FYI
Lots of coverage of Epicurus and Lucretius starting on p7 of the paper...
Although having read it...I still can't tell if the author of the paper is saying Camus was or was not feeling positively toward Epicurus. 
Oh, TauPhi , Little Rocker , and UnPaid_Landlord ... I am intrigued now! I read one of Camus' works (the Sisyphus one, of course) back in 2016 when I was looking for a philosophical direction (having given up the Buddhist direction... Although still seeing some positive notes in that btw) . I didn't really get Camus then although it helped me then ...But the video was very intriguing! I can see some Epicurean echoes... "The passion to pursue the joy of being for the sake of it..." And so on.
Well, if the video is accurate... color me absurdly curious.
Welcome.
We are big fans of Dr. Austin's book. I personally think it is the most-accessible, user-friendly introduction to Epicurus's philosophy currently available.
We also have two episodes of the podcast where we interviewed her, 156 & 157
The Lucretius Today Podcast Listing, Page 2
Does it faithfully represent the authentic Epicurean view ?
Yes, and she does a masterful job of dispelling from some of the misconceptions like Epicurus's supposedly being an ascetic. Her adherence to the actual texts is well done without being pedantic.
4.99 stars out of 5 (Wouldn't want to not leave any room for more Physics for the 2nd edition 
)
I decided to dive back into Long & Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers to see which citations they use for the gods (or God) as they say in their table of contents. Some of the citations are expected, but a couple were noteworthy at least to me:
I'm going to leave Eikadistes 's intriguing suggestion of Epicurus's ingestion of "chemicals that were intended to induce an altered state of consciousness" for later; although I have absolutely zero problems whatsoever with the idea that Epicurus drank wine throughout his life and probably did as part of his participation in the city festivals and definitely, likely undiluted, when he was dying. What I wanted to address here briefly is Eikadistes 's mention of Epicurus's participation in the festivals and sacrifices for anyone who finds this a new idea. It is not a new idea, seems relatively well-attested, and we have an Epicurean source to rely on. Thanks to Eikadistes for reminding me of this!
The primary evidence for this (to the best of my knowledge) is the work On Piety (scholarly consensus as attributed to Philodemus but also very possibly written by Phaedrus, a scholarch of the Garden).
Col. 28/9: Epicurus wrote to Phyrson during the archonship of Aristonymus (289/8 BCE) about Physon's countryman from Colophon, Theodotus, Epicurus says that he (Epicurus) shared in all the festivals... Epicurus celebrated the festival of the Choes and the urban mysteries and the other festivals at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him (prob. Theodotus) to celebrate this feast of the Twentieth for distinguished revelers, while those in the house decorated it most piously ('ολως) and after making invitations to host a feast for all of them.
My Notes
and, btw, Column 28 is fairly well intact for a change:
Col. 29: Epicurus advised them to retain asservations made by means of these and similar expressions, and above all to preserve those made by Zeus himself (maintain the practice of swearing by Zeus by name νή Δία!)... Not merely "it must be so!"
My Notes
Col.31: Epicurus, in a letter to Polyaenus, writes: "(It is necessary for us) to conceive of their nature as accurately constituting the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard (kriterion). Let us sacrifice to those gods devoutly and fittingly on that proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions on matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live like Zeus, as it seems. And concerning obeisance (προσκυνήσεις) in [Epicurus's] On Lifecourses [Περί βίων]"
My Notes
This thread is an offshoot of this thread:
In dealing with the prolepseis over there, I decided to turn to Long & Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers (which is available to borrow on Internet Archive with a free account) to see what they have to say. It turns out they cite a number of instances of mention of the prolepseis/preconceptions. Their numbering system (ex. 21A 4) uses their individual section, cited text, then their subsection of that text. What I've done is cite their citation then cite the specific text with their translation. There are more mentions in Lucretius and Epicurus than I at first realized. I'll dig into a consideration later, but for now I thought this might prove useful or at least interesting:
Long & Sedley's examples of the use of prolepsis/preconceptions in the ancient texts:
body 12E 2
- Lucretius 2.730-833
- - (2) You are quite wrong if you think that the mind cannot be focused on such particles. For given that those who are blind from birth and have never seen the sun's light nevertheless from their first day know bodies by touch without any association of colour, you can be sure that our mind too can form a preconception of bodies without any coating of colour. In fact, we ourselves sense as colourless everything that we touch in the blind darkness...
man 13F 4
Lucretius 5.156-234
Also, from where did the gods get a model for the creation of the world, and from where was the preconception of men first ingrained in them, to enable them to know and see in their mind what they wished to create, or how did they come to know the power of the primary particles and what they were capable of when their arrangement was altered, if nature itself did not supply a blueprint of creation?
utility 13E 4, 19B 4, 22B 2
Lucretius 4.823-57 (13E 4)
Quite different from these are all the things what were first actually engendered and gave rise to the preconception of their usefulness subsequently. Primary in this class are, we can see, the senses and the limbs. Hence, I repeat, there is no way you can believe that they were created for their function of utility.
Lucretius 5.1028-90 (19B 4)
Besides, if others had not already used sounds to each other, how did he get the preconception of their usefulness implanted in him? How did he get the initial capacity to know and see with his mind what he wanted to do?
Epicurus Key Doctrines (22B 2)
(37) What is legally deemed to be just has its existence in the domain of justice whenever it is attested to be useful in the requirements of social relationships, whether or not it turns out to be the same for all. But if someone makes a law and it does not happen to accord with the utility of social relationships, it no longer has the nature of justice. And even if what is useful in the sphere of justice changes but fits the preconception (prolepsis) for some time, it was no less just throughout that time for those who do not confuse themselves with empty utterances but simply look at the facts.
truth 16A 2-3
Lucretius 4.469-521
And anyway, even allowing that he knows this, I'll still ask him: given that he has never before seen anything true in the world, from where does he get his knowledge of what knowing and not knowing are? What created his preconception of true and false? And what proved to him that doubtful differs from certain? (3) You will find that the preconception of true has its origin in the senses, and that the senses cannot be refuted.
all properties of bodies 7B 6
Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 68-73
Now another thing that is important to appreciate forcefully is this. We should not inquire into time in the same way as other things, which we inquire into in an object by referring them to familiar preconceptions.
May also include data of introspection:
our own responsibility or agency 20C 4,8
Epicurus, On Nature 34.26-30
<He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to> blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he should be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned created the preconception of our responsibility. And in that he would be at one point altering his theory, at another <...> ...<On the other hand> if in using the word 'necessity' of that which we call our own agency he is merely changing a name, and won't prove that we have a preconception of a kind which has faulty delineations when we call our own agency responsible, neither his own <behavior nor that of others will be affected...>
desirability of pleasure 21A 4
Cicero, On Ends 1.29-32, 37-9
Some of our school, however, want to transmit these doctrines in a subtler way: they deny the sufficiency of judging what is good or bad by sensation, saying that the intrinsic desirability of pleasure and the intrinsic undesirability of pain can be understood by the mind too and by reason. So they say that our sense that the one is desirable and the other undesirable is virtually a natural and innate preconception in our minds...
Criterion 1: the text is the chief constraint. If we want to take Epicurus on his own terms, the text itself has to support, or at least not decisively rule out, a viable reading, and I prefer, all things considered, to keep my body of primary text reasonably narrow (as in, what we have from Epicurus, not what Plutarch or Clement of Alexandria say about Epicurus).
I concur with that. While not using Plutarch, Clement, et al. limits what's available, limiting oneself to *actual* Epicurean writings at least removes some of the likely anti-Epicurean bias inherent in "quotations" from those opposed (vehemently) to the Epicurean school.
Where do you come down on Cicero? Valuable? Reliable? LOL I find Cicero insufferable as a commentator, but he preserved some pivotal information... but how much to trust him as a conveyor of Epicurean teaching?
Curious also about your view of using the Herculaneum material: Philodemus, the fragments of On Nature, and so on. I'm inclined to make use of it where there is a reasonable amount of intact text, but skeptical of a lot of what might need "reconstruction."
Criterion 2: I know this is contentious, but I also think we should seek the most philosophically and empirically charitable account the text can sustain.
Sure, I got no problem with that. We have such little text (although, relatively speaking, we have a treasure trove!) that we have to read between the lines sometimes.
That means we should rule out interpretations that unnecessarily saddle Epicurus with untenable positions, if a more plausible position can be attributed to Epicurus within the bounds of textual evidence.
Yep, agree with that as well. 
For me, an example of this idea would be that Epicurus was an ascetic as seems popular in some circles. A more plausible position from my perspective is that he may very well have tested himself from time to time to see how much he could live on and still be satisfied... but I certainly don't see him doing this day in day out. I have source amnesia but seem to remember one author talking about "from time to time" Epicurus would test the limits of this kind of thing and to better appreciate abundance when one has it. I think of Lent or Ramadan in a regular religious context.
Which is to say I think it's totally fine, Don, to consider whether Epicurus might be in striking distance of what might count as a viable contender of a view today. I think it's always good to ask, 'how close is he to our current understanding?' Even if, in the end, it turns out the answer is, 'nowhere near.'
I can see that. I think my issue is trying to retrofit modern understanding into an Epicurean context. That's why I think (and, trust me, this is a recent realization on my part) it's vitally important to understand what Epicurus thought, taught, and understood within his own contemporary historical and philosophical context. Once that is reasonably well understood, then we can look for parallels or echoes or similarities to modern understandings. Heck, the ancient Greeks coming up with atoms - fundamental building blocks of matter common to everything across the cosmos - is pretty darn impressive... even if our modern "atoms" are not per se Epicurean or Democritean "atoms." Coming up with a material cosmos and making supernatural gods unnecessary was a great leap forward. It wasn't science but it gets you walking toward a scientific understanding of the universe. Kudos to them!
That said, I'm finding that I'm unable to be as generous when it comes to the psykhe and the mind and memory and all that. Our minds don't seem to grasp eidola from their air to conceive of things. Is it impressive that Epicurus posited a material cause for sensation, and the interaction of "soul atoms" to describe the activity of what is actually the human nervous system? You betcha! But Epicurus was working with a completely different paradigm when it comes to the mind. I just don't think we'll find exact parallels of prolepseis from a modern understanding... but I remain open to the idea!! There are several old posts of mine where I've done exactly that after all For example...
https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/conversation/381-homeostasis/
In a manner analogous to pulling your hand from a hot stove, I would interpret jumping back from the "snake" as a reflex rather than an instantaneous opinion.
But how would we define a "reflex" in ancient Epicurean terms as opposed to other mental or physical activities?
Honestly, in some ways, I think we're trying to do two different things here, and I admit I've contributed. On the one hand, it seems to me, we're trying to get a grasp on Epicurus's understanding of the mind and sensations and prolepsis and how he understood thought and memory etc. On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc. Understanding the brain and sensation in a modern setting and requiring a lining-up of Epicurus's terms or ideas with that seems fraught with difficulties. I'm beginning to think it might be better to simply acknowledge that the two frames are irreconcilable, and move on to understanding each (the ancient and modern) separately.
"In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. [38] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.
"Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions (ἐπιβολὰς) whether of the mind *or* of any criterion* whatever (εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ᾽ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων), and similarly to our actual feelings (παθη), in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.
I read this as Epicurus conveying that words can be - should be - referenced back to and denoting impressions of the senses. He urges Herodotus to test "opinions, inquiries, or problems" in reference to real sensations impressed upon the senses (including the mind) from the real, true external-to-ourselves world.
I see "or of any criterion"* as referring to the other senses - tasting, hearing, etc. - and he includes the mind (διανοίας "thinking faculty, intelligence, understanding" LSJ) specifically in that list of "sensations" as all members in his list of criteria.
The "every term... ought to need no proving" appears to also say that words need to refer back to a mental/physical sensation of some kind, an impression from the real world.
The criteria of truth then, to me, are the sensations, the prolepseis, and the feelings, precisely because they all interact directly with the "real external world." They are the impressions set upon us from the world outside ourselves. These criteria are our first line of contact, unmitigated by "opinions, inquiries, or problems", with the real, true, existing world in which we live.
Now, are opinions almost instantaneous sometimes, following directly on the heels of sensations and prolepseis? Sure! I have no problem with that. Consider you're walking through the woods, your sensations register a long skinny shape on the ground, your prolepseis have identified this shape as a danger in the past (the grooves are well worn in your eye's and mind's apprehension of the shape... so the "prolepseis" slips right into the groove, metaphorically).. your reason jumps in with "Snake!" and you jump back. It is only seconds later that you realize it was a discarded rope. Your opinion was in error, even though there was indeed a long slender shape that registered in your sensations from our external environment. Your sensations were true. Your prolepsis faculty registered the pattern seen and reinforced. Your feelings registered pain. It was your opinion layered on top that got it "wrong."
That's a VERY rudimentary scenario illustrating where my mind is at right now on this topic. To get a "modern Epicurean" take on things, I still think it is fruitful to dig into the work of Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett and her colleagues. I think that line of modern research has a lot of ideas worth exploring when it comes to really understanding how the mind actually works, and I still find a number of very interesting Epicurean echoes if not parallels in it.
(4/2b/?)
2b! But really all 1.
Ah! I think I see what you're doing there. So 1a + 1b = αἰσθήσεις?
I think I was originally seeing τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας being a riff on or related to the προλήψεις, but it's honestly been awhile since I considered it.
Apologies if this is getting laborious
LOL! This is what some of us live for! Here's my take on this topic... as of this writing. Views subject to change in the time it takes me to type this!
DL. 10.49 (Hicks) "We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves."
Let me start at the beginning for my little digression here:
1." Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our (1) sensations (αἰσθήσεις) and (2) preconceptions (προλήψεις) and our (3) feelings (πάθη) are the standards of truth ; the Epicureans generally make *(4/2b/?)perceptions of mental presentations (τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας) to be also standards." DL.10.31. (emphasis and numbers added; I'm going to leave 4/2b/? sit for a moment)
It seems to me that, according to Epicurus, αἰσθήσεις (sensations) include not only what we moderns would call "sensations" (tasting, touching, hearing, tasting, smelling) but also a mental sense that apprehends finely-grained images only sensible to our minds/psykhe. These are the direct impressions coming from external objects. To me, Epicurus is saying these are always the standard of "truth" ἀλήθεια "truth, opp. lie or mere appearance; truth, reality, opp. appearance" (LSJ) So, the sensations are our direct link to an external reality that exists in actuality and is not an appearance (or, to put it in Platonic terms) a mere shadow of a greater reality. There is no opinion offered on the sensation at this point. It is the seal that impresses itself on the wax. We can have an opinion of the artfulness of the seal or the appropriateness of the seal; but not until it is imprinted on the wax.
I have more to offer, but I see I'm running behind in the postings.... Let me catch up then wade back in if appropriate.
I agree that we're not far off from each other, Cassius ; although let me attempt to widen the gulf
I don't think/know if you're saying it, but I want to say explicitly that I don't believe prolepses can be equated with sensations. They're both pre-rational and things upon which reason works, but they're not the same.
To me, sensations register all incoming images/stimuli/whatever generated from the external world - sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, mental activity (bad terms, but there's a mental sensation per the ancient Greek theories). To me, the faculty of the prolepses identify patterns within those incoming stimuli - without assigning meaning or content! Simply identify "This pattern was detected before... This appears to be similar to another pattern identified earlier... etc." and THEN reason steps in and starts assigning meaning to those patterns... those patterns become more refined... the concepts assigned to them become more refined. It is the patterns within the field of sensations that are important to pay attention to.
That's my take. Running out the door to work this afternoon... Checking back in later.
I'm chewing on the idea that the prolepsis comes from the infant-caregiver relationship
I think you're onto something thinking along those links, Godfrey . Part of it comes down on answering the questions:
At the moment I would tend to think the way Godfrey is going is most likely. It seems likely that prolepsis is, like the eyes or other senses, a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty that is neither right nor wrong. In contrast, even the assertions that "gods are blessed" or "gods are incorruptible" are chock full of conceptual right/wrong content.
So... it reads to me there, Cassius , that you don't think "gods are blessed and incorruptible" cannot be the content (so to speak) of a "a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty"? IF (and *please* correct me right out of the box!) that's your point, I'm tending to agree.
Epicurus tells Menoikeus:
). More likely than saying that our brains are stamped at birth "gods exist and are incorruptible and blessed," he's saying that our brains are stamped at birth with an operating system that, when exposed to certain experiences, are disposed to "anthropomorphize and to engage in teleological thinking." The results of that process are deemable to be true and consistent with all evidence only when we conclude that gods are blessed and imperishable, which means that they don't have anything to do with us or earth (that would indicate weakness). To reason otherwise contradicts our physics and all other repeatable and verifiable sensory observations.
Hmmm.... I'm not sure I completely follow your train of thought there.... but I *think* I agree with where I think you're going?
Epicurean style gods
And there's another rub! With the popular and scholarly debates about what an "Epicurean style god" *is*... this discussion continues to have interesting side quests and interesting digressions!
(NOTE: I'm sure these podcast episodes are also available where you happen to subscribe to podcasts. I'm posting the program's episode pages because they also had some additional resources that might not be in show notes on a podcast-subscription platform.)
I just started listening to the second episode of Hidden Brain listed below but felt obligated to share them. I've found them to be instructive and thought-provoking from a cultural evolution of religion perspective.
"Creating God"
"Our God-Shaped Brains"
These two have also made me question whether we really do have a prolepsis of "blessed and incorruptible" characteristics of gods.... or whether the ubiquitous nature of gods across cultures is really (as talked about in "Our God-Shaped Brains") due to our innate proclivity (prolepsis) for assigning agency even where it doesn't exist, to anthropomorphize, and to engage in "teleological thinking" (seeing purpose where none really exists). The episode talks about these innate evolution-adapted proclivities giving rise to gods/spirits/divinities across cultures. Not some innate "preconception" of "blessed and incorruptible" beings existing somewhere. It seems to me that that is worth considering... although I'm fully aware this goes against Epicurean orthodoxy! There are still prolepses involved in there being ubiquitous gods, just not the prolepses that Epicurus posited. And if a "modern" Epicurean wants to imagine gods as admirable archetypes to emulate, I don't see a problem with that (at the moment I'm typing this at least). However, if these podcast episodes are correct, in a manner of speaking, the hoi polloi can be "forgiven" for holding the beliefs they do about the gods... in a way, evolution made them do it.
I'll have to cogitate on this for awhile, but I'm posting here for consideration by forum members. I look forward to any and all thoughts.
I am woefully late to the game on this thread, but **finally** feeling well enough to wade (way) back into some of the the threads I missed.
One thought that came to mind reading this thread is that the word "democracy" didn't mean exactly what we take it to mean today in Ancient Rome and Athens. ...although honestly there are some similarities, both postive and negative. Attempting to cleave to the "no politics" rule of this forum, I'll not go into details. But it seems Philodemus is especially concerned about the people - the hoi polloi, if you will - being able to be swayed by the rhetorical abilities of individuals skilled in the art of speech-making. < sarcasm > I'm glad that's not a concern anymore! < / sarcasm>
When it comes to Philodemus, I always like to go back and see what we're physically dealing with -- not just translation, but what physical remains are the translators working with. Toward that end...
And one example from that page: Philodemus: De rhetorica 1 (PHerc. 232, 234, 247, 250, 398, 426, 463, 1115, 1427, 1601, 1606, 1612, 1619, 1813), encoded by Claudio Vergara, Corinna Lang, Marcel Moser and Vanessa Zetzmann, revision by Vincenzo Damiani and Holger Essler (WCE)...
DCLP/Trismegistos 62474 = LDAB 3650
What I also find fascinating are some of the multi-spectral images of the papyri! fragment right N 1619 fr. 4 (=P.Herc. 1619) (Not a drawing but an actual photographic image. That's cool!)
Thank you, I am german (live near Würzburg where is an Epicurean science center on the university) so it is easy to read for me, perfect
That's good. If you find anything particularly interesting as you read it, please share.
It's in German but there's this:
Don, I mostly agree with your conclusion, but one issue I see is that the "faculty of discerning" would be a faculty of thought --- and not a faculty of the senses. The senses, anticipations included, are still in the "suck in all the sensory stimuli" phase.
I'm not seeing prolepsis as a faculty of thought. To me, there's only recognition of meaningful patterns on which thought can work to assign names or concepts. The analogy of the sieve is the best I can do right now, still feeling under the weather. I would agree that the faculty of prolepsis sucks in everything, but it's like that mechanical sorting bank that has slots for pennies, nickels, etc., in the crudest way. We're born with an innate sorting ability, otherwise our little brains would short circuit from all the stimuli. We have the ability to focus on patterns of significance in our environment. Now I'm not saying at this time how that translates into a "prolepsis of justice" etc., but I think I can get there from here.
Over the past few years, the most cogent suggestion as to what the faculty of prolepsis is the faculty of discerning patterns out of the cacophony of our sensations. It seems to me (to summarize what I've come to understand) that our sensations suck in all the applicable sensory stimuli - mental and physical - from our environment. The faculty of the prolepsis sieves those sensations to find discernible patterns, patterns that have been encountered before, repeated patterns that that faculty have significance within that cacophony. As we encounter them more often, we can find tune that recognition. A crude analogy is If a child's family has a "dog" , all animals are "dog" for awhile until the toddler discerns patterns that fine tune their recognition of patterns identified with other animals. Another crude analogy is the ability to discern patterns within a color blind test, ex.
The full circle is the flood of sensations. Prolepsis allows one to pick out the shape. Then reason/cognition steps in and assigns meaning, as in "that's the number 5."
To me pleasure and pain enter in after prolepsis but before assignment of cognitive meaning.
This confirms, once again, that everything sounds better with a posh English accent.
Cellar door
Thanks, Eikadistes !
For anyone who doesn't get the reference:
