Posts by Don

I agree "happiness" is not an adequate translation ofευδαιμονία eudaimonia. However, I also do not like "flourishing" as a translation of eudaimonia.

Flourishing is primarily defined as (Merriam-Webster) "marked by vigorous and healthy growth" (a flourishing garden); "very active and successful."

I could maybe accept it if one goes with the sense of "successful" as in " having attained a desired end or state of good fortune" but I don't normally get that sense from "flourishing." To me, that definition is better attached to "well-being" "the state of doing well especially in relation to one's happiness or success"

Well-being - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I also like "well-being" because it wordplays off of eudaimonia itself: eu "well" + daimon "a being/god/deity".

Quote from Bryan

Quote from Don

To me the "flaming ramparts of the world" are exactly the outer shell of our cosmos/world-system described by other philosophers of the time. The outer shell - the outer wall/ramparts - are on fire. That's what makes the stars shine. 2:1144 also uses the "ramparts/walls of the world" moenia mundi

Accepting, as we do, the significance that the "walls" can be little more than currents/pressure and, even if more substantial, can and will breakdown into the infinite space beyond them, I must agree that we have the typical high tolerance for various possibilities:

(DL X 88) "A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion, it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or three-cornered or any kind of shape" (Bailey)

"A world is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating [and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, a boundary whose dissolution will bring about the wreck of all within it] in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible : they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned. (Hicks)

Thanks for the citations. So, Epicurus is talking here in 88 about a κόσμος (cosmos). I agree Epicurus is willing to entertain various shapes for the cosmos/cosmos/world-system/visible universe. But the important thing is that the cosmos is delimited portion of The All (the universe) with a definite boundary ofsome kind enclosing it. Epicurus used his imagination andreasoning and observation to "fly" beyond that boundary out into outer-cosmic space and share what he learned. So, by definition, IF the gods live in the space between cosmoi, they, by the definition of intermundia "between world-systems", they have no world to stand on nor stars to see. There's obviously some matter in that space between worlds but not enough to have a world, otherwise the gods would be *in a cosmos*.

btw, I have no idea why I'm so fixated on this. I don't believe gods exist in this physical, metacosmic way... Basically because the universe isn't built like this... Like I said unless we go with the multiverse. Even then, we would have no way of accessing the intercosmic/multiverse spaces. That's why I continue to take the Sedley "idealist" position on the Epicurean gods as I understand it. I can at least reconcile that to both a classical and modern understanding.

Quote from Pacatus

Humanistic Jews might reject the notion of a supernatural creator God (or any God) altogether, but still keep some of the Torah-traditions as a community-bonding practice.

That almost sounds Epicurean in that they take part in the rituals of the community but don't ascribe to the supernatural elements.

This is the most complete list of Usener' s fragments in English that I know of:

Epicurus: Fragments - translation

Bailey's Epicurus: The Extant Remains has most of them, I think? But they're not in the U# order:

Epicurus The Extant Remains Bailey Oxford 1926 Optimized For Greek On Left : Cyril Bailey : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Epicurus - The Extant Remains - Cyril Bailey - Optimized for Greek on Left Side for On-Line Viewing

archive.org

Quote from Bryan

we are in a similar state for DRN's Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus (the University of Leiden has held both since 1690). Pictures of a few pages of each are available, but not the whole of either. A weekend in Holland with access and a quality camera could solve the issue!

Okay, who wants to write the grant!

Correct. Unfortunately, I've been unable to locate a digitized copy of B online

Here's from my Menoikeus material:

The six manuscripts listed by Bailey as the most significant and "representing a careful copying" are:

• codex Borbonicus Neapolitanus gr. iii B. 29 (12th c) known as B
• codex Parisinus gr. 1759 (14th c. paper manuscript, publication date: 1075-1150) known as P
  • https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8470453h/f497.item (the letter begins four lines from the bottom of folio 243r)
• codex Parisinus gr. 1758 (14th or 15th c., publication date: 1401-1500) known as Q
  • https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b107231783/f203.item (letter starts 16 lines down on left folio on page number 148)
• codex Constantinopolitanus Veteris Serail. (14th or 15th c.) known as Co
• codex Laurentianus LXIX. 35 (14th c., date: 1101-1200) known as H
  • http://mss.bmlonline.it/Catalogo.aspx?Shelfmark=Plut.69.35
  • Plut.69.35 is listed in the online catalog as coming from the 12th century, so I am unsure if it is H or something else. However, it's inclusion in the Laurentian Library and its shelfmark 69.35 (i.e., LXIX. 35) leads me to believe it is. I'm not sure why Bailey gives it a date of 14th century.
• codex Vaticanus gr. 140 (14th c.) known as W
  • https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.140 (letter begins 13 lines down on right folio 177)

Quote from Cassius

insomnia

You mean "isonomia", right

"Autocorrect!" (shakes fist at the sky)

Quote from Peter Konstans

1. What might Epicurus have answered if he was asked what natural law necessitates the existence of the gods?
2. Why couldn't the atomic universe simply do without them?
3. Why couldn't they be fully mortal regardless of what the masses think?

1. There is no necessity. The universe does not depend on the existence of the gods. Epicurus posits that all peoples appear to have a conception of gods, and therefore gods appear to have some kind of existence. "Gods exist/There are gods" θεοὶ εἰσιν is a pretty basic statement with no flourishes. How they exist appears to have filled volumes.

2. The universe could exist without them. They serve no creative nor sustaining function for the universe.

3. The "common" knowledge of a god is that it is not mortal. Per Epicurus's definition (from looking at the common knowledge), gods are exactly that which is blessed and incorruptible. That's it. Those two characteristics define what a god is.

Quote from Peter Konstans

At any rate nobody can doubt that Epicurean theology was supposed to function as a medicine against harmful notions regarding the supernatural. The ancient Epicurean conception of the gods worked well as a remedy but only in the context of the ancient polytheistic society it was developed for. ... So I think we need to work out a new theological medicine specifically designed for an era in which the most popular harmful notions regarding the universe are based on monotheism or on nihilism. A profitable solution would be to adapt the most crucial aspects of Epicurean theology to a single God only. The result would be a sort of deism but somewhat different from the enlightenment-era deism of the American founding fathers.

I fully agree Epicurean theology was meant as a medicine, in fact, it's the first "medication" in the Tetrapharmakos. But I see no disparity in it being applied to polytheism or monotheism. The most important Epicurean theological idea is that we have nothing to fear from divinity, no matter how you conceptualize it. A god neither dishes out punishment nor bestows reward. Otherwise it wouldn't be blessed and incorruptible. From my perspective, that applies equally to Zeus, Jupiter, Odin, Ganesh, Yahweh, or any of the other varieties of god humans have come up with.

Quote from Cassius

And I would say that "avoids" = "acting to avoid" and acting is what they have to do to maintain their deathlessness.

Okay, I guess I'll have to give you the "action" inherent in the verb. Most every verb implies action. My contention then would be effortless action, like muscle memory or some other almost automatic action, like a well-trained practitioner of aikido or ballet but without the years of training required. That's my idea of aponia, by the way. And this is all IF we're talking about some anthropomorphic deity floating in space, which I'm not prepared to embrace wholeheartedly. Just sayin'.

Quote from Cassius

I'd say quite likely that's why we see the discussions of the gods having quasi-bodies, and speaking Greek, etc.

I'd agree with that. It's an attempt to make sense of it all IF we're looking for floating divine physical beings between world-systems.

Quote from Don

The shells were the predominate picture of the cosmos. If I remember, it's how Lucretius describes the cosmos/mundus.

Instead of just asserting that, let me give some Lucretian citations with commentary:

1.205: he (Epiurus) fared afar, beyond The flaming ramparts of the world (flammantia moenia mundi), until He wandered the unmeasurable All. To me the "flaming ramparts of the world" are exactly the outer shell of our cosmos/world-system described by other philosophers of the time. The outer shell - the outer wall/ramparts - are on fire. That's what makes the stars shine. 2:1144 also uses the "ramparts/walls of the world" moenia mundi

1.951 (the spear story):

On the nature of things : Lucretius Carus, Titus : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Book digitized by Google from the library of Harvard University and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.

archive.org

When Lucretius talks about throwing a spear into the void, he's talking about the universie as a Whole, not just the cosmos. The ALL goes on forever to infinity. Our cosmos is bounded. The spear would just keep going into the infinite universe.

I also find it interesting in relation to what's lost in translation sometimes. Lucretius uses both mundus and terra and these are both translated "world" but it seems to me that mundus = cosmos and terra = Earth/our planet within the mundus. Gotta dig into the Latin to see what's really being said.

Again, let me emphasize, I DO NOT believe or think or feel it necessary to think this is the way the universe IS. This idea of the nested cosmos is the ancient's best guess as to how the ALL is built. Now, if you want to go down the rabbit hole of the multiverse/many worlds (multi-ALL? multi-cosmoi?) theory of cosmology, that's probably a discussion for another thread. I do NOT think that Epicurus had some sort of idea or preconception or premonition of modern theoretical physics and its idea of the many-worlds theory. As much as we'd like to imagine Epicurus coming up with that 2,300 years ago, I think that's a bridge too far... even if it is amusing to think about it.

Quote from Cassius

1 - As inoculation against the idea that humans are alone in the universe, and that we therefore occupy some kind of special and supernatural focus of existence.

My take is that Epicurean philosophy posits other world-systems, and that's where the "humans are not alone in the universe" would come from.

Quote from Cassius

a slippery slide toward all sorts of mysticism

The slippery slide to mysticism and belief in the supernatural comes from a willingness to see the universe as not completely material or natural with no need of something "above nature" i.e., super-natural. The thinking of "This can't be all there is" is the beginning of the slippery slope.

Quote from Cassius

Contemplation of the nature of a truly blessed existence - one which even though "godlike" must act to sustain itself - is similar to Epicurus' views of reverence for men wiser than ourselves. It's an important aspect of our own drive to use our lives in the most pleasurable way, and not to settle for less than what we are capable of obtaining.

Again, I don't see the god as "acting to sustain itself." The god's existence should be effortless and pain free. Attributing effort to the god robs them of their

Letter to Menoikeus: "You, Menoikeus, believe everything about which a god is able (δυνάμενον) to preserve (φυλάττειν) its own imperishability and blessedness for itself. Do not attribute anything foreign to its incorruptibility or incongruous with the blessedness of the god!"
φυλάττειν (phylattein) "to guard, maintain, preserve, etc." or "to beware of, be on one's guard against, avoid a thing or person"
δυνάμενον (dynamenon) "being able, capable, strong enough to do, can; have the power to"

I take that φυλάττειν as implying that the god avoids anything that would change their incorruptible or blessed nature. The god avoids anything that would go against its nature.

Quote from TauPhi

How can anyone contemplate the nature of a truly blessed existence if no one knows what a truly blessed existence is? Again, it's an exercise in futility. It's nothing more than: I want a truly blessed existence to be like x and y because I feel good making x and y a truly blessed existence. Gods are not needed for us to establish how to live our lives. We can do it with experience and course correction.

This is exactly why I see Sedley's position on the god/divine so interesting. I think it's relatively easy to contemplate "a truly blessed existence" and that Epicurus spells it out: A mind free from trouble and an ease of use of the body without any effort or pain. That's it. From my understanding, that conception of "what could be" is the exact nature of blessedness, of being "makarion." Mortals can never achieve it completely, but we can contend with Zeus if we make the effort to remember what we *can* achieve in this fragile, mortal life. I would completely agree that "we can do it with experience and course correction" as we go about living our lives. The idea of a god floating in the intermundia with no world for it to stand on like some preserved specimen floating in a jar of formaldehyde holds no fascination for me. What does is the idea that I - a mortal human being - can imagine, can have a thought experiment about *my* idea of a blessed life - my "godlike" existence - and work toward that via "experience and course correction" and making choices based on those lived experiences and thinking about consequences.

The shells were the predominate picture of the cosmos. If I remember, it's how Lucretius describes the cosmos/mundus.

Quote from Don

Yep. I'd agree with that. There are other cosmoi out beyond our world-system taking up some of that infinite matter, then probably some matter floating around between world-systems.

I have to add that I do NOT think this is the way the universe is actually structured: with worlds enclosed in shells of stars in the firmament, with other shelled-world-systems elsewhere in an infinite universe.

It makes sense to me that we live in an infinite universe (bounded or unbounded remains to be seen) but I do NOT think we live inside nested spheres like the ancient Greeks.

Quote from Bryan

Would you agree that, although there is a finite about of matter and space in world-systems, there is an infinite amount of matter and space outside of (ie between) world-systems?

Yep. I'd agree with that. There are other cosmoi out beyond our world-system taking up some of that infinite matter, then probably some matter floating around between world-systems.

But, by definition, the intermundia/metakosmos doesn't have a world. If it did, it would be a cosmos/mundus.

Quote from Letter to Menoikeus

First, believe that the god is a blessed and imperishable thing (τὸν θεὸν ζῷον) as is the common, general understanding of the god. You, Menoikeus, believe everything about which a god is able to preserve its own imperishability and blessedness for itself. Do not attribute anything foreign to its incorruptibility or incongruous with the blessedness of the god! Gods exist, and the knowledge of them is manifest to the mind's eye.

τὸν θεὸν ζῷον "the god (is a) blessed and imperishable ζῷον. But what is a ζῷον?

First, note the singular "god." Not gods. This use of the singular - a god, the god - in the Menoikeus letter has led Long and Sedley offer that each individual creates their own god, their own image of the divine. I am still firmly rooted in this conceptual camp of the gods rather than imaging inter-cosmic beings hanging out somewhere in the universe. One reason: By definition, if they are inter-cosmic - literally between world-systems - there is nowhere for them to live! A cosmos is a world-system - ours has Earth at the center surrounded by the orb of the heavenly stars and wandering planets. There is no world in the metakosmos/intermundia - it is literally "between" worlds... No planet, no stars, no world.

But the word ζῷον (zoon) could very well be a clever use of an ordinary word by Epicurus.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ζῷον

Yes, it "typically" means living being, animal. It's where we get zoology from.

BUT... it also can mean "in art, figure, image, not necessarily of animals."

And that second definition is NOT a later application that Epicurus didn't know. Here are some examples from Herodotus (c.484–c.425 BCE, from LSJ; Epicurus lived 341–270 BCE) and others:

The Histories, 3.88: First he made and set up a carved stone, upon which was cut the figure of a horseman ( πρῶτον μέν νυν τύπον ποιησάμενος λίθινον ἔστησε: ζῷον δέ οἱ ἐνῆν ἀνὴρ ἱππεύς)

The Histories, 1.203: Here, it is said, are trees growing leaves that men crush and mix with water and use for painting figures on their clothing; these figures (ζῷα) cannot be washed out, but last as long as the wool, as if they had been woven into it from the first.

The Histories, 2.4: it was they (Egyptians) who first assigned to the several gods their altars and images and temples, and first carved figures (ζῷα) on stone.

The Histories, 2.124: [4] (for the road is nearly a mile long and twenty yards wide, and elevated at its highest to a height of sixteen yards, and it is all of stone polished and carved with figures (ζῴων))

The Histories, 2.148: Near the corner where the labyrinth ends stands a pyramid two hundred and forty feet high, on which great figures (ζῷα μεγάλα ) are cut.

The Histories, 4.88: Mandrocles took the first-fruits of these and had a picture (ζῷα) made with them, showing the whole bridge of the Bosporus

Plato, Republic, 515a: [515a] and shapes of animals (ζῷα) as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material..

Plutarch, Pericles, 13: And yet they say that once on a time when Agatharchus the painter (ζώγραφος "one who paints from life") was boasting loudly of the speed and ease with which he made his figures (ζῷα), Zeuxis heard him, and said, ‘Mine take, and last, a long time.’

So, why am I belaboring this point? I find these instances of ζῷα interesting precisely because of the letter to Menoikeus saying in 123 " πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη." Usually translated as "First, believe that god is a blissful, immortal being, as is commonly held. (Saint-Andre); the literal meaning of this line is something like: "Fundamentally/first, know that the god is incorruptible and blessed, as common knowledge of the god is ὑπεγράφη."

ὑπεγράφη "has been outlined, traced"
Epicurus is using the image of outlining or tracing an image to be filled in by another. Consider this like the image of letters indicated by a teacher by an outline or tracing for the student to then follow. So the idea that the gods are imperishable and blessed is, basically, how the gods are commonly understood to be -- that is the general indication of the nature of the gods.
Herodotus and the other citations above all have to do with etching on stone or outlining on fabric. That similarity with the common knowledge of the god being outlined or traced is too enticing not to explore the implications of for me.

First, discussions of the gods strike me as akin to "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" There's never going to be a right answer. However, I readily admit that Epicurus and the Epicurean school placed profound and primary importance on a right understanding of the gods and our relationship to them. It's first in the letter to Menoikeus, first in Principal Doctrines, first in the Tetrapharmakos, hinted at in Book 1 (1.44-9) of Lucretius and mentioned in several places thereafter.

But what is that profound and primary importance. From my perspective:

1. The gods did not create nor do they sustain the universe as a whole or our cosmos (world-system).
2. The gods take no notice of our existence.
3. We have no reason to fear their wrath nor to expect any favors from them.
4. The gods are "μακάριον (makarion)" and "ἄφθαρτον (aphtharton)"
   1. μακάριον = "blessed, fortunate, wealthy, 'well-off.'" Possibly having something to do with being wealthy, either literally or figuratively.
   2. ἄφθαρτον = ἄ + φθαρτον = α- "not" + φθαρτον "destructible, perishable."
   3. There are numerous places where mortals are called μακάριον. We can be "blessed" but can we be ἄφθαρτον. I would say, in some ways, yes. If we understand the nature of pleasure, we edge over so slightly closer to being ἄφθαρτον. We're mortal and will always BE mortal. And so we can never BE a god, but if we "meditate on these things" that ingrain in us a visceral understanding of pleasure, the stimulative and the calm pleasures, we can find pleasure in unexpected places within ourselves.
5. The gods lead an effortless life, free from all exertion and pain and troubles, totally imbued with pleasure.
   1. That's why I disagree with Cassius 's assertion that "the gods require some form of activity to maintain their deathlessness would likely be a significant part of Epicurean theology." I think that is diametrically opposed to Epicurean "theology." The whole point of being a god is to live in blissful pleasure constantly with no intrusion of pain, want, trouble, exertion, etc.

All that said, I'm still not sold on the idea that Epicurus insisted that the gods exist as "animals." I'm going to address that in the next post to make it easier for everyone to react to the above statements. And I'm sure there will be reactions.

Quote from Peter Konstans

Since the universe can't have just 'popped up' as the late Hawkings believed we must assume that it actually has divine roots.

Quote from Peter Konstans

They could represent a sort of spiritual or contemplative activity by the gods with the purpose of imitating the platonic One, the theoretical ineffable principle of reality, inaccessible even to the gods.

Quote from Peter Konstans

receive some of their divine essence, it can be assumed that the gods contemplate the One and that this contemplation results in a burst of creative energy that perpetually generates finite universes.

Hmmm...I would't think any of that is Epicurean, either classical or modern. Are you getting those ideas from specific textual references?

Just a note on 'apiqoros coming from Epicurean and not Epicurus, remember that the ancient Greek for "Epicurean" is Ἐπικούρειος (Epikoureios) so both Epicurean and Epicurus end in sigma (ς "s") in Greek. So it seems to me both are viable options although the group name does seem to make more sense.

Just saw this thread listed in "Research Projects" and finally downloaded "A Diachronic Study of the 3Apiqoros in Rabbinic Literature" by Jenny R. Labendz. Here are some excerpts and notes (Quotes are from Labendz paper unless otherwise noted):

"Tannaim were the rabbinic sages whose views are recorded in the Mishnah, from approximately 10–220 CE. The period of the Tannaim, also referred to as the Mishnaic period, lasted about 210 years." - Wikipeda (Tannaim)

The paper continues that, although the origin of the name 'apiqoros definitely originally referred to Epicureans, by the 4th century CE the Greek philosophical schools (Stoicism, Epicureanism, Scepticism) had "basically disappeared." The amoraim (Jewish scholars of 200-500 CE) primarily in Babylonia and Israel, probably never encountered actual Epicureans. "..these Rabbis were not bound to maintain that 'apiqoros meant Epicurean, even if they understood the historical and philosophical meaning of that term. It was obvious to them... that an 'apiqoros was something decidely negative, but in the absence of real Epicureans, they could, and did, give free reign to their imaginations to construct new definitions."

"Modern philologists are generally in agreement that the word 'apiqoros is a Hebrew transliteration of the Greek word for either Epicurus or Epicurean." It appears that the consensus is that the generic word Epicurean was the one adapted into Hebrew.

"Epicureans flourished in Palestine...and they missionized ardently." The author cites DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, 3, and Howard Jones, The Epicurean Tradition (Routledge, 1989), 64, for this information. "Since the Epicureans missionized vigorously, the Rabbis may have encountered them somewhat regularly, and might have been able to read or at least hear the epitomes that encapsulated Epicurean philosophy and theology." The author cites Saul Lieberman's Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (1962) in several places:

Hellenism in Jewish Palestine : Lieberman, Saul, 1898-1983 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

231 pages

archive.org

However, the consensus seems to be that since the tannaim literature doesn't employ any Greek philosophical terms "the Rabbi's knowledge of Greek philosophy was limited." ...

Even with this basic knowledge, the Rabbis knew enough to consider the Epicureans "heretical, such as the Epicurean denial of divine providence."

The author notes that this mishnah presumes the reader knows who/what an Epicurean is... later amoraim who inherit the term have to "reconstruct its meaning."

The author posits that the Rabbis encountered the Epicureans would most likely have debated them. The intellectual Rabbis were likely targets for Epicurean missionizing and for the pamphlets the Epicureans distributed. So, the Rabbis goals was to know how to counter these basic Epicurean arguments.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1 (excerpt)

Again, it is assumed that the reader will know who/what an Epicurean is, and this person is someone with whom the student will interact. "Here, the student is being warned against the consequence of actually being an Epicurean himself. This may be what motivates Judah Goldin's assertion that 'apiqoros refers specifically to a Jewish Epicurean." (Goldin, Studies in Midrash and Related Literature (New York: The Jewish Publication Society, 1988, 62).

"Several things can be learned from this mishnah about the tannaitic conception of the Epicurean. First...God is the one who punishes the Epicurean. The problematic nature of being an Epicurean is the theoretical or intellectual rather than practical ... the Epicurean, who denies divine reward and punishment, and is thereby excluded from divine reward in the world to come." The mishnah goes on to say that the Epicureans "says there is no way to learn resurrection of the dead...that the Torah is not from Heaven." These are "essential religious truths" according to the Rabbis. So the "salient charateristics of Epicureanism" were the "outright denial of providence" and not their missionary efforts or some metaphysical, philosophical theories.

Tosefta Sanhedrin 13:5 lists a whole list of ne'er-do-wells condemned by the Rabbis: sectarians, apostates, informers, Epicureans, those who have denied the Torah, those who separate from the ways of the community, and those who have denied the resurrection of the dead. "Based on the tannaitic familiarity with Epicureanism discussed above... it is plausible that the Rabbis' disdain towards Epicureanism encompassed more than the single heresy of denial of divine providence."

The author states that "we may characterize the early Rabbis' understanding and use of the term. An 'apiqoros was a member of the missionizing Epicurean school of philosophy which, among other heresies or impieties, denied divine providence. ... Not much later, Rabbis were less sure of the meaning of the word 'apiqoros."

That gets us up to pp. 175-184. The remainder of the paper traces the use of the word in other texts, but also shows that the writers were less and less aware of what an acutal Epicurean was and rather more able to foist whatever heresies they wanted onto the term 'apiqoros including disrespect for the Torah or simple irreverence. But there is no denying the term originally referred to our philosophical forebears.