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(4/2b/?)
2b! But really all 1.
Ah! I think I see what you're doing there. So 1a + 1b = αἰσθήσεις?
I think I was originally seeing τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας being a riff on or related to the προλήψεις, but it's honestly been awhile since I considered it.
Apologies if this is getting laborious
LOL! This is what some of us live for! 
Here's my take on this topic... as of this writing. Views subject to change in the time it takes me to type this!
DL. 10.49 (Hicks) "We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves."
Let me start at the beginning for my little digression here:
1." Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our (1) sensations (αἰσθήσεις) and (2) preconceptions (προλήψεις) and our (3) feelings (πάθη) are the standards of truth ; the Epicureans generally make *(4/2b/?)perceptions of mental presentations (τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας) to be also standards." DL.10.31. (emphasis and numbers added; I'm going to leave 4/2b/? sit for a moment)
It seems to me that, according to Epicurus, αἰσθήσεις (sensations) include not only what we moderns would call "sensations" (tasting, touching, hearing, tasting, smelling) but also a mental sense that apprehends finely-grained images only sensible to our minds/psykhe. These are the direct impressions coming from external objects. To me, Epicurus is saying these are always the standard of "truth" ἀλήθεια "truth, opp. lie or mere appearance; truth, reality, opp. appearance" (LSJ) So, the sensations are our direct link to an external reality that exists in actuality and is not an appearance (or, to put it in Platonic terms) a mere shadow of a greater reality. There is no opinion offered on the sensation at this point. It is the seal that impresses itself on the wax. We can have an opinion of the artfulness of the seal or the appropriateness of the seal; but not until it is imprinted on the wax.
I have more to offer, but I see I'm running behind in the postings.... Let me catch up then wade back in if appropriate.
I agree that we're not far off from each other, Cassius ; although let me attempt to widen the gulf
I don't think/know if you're saying it, but I want to say explicitly that I don't believe prolepses can be equated with sensations. They're both pre-rational and things upon which reason works, but they're not the same.
To me, sensations register all incoming images/stimuli/whatever generated from the external world - sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, mental activity (bad terms, but there's a mental sensation per the ancient Greek theories). To me, the faculty of the prolepses identify patterns within those incoming stimuli - without assigning meaning or content! Simply identify "This pattern was detected before... This appears to be similar to another pattern identified earlier... etc." and THEN reason steps in and starts assigning meaning to those patterns... those patterns become more refined... the concepts assigned to them become more refined. It is the patterns within the field of sensations that are important to pay attention to.
That's my take. Running out the door to work this afternoon... Checking back in later.
I'm chewing on the idea that the prolepsis comes from the infant-caregiver relationship
I think you're onto something thinking along those links, Godfrey . Part of it comes down on answering the questions:
At the moment I would tend to think the way Godfrey is going is most likely. It seems likely that prolepsis is, like the eyes or other senses, a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty that is neither right nor wrong. In contrast, even the assertions that "gods are blessed" or "gods are incorruptible" are chock full of conceptual right/wrong content.
So... it reads to me there, Cassius , that you don't think "gods are blessed and incorruptible" cannot be the content (so to speak) of a "a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty"? IF (and *please* correct me right out of the box!) that's your point, I'm tending to agree.
Epicurus tells Menoikeus:
). More likely than saying that our brains are stamped at birth "gods exist and are incorruptible and blessed," he's saying that our brains are stamped at birth with an operating system that, when exposed to certain experiences, are disposed to "anthropomorphize and to engage in teleological thinking." The results of that process are deemable to be true and consistent with all evidence only when we conclude that gods are blessed and imperishable, which means that they don't have anything to do with us or earth (that would indicate weakness). To reason otherwise contradicts our physics and all other repeatable and verifiable sensory observations.
Hmmm.... I'm not sure I completely follow your train of thought there.... but I *think* I agree with where I think you're going?
Epicurean style gods
And there's another rub! With the popular and scholarly debates about what an "Epicurean style god" *is*... this discussion continues to have interesting side quests and interesting digressions!
(NOTE: I'm sure these podcast episodes are also available where you happen to subscribe to podcasts. I'm posting the program's episode pages because they also had some additional resources that might not be in show notes on a podcast-subscription platform.)
I just started listening to the second episode of Hidden Brain listed below but felt obligated to share them. I've found them to be instructive and thought-provoking from a cultural evolution of religion perspective.
"Creating God"
"Our God-Shaped Brains"
These two have also made me question whether we really do have a prolepsis of "blessed and incorruptible" characteristics of gods.... or whether the ubiquitous nature of gods across cultures is really (as talked about in "Our God-Shaped Brains") due to our innate proclivity (prolepsis) for assigning agency even where it doesn't exist, to anthropomorphize, and to engage in "teleological thinking" (seeing purpose where none really exists). The episode talks about these innate evolution-adapted proclivities giving rise to gods/spirits/divinities across cultures. Not some innate "preconception" of "blessed and incorruptible" beings existing somewhere. It seems to me that that is worth considering... although I'm fully aware this goes against Epicurean orthodoxy! There are still prolepses involved in there being ubiquitous gods, just not the prolepses that Epicurus posited. And if a "modern" Epicurean wants to imagine gods as admirable archetypes to emulate, I don't see a problem with that (at the moment I'm typing this at least). However, if these podcast episodes are correct, in a manner of speaking, the hoi polloi can be "forgiven" for holding the beliefs they do about the gods... in a way, evolution made them do it.
I'll have to cogitate on this for awhile, but I'm posting here for consideration by forum members. I look forward to any and all thoughts.
I am woefully late to the game on this thread, but **finally** feeling well enough to wade (way) back into some of the the threads I missed.
One thought that came to mind reading this thread is that the word "democracy" didn't mean exactly what we take it to mean today in Ancient Rome and Athens. ...although honestly there are some similarities, both postive and negative. Attempting to cleave to the "no politics" rule of this forum, I'll not go into details. But it seems Philodemus is especially concerned about the people - the hoi polloi, if you will - being able to be swayed by the rhetorical abilities of individuals skilled in the art of speech-making. < sarcasm > I'm glad that's not a concern anymore! < / sarcasm>
When it comes to Philodemus, I always like to go back and see what we're physically dealing with -- not just translation, but what physical remains are the translators working with. Toward that end...
And one example from that page: Philodemus: De rhetorica 1 (PHerc. 232, 234, 247, 250, 398, 426, 463, 1115, 1427, 1601, 1606, 1612, 1619, 1813), encoded by Claudio Vergara, Corinna Lang, Marcel Moser and Vanessa Zetzmann, revision by Vincenzo Damiani and Holger Essler (WCE)...
DCLP/Trismegistos 62474 = LDAB 3650
What I also find fascinating are some of the multi-spectral images of the papyri! fragment right N 1619 fr. 4 (=P.Herc. 1619) (Not a drawing but an actual photographic image. That's cool!)
Thank you, I am german (live near Würzburg where is an Epicurean science center on the university) so it is easy to read for me, perfect
That's good. If you find anything particularly interesting as you read it, please share.
It's in German but there's this:
Don, I mostly agree with your conclusion, but one issue I see is that the "faculty of discerning" would be a faculty of thought --- and not a faculty of the senses. The senses, anticipations included, are still in the "suck in all the sensory stimuli" phase.
I'm not seeing prolepsis as a faculty of thought. To me, there's only recognition of meaningful patterns on which thought can work to assign names or concepts. The analogy of the sieve is the best I can do right now, still feeling under the weather. I would agree that the faculty of prolepsis sucks in everything, but it's like that mechanical sorting bank that has slots for pennies, nickels, etc., in the crudest way. We're born with an innate sorting ability, otherwise our little brains would short circuit from all the stimuli. We have the ability to focus on patterns of significance in our environment. Now I'm not saying at this time how that translates into a "prolepsis of justice" etc., but I think I can get there from here.
Over the past few years, the most cogent suggestion as to what the faculty of prolepsis is the faculty of discerning patterns out of the cacophony of our sensations. It seems to me (to summarize what I've come to understand) that our sensations suck in all the applicable sensory stimuli - mental and physical - from our environment. The faculty of the prolepsis sieves those sensations to find discernible patterns, patterns that have been encountered before, repeated patterns that that faculty have significance within that cacophony. As we encounter them more often, we can find tune that recognition. A crude analogy is If a child's family has a "dog" , all animals are "dog" for awhile until the toddler discerns patterns that fine tune their recognition of patterns identified with other animals. Another crude analogy is the ability to discern patterns within a color blind test, ex.
The full circle is the flood of sensations. Prolepsis allows one to pick out the shape. Then reason/cognition steps in and assigns meaning, as in "that's the number 5."
To me pleasure and pain enter in after prolepsis but before assignment of cognitive meaning.
This confirms, once again, that everything sounds better with a posh English accent.
Cellar door
Thanks, Eikadistes !
For anyone who doesn't get the reference:
When the topic of rights comes up, I turn to George Carlin and his "rights vs privileges"
For those who haven't heard it (language warning!):
Display More
τὰ Συμβεβηκότα
Coniūncta
"Inseparable Characteristics"
"Properties"
Fundamental qualities, Inherent attributes τὰ Συμπτώματα
Ēventa
"Separable Characteristics"
"Accidents" "Symptoms"
Potential qualities, Incidental attributes This outline is specific to Epicurus. For example, Aristotle uses τὰ συμβεβηκότα, with the sense of τὰ συμπτώματα.
So... Did I get that exactly opposite??
so-called accidents* - τά συμβεβηκότα
Just to be clear for anyone reading this, TauPhi 's footnote is exactly right:
Accident (philosophy) - Wikipedia
An accident (Greek συμβεβηκός), in metaphysics and philosophy, is a property that the entity or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity. An accident does not affect its essence, according to many philosophers. It does not mean an "accident" as used in common speech, a chance incident, normally harmful.
Philosophically speaking then, as I understand, my having a beard is one of my accidents; my being a human is an attribute of mine.
We smell and see the film that comes from our meal, for example.
Ok now *there* is another potential issue. I thought that "images" are received directly by the mind, without going through the eyes, and that the "images" technically speaking are not visible or otherwise detectable by the five senses. Is that not the implication of the discussion in Book 4 of Lucretius, and the implication of what Cicero says to Cassius about the mind selecting images as involved in thinking of someone who is not present?
My understanding is that *all* our sensations are based on "images"/fields/eidola. The mental faculty simply picks up the finest, most subtle images. But all sensations are based on touch, from the sense of touch itself to vision touching the images emitted by objects, to the mental faculty touching the finest most subtle fields.
Of course, we now know that this isn't how our senses actually work. But Epicurus posited a completely material theory of sensation, so he gets kudos for that.
The one I seem to return to again and again is at the ending of On Nature, Book 28, where Epicurus has gone on for feet of a scroll, he says, "So let the words which we have prattled suffice for the present." and the verb there is specifically a form of ἀδολεσχέω “to talk idly, prate” so it seems to me that Epicurus is being self-effacing. I really like that.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Α α, , ἀδι^κο-χρήματος , ἀδο-λεσχέω
a luminary in the world of library science
LOL 🤣 Please... Don't.... Stop. But seriously, "luminary" is FAR too kind (read: hyperbole).
in an adjoining state so there may be some rivalry involved
Friendly rivalry Even Ohio and Michigan get along and cooperate in the library world.
circulation assistant
Hey! Y'all in Lending keep the materials flowing to the people and you're on the frontlines of public service. 
Kudos!
A great limited series podcast on the *entire* history of the universe. Accessible and fascinating. I've been enjoying it greatly myself.
Dr. Katie Mack, a theoretical astrophysicist, walks #1 New York Times bestselling author John Green through the history of the entire universe - including the parts that haven’t been written yet.
