think about what is higher, which is something that seems to be an important part of Epicurean philosophy and helps explain why we should not, in fact, generally be satisfied with living in a cave on bread and water.
A platonic red flag was raised in my mind when I read this: This may put you on track to disregard your pleasure by searching for "something higher". I'm pretty sure you didn't mean it the way I'm putting it but I think it's important to clarify it for future reference.
I'm reading the passage of DRN where Lucretius talks about the cow and how she feels the loss of her calf.
Is this an example of an anticipation or pre conception? I'm pretty sure he's not talking about platonic motherly love. So why does the cow feel that, if not because - biologically - all animals have this pre conception that causes them pain... or - psychologically - both mothers and some males form this anticipation somehow?
Why is isonomia important to us? How is it useful? How does it helps us understand nature better?
And also, when you talk about many worlds Joshua you main many configurations similar to earth in this universe? Or other universes similar to our own? (Why would nature allow only one kind of universe like ours)...
Sorry for the apparently stubborn and foolish question, but I think it reinforces for me that this is a concept I don't need at all, but, again, I'm very open to have my mind changed.
The last few days I've been thinking more and more about anticipations trying to understand them but also, I think, getting more my mind around what is it concretely we're talking about.
I liked thinking about them as a faculty. I've been pondering about how this faculty works, and I thought about it (thanks to others in this thread/forum) being the faculty to contrast "automatic" reactions - that we have towards and about things we experience and think about - to how we expect them to be; the expectation being the actual pre-conception, or anticipation, to the reaction and to our consciousness of it.
These expectations being formed both biologically (language) and psychologically, perhaps?
Does anyone have references to current divulgation of research about anything that could align to these anticipations of Epicurus?
we actually use our free will to try an approach/achieve whatever determinism we can get a hold of.
Thanks for the thoughtful post EricR and sorry for the delayed response. What I was trying to say is that to me having free will is so true and obvious that I don't think it's needed to explain why or how it works to confirm it does work. I was offering a "paradoxical observation", just as play, not fully thought through, (as friendly-bait to see if someone saw something about it too) in which with our free will we're constantly trying to find ways of doing things that give us the sense of living deterministically, as if we're so free we actually try to renounce some of the burden of defining our own path systematically, thus our desire to have some sort of outside unavoidable guideline that would let us know what we should do.
About the anarchism part of the post, I'm going to have to side with Cassius in that we're going to get lost in clarifying the definitions we understand of the concept. I would just emphasize that authority is an idea, and as such, is something we either accept or don't, conscious or unconsciously.
I interpret opposition to authority to be rhe essence of anarchism. Can you give me something to explain that?
I guess you're not completely wrong; I think you're right to asume that anarchism as an ideal, by definition, is an opposition to authority as a default; it's implicit in its name too; this probably has led some to believe it is an ideal that promotes full chaos and permanent rebellion without a cause; and probably has led some to act according to that interpretation of the ideal, probably not conducing to much pleasure for them or the ones around them; but, since we as Epicureans know better, we know that not all abstractions and ideals are wrong in and of themselves, but rather in their capacity to provide for us pleasure or pain; so, I don't ascribe to the ideal for the sake of it, much less ascribe to the common and caricaturized interpretation of it, but rather, after putting it to the test, I think it has potential as being useful for our pleasure, as its main argument is not only based on material grounds, but also disposed to dismantle other commonly accepted ideals or superstitions, which I think goes in line with our disposition to learn more about nature with the final objective of dispelling false beliefs (or probably test an anticipation, like the one I wrote about lines above); in this case: that there's no supernatural/unquestionable authority of some over others.
It's not an ideallistic position that all authority is bad, but rather a materialistic position that tries to draw attention and create awareness of something we usually accept blindly or take for granted but that perhaps is not particularly good for us.
So, given that we can accept that authority doesn't exist, because this is an ideallization and no ideal form does exist, it follows that any and all authorities or manifestations of authority should be permanently and from the start questioned/tested (so long as this questioning/testing doesn't create an imbalance of long term pleasure/pain on the side of pain to the testers).
Now that we're talking about real, material, practical issues, we can go a bit further and talk about what the test should be, and there is where I think it can fully connect with Epicureanism: The authority should be good for you, in terms of providing for you the most pleasure, the most opportunity to achieve pleasure, the most stability for you to seek pleasure on your own (like Don said), etc.
Pragmatically speaking, it is a point of view that doesn't necessarily go against any form of government or political system as long as they've proven to be useful to your pleasure. And its useful for you to manage the common anticipation that you need to abide to some leader.
I don't have this fully formed in my head yet, but your questions Cassius have been great to think about this topic (political systems) that has always been pleasurable for me to think about.
I think you are on the right track comparing this with something derived from an anticipation. It is something we experience as true even almost like pleasure and pain. It is part of our natural experience of life and therefore it's a given that we take it and use it regardless of how it works
I goy a bit confused about what is it that you're referring yo here.
Perhaps you meant authoritarianism in the last sentence?
No, I did mean anarchism. As in: "a political philosophy and movementthat is sceptical of authority and rejects all involuntary, coercive forms of hierarchy." It's pretty idealized, but thus are all forms of government and political systems; it's just that this one I find more in line with Epicurean Philosophy. The "skeptical about authority part"'is what I'm alluding to when I reference it in the post. It means that an authority has to prove its value, it's not to be accepted automatically (rings a bell?) and the test is one of materialism, where there should be a clear benefit (rings another bell) for the ones who are "being ruled".
One point I would make among systems however is that I think just like we sometimes choose pain in the short term, and just as there is no absolute justice, it is probably the case that depending on circumstance it can be necessary to move from system to system as required by "temporary" facts
This is the point exactly. The examples you post are confirming of this too.
I write this a bit humorously, because there's some paradox play (it may be frowned upon but it's not prohibited yet 
) and because it's not completely thought through, but it's something that just came to mind and I don't want to forget it.
The more I think about it, the more I'm aware that the debate about free will versus determinism is just nonsense. I really think we don't need more proof or explanation about our ability to live with free will, but just to accept it and experience it. I think this is so evident that we actually use our free will to try an approach/achieve whatever determinism we can get a hold of.
Perhaps this is an anticipation in and of itself. Formed by centuries of wanting to abide to something outside of oneself to find safety (to allow yourself to feel pleasure).
But let me explain this point of view: The platonists seek this determinism in idealizations, the stoics and religious in providence, and we try to do so the most real and natural way, by trying to be aware of what feels good for us (which is undeniably determined by our bodies, and probably anticipations).
I think our way is the best because the authority we abide to is put within ourselves, and what we do is try to understand it, polish it, and let it reign for our own tangible happiness. Whereas the other "leaders, sages" even psychologists advocate for a "losing of the self", "transcendence of the self" for all the wrong reasons, among them subjecting themselves to a will outside of them, we actually can let go of the "ideal" self to embrace the material, real self.
To round up with a little politics, all of this may sound pretty much tending towards authoritarianism, but it's actually rather anarchist, in that anarchism espouses the view that an authority figure is not bad in an of itself as long as its authority is justified by the benefits it provides to the ones it's leading. Which we know is our case.
Likewise I think it is not correct to suggest that we are born with "ideas" of justice such as equality before the law or contracts or cooperation or teamwork. We are born with a faculty of perceiving that something called "justice" is involved in certain situations and arrangements when we perceive those arrangements for the first time. We are not born with an "idea" of a god being omnipotent or omniscient of even self-sufficient. We are born with a faculty of perceiving that there is a spectrum of perfection in living beings, and that as we come into contact with examples of living beings we can recognize that there is a way to rank living beings in terms of how successful they are in living.
I can agree with this. That we are born with something which is, please forgive the redundancy, innate, but not innate ideas. It's an innate "code" perhaps, which is recorded in us genetically, as Chomsky explains about how we as humans have an innate capacity (faculty?) to learn to use language, apparently automatically (when correctly stimulated), in forma that are not explicitly explained to us by anyone. If you've had kids you must remember this, when they surprisingly start talking in complex ways when nobody's taught them this specifically.
One of the reasons we use this pre-conceptions unconsciously must be because it's pleasurable to do so. Perhaps to be still pre-conceptions or anticipations they must remain unconscious? (They are pre-conscious? Anticipated to conscience?) As soon as they become conscious we start trying to define them, or put names to them, when perhaps what would be more pleasurable would be to observe/experience them?
Perhaps they are part of the canon not so much "use them" as faculties, but rather just to be aware that they happen? (As complementary to the senses that we can choose to engage, and pleasure/pain we can use to discern good/bad)
Thanks to everyone for a great thread, it's been very illuminating.
I'm deeming it, for now, as an unuseful abstraction. The more I read about it, the more it seems like a magical ideal. But I'm open to being corrected.
To what does Epicurus's philosophy point? Or What is the point of Epicurus's philosophy?
To me, that answer would be "the greatest good"
I think "the greatest good" is here being used as a platonic ideal. I think Epicurus philosophy pointed to something very material instead: Teaching how to care for the only object you can really posses (life) and how to give it the best use possible (following pleasure) while being able to resolve confusions about it (the canon).
My point is that it's possibly useful to think of the sculpture as a proxy for "life itself," and to think of my conclusion of the best thing to do as "the goal." Of course one may arrive at their own conclusions
This is exactly what I was referring to. I really liked your post. I think you hit the nail in the head.
Wikipedia doesn't seem to help much:
Isonomia (ἰσονομία "equality of political rights,"[1][2] from the Greek ἴσος isos, "equal," and νόμος nomos, "usage, custom, law,"[1]) was a word used by ancient Greek writers such as Herodotus[3] and Thucydides[4] to refer to some kind of popular government. It was subsequently eclipsed until brought back into English as isonomy ("equality of law").
No, I don't think so. I should probably have written "Death would be the greatest evil" but even that may be overstating. But"life as the greatest good" per DeWitt doesn't strike me as helpful. It's not life per se. I think Epicurus would ask what's the kind of life you're living. Is it directed toward pleasure? Are you making choices based on moving your life in a pleasurable direction? Are you loving and practicing wisdom (ie, applying Epicurean philosophy) ?
I kindly wish too push my question again, as I believe you have the right intent in your answer, but I think you're still answering about the adjective "good" (comparing it to evil) and not "good" as a thing (which doesn't need comparison), which is how I understood DeWitt used it. From this point of view, life is not either good or bad, per se, but it's just something that is, and that we do have (semantically somebody would debate that you can't "have" life, but I hope is clear that I use it as in "we can take care of it, cherish it, keep it safe, and lose it"). I remember DeWitt saying "life is the greatest good" in contrast to "pleasure being the greatest good", and making the clarification that pleasure is not something you have, but that you experience, and thus, our objective/end/telos, is to experience pleasure.
As for the adjective "good", as in what is right or wrong, I think it's clear that good is pleasure and wrong is pain.
And as such, we could have a thing that is good (gives us pleasure) or bad (gives us pain), and thus, our greatest thing (life) could be a good one or a bad one.
Wow. From all the clarifications I'm going out of my way to provide, I see why Cassius says we may be falling into a logical or semantic trap, but I don't believe this is the case.
Life can't be the "greatest good," otherwise, death would conversely be the "greatest bad." And death is nothing to us.
Pleasure (i.e., living a pleasurable life) is the goal, telos, beginning, and end.
When I read this in DeWitt, I took it not as an adjective (whose opposite would rightly be "bad") but rather as noun; as in the best thing we could ever have; and if we lost it, we would be loosing the greatest thing we had. This doesn't imply that we should fear losing it, as long as we're certain we are giving it and will keep on giving it the best possible use towards the ultimate goal of pleasure, the thing that is most greatly good.
Was I interpreting this wrong?
I think my best response to that would be to drop back and say that I think we should keep in mind the likelihood (I think a certainty) that Epicurus was aware of the need to, and constantly did, swap back and forth between talking in terms which are primarily "logical" at times, while at other times focusing on the "practical." I think he would say that doing so does not make him inconsistent but acknowledges the limits of logic (the need to always tie it to observable evidence) and the ultimate primacy of the canonical faculties given by nature.
From this, and also from, I think, Episode 22 of the Lucretius podcast, that there is mention of "proper logic" or "proper reasoning", I remembered this podcast:
Which I have listened to, and can recommend. I like that she's very clear about logic being able to provide "valid" arguments, but not necessarilly "true" arguments, particularly that an argument can be valid but not necessarilly true. She does, however, make some distinctions about deductive logic and inductive logic that do have some prerequisites of truth or imply a high likelihood of truth for certain arguments, but I don't recall the specifics.
Has anyone heard or read about her or this topic? I had never studied formal logic in school so this was completely new for me, and I think it, at least, allows you to order your ideas better while presenting an argument, which doesn't necessarilly imply a discussion.
She also has this book about critical reasoning that I intend to read after finishing DRN:
To the extent you are saying that it seems likely to you that advanced beings would take interest in lesser beings as a matter of pleasure to themselves, I think Epicurus would also say "of course" and he would point to his position on isonomia and on infinite numbers of worlds with life on them and he would say of course there are highly advanced beings who do exactly like that, just like we do ourselves, but on a far more advanced scale that would seem to most of us as being "godlike." The isonomia view would I think allow for an infinite progression / spectrum of advancement above us.
I read about Isonomia in DeWitt and did not understand it, it seeming suspiciously platonic. I left it for later and haven't gotten to it. How important is this concept? Could you ellaborate on what it is and what is it useful for?
Thanks.
I do think though that when "other" Epicureans went so far as to admit a fourth leg into the canon, which seems to me to have been done as an accomodation to "logic", was a fateful and fatal mistake.
Are there any examples or anecdotes about this?
In fact this might be analogous to the multiple options that he allowed in astronomical matters (as long as the options all are consistent with observable facts).
I seem to recall having read something close to this, and it had to have been in this forum or in DeWitt. Something like, all the possibilities that are in line with the physics are possible until one is proved to be the right one and the others proven to be wrong? Is there a PD about this?
as he seems to have done on the issue of the "greatest good / good" even while criticizing the Peripatetics for walking around harping on it uselessly.
What do you mean by this? I though the greatest good was life, and the objective/end (or "telos" as DeWitt puts it) is pleasure.
the best way for the "average" human to view the gods so as to live the theoretical happiest life with the least possible anxiety is the way he advocated -- that as a logical ideal, "gods" should be thought of in absolute terms as supremely self-sufficient and therefore not concerned about things that they have no need to be concerned about.
The only thing that bothers me about this ideal, is that it may be looked by many as an objective in itself, instead of pleasure, justifying even the individualistic tendencies that may arise when first exposed to a philosophy like this, or, at least, an aloof position towards other's experience; like most times, for argument's sake, I'm going to an extreme, so let me explain my point of view: when you come from other philosophies/religions, where the common good is dogmatically (while being hipocritically repeated but not practiced) accepted as the greatest good, and you're exposed to a philosophy that tells you that the greatest good is life (thus, your life) and that the objetive of life is pleasure (thus, your pleasure, as it is subjective and you can't experience the other's pleasure), you get a feeling that this philosophy is a highly individualistic one.
I do understand, though, that this ideal, used properly, can allow for greater peace of mind, and evidently comes from an observation of nature, specifically us as the most advanced species we've observed, and how we relate to the other less-advances species on Earth. I'd argue that an important (arguably the most important) part of the observations that we can make out of this comparison of species is that of our ability for empathy and compassion, and the pleasure we can get out of it, which, as I understand, from what I've read, was completely missing from Epicuru's description. Any thoughs on this?
That observation in my view is based on the logical abstraction of quantity which results from categorizing ALL experience as either pleasure or pain. In that statement I believe he is abstracting those two words "pleasure" and "pain" and expecting us to understand that those two words cover a myriad - actually unlimited - number of experiences that are each subtlety different from each other and tied to their individual facts.
I'm not sure I get what you're trying to say here. Could you please explain? I do think all experiences could be categorized as either pleasurable or painful, and I like the simplicity of that. Are you saying this is not so? I'd like to learn your point of view about this.
We probably ought to have an independent discussion of whether it is ever a good idea, and if it is, in what circumstances, to engage in these logic games
I have accepted the doctrine that there's no point in engagin in those kind of discussions. Unfortunately, I've done it many times; since they start from a place of ideallistic competition, they focus on winning or losing the argument, not in accepting and giving good arguments for the sake of growing and having a good experience; and thus, when you win, the other part usually feels offended, when nobody wins, it is seldom a fun experience since most people take it personally, and if the other one wins, you end up confused but probably for the wrong reasons.
(1) confident that the effect was not supernatural, and (2) confident that upon studying the facts long enough they would eventually be able to understand how such things were brought about naturally.
Agreed. Also agreed that physics are needed for this, and thus, foundational to the philosophy. Going back to my first argument about physics, what I meant is not that physics are not important, but rather that the specific physical explanations of Epicurus and Lucretius don't have to be right for the rest of the philosophy to be valid, especially nowadays that we have better explanations that allow us to reach these same two conclusions you mentioned.
Thanks a lot for your answer Cassius.
I am in agreement with you that a search for a totally consistent and comprehensive set of physics propositions, and I think Epicurus says that himself as well, especially in the passage (Herodotus? Pythocles?) where he says that what is needed is not a comprehensive theory of everything but to live happily.
However to bring that point back in a full circle, he could reach the conclusion that what is needed is to live happily ONLY because his physics and epistemology convinced him that there is no life after death to be concerned about reward/punishment, or supernatural gods to be concerned about obeying.
Well, this is something I did not touch upon (the gods), but I'm happy you brought it up; I know it's not part of the original doctrine, but I think (I'd like to learn what people would have to say about this) that there's a point of view about the gods, or god, that is not standard Epecurian, but I'd argue is not far away either.
There's people that believe in a completely benevolent god, so this belief doesn't bring them pain at all. They don't feel compelled to do stuff to gain their favor, and they do understand that these gods or god will not harm them because... that's beneath their divine status, if you will. This is a belief that gives hope to their lives. (From there, I know it could be a slippery slope into trying to be good to gain this god's favors, and opening the dangerous door of what this god could deem "good", but, please, bear with me, as I stated before, these are people who are not subject to this compulsion). I don't think the issue of the gods being supernatural would come to a person like this, because, unless you've been exposed to a point of view of physical/biological gods like the Epicurean ones, I don't think you've taken the time to think about whether they're material or not, you're just aware of the concept of god. But for this argument's sake, I'm not talking about supernatural gods.
What we know now about our species is not the same that we knew back in Epicurs day. We're very destructive but we're also capable of tuning into our empathy a lot more than our fellow other animals can. I'd say this is a trait that's clearly linked to evolution and correlated to consciousness. So it's hard for me to believe that an Epicurean god would not help a less evolved being if they had the opportunity and this made them feel pleasure, while this could happen completely out of our capability of noticing it. As I see it, we can be pretty good to less evolved creatures, and I'm sure most of us are. I've thrown food to a stray dog, I've saved another one that was in pain/danger, and I've changed my walking path to avoid disturbing insects or other animals. If I find a bug in my home I try to take it out without killing it. I don't do this because I want to go to "heaven", or win the favor of a higher being, but because I it makes me feel good, to be in the presence of another being thats alive, in my vicinity, and "allowing" it to improve its condition somewhat and also to allow me to feel my empathy, to become attuned to it. I don't feel like a god, at all, , but it makes me feel good because I listen to my empathy, a clear and present feeling, towards them and this feels good. So, Epicurean gods, being more evolved biological entities, wouldn't hesitate, in my opinion, to do it given the opportunity, because I'm pretty sure it will be pleasureable for them too, and they would do it without us realizing their intervention, as I'm sure the dog and the bugs don't realize at all what I just did for them. I'm sure they're not living to observe us and find ways to help us all the time, though, as classic conceptualizations of god or gods could be.
I understand we have to draw a line somewhere to be able to go forward with things, and as I understand it, Epicurean Philosphy's line is drawn at a place where no involvement from the gods (material, non supernatural) is conceivable, even if it's imperceptible; but as I stated before, perhaps this view is not that-at-odds with the philosophy, and could allow other people to benefit from Epicurean Philosophy, without having to give up their belief that there are blessings of god happening to them. Please don't banish me 
That carries over from what I typed above, and I would say that he was confident in his epistemology NOT because it was logically sound, but because it went hand in hand and mutually supported his physics, and vice versa. The epistemology could not stand without confidence in a physics which helps us explains how the senses work, and of course our physics could not stand without our understanding and having confidence in the sense. The two are mutually supporting and both essential. The ethics follows from both together, in my view of Epicurus.
I can see that. Just to clarify something, and you're going to understand me from previous posts; it is speculative physics, and physics that doesn't impact our immediate reality, that I think are unnecesary now, as were unnecesary then; particularly when they had (back then) so much to clarify in more immediate physics; and now, when we have so much more to learn about us as species (psychology, pleasure, economics, etc.) that affects us directly. So I understand how it could be a prerequisite of the epistemology to have a good physics context, but it would have to be the immediate and descriptive (rather than speculative) physics, and that type of concrete and down to earth physics I think I could see as a foundation to the epistemology and the ethics.
our difference may only be that you seem to believe that it is self-evidently correct to take the position that "after observation we can be sure" that certain things are "impossible" with out a grounding in BOTH the physics and the epistemology. I would say yest that is the conclusion, but ONLY because we have confidence in our epistemology AND our physics.
No, perhaps I sent the wrong message unintendedly, I don't believe observation alone is enough. But I do think that many things, like free will, are so evident without the need to give more explanation, that actually trying to do so coud probably fire back at you; for example, if you decide to 'enroll in the game' of "I need to have the undefeated explanation about this phenomenon" in order to be able to say it exists and it is happening (which is evident), you're very likely to find yourself frustrated, because most certainly you will not have an undefeated explanation about it; and if you base your philosophy on [blank] (something as obvious as free will), the reality is it will remain untouched, regardles of whether you were or not able to explain why and how something so obvious is indeed happening. And many more things are nowadays as evident and obvious as free will (to most people, after a certain age and education) than they probably were back then; so I guess my point is that the physics that are practical and useful are settled and pretty much allow, most basically educated people, to reach those same conclusions (of no supernatural stuff happening), allowing them to be able to jump into the parts of the philosophy that are actually more helpful to live happy lives. I'm not saying they're not important, I'm saying today's physics (in the domain that describes our immediate experience) are pretty much settled and serve their purpose to allow people to connect the dots easily when presented with this materialistic ontology. On the other hand... There's so much more to do about the Epistemology and Ethics!
