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Another aspect is investigating modern psychology and neuroscience in specific situations. When you mention the word "play" that reminds me about something Don posted (an article or podcast) about including more play in one's life. (I'm not sure where that is located).
Was it The Fun Habit: How the Pursuit of Joy and Wonder Can Change Your Life by Michael Rucker?
We need more input from others....
Okay, I'll take the bait...
To move-from pleasure, move-to pain or stay-in pain are not things I should do; let's ignore them in this post.
I wouldn't ignore those as options. We can choose to undergo pain IF it will lead to future greater pleasure. So, move-to pain is an option, and even stay-in (for a defined amount of time) are options; which, by definition mean one is in a move-from pleasure motion by choice to gain greater pleasure.
To stay-in pleasure. This experience doesn't tend to last long, and it is an absence-of-direction. This means: I can desire it and pursue it, but I cannot do it, because not-doing cannot be done.
I'm not sure I agree with this formulation. From my perspective, a goal of Epicurean philosophy is to be able to experience pleasure for as long as possible. If one's life and attitude are structured to experience the joy of existence, "feeling no pain", that seems a desirable state. Various activities can be undertaken and experienced, but the through-line is being able to experience a pleasurable state in as many activities as possible if one feels no pain.
Moving-from pain. I have begun to call this action "to avoid", to call the process "avoidance" and the behaviour "avoiding".
For anyone whose been around here a while, I apologize for jumping on my habitual soapbox/broken record. Personally, I dislike the "avoid/avoidance/avoiding" translation used in the stock phrases "choice and avoidance." The Greek words Epicurus uses are αἵρεσις (hairesis) and φεύγω (pheugo) which literally mean "taking/choice" and "flee/take flight/escape" (avoid is also a definition, but down the list). αἵρεσις (hairesis) evolved later into the word heresy as in "someone making a choice... oops! wrong choice, we're going to have to punish you!" φεύγω (pheugo) as "flee/escape" always struck me as more immediate, more urgent, than "avoiding" which always reminds me of "avoiding a mud puddle." I realize that's a tangent, but one I can't "avoid" when it comes up.
using special words (to play/to avoid) to encapsulate the same meaning in a single, direct linguistic entity made it much easier to shift myself. It seems quite useful to me to categorise my behaviours into avoidance and play, to think of everything I do as either avoiding or playing.
Hmm... I *think* I can see where you're going, but moving toward pleasure isn't always "play" unless you're redefining "play." I'm all for play, btw, just to be clear! But moving toward pleasure sometimes means getting rid of fears, superstitions, anxieties, etc. Yes, that's moving away from pain, or jettisoning pain-producing fears, etc. You can certainly assign words to those movements you've described, but I'm not sure playing and avoiding are expansive enough to encompass what can be involved in those "motions."
Since this post is getting long, I'll stop here and start anew...
My first thought is that "worlds" appears to refer to a "collection" of lots of objects like planets and stars (presumably) then I would take "world" to be the "collection" of things, and not indicative that it would be impossible for planets or even starts to exist "on their own" part from a "world-system."
Hmm... Can we first agree that a "world" - in the Epicurean sense - refers to the word κοσμος (kosmos)? That seems to be the usual referent of the English translation "world" in the texts. If so, yes, I would fully agree that it is a "collection" of objects; however, those objects are in an "ordered" arrangement with a planet, stars and wandering stars (what we call "planets"), etc., all enclosed in an ordered pocket of the universe (The All). They all work together in the world-system. I don't see anywhere in the texts that talk about a "planet" forming outside of a kosmos.
A scholion to the letter to Herodotus does talk about different shaped "worlds":
[74] "And further, we must not suppose that the worlds (κόσμους kosmous) have necessarily one and the same shape. [On the contrary, in the twelfth book "On Nature" he himself says that the shapes of the worlds differ, some being spherical, some oval, others again of shapes different from these. They do not, however, admit of every shape. Nor are they living beings which have been separated from the infinite (ἀπείρου apeirou).]
So the shapes of the kosmoi/worlds can differ; they're not all spherical.. but they are all kosmoi.
He also talks about the infinity of worlds in 45:
"Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds (κόσμοι kosmoi), some like this world, others unlike it. For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world (κόσμος kosmos) might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds (τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων ten apeirian ton kosmon).
There is no such thing as a star or planet outside of a kosmos/world-system. 88-91 are directly relevant to the current conversation:
"A world (Κόσμος kosmos) is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating [and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, a boundary whose dissolution will bring about the wreck of all within it] in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible : they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned.
[89] "That there is an infinite number of such worlds (κόσμοι kosmoi) can be perceived, and that such a world (κόσμος kosmos) may arise in a world (κόσμῳ kosmoi) or in one of the intermundia (μετακοσμίῳ metakosmioi) (by which term we mean the spaces between worlds (κόσμων kosmon)) in a tolerably empty space and not, as some maintain, in a vast space perfectly clear and void. It arises when certain suitable seeds rush in from a single world or intermundium, or from several, and undergo gradual additions or articulations or changes of place, it may be, and waterings from appropriate sources, until they are matured and firmly settled in so far as the foundations laid can receive them. [90] For it is not enough that there should be an aggregation or a vortex in the empty space in which a world may arise, as the necessitarians hold, and may grow until it collide with another, as one of the so-called physicists says. For this is in conflict with facts.
[91] "The sun and moon and the stars generally were not of independent origin and later absorbed within our world, [such parts of it at least as serve at all for its defence] ; but they at once began to take form and grow [and so too did earth and sea] by the accretions and whirling motions of certain substances of finest texture, of the nature either of wind or fire, or of both ; for thus sense itself suggests.
So, the sun, moon, and stars (NOTE: No mention of "planet" other than the one on which the beings - human beings in this case - stand) arise as a whole system. The kosmos works as a whole, arises as a whole. It can form within another world or in the intermundia, but the kosmos coalesces and bodies form within the kosmos. There are no suns, moons, or stars independent of a kosmos in which to form.
I don't think it's necessarily the only conclusion to draw
I am certainly open to hearing other conclusions. 
Talk me down.
On this topic, I keep coming back to the assertion in Cicero (Is it elsewhere?) that the gods live in the between-cosmos area of the universe. By definition, that means there is no world, no world-system, no ordered part of the universe on which a human-shaped god could reside. By definition, the intermundia/metakosmos has no "world." Are we to imagine them floating around like bubbles? They literally would not have a spot to stand or sit in this area of the universe. That's why I have a hard time accepting that Epicurus believed gods were existent beings somehow residing "between world-systems." Quick lunch time rant for now.
I'll hopefully have a chance to address some of Eikadistes's very valid concerns from my perspective this evening.
*But* we don't have prolepseis of the good and pleasure. One is a philosophical concept, the other is a direct connection to reality. Epicurus did posit prolepseis of the god and justice.
Some good points you raise. Heading out the door to work, but I wanted to get this down...
I think the "existence" of something doesn't necessarily mean its being able to be touched or seen. Epicurus clearly says the gods are only perceptible by the mind... at least to us mortals.
There is also the issue of Epicurus's saying that we have a prolepsis of justice. Just can't be seen or touched but "we know it when we see it" due to a prolepsis. Of course, for my part, we have the same issue with that in that if justice is, at its root, to neither be intentionally harmed nor to intentionally harm others, that also has a load of semantic and conceptual content for something (the prolepsis) that I think we believe is a pre-rational faculty.
Throwing it out there for discussion.
This episode made me go back and examine the relevant sections of the letter to Menoikeus... And I found myself asking "What *really* is the prolepsis of the gods that Epicurus is proposing?" I thought it's straight forward: A god is a blessed and imperishable 'being'. But I'm not so sure. Let me break down the text and show where I'm coming from:
First, on the one hand, believing that the god is a blessed and imperishable thing as is the common, general understanding of the god... πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων,...
First = not numerically, but "primarily, foremost, most importantly."
believe = νομίζων "believing, holding, considering" (present active participle of νομῐ́ζω) To me "believing" involves a cognitive act of choosing to believe, hold, or acknowledge something. You can choose to believe the earth is flat. However, once you have evidence available, you can become convinced to believe the earth is round. Believe that the god is blessed and imperishable has too much semantic and conceptual content to be the prolepsis, which I believe most of us take to be a pre-rational, pre-conceptual impression (like sensations).
Even ζῷον (as I've mentioned before) can be a "living being/animal" but also an "image" of a living being as in the painting of a horse. Could Epicurus be hedging his bets here? Is the god only apprehended by the mind and contemplation because it is really is an image constructed by the mind, like the painting on a cloth or wall, in the mind itself of the one who turns their thoughts toward the god?
...as the common understanding (mental perception, idea, concept) of the god has been outlined...ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη,
The use of ὑπεγράφη (hypegraphe) is especially interesting in this context because this word literally means to be outlined with the intent of someone filling in the details, like the image of letters indicated by a teacher by an outline or tracing for the student to then follow. It seems according to this, the most basic characteristics of the god are merely outlines in our mind on top of which all the incorrect assumptions and concepts of the hoi polloi are piled on. But those characteristics of blessedness and imperishability seem far too "detailed" to be considered ὑπεγράφη (hypegraphe).
Then we have:
Do not attribute anything foreign to the incorruptibility or incongruous with the blessedness of itself (i.e., the god)! μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε.
Believe everything about which a god is able to preserve its own imperishability and blessedness for itself. πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετα ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτον δόξαζε.
In this case, "believe" is actually δόξαζε (doxaze) "think, suppose, imagine, hold the opinion that" This word is connected with δοξαι in Principle Doctrines κυριαι δοξαι (kyriai doxai)
So, Epicurus exhorts his students to believe the god is a blessed and imperishable being (or the image of a being in their mind), to hold the believe that the god is able to preserve its own blessedness and imperishability, because the common idea of the god is engraved somehow in our minds by the faintest outline.
I still find it hard to believe that the prolepsis of the gods includes all that, somehow including all that conceptual framework.
This line of thought is one reason I continue to be intrigued by the "idealist" position of the Epicurean gods. The god's blessedness and incorruptibility is maintained by our very focus on their blessedness and incorruptibility in our minds. As we approach a temple or image, that image of blessedness and incorruptibility allows the Epicurean to interact with a divine image as the physical representation of that image in the mind of a blessed and incorruptible being - and ONLY as that - without all the baggage of imagining a vengeful, wrathful god.
Still very much a work-in-progress but that a direction of inquiry I'm heading down.
Excellent, thought-provoking episode! Thank you all.
Epicurus' redefinition of pleasure was rather only a reinstatement of its pure form, before all the manipulations of culture came to taint it; the way toddlers and piglets still perceive it.
I admit I haven't thought of it in that way before, but I like it.
The longest treatise on language by Epicurus left to us is Book 28 of On Nature:
Sedley's translation is the best source to dig into that work.
It does appear you're correct. To use Saint-Andre's translation as a starting point:
VS71. Ask this question of every desire: what will happen to me if the object of desire is achieved, and what if not?
πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;
NOTE: Literally, τὸ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον means something like "what is sought because of this desire" (cf. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 1098b22); however "the object of desire" is more readable in modern English.
A more literal translation (sacrificing eloquence) would be:
Concerning all the desires, this question must be applied: What will happen to me if what is sought because of this desire should be fulfilled? and what if it is not fulfilled?
τελεσθῇ is a 3rd person Singular Aorist Subjunctive Passive verb. One page I found explains the aorist subjunctive as " if the subjunctive mood is used in a purpose or result clause, then the action should not be thought of as a possible result, but should be viewed as a definite outcome that will happen as a result of another stated action." That seems to apply here, since applying the accomplishment of the desire is a result of asking the question. It is also doing the action and asking "what will happen to me" if this action is completed. It seems to be the person is:
The point is not to ask what's in my power and what is beyond my capabilities and to examine everything that comes to my mind according to this procedure. The key is to actually focus on what's important in life, what does have priority and what is established by nature as the foundation of life.
I would agree that for the most part; however, the Stoics have no monopoly on what is usually ascribed to them:
whom do you consider is better or more powerful than one who holds pious beliefs concerning the gods; one who has absolutely no fears concerning death; one who has rationally determined the τέλος of one's natural state; and the one who grasps that, on the one hand, good things (namely pleasures) are both easily attained and easily secured, and, on the other hand, evil things (or pains) are either short in time or brief in suffering; someone who laughs at Fate which is introduced onto the stage of life by many as the mistress of all things? For that person, even though some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some by our own power, for although necessity is beyond our control, they see that chance is unstable and there is no other master beyond themselves, so that praise and its opposite are inseparably connected to themselves.
Re post #12 graphic: also include PDs 15, 21, 26 and 29, in addition to 30.
FYI:
15. Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion have no end. ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν (kenōn < emptiness, void) δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.
ἄπειρον = infinity "no-limit"
Limited in this PD is ὥρισται which includes the connotation of "limit (one thing according to another)"
"Easy to acquire" reminds me of the 3rd line of the tetrapharmakos.
I like the connotation of ὁ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει. Those based on empty beliefs εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει. ἐκπίπτει has a meaning "to fall out, fall down" but also to be cast ashore or suffer shipwreck, to be driven out or banished, etc. εἰς ἄπειρον "into infinity." So, to me, this has the underlying meaning of having an empty desire for limitless wealth is like being banished to search for satisfaction in your wealth into the infinite void with no end in sight forever.
The rules of pig-Latin;
Wikipedia has a surprisingly extensive article on Pig Latin:
πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν
VS79 has a form of this word:
He who is as peace within himself also causes no trouble for others. ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος. (Ho atarakhos heautō kai heterō aokhlētos)
I didn't address Godfrey 's original thesis!
I would argue that Epicurus expects his students to apply his philosophical methods in both good times and bad, in times of upheaval and in times of jubilation.
The questions you pose are intriguing and would serve as a good starting point for planning ahead in those times of upheaval that inevitably arise in our lives. They also seem to get at those aspects of our lives over which we have control and those which are subject to chance. Making the most of those parts of our lives that we do have control over - that we have agency over - seems to me a big part of Epicurus's philosophy.
I perceive that in some minds, this statement of only two criteria sounds like Epicurus was referring to "the pleasures of the moment" and "the pains of the moment." ... etc...
Fully agree with all this in your number 2 paragraph. Well stated, Cassius. My understanding is that the "pleasures/pains of the moment" considerations are more inline with the Cyrenaic position.
All the discussion of "natural" and "necessary" is *contextual*, and cannot be reduced to universals that apply to all people at all times and all places. Even breathing can be postponed if by holding your breath to swim out of a cave you save your life. As Torquatus said, the classification has a principle, that things which are most natural and most necessary are generally going to be the easiest to obtain, and therefore can generally be obtained with the least resulting pain, but that is **not** a general statement that nature universally demands that you eat bread and drink water and live in a cave. It is only a general consideration that can serve as a guide when you don't have enough information to be confident that what you can do will be achievable, but over time you learn to know what is and is not possible, so you move out of the cave and you start eating more than bread and drinking more than water, unless circumstances demand it.
I don't think "natural" and "necessary" are as contextual as you're trying to make out. The literal translation of the pertinent Menoikeus section (127-128) is:
Furthermore, on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life.
The 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones' uses ΚΕΝΑΙ which is a form of the same exact word Epicurus uses for the void in "atoms & void."
My reading is:
1. Natural Desires
A. Natural *and* Necessary Desires
i. Necessary for Eudaimonia
ii. Necessary for "Freedom from Disturbance in the Body" (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν)
iii. Necessary for Living Itself (πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν)
B. Only Natural Desires (αἱ φυσικαὶ μόνον)
2. Empty, Fruitless "Void" Desires
I find that "the ones which are only natural" interesting. I'm not sure how to interpret that, honestly.
To get back to Cassius' commentary, specifically: "All the discussion of "natural" and "necessary" is *contextual*, and cannot be reduced to universals that apply to all people at all times and all places. Even breathing can be postponed if by holding your breath to swim out of a cave you save your life."
A distinction has to be made between natural/necessary behaviors and "desires." It is a universal that we mammals find breathing, eating, sleeping, and shelter necessary to continue living. Of course, we'll postpone breathing when swimming out of a cave because we can't breathe water and we desire to continue living if at all possible. I don't see that as an example of a contextual desire.
"things which are most natural and most necessary are generally going to be the easiest to obtain, and therefore can generally be obtained with the least resulting pain, but that is **not** a general statement that nature universally demands that you eat bread and drink water and live in a cave."
Your water/cave metaphor seems to be a bit of a non sequitur here. If you're living in a cave, it is going to require quite a bit of effort to obtain bread and make sure you have sufficient water stored away... unless you're living directly beside a spring and have bread delivered to you... in which case you'll need a baker who's willing to trek up the mountain... but then you'll need... and so on.
My understanding is that nature provides sufficient amounts of what we need to live - if we were to be in dire straits - which is why Epicurus, from time to time, limited his food and drink to see how much he could live on and still be satisfied. Then, after his fasting experiment, went back to living "normally" until his next experiment.
I laughed because I am supposed to but I am not sure I get it ?
I can see the "pig" double-meaning, but why put the "vay" at the end?
Latin: Veni, vidi, vici (I came, I saw, I conquered)
"Old School" Pig Latin: eni-vay,...
English: Pigs can fly. > Igs-pay an-cay y-flay.
