Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

Satisfaction of desires isn't sufficient there either because you still have to ask "what desires?"

To my mind, from an Epicurean perspective, it's not satisfaction of "specific" desires but more being satisfied - taking pleasure - in what is currently available... while at the same time being open to luxuries when they become available. It's the "maza and spring water" (barley bread/meal and water) in the Letter to Menoikeus. It's taking pleasure and satisfaction in the day to day things, not scraping, striving, fighting, etc after "empty" desires like unlimited fame, unlimited wealth.

Quote from Bryan

"Happiness" is not incorrect

Well put! It brings to mind people saying "You're not wrong, but..." Thanks.

Here's the Liddell & Scott definition of eudaimonia:

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…4.0057:entry=eu)daimoni/a

A translation of Herodotus uses "prosperity" for eudaimonia in one place, but "happiness" is used in the translation of the story of Croesus (same word, two different translations):

Thus Solon granted second place in happiness (εὐδαιμονίης) to these men. Croesus was vexed and said, “My Athenian guest, do you so much despise our happiness (εὐδαιμονίη) that you do not even make us worth as much as common men?”

A translation of Thucydides uses "wealth" for eudaimonia:

[5] For of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was, for revenue of money and other wealth (καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ), the mightiest; though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the same be far short of the Scythians.

So, there is a dimension of satisfaction, prosperity, being well off, having a sense of satisfaction, that isn't encompassed in "happiness." As Bryan says, "happiness isn't wrong..."

Quote from Cassius

In our discussions we aren't targeting writing a Greek dictionary, we're targeting the practical concept of "happiness," which "everyone agrees" is the goal of life.

I haven't thoroughly read all the thread (looks like a good discussion), but here's my first reaction to that statement. Fully agree we aren't writing a Greek dictionary, but...

We are obligated to know what we're talking about. I would hazard that the average person thinks of "happiness" or "being happy" as a - as we've been saying - a titillation of the mind, a pleasant stimulation of the senses. If you ask someone if they're happy, I would guess that they're going to be befuddled if they're just walking down the street and get asked. "I guess so. I'm doing okay."

The fact that ευδαιμονια is the word being referred to, it behooves us to know what is meant by that word. That's my big beef in just accepting that "it means 'happiness' and going on with the discussion (not just here but all over the internet, books, etc.). It's just taken for granted that eudaimonia = happiness, now let's use happiness. Which brings me to the Declaration of Independence's "pursuit of happiness."

I went and looked up in Samuel Johnson's 1768 edition of his dictionary and looked up "happiness"

A dictionary of the English language. Abstracted from the folio ed., by the author. To which is prefixed, an English grammar. To this ed. are added, a history of the English language [&c.].

books.google.com

Would people nowadays equate "happiness" with "state in which the desires are satisfied"? I think most people think of happiness as being more smiling people at a dinner party, having lively conversation. "I'm so happy!"

Which brings me back to my unending soapbox blathering that I think "well-being" is a much better translation of eudamonia than "happiness." "Well-being" gets at that satisfaction aspect that I think happiness misses (maybe it's a part of it but it doesn't square up well) and that I think eudaimonia actually encompasses. One feels lucky, satisfied, living a fortuitous existence... I know we don't think much of "fortune" or "luck" but from an everperson-off-the-street stance, I continue to picket for "well-being" being the better translation of that word to which Epicurus and the Greek philosophers were pointing.

(Steps down off soap box and goes back to reading thread...)

People, were talking the late 1700s here. Grammar is not what it used to be.

The whole idea with that phrase was that the Constitution would be "closer to being finished, more complete, more fully formed" than the wonky, loosey-goosey Articles of Confederation.

The Constitution, in the eyes of the Framers, made the United States of America closer to a real country rather than a conglomeration of individual states (ie, their own countries).

Quote from Wikipedia

To form a more perfect Union
The phrase "to form a more perfect Union" has been construed as referring to the shift to the Constitution from the Articles of Confederation. The contemporaneous meaning of the word "perfect" was complete, finished, fully informed, confident, or certain. The phrase has been interpreted in various ways throughout history based on the context of the times. For example, shortly after the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court said that the "Union" was made "more perfect" by the creation of a federal government with enough power to act directly upon citizens, rather than a government with narrowly limited power that could act on citizens only indirectly through the states, e.g., by imposing taxes. Also, the institution was created as a government over the States and people, not an agreement (union) between the States.

Quote

The riddle is better suited to oral than to written exposition,' and indeed Epicurus' description of it in our passage implies that he has recently witnessed its use in debate, perhaps in a direct confrontation between Epicureans and Megarians. Such a clash must almost certainly have occurred in Athens. ... The correct. Epicurean retort to the sophist must be to say, 'You have asked me a question about actions, and a purely verbal argument can never answer it satisfactorily. The only proof- that I will accept is an empirical one (επιλογισμος). Only when I see how one can lead one's life well according to the principle that it is possible to know and not know the same thing will I believe that the princ'ple is true '.

... Epicurus then sums up the error of the sophist's victim as failure to work out by (επιλογισμος) (ουχ επελελογιστο , 10 sup.) that in normal circumstances it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and that the sophist has merely played upon an exception to this rule.

FYI

Epicurus, On nature, book 28

Epicurus, On nature, book 28

www.academia.edu

These kinds of "paradoxes" seem so disingenuous to me. They seem to just play on the ambiguity of language to *appear* to make some kind of deep point. The Covered Father seems to me to simply be using the different meanings of the word "know." Of course, IF the person under the cloth was uncovered, the son would know the father. But how is someone supposed to know a hidden or secret fact before it is "uncovered." Okay, so maybe we (or the ancient Greeks) should have different words for "know"... and we do... and so did they! We have

appreciate
experience
learn
notice
perceive
realize
recognize
see

as synonyms with other shades of meaning to "know." When I read The Covered Father in Book 28, I found it silly, and it appears to me the Epicurus had the same reaction: "everybody can easily laugh when somebody gets another to assert that it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and then cites the riddle of the Covered Father,".

That hypothetical "Don" character sounds like one sharp cookie

Quote from Cassius

even be compared to eel

Oh, I loves me some eel. I've never had it other than as sushi (grilled unagi), but I order it regularly when we get sushi. Sooo good.

Yes, Very different. But that can be a contentious matter.

Learning modern Greek isn't a bad idea as a start. Just realize that the grammar and even meanings of words won't translate (no pun intended) into understanding ancient Greek.

Here's another translation of that Seneca quote, starting a lttle earlier in the letter (LXVI.8-9 )

"Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect."

Seneca is saying that a virtue is limitless, it is infinite in that nothing can be added to it *because* it has no limits. If something could be added, it wouldn't be infinite. It seems to me it's the "adding" part that is important. Epicurus comes along and says pleasure has a limit (the removal of all pain) but, by definition, once all pain is removed and pleasure is complete, no more pleasure can be added. Therefore, as Senea says "the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight,..." Epicurus answers that by saying pleasure cannot rise to greater heights than the absence of all pain, therefore, pleasure cannot be added to once it has replaced all pain.

To me, VS33 speaks to this "perfection" of the gods, using Zeus as the stand-in for the divine nature. To me, VS33 doesn't speak to the perpetuity of feeling not hungry, not thirsty, not shivering in the cold; BUT if you have experienced the state of being satisfied - not being hungry, thirsty, or shivering in the cold - you have competed with Zeus for well-being.

VS 33. The body yells out not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not shuddering in the cold; for anyone who has these things and who has confidence in continuing to have them in the future, they may compete with Zeus for well-being. (my own translation)

σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν [hope or expect to have] κἂν <διὶ [dative of Zeus]> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. [contend/compete]

φωνή f (genitive φωνῆς); first declension

• sound
• Usually of the human voice: voice, cry, yell
• The voice or cry of animals
• Any articulate sound (especially vowels)
• speech, discourse; language

εὐδαιμονίας - eudaimonias "well-being" (usually rendered "happiness" but I don't like that )

μάχομαι

• (with dative) I make war, fight, battle
• I quarrel, wrangle, dispute
• I contend, compete

μαχέσαιτο appears to me to be "The POTENTIAL OPTATIVE expresses the opinion of the speaker about the possibility or likelihood of an action"

Here's Luke Ranieri's Introduction to the Greek Alphabet using reconstructed Ancient Greek pronunciation all in Ancient Greek (part of the Ancient Greek in Action series of videos). This is in his Lucian pronunciation of around the 1st c. CE (based on how Lucian of Samosata would have *maybe* pronounced his Greek). Watch till the end to hear Ranieri sing an Alphabet Song in Ancient Greek

Erasmian pronunciation is the default for many books teaching Ancient Greek; however, there are better methods now (i.e., more closely approximating Ancient Greek pronunciation). Erasmian - developed originally by Erasmus of Rotterdam - is an academic mishmash of convenient pronunciations in one's native language: English "Erasmian" is different from French "Erasmian" from German "Erasmian." It doesn't really try to approximate ancient Greek pronunciation nor does it attempt to be. The vowels especially are a mess, to my understanding. Long and short vowels are supposed to be distinguished by actual time or length of pronunciation, not different sounds. For example, eta Η η is held longer (let's say twice as long) than epsilon E ε. Short alpha Αα is held half as long as long alpha, and so on. All that's not to say Erasmian isn't alright to start with! But approximating the ancient pronuncation, to me, is just so much cooler LOL

Here's one from the JACT Summer School, JACT is the publisher of the Reading Greek series of books:

Quote from Cassius

Even if someone decides that the disagree so firmly with a key Epicurean tenet that they just can't see calling themselves an Epicurean

I don't *think* this is directed at me, but I'm going to use that as a jumping off point anyway to expand on my comments about the swerve on the public thread. I stand by my assertion (my dogmatic assertion) that there is no such thing as "the swerve" because atoms don't act like Democritus and Epicurus thought they did. The Standard Model doesn't leave a place for "the swerve" although, like I said, a rough analogy can be made to overlay it on indeterminacy at the quantum level... but the overlay certainly doesn't fit well.

However, I also do not see the swerve as a "key Epicurean tenet." It's barely mentioned in the extant texts. There's Lucretius and Cicero, and I don't think Cicero relates the swerve to free will, just the impossibility of uncaused action on the part of atoms.

Quote from Cambridge

"Lucretius presents the most extended consideration we have by an Epicurean of the swerve and freedom (DRN II 251–93). It comes immediately after his argument that the swerve must exist in order for atoms to collide. Atoms naturally fall straight downwards, and they also move because of collisions and entanglements with other atoms. However, there is a third cause of atomic motion, a random swerve to the side by one spatial minimum, which saves us from what Lucretius calls the “decrees of fate”. "

However, if we want to explore "how" the swerve functions within the system of Epicurean philosophy: Lucretius talks about the swerve at the atomic level, but then goes into talking about horses at the starting gate of a race. This excerpt from Lucretius doesn't satisfy me:

Quote

But that man's mind itself in all it does
Hath not a fixed necessity within,
Nor is not, like a conquered thing, compelled
To bear and suffer,- this state comes to man
From that slight swervement of the elements
In no fixed line of space, in no fixed time.

A random swervement seems unlikely to lead to the ability of a "man's mind" to make a choice. If the description here is correct, our choices are random - which seems to me to possibly be worse than determined. If choices are random like the swerve, how could one be held responsible? How could praise and blame be attached to them? We would have no more control over them than random coin flips or rolls of the dice. **Maybe** by analogy.... atoms can swerve "on their own", humans can make choices "on their own"... but I don't see how the random swerve can be the mechanism of free choices.

Quote from Cassius

Incremental advances in "scientific" textbooks do not upend basic philosophical conclusions about the nature of life and death, and yet I agree that Epicurus would be the first to accept and incorporate new discoveries.

I fully agree. My contention is that those "basic philosophical conclusions" that make up Epicurean philosophy include (but aren't limited to):

• The universe is material in nature, made of particles and space.
• There are no gods to provide benefit or punishment. We're on our own.
• Pleasure is the "thing" to which all other "things" point.. The endpoint of all actions if asking "Why do you do that?" is pleasure.
• Things like virtue, honor, knowledge, etc. are instrumental ways to achieve pleasure but they aren't the endpoint.
• We live finite lives. Wishing for eternal living wishes one's life away. Live in the here and now, plan for the future but don't be constrained by it, remember pleasant memories of the past, work to make pleasant memories in the future. This life is all we have.
  • We don't exist. We exist. We exist no longer. No reason to fret.

BUT... when it comes to making pronouncements about atoms and physics, we leave the specific details in the past and work with what we have now. Talk of "atoms and void" is certainly acceptable shorthand for a material universe. But if we insist on atoms falling "straight down" and randomly swerving the minutest distance, we will fail to translate Epicurus's core true meaning into a modern vernacular. We cannot be constrained to interpret the philosophy as if we are living in a world 2,300 years old or even 1,900 years old. My contention is that we do Epicurus's insight and foresight and genius a disservice if we do that. I truly believe his philsophy is evergreen and THE most applicable to a modern world, in contrast to the Stoics and their Logos (conveniently left out by modern followers of that philsophy). I think we can re-interpret and update some of Epicurus's terminology and physics and understanding of "how things work" without losing any of the vitality and applicability of his philosophy.

Quote from Cassius

If We Agree For The Sake of Argument That "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good," then let's ask "What *Should* We Consider To Be The Proper Relationship Between The Perfect And The Good?"

I'm sorry to be pedantic, but - same as the other thread - I think that's an improper way of thinking about the question. The aphorism is indeed "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good." However, a better way to think of this is "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good Enough." I don't think this saying has anything to say about The Good (telos, tagathon) in the philosophical sense. From my perspective, it has to do with procrastinating in action until a "perfect" solution or course of action or choice can be devised. To me, it says we can't wait around for the "perfect" but should take action where a "good enough" course can be charted. There's time to revise, regroup, rethink later. Get on with it! It's better to have a working solution than to wait until all the planets align and a perfect course is laid. There is no such as perfection in our human world. Don't waste time waiting around for it.

Quote from Cassius

Given The Stress That Many Greek Philosophers' Placed On "Virtue" or a perfect view of "The Good" As The Ultimate Goal, To What Extent Would An Epicurus Have Considered That Approach An "Unnatural and Unnecessary Desire?"

From my perspective, you're asking the question incorrectly.

The Good (τἀγαθόν tagathon lit. The Good), using Aristotle's definition from Nicomachean Ethics - and the one I have no doubt to which Epicurus was responding - is "the Good is That at which all things aim.”

If you are not aiming at pleasure - since that is "That at which all things aim" - you're going about life all wrong. If you're aiming at "virtue" as your telos, your ultimate goal, you're missing the mark. I don't think he would have called aiming at virtue an "unnatural and unnecessary desire." I think he would have called it an empty belief. If you believe you should be living for virtue, you are under an erroneous empty belief. You're aiming for the instrument and not the goal. Virtues are steps on the ladder, at the top of which is pleasure. If you're only looking at the steps, you never get to the top of the ladder. The "desire" to see virtue as "The Good" is simply based on a mistaken belief.

Quote from Onenski

The capacity, for example, for self control can be explained as the outcome of your personal history under certain circumstances, I invite you to read Walter Mischel's "The Marshmallow Test"

Thanks! Book is on reserve.

Would you correct l characterize Mischel as deterministic or doesn't that label fit his presentation?

My opinion is that we have to acknowledge that there is no such thing as "the swerve."

It was an innovative thought experiment by Epicurus (and Lucretius who mentions it) given the atomic parameters he was working with at the time. Yes, it has parallels or we can overlay the *basic* idea onto modern quantum physics, but the overlay doesn't fit perfectly because it wasn't designed to! But atoms do not move like Epicurus and Democritus thought/said they did. Quantum particles do not move like that. Plus, Epicurus could very well have thought that atomic motions could engender free will because everything was atomic movement, including sensations. And, yes, we know that chemical and biological processes are at the heart of sensation, but they're NOT like Epicurus proposed them. We don't intercept atoms from outside us into channels in our ψυχη (psyche) leading to memories and thoughts. Again, we can make analogies and see Epicurus's atomic movements and swerves as precursors or metaphors of how actually "the way things are." But we are not constrained by Epicurus's physics! Science has come a long way in the last 2300 years, and using outdated terms and ideas to argue for free will is not going to get us anywhere in the year 2024 CE. We need to work with the material world at hand as it is currently understood. That's why I find Mitchell intriguing... and no I haven't had a chance to read any of his stuff in the last couple hours. This is just a visceral reaction to our continuing to talk about whether the swerve leads to free will. Unfortunately, I find it similar to discussing whether God has anything to do with our free will. That's it for me right now.

Epicurus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I'm some ways, Epicurus's position on choice and free will and determinism is δογματικός (dogmatikos), not being afraid to declare a position.

In light of Sapolsky and Dennett and the rest, a big part of me wants more than to simply declare a position. That's why Mitchell is intriguing to me. I'm planning on exploring his stuff before weighing back in (too much, that is).