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A paper looking at Epicurus's philosophy in general and Philodemus's contribution in particular.
This *may* be a repeat of a previous post, but never hurts to check it out again. Still very exciting stuff!
If I recall correctly Thomas Jefferson picked up that line and put it in his outline:
That was an incredible display of recall, Cassius . Well done!!
I was curious to check out the Oxford English Dictionary to see what definition Jefferson would have been working with (as well as maybe those translators):
From 1603-1723: † Insensibility or indifference to pain; want of feeling. Obsolete.
From 1656-1751: Freedom from pain; a state of rest or ease, in which neither pain nor pleasure is felt. Obsolete.
Quotations (This definition actually uses quotes about Epicurus):
1656
Indolence, which Epicure held, they esteem not pleasure, nor want of pleasure,..for Indolence is like the state of a sleeping man. (T. Stanley, History of Philosophy vol. II. iv. facing p. 5)
1702
D'you know, said I, what Hieronymus Rhodius has allotted for the Summum Bonum? I know, said Torquatus, he resolves it into Nihil dolere, Mere Indolence. (S. Parker, translation of Cicero, Five Books De Finibus ii. 56)
1713
I cou'd rather call it an Indolence. It seems to be nothing more than a Privation of both Pain and Pleasure. (G. Berkeley, Three Dialogues Hylas & Philonous i. 14)
1751
That tranquility of mind, and indolence of body which he made his chief ends. (Earl of Orrery, Remarks Swift (1752) 113)
From the Historical Thesaurus entries for this definition:
non-feelingness 1650 Absence of sensation.
indolence 1656–1751 Freedom from pain; a state of rest or ease, in which neither pain nor pleasure is felt. Obsolete.
dispassion 1690– Freedom from passion; dispassionateness; †apathy.
dryness 1748 figurative. Absence of emotion, feeling, or fervour; lack of cordiality; coldness of feeling; distance of manner.
dispassionateness 1842– A dispassionate condition or quality.
passionlessness 1867– The state or condition of being or appearing passionless.
emotionlessness 1873– The quality, state, or condition of being emotionless.
(My Note: Those all sound more Stoic than Epicurean!)
Finally, definition from 1710-
The disposition to avoid trouble; love of ease; laziness, slothfulness, sluggishness.
We are doing what we can to maximize pleasures of all kinds, and we are doing what we can to minimized pleasures of all kinds,
...minimize pains of all kinds...right? 
I agree with everything you wrote in post no. 20, Cassius . Well put.
The issue is more that the Doctrines are presuming an Epicurean understanding of so many key terms and concepts, and without that background understanding the simple words are generally taken to mean something much different than intended. It's not "simplification" of wording that is needed, it's more "additional" wording that explains the use of the terms.
Agreed. On that note, it's important to emphasize that all the epitomes, letters, Principle Doctrines, even The Sayings of Epicurus contained in the Vatican manuscript are summaries of voluminous teachings of the Epicurean school. They were literally - even explicitly, in the case of the letters - designed to remind the student of the larger body of teachings. They weren't an end in and of themselves. They were a useful means to an end. Even the Tetrapharmakos itself *needs* the full context of *all* the teachings and is meant as a memory aid not as an evangelism tool. So, "simplifying" them further is pointless if the wider doctrines and teachings aren't being pointed back to. If you try to use a summary to remind you of the content of just a larger summary, you're missing the reason for the initial summary in the first place.
As for evangelism and "spreading the word," we have Cicero complaining that the common people understood Epicurus's philosophy enough to be considered (by him, at least) members of the school. At it's most basic, Epicurean philosophy IS easy to understand. Let me take a stab:
You can spend a lifetime (however long that is) studying, learning, discussing, internalizing the finer points; but those seven basics might be why Cicero was so angry about the hoi polloi being Epicureans. It's not that hard to "get started." And, no, I didn't mention physics, nor the details of how to choice and reject, nor a myriad of other things. But agreeing with those seven things doesn't seem a bad place to start for someone, in my opinion.
It could be instructive to see how modern neuroscience explains the pleasure/displeasure aspect of affect. Because it seems to me that's what we're trying to communicate here.
In English "pleasure" can go up and down in intensity, duration, location (at least).
To say that "absence of pain" is "the same as" pleasure" would imply that it too can go up and down.
Agreed. And that's implied in the Epicurean texts since:
PD3: The limit of pleasure (hedone) is the removal of all pains (algos). Wherever and for however long pleasure (hedone) is present, there is neither "algos" nor "lupe."
I'm purposefully leaving those Greek words to express the all-encompassing nature:
algos: "pain (of either mind or body), sorrow, trouble, grief, distress, woe."
lupe: "grief, sadness; pain (of mind or body), suffering, affliction, distress"
But PD3 implies that both pleasure and pain "go up and down," to the limit where all distress, trouble, grief, sadness, suffering has been eliminated in both body and mind. And it is the "limit" of pleasure! Which, again, implies there's pleasure all along the spectrum, from being completely overcome by suffering and pain to being completely filled with nothing but pleasure.
But to then state that "absence of pain" is "the highest" or "most intense" pleasure indicates that it is at a fixed position (at least to my way of reading).
The total absence of pain *is* the "highest" limit of pleasure. That's by definition. No pain = maximum pleasure. Yonge has "Torquatus" say "painlessness is the greatest of pleasures which no other can possibly exceed." Which is Cicero's clever wordplay as far as I'm concerned using his new word. But "absence of all pain" is the "greatest" of pleasure simply because there is no more room for pain to exist, pleasure has completely filled the cup to the brim. That's why pleasure, when pain in gone, can only be varied.
That "highest notch" you refer to is just "the limit of pleasure" = "total absence of pain." It's not a special state, just the brim of the cup.
In reading (and re-reading and re-reading and..) that quote from Epicurus's On Choice, I don't necessarily think ataraxia and aponia are being given special status. The only "special" status given to the stable pleasures of "peace of mind" and "freedom from exertion" are that we just experience them. We don't have to "do" anything to experience the pleasure of them. We just have to notice that they're there. There a state of being, not a thing you do.
It's that issue -- that you want the highest but will take what you can get - that I sense needs to be made more clear in order for the terminology and the system to be made as clear as possible.
Fair enough. Maybe that's why the "gods" are held up as an archetype or paragon of what that limit of pleasure, that total absence of pain, suffering, and exertion could look like. We mortals can never attain that. Epicurus certainly didn't experience that! He suffered physical pain and suffered, but he knew how to "play the game" (for lack of a better way of putting it) to fill his cup with the most amount of pleasure, both in his stable anxiety-free mind and in his choice of what active pleasures to pursue and which to reject.
As a curiosity, I wanted to see how Yonge translated that section of On Ends:
but unless you are very obstinate, you must admit that pleasure is a perfectly distinct thing from mere freedom from pain. You will, however, said [Torquatus], find that I am obstinate in this; for nothing can be more real than the identity between the two. ...
IV. Is it possible, said [Torquatus], for anything to be more delightful than freedom from pain? Well, said [Cicero], but grant that nothing is preferable to that, (for that is not the point which I am inquiring about at present,) does it follow on that account, that pleasure is identical with what I may call painlessness? Undoubtedly it is identical with it, said [Torquatus]; and that painlessness is the greatest of pleasures which no other can possibly exceed.
For the heck of it and easy reference, here's the Latin:
[3.9] Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam.
Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere.
Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante1 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio.
Non dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est.
Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius.
Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas?
Quis istud possit, inquit, negare?
Eademne, quae restincta siti?
Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis3 stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit,4 illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est.
Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles eodem nomine appellas?
Quid paulo ante, inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem? ...
[4.11] Immo sit sane nihil melius, inquam—nondum enim id quaero—, num propterea idem voluptas est, quod, ut ita dicam, indolentia?
Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest.
Quid dubitas igitur, inquam, summo bono a te ita constituto, ut id totum in non dolendo sit, id tenere unum, id tueri, id defendere?
So, Cicero asks "num propterea idem voluptas est ut ita indolentia?" "Is pleasure (voluptas) the same as "freedom from pain" (indolentia)?" Interestingly enough, indolentia, according to Lewis & Short (*the* Latin dictionary) is a word coined by Cicero! So, Cicero is literally putting words in Torquatus's mouth. And "Torquatus" then agrees that they are the same: Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. "Plainly the same, says he, and indeed the greatest, than which no greater can be done."
Again, I have to stress that Cicero is making Torquatus say what Cicero wants him to say. Cicero may be a d*ck, but he's a very intelligent, crafty, talented d*ck.
I *think* freedom from pain is usually aponia (απονια) or some form of that or algos (αλγος).
απονια is a "not/un-" + ponos
Ponos has a wider meaning that just "pain": stress, trouble, distress, suffering; hard work, toil; pain, esp. physical.
So, to me "aponia" goes beyond a surface reading of "freedom from pain" as I mentioned previously. It's freedom from exertion, toil, suffering, in body and maybe even in mind. That suffering part is important to me. We can experience pain without necessarily layering on suffering.
Algos encompasses "pain (of either mind or body), sorrow, trouble, grief, distress, woe."
So, when we see "freedom from pain" translated from Greek texts, it is an all emcompassing idea of freedom from exertion, sorrow, trouble, suffering, distress.
Cicero creates a new word "indolentia" and make it mean "freedom from pain, insensibility" from which we get "indolence" which used to mean "A state in which one feels no pain or is indifferent to it; a lack of any feeling." Then he has his Torquatus agree that pleasure is equated with painless indifference or lack of feeling. By definition, that's NOT an Epicurean equivalence... By definition "freedom of pain" is the feeling of pleasure.
This post has gotten a little long... let me stop here, regroup, read the rest of Cassius's post and Nate's and then ...I'll probably have more to say! 
"highest good"
The "highest good" is JUST pleasure. There's nothing mystical or woo-woo about the term "highest good." It's just "that to which everything else points" and "why we do what we do." "Attaining the highest good" makes it sound like some unattainable, woo-woo goal. Which is what some people want to make it mean. But that's not what it means.
Joshua 's "why" questions on the Hume posts over on the other thread seem applicable here. If you keep asking "Why do you do that?" the answer is going to be "because it's pleasurable." That's why it's the "highest" or last good standing.
If the foreign word has a clear equivalent that might or might not resolve all the questions.
Ah! There's the rub. There can be more or less precise "equivalents" from one language to the other. Yes, a rose is a ῥόδον is a rosa... but even there, A ῥόδον usually referred to a Rosa gallica whereas when I think of a "rose" (in English) I'm most likely thinking a red hybrid tea rose. Same with imagining "a cat in a hat." I'm going to imagine a much different image than if I read "a cattus in a pīleus." So, of course, translation is possible. One just has to be wary.
But I digress, as I *think* I see more clearly where you're going now. That last post of yours helps a lot! Thanks!
"Are there degrees of ataraxia and aponia?"
I would have to say, "Yes." If we look at Epicurus's definition of stable and active pleasures, he sort of implies that, from my perspective:
Epicurus in his work On Choice : "Ataraxia (Peace of mind) and aponia (freedom from effort or struggle in the our physical body) are pleasures are stable pleasures; khara (joy) and euphrosyne (delight) are seen to consist in motion by means of activity."
ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."
We are not constantly in a state of joy and delight. Those come and go through means of our own activities.
Ataraxia and aponia are more "stable" by definition (per Epicurus and the Epicureans) but they can obviously ebb and flow. Epicurus could in no way be described as being in a state of aponia during his final illness. He could barely move from the pain. Maybe when he was younger, he felt that state of aponia where his body worked effortlessly. He was "in the zone." Our bodies can be more or less prone to effortless movement and struggle. When we're not thinking about our bodies' and their pains and aches, then, I think, we can be said to be in a state described as aponia. That's going to come and go.
With ataraxia, I'm more inclined to say that that state of "peace of mind" is more long-lasting, maybe throughout one's life, once the anxiety and fears of gods, death, etc. are eradicated through reasoning through the physics and understanding the "way things are". I do think Epicurus can be said to have had a state of ataraxia, "peace of mind," during his final illness... and, in fact, this is exactly allowed what him to concentrate on his "active" pleasures of recalling pleasurable memories of time spent with his friends.
This may not be the mainstream academic opinion, but that's where I'm coming down... as of 3:03 pm on a Tuesday afternoon.
Is ataraxia and aponia and "highest good" something that is attainable in reality for any length of time?
Yes, to answer your question. For the reasons I shared above.
Cassius : I may be misinterpreting where you're going, and I think I agree with the direction I think you're headed. So, with those caveats, I'll add the following:
I agree it does no one any good to use jargon and technical terms (in this case, Ancient Greek words) in a context meant to be understandable by "the average person" who speaks/reads English in an attempt to explain ideas to them. Likewise, someone who wants to explain philosophical or scientific ideas should be able to do so at a number of levels, jargon-free and aimed at a particular audience. I'm thinking specifically of videos I've seen online like The Flame Challenge (explaining complex science to children, judged by children: 2014 Winner "What is Color?") or WIRED Magazine's "Astrophysicist Explains Gravity in 5 Levels of Difficulty." It's an application of the Feynman Technique. Or as Kurt Vonnegut writes in Cat's Cradle: Dr. Hoenikker used to say that any scientist who couldn't explain to an eight-year-old what he was doing was a charlatan.
So, using words like katastematic, ataraxia, prolepsis, etc. can be a helpful shield in protecting someone who really doesn't understand - or *thinks* they understand - what those terms mean but knows how to bandy them around to sound erudite or at least make it sound like they know what they're talking about. Full disclosure: I **firmly** include myself in this camp from time to time. I *think* I know what they mean. BUT, if so, I should be able to explain them in "plain English."
One issue is that these terms are convenient shortcuts, both for good and for less good purposes. If I have to say every time "a mind free from anxiety and fear of the gods and death" versus "ataraxia," that eats up a lot more words. And is "a mind free from anxiety and fear of the gods and death" really enough? Maybe I need to include "fear from anxiety about what happens after you die as well as fear of the gods retribution after you die as well as anxiety about fate and destiny and predestination and..." Or just say "ataraxia." It's a powerful pull toward just *using* the word... but then we're back to square one. Same for katastematic. Same for prolepsis. Same for (fill in the blank).
That said, by only using regular English words, one obscures what the ancient writers are talking about. As an example, where translators may use happiness, well-being, joy, pleasure... you look at the ancient texts and lo and behold, it's the SAME word in all those places. Using regular English words can be as objuscating to the meaning of the subject as using the Ancient Greek words.
Have I resolved anything? Of course not! But I think a case can be made for explaining topics jargon-free but also at some point, the actual Ancient Greek words have to be understood. They are a very convenient short-hand AFTER the topics are explained.
Can't Catholics (to take one example) not find joy in memories of past times and friends?
If a Christian of any stripe is **convinced** in their bones that they'll be livin' with Jesus after they die (albeit erroneously, may I add), maybe we could describe them as being free from the anxiety of death.
Maybe I should extend my remarks and say that freedom from fear and anxiety and pleasurable memories of friends (to use two specific examples) are complementary and reinforcing but can also occur independently of each other.
Katastematic and "kinetic" pleasures are complementary. From my perspective, Epicurus was able to "offset" his physical pain with the "kinetic" pleasure of memories precisely because he had cultivated his katastematic pleasure of a mind free from anxiety and trouble. If he had been worried about what happens after he dies, would the gods punish him for some transgression, would be become a shade in the underworld... He wouldn't have been able to find joy in memories of past times with friends. Likewise, he didn't - by definition almost - have aponia in his last days. His body was not free from pain or working effortlessly and without struggle or suffering (which I think is a better way to think of aponia rather than just "freedom from pain"), but he could still have ataraxia. Ataraxia and aponia do not arise together. You can have one without the other.
Another interesting online resource is Textkit:
Textkit Greek and Latin Forums - Index page
It's both a forum and a resource for learning Ancient/Koine Greek and Latin. There are some valuable discussions about books and other things but also in-depth grammar discussions. I haven't spent much time there myself (maybe I should?), but I think it's a good resource to be aware of.
All this online discussion is not to say your shouldn't look at good old books. I think Textkit uses some old books on Internet Archive to learn Greek and Latin like http://www.cloviscorp.com/collegium/gram…se/grammar.html
but there's also
Athenaze
The JACT Reading Greek series (see my bookshelf image above)
Teach Yourself Ancient Greek
Etc...
However, some of those stick to the grammar-translation method which isn't necessarily the best way to go about it. Comprehensible Input (CI) seems to be more in favor now, but it seems to me both have their place. Both Luke Ranieri and Carla Hunt are big proponents of the CI approach and have GREAT content to back it up.
Here's more Latin CI content:
That's enough for now!
I encourage others to share their experiences and favorite (or least favorite!) learning resources.
I am not a fan of AI generated artwork for various reasons. Using "tools" is one thing. Plugging in text and getting AI to spit out an "original" artwork is something else.
We can't decide whether something is pleasurable or painful. It's immediate, pre-rational.
Am I missing something here? If this would be the case, we could throw Epicurean calculus out of a window, forget about any form of philosophy and jump from the nearest, highest building because flying sounds like something cool to do this Monday evening.
Good point. I should clarify my point.
My understanding is that we can experience pleasure or pain, per Epicurus and modern neuroscience (pleasure vs displeasure/pain). The feeling itself is automatic. You experience one of the two. That's why you pull your hand away from a hot stove. That's why you make yummy noises when you eat something you enjoy.
That said, we can *choose* whether or not to engage in an experience - to fulfill a desire - be it one we anticipate pleasure or one we anticipate will be painful that leads to pleasure.
But the feeling *itself* is pleasurable or painful before we put a rational value on it.
The "feelings" of pleasure and pain are πάθη (pathē).
The "senses", perceptions, sense-perceptions, sensations (including mental perceptions) are αἴσθησις (aisthēsis).
Two different words, two different connotations.
We can't decide whether something is pleasurable or painful. It's immediate, pre-rational.
αἴσθησις is also the word used in PD2. It also can refer to "consciousness" in general.
So, you have the alphabet memorized now? Where do you start learning the language?
I'm going to stick with ancient Greek and/or Koine, but some of these have good Latin content as well.
I can't say enough nice things about Luke Ranieri and his Scorpio Martianus and Polymathy channels on YouTube:
Feel free to look around, but a good place to start is his Ancient Greek in Action series:
He uses his reconstructed Lucian Pronunciation of Ancient Greek in the videos, but there are other videos that talk about other reconstructed ancient pronunciation. (I'm gravitating to his reconstructed Pompeiian pronunciation, but I am still liking Sidney Allen's reconstruction from Vox Graeca).
If you want an IN-DEPTH discussion on the best ways to learn Ancient Greek or Latin on your own, may I suggest (and one of these includes Carla Hunt of Found in Antiquity:
If you want a VERY traditional way to learn Ancient Greek, there's the 118-video series from the Center for Hellenic Studies with Prof. Leonard Muellner (Professor Emeritus of Classical Studies at Brandeis University) and Belisi Gillespi, his teaching assistant:
The most important thing is just... start somewhere! Explore! See what works!
On one hand we have outlined the likely possibilities, and should probably suspend judgment.
But just for fun:
My sentiments exactly ...
In this case we are looking for something specifically that is not perceptible "by the 5 senses" as the text says (οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν) but is perceptible by the mind.
I'm still not entirely sure/convinced of the syntax of that sentence, whether:
πάλιν τε οὐδὲν διφυὲς αἰσθητόν.
or
πάλιν τε οὐδὲν διαφανές αἰσθητόν.
I'm going to talk some of this out in real time, so I hope you all will indulge me.
διφυὲς and διαφανές are both neuter nominative/accusative singular adjectives.
διφυὲς is the "two natures; of double nature or form, generally, twofold, double"
διαφανές is translucent, transparent; but can also be metaphorically "manifest, distinct, distinctly seen, conspicuous"
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, διαφαν-ής
But we know adjectives can be used as substantives so one/both of these could be "that which is X"
αἰσθητόν "sensible, perceptible; able to be perceived by the senses" can also be nominative/accusative singular. Same here: Either an adjective or "a sensible/perceptible thing."
To get back to Bryan 's comment above:
In this case we are looking for something specifically that is not perceptible "by the 5 senses" as the text says (οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν) but is perceptible by the mind. Although translucent things may not be visible by a focus of the senses (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῶν αἰσθήσεων) they must be visible by a focus with the mind (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῇ διανοίᾳ) - because we can get a mental image of "a translucent object" whereas we cannot of "something simultaneously having both greater and lesser density within a defined space" - which is equivalent to imagining two atoms at the same point at the same time.
Why does the topic of the sentence have to be "perceptible by the mind"? Is the import of the sentence talking about things that are being ruled out as being imperceptible by *all* the senses (physical and mental)? Saying in effect, the gods cannot exist in this "two-natured" state, so Demetrius is ruling it out?
That pesky οὐδὲν "nothing" in there seems to be saying that "Once again, nothing (which is) X (διφυὲς/διαφανές) is able to be perceived by the senses (5 physical senses + the mind)" or to look at adverbially, "Once again, in no way is "an X-thing" (διφυὲς/διαφανές) able to be perceived by the senses (5 physical senses + the mind)."
And that pesky "once again" seems to be referring back to something previously discussed in the text. But what??
Revisiting the memorization and "method of loci" idea...
I found the section 2, Recursive argumentation: Lucretius’ spiritual exercises, very interesting. I haven't had a chance to review the whole paper yet, but the authors take on the repetition in Lucretius was novel and compelling from what I read. The method of loci came to mind with:
Lucretius: "keep atomic laws under seal (obsignatum habere) and to “retain it in the depository of one’s memory” (memori mandatum mente tenere).
I also remember reading elsewhere that some translators dismiss the repetitions in Lucretius as evidence of a work in progress. I like this scholar's take on it as an alternative perspective.
PS. I'm not overly fond of Pierre Hadot's specific term "spiritual exercise," however, I don't really have a problem with his general ideas (as far as I understand them).
Bryan & Joshua , thanks for engaging in this exercise!! 
With both your ideas in mind (pun intended?), I'm wondering if the "two natures" being mentioned "again" refer back to column 21:
21. Greater density and lesser density areas differ to the extent that the [greater density] is composed of more atoms, the [lesser density] of fewer atoms. As a consequence of this, that which is denser and capable of generating sensation, produces it – and conversely, that which is less dense and does not produce sensation, cannot set it into motion.
You can't have something that has both lesser and greater density? Only something with enough density is perceptible? This *could* possibly maybe lead to a sentence like "Once more, in no way (πάλιν τε οὐδὲν) is that which has two natures perceptible by the senses."
PS. Because, according to the Epicureans, the gods are perceptible, just perceptible by the mind. Using diaphanous there would imply to me that the gods are not perceptible.
