Posts by Bryan

Quote from Cassius

it is repeated observations that confirm "opinions," which we make from the perceptions, but the perceptions themselves are not "confirming" each other.

I agree, the senses cannot confirm or negate each other.

Quote from Cassius

Perceptions are NOT equal to opinions, and perceptions are never true or false!

62b "Everything observed [by the senses] or apprehended through attention to [mental] perception is true"

(τό γε θεωρούμενον Πᾶν ἢ κατ᾽ ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐστι)"

Opinions about perceptions can be false, but the perceptions themselves are not false - they must be real because they physically affect us. However, we must think about and judge these "honest" reports of our sensations to figure out the extent that they do, in fact, accurately correspond to external objects and circumstances.

51c "and regarding this [movement of thought in us], if it ^[Ǝ] is not affirmed or ^[A] is contradicted, Falsity is produced ¬ if it ^[E] is confirmed or ^[∀] is not contradicted, Truth [is produced]"

(κατὰ δὲ ταύτην, ἐὰν μὲν ^[Ǝ] μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ^[A] ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ψεῦδος γίνεται ¬ ἐὰν δὲ ^[E] ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ^[∀] μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ἀληθές)

A true opinion is established by the full correspondence of that opinion to external objects and their circumstances. If our opinion is not affirmed or is refuted, it is false; but if our opinion is affirmed or not refuted, it is true.

Yes, this was just a quick search in English in Epicurea, where a form of the word "pleasure" is used 477 times, and "tranquility" only 25 times.

I am only 1/6 complete adding the Latin and Greek into Erik's work, but so far I have, looking at specific words: variants of ἡδονή 48 times, and variants of voluptas used 34 times. For tranquility, we have variants of ἡσυχία (including verbal forms) mentioned 8 times, and similarly for ἀταραξία which is also mentioned 8 times. So far, then, it seems pleasure is being referenced in the primary sources 5x the rate of tranquility.

I wanted to share this statue of Glycon, complete with his statement that he is the grandson of Zeus and a light to humans, requests for his prophecy (with intact seals of course), Alexander's best selling ointment (kytmides), and payment.

Great Discussion! Allow me to throw in these quotes as well:

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.36.1023 – 1.37.1054: ^[Obbink] And for the production of benefits from the gods for good people and harms for bad people, they [the kathēgemónes] allow. And for the wise and just it must be conceived that benefits and harms which are no feebler or even greater than people in general suppose are made complete, not out of weakness or because we have need of anything from God, even in return [of] his benefit [here], and these things [the kathēgemónes] say most piously. And in On Gods what kind of source of retribution and preservation for humans through the deity must be accepted he outlines in some detail. And in book 13 he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people.

And of course we all remember SV65 "it is pointless begging from the gods for what one is sufficiently able to obtain for himself."

P.Oxy 2.215, col. 2, lines 8-16 ^[Chilton] Only be careful that you do not permit any admixture of fear of the gods or of the supposition that in acting as you do you are winning the favour of the gods. For indeed, in the name of Zeus (as men affect to say) what have you to fear in this matter? Do you believe that the gods can do you harm? Is not that, on any showing, to belittle them?

Quote from Cassius

This (So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is fit for us to seek, the other to reject) sounds pretty close to something in which "prolepsis" is involved.

I'd say that an anticipation must be involved for every word we use -- we would have no idea what any particular word indicated unless we have some general stereotype that we access before we start thinking or speaking about any object or relationship.

This is also mentioned by Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria, VII.3.5) "for he gave God human form and a place in the spaces between worlds."

And Aetius (Doxography, 2.1.8) gives us, "Epíkouros asserts that the spaces between world-systems are unequal." A world-system, as we know, is a closed system and contains a finite amount of matter, but there is an infinite supply of matter in-between world-systems.

Quote from Cassius

pleasure & pain: These terms can be used to describe BOTH fundamental units of experience themselves, AS WELL AS innate categories of fundamental experiences, depending on the context of the discussion.

Yes I agree. Epicurus employs this flexibility.

Quote from Cassius

"Absence of pain" is simply a way of extending the definition of pleasure to ALL non-painful experiences

And how happy we are to realize this truth -- an instant and constant source of gratitude!

"4) But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain."

As we know, this is true of active pleasures of variation that we experience after we have established a foundation of static pleasure through philosophy. When an active pleasure is withdrawn, static pleasure remains. And we are of course fully grateful to lose an active pain -- even of not replaced by an active pleasure, because we have our foundation of static pleasure.

As you said, images ("films") are always flowing off of other objects and contacting our body. Our body is able to perceive these films differently in different parts of the body (the nose will smell, the eye will see, the brain will visualize).

It seems to me that repeated contact with these images/films produces an automatic expectation (basic stereotype) of objects and object-interactions that we can access in our mind by focusing on them -- and these stereotypes are the basis of our thought and speech.

Epicurus says (38a) "Seeing [for ourselves] the primary thought for each word, and in no way needing proof, is necessary – if We are to have [something] to which we will refer what is investigated, uncertain, or judged."

Quote from Don

There really is no applicable analogy in modern cosmology

Yes, given our inability to translate it, I suppose we can take refuge in "cosmos" and "cosmoi."

I fully agree using terms from other schools confuses the issue and should probably be avoided... to the extent that cosmos means different things to different people, this will be ground that must be defended, and we will have to educate them about the correct meaning!

(As we know, Epicurus uses "atomos" and translating that as "atom" means we use the word that is not the same as modern science. But, I think you would agree, not using "atom" when translating him certainly gives up too much ground. We can use "atom" in our school, and use in its proper and true meaning. )

Quote from Don

Using "galaxy" obscures the ancient Greek understanding of what a kosmos was.

This is certainly true and I do agree. But then of course Epicurus would have a different view of the meaning of the word compared to his predecessors. LSJ often accommodates Epicurus' variance, but it does so unevenly, as you know. I see that galaxy is too much, and that "world-system" is correct, but I do wish for a more elegant solution. I only want one unnamed thing (that 4th part) and this feels like adding to that list. Perhaps, just cosmos.

Quote from Cassius

people of normal intelligence shouldn't be asked to accept "trust the scientists" or "trust the mathematicians" any more than they accept "trust the priests" as an explanation.

Yes, as we know, authorities and what they say may or may not be helpful, but they are certainly not our measure of truth. Sensation is our measure of truth.

Quote from Don

infinite number of worlds (κόσμοι ἄπειροί kosmoi apeiroi)

I agree we should not "update" or add ideas when translating -- but do we have any good arguments or objections to using "galaxies" for "kosmoi"? (We all know the difficulty with the English "world," which now means only one planet).

Well done, guys! I agree, it is by looking for gods that are more than physical living mammals in outer space that people come to atheism (and rightly so, for what they are looking for, a non-physical being that can create physical matter, cannot exist).

Joshua, you mentioned that many scientifically-minded people accept that aliens must exist; it is statistically guaranteed. This line of thinking is, of course, even more proof of gods—as gods are (by one way of speaking) a class of aliens.

Yes, On Methods of Inference is very difficult and On Nature book 28 is too. I was a bit wary to even bring up this list, because I am not ready to go back into either one just yet!

On a related note, I cannot look at my work for very long without seeing a lot of errors. This is a bit better:

We can be sure Epicurus was aware of such distinctions, but as far as I can tell he was casual in dealing with these categories.

I fully agree with your point, Joshua, about pi. However, I am also thinking that the idea that pi goes on indefinitely seems to come close to infinite divisibility. It seems, from a physicalist perspective, pi does not show anything infinite, but could be viewed as another example of how math/geometry fails to adequately correspond to reality.

Quote from Cassius

"she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds."

"has made, does make, and will make" is probably too formulaic to be evidence either way, but we have:

PD16, "Chance falls upon the wise man briefly: for Reasoning has managed the greatest and most critical things – and for the whole time of life manages and will manage." or

SV10 "Remember that you are of mortal nature and have a limited time to live and have devoted yourself to discussions on nature for all time and eternity, and have seen “things that are now and are to come and have been."

This last line there is a quote from Hesiod's Theogony line 38. εἰρεῦσαι τά τ᾽ ἐόντα τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα ""declaring the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before"

Quote from Cassius

"answering" may be a better rendering of "respondeant" than Rackham's "exact match or counterpart.

For rēspondĕo, we have:

• To promise a thing in return for something else; to offer or present in return.
• To answer, reply, respond (to a question or any statement, friendly or hostile).
• To give an opinion, advice, decision, response (lawyers, priests, oracles).
• To appear before a tribunal, to answer an accusation, meet a charge.
• To answer to; to meet, agree, accord, or correspond with a thing.
• To return, make a return, yield.

"Exact match or counterpart" does seem interpretive. "Omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant" is almost poetic, we have literally "all things correspond as equals to all equal things."

This would not have been so wordy to the Roman ear, as the double use of paria/par is common for rēspondĕo:

"give as good as you get"

"return like for like"

Omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant = Everything alike corresponds to everything alike. Hard to argue against, but not packed with meaning. If tautology is ever appropriate, I suppose it would be for isonomía.

You really have made a beautiful website. It is very well organized, and it is filled only with treasures.

I really appreciate the more accurately transliterated Greek. You used "Loukianos." I think this is excellent. Calling Loukianos "Lucian" is like calling Lucretius "Loucret." But if people only know Lucretius by "Loucret" do we force the issue? -- or do we just use "Loucret" too? I have been indecisive on this point.

Does using Epíkouros add another layer of complexity, or does it get us closer to source? The answer must be that it gets us closer (even if the transition is uncomfortable).

The advice below from book 28 seems close to the point. However, of course, it is about the meanings of words, not accuracy of transliteration.

^{Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 8 col. 5 [Sedley]} It is not possible to alter many different kinds of names. It is possible to alter a few of those which entail perception – the one which we previously defined in the non-image-making manner, but which we altered when by some act of empirical reasoning we saw that they were not of this kind.

Quote from Cassius

Repeatability / regularity is a major aspect of something being "real."

I agree, continuity is key.

10.50a: "[Impressions] render the image of a single continuous object (and preserve the continuity at a distance from the original source) according to the proportional impingement [of the impressions] from that source – out of the deep vibration of the atoms in that solid object."

Quote from Twentier

example, what if I were to posit that I have experienced a prolepsis of a being "with a permanent lack of pleasure"

Interesting! Just as we look to the blissful beings as models of the good life, we look to miserable beings to foster our gratitude (DRN book 2 opening, etc). To take this to the (speculative) extreme: Comparing myself to beings that do not die but are miserable -- would, even if I were also miserable, make me grateful at least to be mortal!

Quote from Twentier

Demetrios of Lakon wrote a book entitled On the Form of the Gods (is that right?)

Yes, but of course just a little bit remains.