Posts by Mathitis Kipouros

In episode 20 of Lucretius Today there's mention of the possibility of "us being in a 'hypersphere'" and some other mathematical "possibilities" to describe our existence; among them was mentioned the comparison between "beings" that could live in two dimensions compared to us; and then, extrapolating from there, the possibility of there being a 4th dimension of reality that we could not see or understand, as the 2D beings could not see or understand our 3D world. There's a video of Carl Sagan about it here:

As expected, nobody in the podcast said they considered this to be true, or that they accepted these views as valid. I just wanted to post this as an example of the type of paradoxes that may confuse people into thinking that because these mathematical definitions are valid in the realm of math they could be valid in reality automatically, which was pointed out in the show and I appreciated it. This is something I think is not pointed out often enough.

Also in the podcast, I percieved a need of most to justify that even if Epicurus got some things wrong in his physics, "he got most things right" and "it's impressive how he could explain these things", as if there had to be a balance in favor of having gotten the most things right. But there's something that bothers me about trying to say that Epicurus "had a lot of things right" when it comes to physics, as if, if he hadn't, everything else could be discarded as invalid. Ironically, I think there is something platonic about this search for the ultimate truth and most accurate description of our existence, as an ideal state of perfect knowledge; and as such, I think we should be wary of it. Mostly because we're likely to have mistakes when we extend beyond what we can experience immediately, and could suffer from founding ourselves in theories of things we may not even be able to comprehend ever, and when proven wrong or contradicted, it might conflict us.

Whereas, if the physics is seen as something that serves the purpose of giving an adequate context, or better understanding, of our immediate reality, we can accept that they can be good for a while, and then perhaps we could find out they're actually wrong, but that doesn't change our reality. What I'm saying is that Epicurus proposed some theory of physics to give a sufficiently good context to the obvious things we experience in reality, not as a foundation of everything. I'm not saying not to keep on researching and trying to learn about our environment better. I just say that we should do it as I think Epicirus did it: Either for the intrinsic joy that the research activity brings to the researcher, or to give a context that could allow us to better understand our immediate reality and life experience, not as a way to find the ultimate and most accurate foundation of reality; as I understand it, he didn't say that his physics were the foundationi of his whole philosophy, but the Canon is, but I may be wrong about this. But still, with the Canon we can be certain of many things even if the current theory of physics is proven to be wrong afterwards, because it is related to our immediate reality and life experience.

Using the Canon we can be aware that the fact is that not even us can experience an interaction with "beings" in 2D, because even a line in a paper is a 3D thing when looked at the proper scale and perspective. For us, there's no 2D in our immediate experience, as there's no 4D. I'm not saying there's no 4D in the universe, I'm not the owner of the truth, perhaps there is, but most importantly, it doesn't concern me; what I'm saying is that, in our immediate experience there is nothing that could allow us to think there is.

On line with what was talked about in the episode, there might as well be a material end point to the vacuum we now think engulfs all matter in the universe (doesn't make sense to me, but we wouldn't be able to see it anyway), and there might as well be one or many supreme beings out there, creators even, with what we would call supernatural powers, in a more complex reality that we couldn't understand, and, theye may even find in the future that the model por atomic particles allows for them to propose further divisions of these particles... but the point is, even if there were, what's evident for us in our life experience is that this shouldn't concern us, because it doesn't influence our lives, or if it does we can't percieve it at all.

So, even if the vacuum is not infinite, even if matter is finite (which it could be and we could be just existing in the right place at the right time, as we now know this could be because statistically somebody had to, not because we're special beings) and it is about to be dissipated to the point of not being able to form compounds anymore, and even if we find out that probably black holes eject into our universe matter that wasn't here before, or they disappear matter into apparently "nothingness"... all of this doesn't change the fact that in our immediate experience, even though these observations (if they were observed) may contradict the theories put forth by the epicureans, it doesn't change our immediate reality and life experience as we can percieve it with the bodies we are, in the place we are now.

One of the key takeaways I got from reading DeWitt is that Epicirus was first and foremost an observer of nature, and thus, of our immediate experiences, so it's hard for me to accept that the physics, extended to the end of the universe, and to the infinitesimal size of atomic particles, are the whole foundation of the philosophy, as I understand has been proposed sometimes. Physics help us have a common context, most of us can agree with at some point in time, that's adequate to confirm what we experience in reality.

So my guess is that he, and they, ventured into giving an explanation of the whole universe, from the atomic to the astronomical level (I say this particularly because they were usinig mostly logic to do so, which they themselves said could not be trusted), not because they wanted to find ultimate and unchangeable truths, but because they wanted to give this common context, that helped most refute the possibility of us experiencing, in this reality we live in, in this Earth, the things that we, after observation can be sure that are impossible (like having external invisible forces influencing our lives and having things appearing or disappearing to and out of nowhere), and thus, carry on to more important things, like learning how to enjoy life.

One of the links on this thread: Sabine Hossenfelder - Why the Multiverse Is Religion

Took me to a website where Sabine H. wrote about why free will is inexistent. After the pleasant surprise we had with the other two videos Cassius I thought it may have been an error but I did find out this video later on:

It seems to me that this "paradox" (because, of course, we perceive free will with our senses, but she states we're being fooled) falls a bit into what was talked about in this episode.

I think she's taking the theory of what differential equations, math and physics _could_ describe and confounding it with what we actually experience.

It's a bit disappointing, after the talk we had about her other videos.

I hope Martin could give an opinion on this.

This part of my reply is less about paradoxes in general and more about the specific apparent "paradox" of free will.

I like Noam Chomsky's very pragmatic response to the question, which can be seen in this video:

Also, this:

"QUESTION: What about the problem of free will? If genes play a crucial role in structuring the mind’s abilities, is free will an illusion?

CHOMSKY: Well, that’s interesting. Here, I think, I would tend to agree with Descartes. Free will is simply an obvious aspect of human experience. I know — as much as I know that you’re in front of me right now — that I can take my watch and throw it out the window if I feel like it. I also know that I’m not going to do that, because I want the watch. But I could do it if I felt like it. I just know this.

Now, I don’t think there’s any scientific grasp, any hint of an idea, as to how to explain free will. Suppose somebody argues that free will is an illusion. Okay. This could be the case, but I don’t believe that it’s the case. It could be. You have to be open-minded about the possibility. But you’re going to need a very powerful argument to convince me that something as evident as free will is an illusion. Nobody’s offered such an argument or even pretended to offer such an argument.

So where does that leave us? We’re faced with an overwhelmingly self-evident phenomenon that could be an illusion even though there’s no reason to believe that it is an illusion. And we have a body of scientific knowledge that simply doesn’t appear to connect with the problem of free will in any way.

QUESTION: Do you think that science will ever solve the problem of free will?

CHOMSKY: Personally, I don’t think so. People have been trying to solve the problem of free will for thousands of years and they’ve made zero progress. They don’t even have bad ideas about how to answer the question. My hunch — and it’s no more than a guess — is that the answer to the riddle of free will lies in the domain of potential science that the human mind can never master because of the limitations of its genetic structure."

(From: https://chomsky.info/198311__/ )

There's also this video, still on the topic of free will:

By the way, at around 2:15 of it he describes something similar to the canon of truth but not exactly the same.

Yes, she has a very interesting channel in YouTube, I encourage you to see it. I'm pretty sure she'd enjoy learning about EP.

Exactly that comment about Plato made me think it would be welcome around here. And it got me to see another video of her about the multiverse, which also should fit around here somewhere, because she makes the association of such speculations (the multiverse) with religion. Here it is:

This can be clarifying of the concept that reason alone is not sufficient to know the truth, and I'm guessing you'll enjoy it:

I guess that someone studying Epicurean Philosophy would fairly quickly grasp the general idea of how the soul is thought of being and dissolving in this materialist context.

So, the Epicureans provide an answer to the questions of the soul, but don't say what it is (at least I think they don't), in a way of a redefinition of a previously superstitious and abstract concept, as they do with the gods (with the explanation of the natural evolution of humans into what they must be), into something related to nature.

For me, it's not that this particular topic is of the utmost relevance, since I think these were just explanations needed to be given by Epicureans to previously existing superstitious concepts in order for the philosophy, and its most relevant contribution of ethics, not to be disqualified as "incomplete". But Still, the problem of superstition is still a real one these days, and being able to provide a bridge to someone to get out of it depends on being able to talk about the things most relevant to them. And I think the soul is one of them, usually.

So, after eliminating what I think would be the previous or traditional conception of soul, a superstitious and abstract "spirit or essence", the only definition I could find (online) is that of the energy (a material thing) that causes the (biological) vigor (an observable and possibly measurable quality of strength of action) that all living things show in different ways.

Is there an "official" one of the philosophy?

Just getting into full-nerd-mode, because it's not significant but it's weird nonetheless: Strange that MFS would talk about this as something so obvious, dropped casually as a 1 line footnote without further references or information, and yet we're not being able to pin point what exactly is he talking about.

Thanks to both. Interesting answers. I agree that the poetry could have interpretations that are coherent with Epicurean Philosophy; so it's the more confusing to read MFS talking about an Epicurean deduction/description/observation of a "fiery envelope" as I don't believe the use of poetics was common neither in Epicurus nor in any other disciple except Lucretius, and it doesn't seem like a description of anything observable in the world that wouldn't have been described quite differently were this the case.

In the MFS version there is a footnote linked to the following text (1.71-73):

..."far beyond the blazing battlements of the world".

The footnote reads:

"The reference is to the _fiery envelope_ that, according to the Epicureans, surrounds the world"...

This is the first time I've come across this "fiery envelope belief". What is he talking about?

Quote from Cassius

I wonder if my implying that the ultimate test of the validity of the system is that is logical makes me a Platonist myself?

Ha, I hadn't thought of that, but what I gather from this is that you're trying, as they did back in Athens, to have the most logically solid argument, not because that's what gives actual validation to the system, but because it improves the possibility of it being recognized at the outset as a valid system, to later be actually validated by experience, logic taking the back seat.

Quote from Cassius

Camotero something else going on here that I think is relevant, and I see myself making this point a lot lately:

It may look like we (I? Epicurus?) are taking things to unnecessary extremes by carrying things out to "extreme" logical conclusions, but I think that is exactly what Epicurus was doing. Epicurus was faced with teaching philosophy in ancient Athens, where everyone who was anyone was expected to know and understand the arguments of Plato and other similar authorities, starting with Philebus on pleasure but also lots of other dialogues with similar arguments. Those guys in Athens were fully committed to "logic" as the key to everything, so Epicurus could ill afford to take half-measures and appeal to practicality like we might do today. I think that is one reason that some of us have problems coming to grips with how extreme some of the conclusions can sound, but after going through Philebus and other Platonic dialogues a couple of times I am convinced that Epicurus thought that if he left any logical conclusion unanswered then his entire system would be ridiculed into obscurity.

Yes we are appealing to the sensations and feelings as the ultimate guide of how to live, but we are doing so only after a rigorously logical argument as to why we are doing so. Anything less than than would be pure assertion on our part, and make our philosophy arbitrary, as a result of which it would rightly be laughed out of Athens.

It's clear, thanks.

Quote from Cassius

I think you are probably trying to separate out mental and bodily pleasures in a way that would contradict the position just stated in the above quotations. If one feels pleasure it can be from any source, mental or bodily, and this I think is playing in to your resistance to the saying that the wise man will on occasion die for a friend, which is something that can be extended very far into war, etc. If in our own personal calculatons/feelings we would feel so awful if our friend died when we could have attempted to do something about it, then for some number of people such a result would mean such agonizing pain for the rest of their lives that they would rather die. That's the comparison that each person has to make for themselves, weighing the result of each action in terms of total future pain and pleasure (and this again is a situation where I think duration - length of time - is only one of the factors involved).

I think I understand it better with the following aid: When we talk about mental or bodily pleasures, we're talking about the source of the pain or pleasure, not where said pain or pleasure is felt. I remember DeWitt saying something about the mind as another source of sensation, and I think I may have gotten confused about the posibility of experiencing pain or pleasure in an abstract way (as in, as an example, being able find proof of some mathematical thing would be satisfactory intellectually without the need of experience said satisfaction in the body) vs a tangible way; I know, it sounds weird now that I re think it. I now understand that pain or pleasure are only felt in a tangible way, in the body, but the sources of stimulus may be from our physical senses, that interact with atoms outside the body, or from the mind, which interacts with atoms inside the body. Does this make sense?

Quote from Don

We expand, codify, ignore, misuse, and corrupt that innate faculty as adults, but nature and evolution has given us the ability to distinguish justice from injustice at a fundamental level and to act accordingly if we so choose.

I would argue also that having a "Justice System" to resolve issues for us, helps to the atrophy of our justice-recognition-organ, because it makes it external, and sometimes overly complicated to discern. One contribution of Epicureanism to humanity could be to rehabilitate this faculty, organ, of recognizing when justice is or isn't being served/practiced.

Quote from Don

I am becoming more and more convinced that we are born with a prolepsis or anticipation of justice - or call it a basic sense of fairness. I've been watching a Netflix documentary series on research on babies and their development, psychological and physical. In experiment after experiment, it can be shown that babies can distinguish between what we would call fair play - or what is just - and what is not.

I don't know if you guys are familiar with Noam Chomsky, but regardles of his political activism, he has some very interesting and down to earth theories about language, one of them being that our ability for language is too a prolepsis. This was the first time I had heard about this concept (of anticipations).

Quote from Don

When you say "make them valid amongst us and have as many people as possible recognize them as well , and dogmatically, as good" I think that's where you'll get push-back. When we start labeling something as good in and of itself are we starting to elevate that concept to an ideal in the sense of Plato's Ideal Forms?

Yes, I guess you're right. I realized this after reading the other responses and crafting my own.

Quote from Don

By declaring dogmatically that these rights are good doesn't increase anyone's pleasure unless it's to just feel good by holding those beliefs.

Yes, and thus it could even be detrimental. Because of a false sense of achievement that such statements can produce.

Quote from Cassius

Yes most of us agree that these are desirable, and that they bring us pleasure, and therefore we should "fight" for them as appropriate, but the starting point for the analysis is that the things that bring us pleasure frequently require action on our part to obtain, and they are not handed to us free by god or nature - they require effort.

Yes. In line with my comment above, once again one could suspect of machiavellic intentions behind all this promotion of them.

Quote from Cassius

If the issue he is raising is why "justice" gets special treatment as an abstraction

Yes, this is what I was implying. I am now entertaining the possibility that the abstraction of justice, as I tried to define it above, and not as I used to understand it before, could have great potential to be effective as a suplementary criterion of the sensations and the feelings.

Quote from Cassius

the problem is that those who don't agree cannot be expected to go along and give up their own views of pleasure and pain.

There, again, it could be said that it can become unjust, because these utilitarian wouldn't be taking into account our sensations and feelings about it, and just trying to create an absolute solution for every case.

Quote from Cassius

We can probably generalize from the PD's and other texts that the greatest happiness of the greatest number would result from each of those involved achieving the most pleasure and the least pain for themselves and their friends, but that doesn't end up producing a real-world rule that can be used to make specific day to day decisions.

Are any of you guys familiar with Anarchism? Not in the definition of disorder and damage to private property, but rather in it's definition that any form of hierarchy (thus, government) is only justified as long as it proves itself useful to the ones it rules over; and if such proof can't be found, it should be dismantled and changed for one that does; this would perhaps imply many different and probably more local types of governments, rather that ones that encompass large geographic areas and populations that can be very different. Again, Chomsky has some stuff to say about this.

Quote from Cassius

All this is VERY helpful and absolutely within the scope of things that are proper for this forum. This is not partisan politics or the type of "careerism" that I think Epicurus was mainly warning against. This is basic-level theory that in my mind is closely akin to the observation that friendship is among the most important tools for achieving happiness. Practical reality is that we are social animals and we need to understand the implications of that in an atomist universe.

Quote from Don

If we believe these ideas give us pleasure, and by extension allow our society to let us pursue our pleasure, then we must defend the society or government that allows us the freedom to pursue our pleasure against those who would institute a form of government that would curtail our pleasure.

I was about to argue in favor of freedom being an absolute need for pleasure... but I guess it's not either. Perhaps there could be a scenario where our freedom could be curtailed in order for some other basic pleasure be continued (either immediately or later on)? And, judging it by the prolepsis of justice, defined as I did lines above, it wouldn't be unjust to have your freedom curtailed in that scenario as long as the government that reduces said freedom is making sure you're pleasures are taken into account? And as such, it also makes sense to curtail the freedom of those who are unjust (those who don't care for allowing the others experience and live by their sensations/feelings, or outright impede it).

Quote from Godfrey

great look at the subject through the development of and interaction between various cultures through the melting pot of an island paradise. Immigrants from Bora Bora, China, New England missionaries, whalers, merchants, lepers....

This brought thoughts about the definition of justice. And what missionaries usually do, trying to impose their worldview unto others'. Perhaps justice is an innate ability, that gets forced out of us somehow, to intuitively recognize that the other ones have their feelings too, as we do, and these are based on their and our specific culture/upbringing/personality and we can be happier letting them be with them, and procuring we're left to be with ours as well?

Also, I realize, that the decision between living a life of public action, activism, etc, or a more recluse or retired life, is highly correlated to personality, which comes down to what, according to your wiring, produces you more pleasure, and produces a better result at the hedonistic balance (i liked the term Godfrey ). What I'm getting is, none is wrong, none is better than the other, if lived using the criteria. If not lived using the criteria, it's just a missed chance to live a more rational, conscious existence, controlled experience. Interesting

Quote from Cassius

remember what Torquatus had to say about his ancestors and the way they acted in war:

At the outset, it all sounds like mental gymnastics to justify otherwise avoidable atrocities. But, what I'm gathering is, that within the framework of EP, anything is justifiable, as long as you were true to your sensations and feelings?

Quote from Cassius

But this is a logical mistake to make if someone thinks that "painlessness" or "absence of pain" or even "immediate bodily pleasure" is the goal of Epicurean philosophy. I think Epicurus was very clear from his deeds and words that such asserts are dramatic misunderstandings, but they will recur so long as people talk about Epicurus in these terms instead of diving deeper into the text to see the underlying role of feeling as the true guide of life rather than virtue/ being good / being holy / being reasonable etc.

It could very well be that I'm experiencing a resistance now to assimilate the relativity that is allowed for in EP. I sort of can recognize this. There's in me still a desire for a philosophy that allows for, and is conducive to, things being simpler, easier, more peaceful. But I realize, I may be falling for an idealization.

Could someone explain better what's the role that virtue plays in EP, and how does it play it? From all these readings I'm getting a greater importance is put on virtue than I initially thought there would be in EP.

Thanks

Quote from Cassius

in my view of Epicurus' teaching, pleasure is EVERYTHING that we find to be desirable, including our attachment to our friends and our family and our "country" and innumerable other things. I think it is dangerous to narrow the definition at all beyond "what we feel to be desirable" and that means that certainly mental constructs and abstractions are pleasurable and desirable too.

This is clarifying for me. I think I can agree with this definition. Is this an interpretation of yours Cassius or is it shared by others in this group? Is there evidence among the texts that this is a definition that aligns with Epicurean Philosophy without the risk to becoming too intangible? As you know, I'm a novice in these topics, so even though it's intuitively clear to me that it can all be sensational pleasure, I do try to see how one situation or another would translate into actual sensational pleasure, in the shortest - or more probablly succesfful time frame - to regard it as good or bad (hence my argument against the war, and C. Longinus logic for going at it).

Quote from Cassius

Epicureans held that mental pains and pleasures can be / often are more intense than "physical" ones. We don't have much problem seeing that in terms of visual art and music and dancing, but it also extends to literature and to any and all other forms of abstractions as well.

And these, I think, sort of reinforce my point about pleasure having to be actually felt, because if we leave it at them just being something that happens in the mind, we're one inch away from falling into idealizations again. And I remember, from what I learned in DeWitt, that even such abstract stuff as humor or fear at the end get translated into things we feel, because there are atoms in our body moving from one place to another that allow us to feel the effect of these abstractions on us. So, from my understanding so far, yes, everything has to end in something physical, to be real. Literature and music produce emotions in us, that are atoms (molecules if you will) that make them real. What other "pleasures of the mind" can we think of to see if they hold up to this test? Can you tell me of some pleasures of the mind that stay just there, as mental constructions and as such "are pleasant" without producing an effect in our bodies?

Quote from Cassius

So absolutely I think that a person can employ Epicurean philosophy not only to die for a friend, as Epicurus specifically included, but also to die for any number of things if we find our value (our pleasure) to be deep enough in that objective.

So far into my studies, I don´t see this. I know we shouldn't fear death, because if we're dead we won't feel pain, but following your line of thought Cassius where you point out that painlessness is not the objective, death only achieve painlessness, but deprives us from keeping feeling pleasures, so I don't see any scenario where, absent of terrible pain, it would be desirable to get into a scenario of certain death for someone, anyone; I know this doesn't sound romantic at all... but aren't we the pragmatists? Thinking of going towards certain death for someone else, seems to me the most idealistic thing. On the other hand, if death is not certain, and you could do a calculus of putting yourself at certain risk of death, like, let's say, donating a kidney, to help someone you love and that will bring you more pleasure afterwards, well yes, I think it's something worth doing. Since I'm no oracle, to me, there are situations that are better to be regarded as certainly conducive to death, like war, and some that are not. When you enlist to fight, if you havent' come to terms with the possibility of dying, you're fooling yourself. So for me, it's a no, from the outset. Keeping in the pragmatist line, why is your loved one exposed to this danger that could hurt him so bad and probably end your life? Isn't it a consequence of their life choices? And also... if they're the ones to go, we are certain they're not suffering anymore, and we know, that our pain of losing them won't be eternal, and if it's goint to be long, it's not going to be very intense.

I want to clarify that for argument's sake I'm taking postures that are actually rather extremist for me.

Quote from JJElbert

By resting their best philosophical case on natural rights, the American Founders (to take the earlier example) left open the door to every manner of specious argument. The condition of the African slave? Natural. They'd be worse off without us. The disenfranchisement of women? Natural. They are the weaker sex. The racial partition of society? Natural. What right do we have to intermix what God at Babel hath set apart? The prohibition of homosexual sex and marriage? Natural. Two men, after all, cannot procreate.

Thanks for your reply Joshua . I particularly like the ponit about the Enlightenment Rebels. But this paragraph here I need to delve deeper into, because I think it's an evidence of the confusion that I'm arguing against. All these arguments you talk about here, are manipulations via mis interpretations and wrongful use of rhetoric to advance some macabre interests. And thus, we can confirm once again that the name for these rights is a misfortune, since it can so easily be misused to reinforce these cases. But it is analogue to saying that some stupid stuff the Republicans or Democrats say is actually what Republicanism or Democracy is about. It's not. But my argument is that there are other concepts, like justice, which is just a concept, that unfortunately have been misappropriated before by groups in power, but that we would be benefitted from recognizing in the same category as justice. Again, life and freedome. Of course justice. Education I think is a big one.

Quote from Cassius

You didn't see that warning did you? Because if you did, or people see it elsewhere, I need to work harder to turn it off.

I didn't see any warnings, Cassius .

Quote

From Don:

I would say that there are some things that promote people living together but I don't want to go down a Utilitarian rabbit hole.

by the way. The calculus of pleasure, which is something I’ve come to identify as very epicurean... sounds very utilitarian to me. Could someone elaborate on what are some big differences between utilitarianism and epicurean philosophy?

Quote

From Don:

The Epicureans saw something like justice to be a contract among people to live without being harmed and to not harm others.

Don

But, how is justice not the same as the other constructs ? It is equally idealistic. There’s no physical justice in nature that you can see or grab, the same as the other constructs. If the problem is the name (natural, universal, etc.), because they are made to sound as if a supernatural authority is or should be enforcing them, well, let’s jot use that name. But the constructs listed under those unfortunate names are as useful for pleasure as justice. So we should clarify that it’s not the non-existing quality of those constructs what impedes them to be put on par with justice, but rather the fact that their grouping name sounds woo-woo. Of course they don’t exist. But of course we should try to make them valid amongst us and have as many people as possible recognize them as well , and dogmatically, as good (which I guess is the whole reason they gave them said names). Or why is justice the only one that can pass the cut? Is it not? (I truly don’t know)