Posts by Don

I would agree with Cassius that the prolepseis have to be (to be part of the Canon) pre-rational and provide "building materials" (best phrase I can do right now) for concepts but not concepts themselves. Prolepsis, it seems to me, is a faculty of the mind like sight is for the eyes, taste is for the tongue, hearing is for the ears, etc... Yes, we know they all flow into the brain now, but Epicurus didn't seem to divide up the senses that way.

I've entertained on this forum that the prolepsis of the gods is our innate faculty to feel awe. This also seems at least *partially* substantiated by the use of σέβομαι "to feel awe or fear before a god". For example:

Post

RE: "A Socio-Psychological and Semiotic Analysis of Epicurus' Portrait" by Bernard Frischer

[…]

It seems the practices of wearing rings or displaying portrait busts or having cups with Epicurus's picture on them is a physical manifestation of both Seneca's quote "Do all things as if Epicurus were watching" and VS32 Honoring a sage is itself a great good to the one who honors. τοῦ σοφοῦ σεβασμὸς ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί.

σεβασμὸς in modern Greek just means "respect" however, in ancient Greek it was broader: "to be moved by awe, fear, or respect for others or for their…

Don

January 23, 2023 at 11:58 AM

and

Post

RE: Philodemus On Piety

The following are excerpts and notes from columns 27-36 of Obbink's Philodemus On Piety which outline the participation of Epicurus himself and the early Epicureans in religious festivals and other rites and practices. Obbink also shared more detailed notes in his book, so I may try and share some of those pages in later posts. For now, the material below has proved quite interesting...

Quoted in col. 27, On Piety: Epicurus, On Gods (Περί θεών): as being both the greatest thing and that…

Don

December 25, 2020 at 10:05 PM

Of course, that "faculty" of a prolepsis doesn't help as much when deciding Epicurus's "blessed and incorruptible" vs the mistaken notions specifically the hoi polloi had (LOL... I just like calling them that to keep the original.. better than "the many" or "the crowds".. I'm assuming the Romans would have used "the mob.").

As for the letter to Menoikeus, I think 124 has to be read in the full context, along with 123:

Quote

The gods do not exist in the way that the 'hoi polloi' believe them to, because they do not perceive what maintains the gods. One is not impious who does not take up the gods of the hoi polloi; but the one who attributes the beliefs of the hoi polloi to the gods.For what they believe are not prolepses but rather the judgements of the hoi polloi concerning the gods which are false, hasty assumptions. So, they believe the greatest evils are brought to the wicked from the gods as well as the greatest aid to the good, because the hoi polloi are believing that the gods accept those who resemble themselves who are similar through all excellences and goodness; all those not of their sort are strange and alien.

So, the hoi polloi's first big mistake is that "they don't perceive what maintains the gods." Plus. their fundamental "false, hasty assumptions" are that the gods bestow favors and punishments. The "gods of the hoi polloi" are the ones that demand sacrifice to keep them on your good side. There's every reason to reject those "gods" because all that is assigning false attributes to the gods, like jealousy, anger, beneficence (to humans), etc. All that has nothing to do with Epicurus's inborn faculty of perceiving the gods' nature. It seems to me that the ONLY things Epicurus is willing to assign to the gods, per Menoikeus's letter, are that they are "blessed" (makarios) and they are "uncorrupted, not liable to corruption or decay, imperishable" (aphthartos).

Welcome, Remus! Salve & χαίρε !

FYI

The Birth of Venus - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I didn't even look at the context before I posted this link. Maybe as an Epicurean image, but not as a background.

Quote from Twentier

Do we have a picture of Fragment 551?

Not to the best of my knowledge. It would just be contained in Plutarch or that letter anyway... Not in an Epicurean source.

FYI

Tertullian : Adversus Marcionem

and

Marcion and His Critics (for Oxford Handbook on Early Christian Biblical Interpretation, eds. Blowers and Martens)

Marcion and His Critics (for Oxford Handbook on Early Christian Biblical Interpretation, eds. Blowers and Martens)

www.academia.edu

These scenarios remind me of the Buddhist saying:

If I were to accidentally fall to my death from a great height, it would be a shame to miss the view on the way down.

That seems very Epicurean to me.

My comment on the article...

Quote from Cassius

This statement helps clarify the difference in perspective, because i do not see this as a "discovery" at all

Okay, I think I'll agree that "discovery" is maybe not the right word to use in this case. His "discovery" is definitely a reaction against his contemporary philosophical schools' position on that "neutral state." Maybe assertion? Epicurus asserted that "You're all wrong. There is no 'neutral' state. If you all are going to say there's pleasure, there's pain, and there's some 'neutral' state between them, I'm not okay with that. When we're alive, we feel pleasure and we feel pain. Period." So, that's why he was constrained in the terms he could use within the philosophical discussions taking place at the time. He could have used different words, but his rivals would just then say "Epicurus is just renaming the neutral state." He had to make a hard break with the rival schools and decided to use the words they used to beat them at their own game, so to speak.

Quote from Cassius

Now that one I doubt we'll be able to bridge very easily, because I cannot see Epicurus holding a "virtue" (such as wisdom) to be "what society feels is the excellent/noble thing to do." I would think that Epicurus would have deferred to "society" in defining the attributes of "virtue" exactly as much as he deferred to "society" in defining the attributes of a "god."

I was just trying to go back to the meaning of virtue/arete/virtus of "something that shows/exhibits excellence of character; a person or thing's 'full realization of potential or inherent function'." That "society" inclusion was a clumsy way of putting it. The arete of a knife is if it cuts well. The arete of a human is... well, I guess, fill in the blank depending on the situation?

Quote from Cassius

But yes regardless of where we end up this discussion is extremely helpful toward bringing clarity to the questions!

Quote from Little Rocker

you and Don have a history

This made me chuckle... I don't know whether I'd phrase it in quite that same way, but point taken I went back and looked, and our "history" goes all the way back to 2020 (and back when I was using a nom de plume... or de guerre, as the case might be )!

Quote from Cassius

(respectfully!)

Fully agree we need keep this difference of opinion/perspective respectful and civil!

I agree with both Little Rocker and Cassius that using terms like "psychological hedonism" don't advance the conversation in a meaningful way, and the phrase wouldn't be a useful explanation to the general reader or someone curiously coming across Epicurean philosophy. That said, I stand by my conviction outlined in post #28 above: Humans are "psychological hedonists" and one of Epicurus's significant "discoveries" was to point this out and try to harness this tendency to allow us to live more pleasurable lives.

Quote from Cassius

Looking at things in a conceptually rigorous way, "IF a life of debauchery did in fact bring a pleasurable life" means that for purposes of discussion we are accepting that result -- and thus we would have no problem with such a person.

IF! This is all a re-hash of my position back in 2020, for the most part. The key word there is "IF". IF x, then y. IF it was the case...*then* we would have no problem. And, yes, IF it was the case the things that produce the delights of the life of "one having no hope of safety, in desperate case; one who is, in a moral sense, abandoned; profligate" did what? If those things "washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires" *then* we'd have no problem with them. But those *things* don't wash away the fears. They're pleasurable activities, and Epicurus never denies that. But those things alone won't get us down the road to dispelling fears. It seems to me he's saying you have get the fears dispelled first... then you can enjoy various "delights" unencumbered by those fears.

PD10-12 has to be read in the context of the Letter to Menoikeus (my translation):

Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the goal (τέλος)," we do NOT say the pleasure of those who are prodigal* and those stuck in delighting in pleasures arising from circumstances outside of ourselves like:

• those who are ignorant
• those who don't agree with us, or
• those who believe wrongly;

but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. [132] For it is NOT an endless string of drinking parties and festivals, and NOT taking advantage of slaves and women, nor does an extravagant table of fish and other things bring forth a sweet life but self-controlled reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble. (emphasis added)

*ἄσωτος This is the same exact word in the Greek that is used in PD10.

That section of the letter, to me, clearly states "we do NOT say the pleasure of those who are profligate" when we say "pleasure is the goal (τέλος)." There's no equivocation and no hypothetically-speaking. οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς = not the pleasure of the profligate.

Quote from Cassius

whether he is primarily making practical points or clinical points. Is he giving personal advice about pleasure and how to pursue it moment by moment, or is he giving philosophical advice about how Plato et al are wrong, so that by examining the words that people are using we can make the differences between the schools clear. Or is he (more likely) working on both goals, since the statements he is making can be seen as true on both levels.

From my perspective, Epicurus does both but in different writings and in different contexts. Principal Doctrines was meant to give an overview of the philosophy and advice on how to apply and understand the philosophy, I'm assuming, primarily for students of the Epicurean school and as a quick primer for those curious about the school. Same for the letters: hit the high points and provide instruction on how to apply the philosophy to struggling students. I don't necessarily think he needs to be working on both goals in every piece of writing.

Quote from Cassius

It seems to me that this is the only realistic way to account for the "flatness" of Epicurus' choice to categorize all the many shades of feelings (which Cicero and everyone else in the world recognizes as different from each other) into only one of two categories, pleasure or pain.

It took me a minute to understand what you meant by "flatness" but I get it: You're referring to the "flat" hierarchy of two feelings: pleasure/pain. There's only two branches of the tree. I would rather characterize it as an expansive inclusion within those two feelings. This still makes sense the more I think about it: When you're alive, you're either feeling pleasure or pain, because you're always feeling *something*... If you didn't you'd be dead. It may be subtle, it may be sharp, it may be intense... but you're always feeling something. There are innumerable "feelings" and emotions within those two categories, but every sensation is either pleasurable or painful. That seems to be a very insightful discovery, and seems to be born out by current psychological affective research... but we're not going down that road

Finally, I don't think Epicurus is necessarily redefining "virtue". It seems to me that "virtue" to Epicurus still means generally "to do what society feels is the excellent/noble thing to do" but for Epicurus we do it because it brings us pleasure, both as the feeling and leading to a more pleasurable life (i.e., PD05) Virtue has no intrinsic value *other than* to serve as an instrument leading to pleasure. And now pleasure is widely defined!

Cassius : I know you feel strongly about these points you're making, and I can respect that passion. I don't expect to "change your mind." But, I'll admit, after reading my thread from 2020, I seem to be a little pig-headed (Epicurean pun firmly intended) in the opinion I hold.

In light of the text that there were no individual PDs in the original, I think PD10, 11, and 12 need to be read as a unit. Both 10 and 11 start out "if .." 12 then talks about the impossibility of getting rid of the fears discussed in 10 and 11.

Lunchtime over... Back to work.

Quote from Cassius

That's why I see the "logical extreme" interpretation of PD10 as so important -- I see Epicurus as saying that "IF we look at things his way," then a "pleasurable life" is a "pleasurable life" no matter what type of pleasure it contains, because we are using the term pleasure in a logically consistent way. From that perspective PD10 is an in-your-face assertion that pleasure is pleasure is pleasure.

I'll have to dig back in, but I don't think the language supports that interpretation, especially in light of the letter to Menoikeus. It seems to me he's giving practical advice in PD10, not necessarily making a grand philosophical point. I see this as directly countering the Cyrenaic position.

But I'll need to revisit this tonight after work.

Okay, I think I follow you.

I'm using "psychological hedonism" as an expedient shorthand for "pleasure is the guide, goal, and end of all our actions."

From my perspective...

People are dutiful, because it ultimately brings them pleasure.

People are pious because it ultimately brings them pleasure.

Continually asking "Why do you do that?" will, if the person is honest, ultimately result in the answer "Because it makes me feel good." Otherwise, I believe people are fooling themselves... Sometimes quite effectively and thoroughly, but fooling themselves nonetheless.

Quote from Cassius

Yes this whole sidebar discussion may be more confusing and awkward than it is worth.

On the contrary, I think it's right on point.

Quote from Cassius

We can discuss "duty" or "piety" in terms of the pleasure they bring all day long, but in the end what we're trying to accomplish is to decide if "duty" or "piety" are in themselves pleasurable, or whether they or anything else is worth pursuing only because they bring pleasure as a result of pursuing them.

I think this strikes right at the heart of why Epicurean and not Stoic philosophy. I don't think anything is inherently pleasurable in and of itself. That strikes me as almost Platonic. Pleasure and Pain are subjective feelings. Pain less so (eg., hand on a hot stove) but still its in the mix. "Duty" and "piety" are instrumental to a pleasurable life, see PD05 et al. They are worth pursuing ONLY because they bring pleasure. Someone may say they're doing it because of "duty" but my contention will continue to be that they're doing because it feels good to say "I did my duty."

Quote from Cassius

Would that not be better worded with some kind of caveat that "we need to be cautious in making choices based on evolutionary considerations..." rather than "we don't...." because:

- in fact many people often "do" make choices that way, even though it "may" be shortsighted.... and

I'm not sure I necessarily agree that that's better wording; however, I may not be conveying what I'm trying to convey. What I'm trying to convey is that humans don't make decisions based on "evolutionary" considerations. Humans make decisions based primarily on self-interest, or perceived self-interest, what they feel will lead to pleasure for them. That's the root of psychological hedonism as I understand it. People may use "evolution made me do it" as a rationalization or justification post facto. But I doubt anyone is making a decision solely for by saying "My evolution dictates that I do this thing." People make decisions on the spur of the moment all the time based on instinct and fight/flight responses ingrained by biological evolution. So, in that sense, they "do" make choices that way, and, yes, these "may" be short-sighted... but that's saying - it seems to me - that they were necessitated or were inevitable, when Epicurus states clearly that decisions should be made using practical wisdom and not soley on ingrained, biological urges or proclivities.

Quote from Cassius

- in an Epicurean perspective without fate or necessity or a providential god force, '"sometimes" a decision to go against the generally-observable rule (I gather we all agree that the general rule is to the effect that blindly following evolution in every case is generally a bad idea) will in fact work out and be the proper choice in some circumstances?

I added emphasis on your word "choice". It's not a "choice." In fact, it seems to me to be the opposite of a choiceif one is "blindly following." And, yes, sometimes things work out by dumb luck, but, according to Epicurus, "it is better to be unfortunate rationally than fortunate irrationally."

And, yes, we've gone round and round on PD10 in the past. To state my position, I think PD10 is cautionary. To review:

If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that's what is bad). (Saint-Andre translation)

I see this as cautionary and not necessarily proscriptive. Sure, you can engage in the delights of the decadent, but it's not going to "wash away the mind's fears" IF it did, we'd have no problem with it... but it doesn't. I'm also looking at the verb tenses here in Greek. That's one reason for my conclusion, but also just the general tenor of the statement and what he says in the Letter to Menoikeus.

I'll assume I've cleared up nothing and merely muddied the waters with this reply

Quote from Little Rocker

That leaves a person who contends that men should aim for fidelity two options--show that cheating is not actually adaptive (i.e. challenge the scientist's empirical claim) or decide that what is good for us/right for us is not governed by what is evolutionarily advantageous.

Quote from Godfrey

Might one also contest the evolutionary biology approach by pointing out that evolution occurs over such a large span of time as to be meaningless for practical human ethics?

It seems to me that Little Rocker and Godfrey are both onto something. While we are the products of evolution, we don't make choices and rejections based on evolutionary considerations in the here and now in this one life that we have. In this life, infidelity can (and likely will) lead to pain, both in an individual relationship and rippling through societal relationships. If someone is unfaithful to another in a relationship, that unfaithful person can be seen by others as being untrustworthy; hence leading to more pain for the unfaithful partner. There is a chance that there may also be actual physical pain involved should the other party in the relationship exact "revenge" on the unfaithful party. And if not revenge right away, there may be revenge later. It may be easy to commit infidelity undetected, but impossible to be sure that you have escaped detection... to paraphrase a Vatican Saying.

PS...

Quote from Little Rocker

‘Men are naturally prone to infidelity because it’s not evolutionarily advantageous for them to be monogamous....

This got me thinking of animals that do pair bond as part of their natural behaviors. And I realize one can't necessarily extrapolate among all these species nor does the concept of "infidelity" translate across species, but a purely "it's natural" (above and beyond the universal feelings of pleasure/pain) is not the slam -dunk argument some feel it is. There are societal and cultural considerations. Which is why, it seems to me, the last few seconds of Principle Doctrines talks about justice and living in a social setting.

6 Animal Species that Mate for Life

Mating for life is relatively uncommon in the animal kingdom. Find out which animals, from gray wolves to macaroni penguins, are in it for the long haul.

www.britannica.com

https://www.bbcearth.com/news/seven-animals-who-mate-for-life

(Oh, and Godfrey , you're welcome to reconsider your after I added my PostScript )

It's pareidolia transposed to the technology realm:

Pareidolia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

We are conditioned by evolution to detect, expect, assign agency to things or the origin of things. What makes lighting? Gods. Look at that face on the moon (or the rabbit on the Moon, depending on your cultural upbringing).

For AI, the machine speaks to me, therefore, there must be agency to it. All hail, our robot overlords!

Misspelling: if you sign up for an account outside of regular waking **ours** in the North American time zone

**hours

I appreciate the additional information and perspective, Onenski ! I have some reactions:

Quote from Onenski

think about this exaggerated example. Imagine that, in a community, people believe that men should work and women should stay at home. They might say: "for generations things have been like this, it's the natural order, it must be like this". Philosophers say that this reasoning is wrong, because they are infering a normative proposition from factual propositions. They're infering an ought from an is.

From that example, my reaction is that that is a culturally-dependent example, not a "naturally occurring" one. The "fact" is merely built on cultural and societal norms. The feeling of pleasure - or the aversion to pain and the attraction to positive stimuli - is biological.

Quote from Onenski

The basic idea is that in a naturalistic ethical project (like the Epicurean one, for example), holding that pleasure (or any other natural entity) is good, implies that there's something in pleasure that makes it good. The question is, which property is that and why pleasure has it?

I still think the idea of "good/bad" - although Epicurus clearly uses good (agathos) and bad (kakos) - is a function of the language we have available to us. "Good" can mean "morally/ethical 'good'" but to I still maintain that it is built on a fundamental meaning of positive feeling. Pleasure - according to Epicurus - is fundamentally agathos, by pleasure's nature. If we take agathos at its most basic meaning, it is something that is useful for a purpose, and from that springs all other meanings. I'm not a big fan of extrapolating from etymologies, but in this case, I'll make an exception. Pleasure is generally useful in one's life to steer toward something positive. Can pleasure's usefulness be short-circuited? Of course. An easy example is drinking too much alcohol, although some alcohol seems to have societal and personal benefits (Check out this episode of The Next Big Idea). Extrapolating this to a "moral" or "ethical" "good" isn't necessarily necessary.

Quote from Onenski

As you may see, this approach looks suspicious, because is taking the naturalistic Epicurean theory in a kind of platonic terms

Exactly, and well put! It seems like they're saying, "We're not going to play by your rules. We reject your rules, and replace them with our own!" ... sigh...

Quote from Kalosyni

Quote from Don

But you, although you are not master of tomorrow, are postponing your happiness. We waste away our lives in delaying, and each of us dies without having enjoyed leisure." {= Usener 204}

Instead of "without having enjoyed leisure" for the last line....perhaps: "without having enjoyed living".

Don ?

That's really not an option, unless you widen what you mean by living. The word is ἀσχολούμενος and comes from α a "not/un-" + σχολή:

• leisure, free time
• rest
• that in which leisure time is spent, especially lecture, disputation, discussion
• philosophy
• place where lectures were given, school, lecture hall

So a more exact translation is "not having taken advantage of leisure time in studying philosophy"

This was kind of fun... Ranieri reading an actual Herculaneum school in Pompeiian Lucian Reconstructed Pronunciation:

I was also unaware of this resource:

GreekSchools Open Access Viewer