. And one of the precepts promulgated on this occasion was, that men should not destroy each other without discrimination.

10. Those, however, who first defined what we ought to do, and what we ought not, very properly did not forbid us to kill other animals. For the advantage arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, since it is not possible that men could be preserved, unless they endeavoured to defend those who are nurtured with themselves from the attacks of other animals. At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most elegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from slaughter because it was useful to the public safety, they also reminded the rest of the people in their mutual associations of what was the consequence of this abstinence; in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their kindred, they might preserve that communion which greatly contributes to the peculiar safety of each individual. But it was not only found to be useful for men not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing injurious to those who were collected together in the same place, for the purpose of repelling the attacks of animals of another species; but also for defense against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a certain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter of men, for these reasons, viz. in order that there might be a communion among them in things that are necessary, and that a certain utility might be afforded in each of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of time, however, when the offspring of mankind, through their intercourse with each other, became more widely extended, and animals of a different species were expelled, certain persons directed their attention in a rational way to what was useful to men in their mutual nutriment, and did not alone recall this to their memory in an irrational manner.

11. Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other, and who, through an oblivion of past transactions, prepared a more imbecile defence. But in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting to them, in consequence of now perceiving, in a greater degree, the advantage arising from an association with each other. For the destruction of every thing noxious, and the preservation of that which is subservient to its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. And hence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the above-mentioned particulars was forbidden, but that the other was not prohibited. Nor must it be said, that the law allows us to destroy some animals which are not corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any other way injurious to our life. For as I may say, no animal among those which the law permits us to kill is of this kind; since, if we suffered them to increase excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the number of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted to human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but if they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which is sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by employing their strength, in consequence of participating of this through an innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment which springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through this cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in order that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we may be able easily to subdue, may be left. For it is not with horses, oxen, and sheep, and with all tame animals, as it is with lions and wolves, and, in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that, whether the number of them is small or great, no multitude of them can be assumed, which, if left, would alleviate the necessity of our life. And on this account, indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others, we take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate to our use.

12. On this account, from the above-mentioned causes, it is similarly requisite to think, that what pertains to the eating of animals, was ordained by those who from the first established the laws; and that the advantageous and the disadvantageous were the causes why some animals were permitted to be eaten and others not. So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men respecting those who establish the laws, are full of a certain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible that this thing can take place in any other way than that in which the other utilities of life subsist, such as those that are salubrious, and an innumerable multitude of others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in many particulars, both of a public and private nature. For certain persons do not perceive those legal institutes, which are similarly adapted to all men; but some, conceiving them to rank among things of an indifferent nature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary opinion, think that such things as are not universally profitable, are every where advantageous. Hence, through this cause, they adhere to things which are unappropriate; though in certain particulars they discover what is advantageous to themselves, and what contributes to general utility. And among these are to be enumerated the eating of animals, and the legally ordained destructions which are instituted by most nations on account of the peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, however, that these institutes should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the same place as those did by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible to make a certain compact with other animals in the same manner as with men, that we should not kill them, nor they us, and that they should not be indiscriminately destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice as far as to this; for this extent of it would be attended with security. But since it is among things impossible, that animals which are not recipients of reason should participate with us of law, on this account, utility cannot be in a greater degree procured by security from other animals, than from inanimate natures. But we can alone obtain security from the liberty which we now possess of putting them to death.

Quote from Cassius

The point that even the gods require some form of activity to maintain their deathlessness would likely be a significant part of Epicurean theology, giving us another useful thing to consider as points of emulation. We too have to act properly to sustain our happiness just as they do - there's no supernatural state that "hands it to us free" for men or gods.

Or stated in the way that the death argument is made in Lucretius (if even Epicurus and Scipio had to die, we should not be offended that we too die), then the analogy would be something like: If even the gods must act properly to maintain their happiness, who are we to complain that we must do the same? We should emulate the gods not only in the result of being happy, but also in the process of getting there, with both gods and men acting property to perpetuate our happiness.

Yes I agree with you completely, including some uncertainty about the positive use of Homoeomeria - whether the atoms with which the gods easily form themselves are (1) all exactly the same kind of atom or (2) just within a class of atoms that is kindred to them. The effect and the appearance is the same either way.

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Throwing this in as well.

(Gaius Cotta via Cicero NDN 1.114) "Nevertheless, I fail to understand how this so-called blessed deity remains unafraid of destruction, given he is relentlessly bombarded and disturbed by an everlasting stream of atoms, and considering that images constantly emanate from him."

Nec tamen video quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, cumque ex ipso imagines semper afluant.