Posts by Bryan

Some highlights from "Nigrinus" by Lucian (translated by Fowler).

33. There is no satisfaction to be got out of the costliest viands before consumption; and after it, a full stomach is none the better for the price it has cost to fill it. Ergo, the money is paid for the pleasure snatched in transitu.

23. Not wealth, but the envy that waits on wealth, is the object of their desire. The truth is, gold and ivory and noble mansions are of little avail to their owner, if there is no one to admire them. If we would break the power of the rich, and bring down their pretensions, we must raise up within their borders a stronghold of Indifference.

15. He whose ears must be tickled with lascivious songs, and the voluptuous notes of flute and lyre — let all such dwell here in Rome; the life will suit them. Our streets and market-places are filled with the things they love best. They may take in pleasure through every aperture, through eye and ear, nostril and palate; nor are the claims of Aphrodite forgotten. The turbid stream surges everlastingly through our streets; avarice, perjury, adultery — all tastes are represented. Under that rush of waters, modesty, virtue, uprightness, are torn from the soul; and in their stead grows the tree of perpetual thirst, whose flowers are many strange desires."

Excellent work on your website, Twentier, thank you! The only books I have on Philodemus' Rhetoric are Hubbell's translation (that Cassius shared) and Clive Chandler's work on books 1 & 2, did you use/find any other sources?

Great job guys, thank you!

Well said Joshua, at 36:50 "it is not the prolepsis that is wrong -- while the sensory input is streaming into our senses, the mind is adding it's own layer to that -- and this layer of opinion is where error comes in. In all of these cases, if you are not aware of that ongoing process, it becomes very difficult to distinguish what is true from what is not true."

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The description of the prolepsis was excellent all the way through! "The distinction, which seems very clear to us, between the senses and the mind may not have been made to the same degree among the Epicureans in the ancient world."

Well said and certainty true!

10.49a Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν – ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν – τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

It is also necessary to understand that – by something entering from the outside – we see forms and think.

^[Hicks] We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them.

^[Yonge] Also, one must admit that something passes from external objects into us in order to produce in us sight and the knowledge of forms.

^[Bailey] Now we must suppose too that it is when something enters us from external objects that we not only see but think of their shapes.

Don, I mostly agree with your conclusion, but one issue I see is that the "faculty of discerning" would be a faculty of thought --- and not a faculty of the senses. The senses, anticipations included, are still in the "suck in all the sensory stimuli" phase.

Laertius gives ⁽¹⁾sensations, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ^(x)anticipations and ⁽³⁾image-based focus of the mind.

Epicurus himself says ⁽¹⁾sensation, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ⁽³⁾the whole visual focus of the mind

There is no discrepancy, but if there was, it is the anticipations that are the addition by Laertius -- because both mention ⁽¹⁾sensation, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ⁽³⁾mental focus.

Quote from Cassius

there's no reason to split the term into two, and that it's best to think of there being only three categories

Quote from TauPhi

I don't think the fourth criterion is a mistake.

You are both correct. Fundamentally any and all sensation is our measure of truth -- we receive information from all impressions from the outside world that interact with our body.

^{10.51a [Hicks]} For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact.

^{10.51a [Bailey]} For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses.

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The anticipations are just as momentary as your sight -- and your use of them can improve in the same way: over time you can increase your discipline/ability to focus on what is real, as Epicurus says "through the influences entering from the surrounding environment, taking the guidances towards improvement." (P.Herc. 1191 fr. 124).

Epicurus also says, in Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43) ^{[Sedley 20C.1]} From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us...

Although we often speak of the ⁽¹⁾sensations, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ⁽³⁾anticipations

That comes from Laertius' summary:

^{D.L 10.31} In The Canon, Epicurus affirms the criteria of truth are the sensations and the preconceptions and the feelings, and the Epicureans (also affirm) the image-based focus of the mind.

We also must remember:

We have Epicurus' words on the issue. Epicurus tells us exactly what the anticipations are in PD 24:

^{PD 24.} If you simply reject any one sensation and you will not separate ^(A)a theory about what is still pending versus ^(B)what is actually present according to ⁽¹⁾sensation, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ⁽³⁾the whole visual focus of the mind: then you will disturb even the remaining senses with empty thought – as you will be rejecting the whole basis of judgment.

Quote from Godfrey

But this model is more in line with the common conception

I agree, Godfrey. Also, of course, given the word "conception" is appropriate here is itself an indication that this is an idea and is past the point of preconception.

Quote from Cassius

And I think that "before they have seen the first example"

As you say, "adults forming conceptions" is too late to be anticipations, because it involves thinking.

"Before they see their first example" is too early to have an anticipation, as the anticipations are a sense just like the others. We cannot see anything until we have something to look at.

Our anticipation of numbers is just like our vision of numbers: just as we can see 2 apples on a table with our eyes (if they are near) we can also see 2 apples on a table with our mind (if we think about them).

Different versions of D.L. 10.38

^[Hicks] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

^[Yonge] In fact, it is absolutely necessary that we should perceive directly, and without the assistance of any demonstration, the fundamental notion which every word expresses, if we wish to have any foundation to which we may refer our researches, our difficulties, and our personal judgments.

^[Bailey] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.

I believe there are only four instances of τὰ Συμβεβηκότα in Diogenes Laertius book 10, all in the letter to Herodotus.

^{10.40b [Sedley]} Over and above these [atoms and void] nothing can be conceived, either by imagination or by analogy with what can be imagined, as things grasped in terms of complete natures, and not as what we call the "accidents " and "properties (συμβεβηκότα)"of these.

^{10.50b [Hicks]} And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties (συμβεβηκότων), this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts.

^{10.68b [Hicks]} Moreover, shapes and colours, magnitudes and weights, and in short all those qualities which are predicated of body, in so far as they are perpetual properties (συμβεβηκότα) either of all bodies or of visible bodies, are knowable by sensation of these very properties – these, I say, must not be supposed to exist independently by themselves (for that is inconceivable).

^{10.71b [Hicks]} Nor, on the other hand, must we suppose the accident to have independent existence, for this is just as inconceivable in the case of accidents as in that of the permanent properties (τῶν ἀίδιον συμβεβηκότων); but, as is manifest, they should all be regarded as accidents, not as permanent concomitants, of bodies, nor yet as having the rank of independent existence. Rather they are seen to be exactly as and what sensation itself makes them individually claim to be.

We also have this, which is probably from Epicurus' book 25 On Nature:

P.Herc. 419 fr. 5: …οὔτε γὰρ ἕν̣ [τί] [ἦν] ὧς τὸ συμβεβηκ[ὸς] [κ]α̣ὶ ὧι συμβέβηκ[ε] [ῥη]τέον εἶναι – οὔτ[ε ἕτε]ρον ὡς τὸ ἀ[πό τινος δι]αστήματος [ἐπεισερχό]μενον…

Therefore we know that:

The whole natures are, and are only, the atoms and the void. Everything is either an atom or the void – or an emergent characteristic of atoms and void. Emergent characteristics are of two types:

(1) Lucretius gives examples of inseparable characteristics (τὰ Συμβεβηκότα): Weight to stone, Heat to fire, Liquidity to water, Touch to bodies.

(2) Lucretius gives examples of separable characteristics (τὰ Συμπτώματα): Slavery/Freedom, Poverty/Riches, Peace/War.

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There is more in Philodemus, but I am not sure where LSJ is getting the idea that τὰ Συμβεβηκότα "do not feature in the definition" of a thing. I would have a hard time "defining" fire without mentioning heat, and the same for the rest of Lucretius' examples.

We also must keep in mind that Epicurus and Aristotle use συμβεβηκός in different ways (Aristotle himself is inconsistent), so we have to get the Epicurean-specific idea for it. General definitions will tend to favor Aristotle, so it can be confusing (please see my last post above).

Quote from Cassius

Bryan would you agree or disagree with saying that the faculty of prolepsis operates on "images?"

Agree, certainly. Just as all our senses. We smell and see the film that comes from our meal, for example.

Quote from Cassius

And do you see any connection between the Centaur / image example in Lucretius and prolepsis?

Yes you can have real and immediate impressions of centaurs, particularly if you are asleep or crazy. But if you are sane and awake those impressions lack continuity -- when you are sane and awake you do not see centaurs frequently.

This is a physical sense that stems from contact -- impressions of particles entering your body -- just like all the other senses. We can only form propositions after we have this sense/contact.

In some circumstances you may focus on being physically touched by the images of trees that are around you, at other times you may focus on being physically touched by circumstances in a way that produces a sense of guilt (or lack of guilt) or a sense of justice (or lack of justice), at other times you may focus on being being physically touched by the images of the gods.

Just as we have an innate ability to sense trees with our eyes, we have an innate ability to sense gods with our mind.

If we take "intuition" as meaning "expectation based on experience" then we can say that we get "intuition" over time based upon the data from our senses. From continuity of sense impressions we gain confident expectations regarding the operations of nature.

For part 1. Yes, absolutely.

Part 2. Yes, just as we can form an idea of guilt, this idea only forms from a prior and automatic sense of guilt. Same for the gods and justice and all anticipations.

Part 3. As we know, the anticipations do not process information anymore than the eyes. We can focus our attention internally (mental focus) and externally (visual focus).

The proposition that "the gods exist somewhere in the universe and are blessed and imperishable" emerges only after a real and automatic sense of the gods being blessed and imperishable.

In some circumstances you may sense many trees around you, at other times you may sense guilt from the circumstances, at other times you may sense the gods.

Your eyes do not give you the proposition "there is a green tree outside" when you sense (visually focus on) the green tree outside --- just as your anticipations do not give you the proposition "the gods are incorruptible" when you sense (mentally focus on) the incorruptible gods.

Quote from Cassius

the statement "gods exist somewhere in the universe and are blessed and imperishable" is an opinion of the mind and may be either true or false

The sense that the gods exist somewhere in the universe and are blessed and imperishable is just as natural to humans as a sense of justice and a sense of guilt.

The statement/thought "I feel guilty because..." only comes after a real and automatic sense of guilt -- similarly the statement/thought that "the gods exist somewhere in the universe and are blessed and imperishable" only comes after a real and automatic sense of the gods being blessed and imperishable.

I want to also include this because it mentions both the automatic insertion of images along with the anticipation (of responsibility), which seems exactly equivalent to, as we say "the sense of guilt."

P.Herc. 1056 col. 22 (fr. B 44), & P.Herc. 1191 fr. 110 ^{[Sedley 20C.2-4]} ...by which we never cease to be affected, the fact that we rebuke, oppose and reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and penetrates us. For if someone were to attribute – to the very processes of rebuking and being rebuked – the accidental necessity of whatever happens to be present to oneself at the time, I'm afraid that he can never in this way understand ‹his own behavior in continuing the debate... He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to› blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he would be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned creates the preconception of our own responsibility (τὴν τῆς αἰτίας πρό[λη]ψιν).

To tie together the immediate impression of the anticipation with the scholia's "conceived of through contemplation by reasoning," we have Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25:

^{[Sedley 20C.1]} From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us and depend upon beliefs of our own making…

Sedley construction, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43): ...[ἔκ] τε [τῆς πρ]ώτης ἀρχῆς σπέρμ̣[ατα ἡμῖν ἀγ]ωγά, τὰ μὲν εἰς τάδ̣[ε] τὰ δ' εἰς τάδε τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω [ταῦ]τά [ἐ]στιν ἀεὶ [κα]ὶ πρά[ξ]εων [καὶ] διανοήσεων καὶ διαθέ[σε]ων καὶ πλεί[ω] καὶ ἐλάττωι. ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ρῶτον] ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἤδη γείνεσθαι, [τ]οῖα ἢ τοῖα, καὶ τ[ὰ ἐ]κ τοῦ περιέχοντος κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκ̣ην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους ] εἰσρέο[ν]τα [παρ'] ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γε[ίνε]σθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς ] ἡμε[τέρα]ς [ἐ]ξ ἡμῶν αὐτ[ῶν] δόξ[ας]…

I noticed today that Wingdings 2:248 is an ancient punctuation mark, the asteriscus "little star," which is the proto-asterisk.

At the very least, this symbol is used a few times in Philodemus' On Methods of Inference (locations listed in second image below).

Thank you all for this great discussion!

Quote from Little Rocker

So the chief option would be that it's part of our biological nature/cognitive architecture to categorize the world in a particular way or arrive at a particular conclusion in light of experience.

Yes, I agree. Just as we have an innate ability to see (but we have to actually look and see things to use that ability) -- similarly we have an innate ability to anticipate (but we have to actually anticipate [mentally focus] to use that ability). As Long says, "any explanation of Epicurus as an intuitionist is on quite the wrong track."

We are born with the ability to mentally focus on gods in the same way we are born with the ability to visually focus on dogs. By focusing we get a clear view, and correspondence of clear views shows us the true nature of an object.

^{[D.L. 10.38b]} And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions, whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen. 

Quote from Little Rocker

I tend to think you can remain happily an empiricist and posit underlying explanations for what you observe all the time, so long as you consider them hypotheses.

The atoms are in a different class because the atoms do not give off images. One of the features of Epicurus' empiricism is that (as Long says) "Judgments about non-evident objects are true if they are consistent with clear sense-impressions."

Thus we have a positive use of the non-contradiction principle: Epicurus does not make the presupposition that atoms exist -- it is the absence of any other conceivable theory for phenomena which justifies the general inference about the existence of atoms.

Quote from Cassius

Do we have notions of "atoms" impressed on our minds even though we have never seen them?

As we know, atoms are not visible in any way because, unlike every other object, atoms cannot give off images. Atoms do not flow off of the bodies of other atoms, but atoms do flow off every other object.

Quote from Cassius

Do we have notions of "justice" impressed on our minds even though justice is an abstract concept which cannot be seen in bodily form?

The physical basis for justice is simply the fact that life is a potential characteristic [sýmptōma] of matter -- and justice is a potential characteristic of life.

"The fact that humans seem to be born, at the very least, with this disposition to talk about this subject that seems to be of great interest to them -- a subject that is of such tremendous interest to so many different people is something that cries out to be addressed." --Cassius

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I also enjoyed:

"Empedocles jumped into an active volcano to prove that he was god -- you can ask yourself whether you think that experiment bore fruit." --Joshua

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Great point about the "positive and negative aspect" of the gods.

Certainly Epicurus was working with both sides -- But the negative is very much more emphasized in modern scholarship. Thank you both for doing these!

Great point also in connecting this with the many positive practical results that come from the naturally negative origin of pleasure.