Posts by Don

I realize I stray from the title of this thread, but one Lucretian passage I return to when it comes to gods is in Book 2:

In many a way she brings the many forth
Into the light of sun. And here, whoso
Decides to call the ocean Neptune, or
The grain-crop Ceres, and prefers to abuse
The name of Bacchus rather than pronounce
The liquor's proper designation, him
Let us permit to go on calling earth
Mother of Gods, if only he will spare
To taint his soul with foul religion.

Here, we're given permission to personify physical things metaphorically as gods. Why not metaphorical ideal lives as gods?

Wow! Even items from the Villa of the Papyri! Thanks for sharing.

PS. And, oh, the cradle! That is heartbreaking.

I suspected you might have a response, Cassius . I'm happy to state explicitly: This is my opinion and in no way would I assume to make a "policy statement" for the EpicureanFriends forum as a whole.

That said... To expand on my personal perspective...

Epicurus' and the ancient Greek concept of eidolon (images, films, etc) was revolutionary in its time and was a move toward an understanding. It was less wrong than the alternative theory of rays from us interacting with the external works and reporting back to us. However, eidola are not how the senses work nor is it how the brain and memory work. For me, starting from Epicurus' desire to know how things work, we modern Epicureans should endeavor to know how things work to the best level (and reserve judgement on what needs confirmation) we should not try to shoehorn ancient understanding into modern molds. Epicurus didn't have access to information we have, and we can't unlearn general scientific principles we take for granted now.

Responding to TauPhi , in relation to gods' moral/ethical incorruptibility, I'd say it describes their ability to never make any choice that dilutes or decreases their pleasure. They don't have "temptations" for lack of a better word like us mortals.

But I'll lay my cards on the table:

I don't believe in any gods.

Whether Epicurus taught there were physical gods or he thought of them as metaphors is secondary, to me. The most important aspect of Epicurus' teaching on the gods is that even if there were gods, they have no impact on the blessings or misfortunes that befall me in my life. Any thoughts I have about the gods of a one-way interaction.

If I want to imagine a perfect state, I can do that. If I want to call that perfect state "godlike", fine. But that *is* metaphorical.

Putting ourselves in Epicurus' headspace and social context in this topic is nigh impossible given our current understanding of the universe. Those tenets of "1. gods don't bestow blessings or curses. 2. There's no evidence the universe is created or sustained or administered by gods" are enough for me.

Quote from Godfrey

This leads from the fullness of pleasure, and the confidence of it continuing, to blessedness and incorruptibility.

From this current direction I'm headed, the gods would have confidence in the continuation of their incorruptible nature because they've come to a right view of how things are, the nature of pleasure, their inability to be affected by praise or blame, their self-reliance, and so on. The gods would have no more need of infinite lives than a mortal would, but I'd have to dig into the texts a little deeper than Raghunanan does on that eternal existence issue. Gods or the divine nature as a class may be eternally existing but that doesn't necessarily imply to me the necessity of the eternal existence of any one specific god.

From my perspective, it is problematic to assign the gods the activity of maintaining their "incorruptibility" through their actions. That implies to me that if they, for some reason, fail to maintain themselves that would be a source of anxiety for the gods. They would have to remain vigilant every minute, maintaining, checking, working to keep balance in their atoms, or some such thing. That seems incompatible with Epicurus's whole definition of divinity. To me this excerpt from Diogenes Laertius implies that not only do the gods not experience an increase in pleasure but they do not experience any decrease as well. If their "incorruptibility" aspect dips a little and they have to maintain it, that implies a decrease in pleasure as well.

Quote from Diogenes Laertius 10.121

Happiness must be understood in two senses; the highest happiness, such as is that of God, which admits of no increase; and another kind, which admits of the addition or abstraction of pleasures. (Yonge)

[121] Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῆ νοεῖσθαι, τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: καὶ τὴν <κατὰ τὴν> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.

VS33 also says "The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness." To me, a god would not have a body that cries out to not be incorruptible. I suppose someone could counter that the gods are "confident of continuing" to be incorruptible.

The paper by Geeta Raghunanan provides an interesting solution to the incorruptible seen as eternal issue:

“Imperishability” as Immunity to Moral Corruption: A Response to the Problem of the Imperishability of the Epicurean Gods (Presentation for the CPA Annual Congress 2014)

“Imperishability” as Immunity to Moral Corruption: A Response to the Problem of the Imperishability of the Epicurean Gods (Presentation for the CPA Annual…

www.academia.edu

Quote

I contend that they may be imperishable; that is, the Epicurean gods may be destined to dissolution and yet be imperishable in the sense that they are impervious to decay or corruption, particularly, what might be termed moral decay or moral corruption. ... But I emphasize “moral corruption” or “moral decay” also to incorporate Epicurean descriptions of the gods that seem to suggest that imperishability might in fact have meant to the Epicureans imperviousness to moral corruption. ... it is possible
to maintain that given an Epicurean physical theory and the doctrine that all compounds will dissolve, the Epicurean gods, as compounds, are yet still imperishable in the sense that they are morally incorruptible.

This appeals to me - if I were to accept the idea that the Epicureans thought of the gods as living beings. One of my main objections to "god as living being" vs "god as conceptual metaphor" is that I can't reconcile Epicurus's foresight and critical thinking with believing in a physical god... However, Raghunanan narrowing of αφθαρτον to "incorruptible" ie "not able to be corrupted, from a moral/ethical perspective" - with the understanding that the gods will eventually physically decay due to their being material compound beings is enticing. And, if the gods do die, it would be nothing to them as they have lived in the midst of unceasing pleasure.

Things to think about for me at least.

123f. ἐναργὴς γαρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις.

Here's our δέ "on the other hand."

ἐναργὴς [δέ] ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις

"And the knowledge (ἡ γνῶσις (gnōsis)) of them (θεοί "gods", note the plural here) is ἐναργὴς." But what does ἐναργὴς mean?

LSJ provides two primary definitions:

visible, palpable, in bodily shape, properly of gods appearing in their own forms (in Homer); so of a dream or vision; ex., ἐναργὴς ταῦρος "in visible form a bull, a very bull"

manifest to the mind's eye, distinct

Epicurus can't mean the first meaning since he's adamant that the gods don't interact with humans. But the second definition coincides with his contention (and the idea of the prolepsis of the gods) that the gods are apprehended by the mind only. In first Principal Doctrine's scholia (i.e., a note added to the text by a later author), we read τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς "the gods are conceived of through contemplation by reasoning." We don't - can't! - see the Epicurean gods with our physical eyes as Homer describes seeing the Olympian gods "in visible form." Homer's gods were εναργής in one sense of the word; Epicurus's in the other sense. The truth of the gods' existence in Epicurus's philosophy takes place entirely in our minds by reasoning through their existence by means of contemplation. But through that contemplation, Epicurus asserts that their existence is εναργής "clearly discernible to us / manifest to us in our minds."

This emphasis on contemplation is interesting in light of the characteristic of the Epicurean sage in Diogenes Laertius Book X.30: μᾶλλόν τε εὐφρανθήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις. I continue to maintain that "in contemplation" is the best translation of ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις for this characteristic of the sage: "The sage will also enjoy themselves more than others in contemplation, speculation, and theorizing." Many translators see this as referring to state festivals and spectacles. I've explored the use of the word elsewhere in Diogenes Laertius' work as well as in Aristotle online. https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…tion?authuser=0 If the gods are "manifest" in contemplation, this seems consistent with that characteristic of an Epicurean sage.

Unfortunately, this does nothing to resolve our problem with puzzling out how a god is a ζώον. Are they physically-existent material beings? Are they existing only as mental perceptions manifest merely to the mind's eye? The ambiguous nature of εναργής doesn't necessarily help us fully. It does, however, set up some of Epicurus's clever wordplay contrasting his view with Homer's.

Thanks, TauPhi , for the citation. I did have On Nature 14 as part of my review of Les Epicuriens that I checked out of the library on interlibrary loan. Here's my rough translation from the French, but we'll need to march this up to the Greek, too. This rough draft just happened to be sitting in my Google Drive:

[34 : p. 19 Leone: (29.22)]. [those] who specify a particular form belonging to fire, earth, water or air, are more ridiculous than those who, without specifying any, according to the juxtapositions, willy-nilly, that certain particular species of forms arise, which correspond to each of the associations which one could call substantial (for some are mistaken on the subject of the elements); but in speaking thus, they would say something that is more in line with these. And generally also they [introduce ?] differences in mixtures, and...

π̣[υρ]ὸς ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ̣ [ἀ]έ̣ρος

Fire or earth or water or air

γελοιότεροί something like "those who are to be laughed at", ultimately from γελάω "laugh" but meaning more like ludicrous, absurd; mirth-provoking, amusing. Maybe in the spirit of the "laughing philosophers"?

For a start:

Ionia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Chios is the same place as referenced in Philodemus' invitation to Piso for the Twentieth with "Chian wine", wine produced in Chios Βρομίου χιογενῆ.

Chian wine - Wikipedia

Metrodorus was not an uncommon name.

On Metrodorus of Chios:

Aetius (philosopher) - Wikipedia

Quote from Cassius

"teacher of Epicurean philosophy."

That makes the most sense.

Quote from Kalosyni

Quote from Don

αὔριον εἰς λιτήν σε καλιάδα, φίλτατε Πείσων,

ἐξ ἐνάτης ἕλκει μουσοφιλὴς ἕταρος,

εἰκάδα δειπνίζων ἐνιαύσιον: εἰ δ᾽ ἀπολείψεις

οὔθατα καὶ Βρομίου χιογενῆ πρόποσιν,

ἀλλ᾽ ἑτάρους ὄψει παναληθέας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπακούσῃ

Φαιήκων γαίης πουλὺ μελιχρότερα:

ἢν δέ ποτε στρέψῃς καὶ ἐς ἡμέας ὄμματα, Πείσων,

ἄξομεν ἐκ λιτῆς εἰκάδα πιοτέρην.

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Don English translation?

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It's Philodemus' epigram invitation to Piso to attend the Twentieth at Philodemus self+described καλιάς "hut, wooden dwelling." Metaphorically, it can refer to a bird's nest or can refer to a shrine.

To-morrow, dearest Piso, your friend, beloved by the Muses, who keeps our annual feast of the twentieth * invites you to come after the ninth hour to his simple cottage. If you miss udders and draughts of Chian wine, you will see at least sincere friends and you will hear things far sweeter than the land of the Phaeacians. But if you ever cast your eyes on me, Piso, we shall celebrate the twentieth richly instead of simply.

Philodemus: Epigrams - translation

αὔριον εἰς λιτήν σε καλιάδα, φίλτατε Πείσων,

ἐξ ἐνάτης ἕλκει μουσοφιλὴς ἕταρος,

εἰκάδα δειπνίζων ἐνιαύσιον: εἰ δ᾽ ἀπολείψεις

οὔθατα καὶ Βρομίου χιογενῆ πρόποσιν,

ἀλλ᾽ ἑτάρους ὄψει παναληθέας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπακούσῃ

Φαιήκων γαίης πουλὺ μελιχρότερα:

ἢν δέ ποτε στρέψῃς καὶ ἐς ἡμέας ὄμματα, Πείσων,

ἄξομεν ἐκ λιτῆς εἰκάδα πιοτέρην.

I also want to say that I don't think we're trying to rationalize or water down or make excuses for Epicurus on this. I'm including both the 4th line of the tetrapharmakos AND PD04 in this. Epicurus was neither stupid nor naive. But if even Cicero can give criticism that makes one go "Hmmm, he's not entirely wrong here" it deserves some digging into the meaning.

I wanted to add, after my lengthy digressions, a short appreciation of the chance to discuss this. I assume most people will read "easily" and dismiss Epicurus as out of touch and irrelevant. Here we have the opportunity to wrestle with, discuss, bounce ideas off each other.

So, thank you to the community, to the existence of the forum, to Cassius for being the "founder of this feast".

Quote from Godfrey

The big criticism of PD04 is that it takes severe circumstances too lightly. Chronic long-term illness, terminal illness: these must be boldly met.

I've tried to rationalize PD04 in the past as "Epicurus was writing in a different time. Wounds or illnesses that would be curable now were fatal back then. PD just needs updating to our time.... Etc." But if I remember correctly, even Cicero had the same criticism we do of the sentiments of PD04:

2.29.94 On Ends: As for your maxim that severe pain is short and prolonged pain light, I cannot make out what it may mean. For I see pains that are at once severe and considerably prolonged; and the truer way to endure them is the other method, which you who do not love moral worth for its own sake are not able to employ. Courage has its precepts and its rules, rules of constraining force, that forbid a man to show womanish weakness in pain. Hence it must be considered a disgrace, I do not say to feel pain (that is sometimes inevitable), but that 'rock of Lemnos to outrage' with the cries of a Philoctetes,

Till the dumb stones utter a voice of weeping,

Echoing his wails and plaints, his sighs and groanings.

Let Epicurus soothe with his spells, if he can, the man whose

Veins and vitals, from the viper's fang

Envenom'd, throb with pangs of anguish dire

in this way: 'Philoctetes! If pain is severe, it is short.' Oh, but he has been languishing in his cave for these ten years past. "If it is long, it is light: for it grants intervals of respite.' In the first place, this is not often the case; and secondly, what is the good of a respite embittered by recent pain still fresh in memory, and tormented by fear of pain impending in the future? Let him die, says Epicurus. Perhaps that were the best course, but what becomes of the maxim about 'a constant preponderance of pleasure'? If that be true, are you not guilty of a crime in advising him to end his life? Well, then, let us rather tell him that it is base and unmanly to let pain demoralize, crush and conquer one. As for the formula of your sect, 'Short if it's strong, light if it's long,' it is a tag for copybooks. Virtue, magnanimity, endurance, courage — it is these that have balm to assuage pain.

I'll have to go back and listen to the podcast episode(s) that tackle those sections.

Thread

Episode 219 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 26 -Cicero Continues His Attack On Epicurus' Position On Pain

Welcome to Episode 219 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread…

Cassius

March 10, 2024 at 2:30 PM

However, even Cicero's last line - Virtue, magnanimity, endurance, courage — it is these that have balm to assuage pain. - I don't know if Epicurus would disagree. Can pain be endured boldly by leaning on courage and being generous and kind to others who genuinely want to help, living virtuously? Does that path eventually lead to a "preponderance of pleasure"?

Quote from Cassius

Would "readily" work?

No.

Seriously though, "readily" conveys to me something immediately available: "without hesitating; ex., They readily accepted her advice." It can be used for "easily" but, to me, it doesn't have the right connotation.

Quote from Eikadistes

Fear not God nor death;
The good is easy to get,
The bad, boldly met.

I like the direction that heads. We don't have to run from pain or hide from pain or try to convince ourselves that pain isn't there. But boldly strikes me as leaning Stoic: teeth-gritting, "virtuously" standing up to show how one sees oneself as being indifferent to pain.

That said, some synonyms/uses of "boldy" are possible: fearless before danger; (obsolete) assured, confident.

We can be "emboldened" by putting "the terrible" in context. If the pain is acknowledged and dealt with, we need not pile mental suffering on top of physical pain or on mental pain, grief, sorrow, etc. I'm an NOT saying that chronic pain is "easily" dealt with, as in "it's no big deal, be stoically indifferent to it." Investigate it, how can you gain perspective on it? How can you put it into context within the larger experience of your life. By Zeus, I count myself fortunate that I do not have any type of chronic pain, but I am convinced that if we belittle anyone who does or say "Pain is easily endured," Epicurus's philosophy loses credibility.

That said, I still contend boldly that the tetrapharmakos is a useful shorthand for those who want to explore the philosophy and a useful shorthand for "veteran Epicureans" to keep the MOST basic tenets of the philosophy at hand.

So, how to deal with the English translation "easily..."? We don't seem to have a problem with the εὔκτητον "easy to get". We don't like the εὐεκκαρτέρητον "easily endured."

I keep coming back to my options in #48 above: "without undue effort" or going smoothly or being able to accomplish something without any impediments or burdens. In keeping with eu-'s usual "well/good" connotation.

εὔ-κτητον "well/good - acquired, procured" Interestingly, LSJ gives εὔκτητος the definition of "honestly acquired." One can acquire pleasure without effort. It is literally all around you, every minute of the day, if you are willing to recognize it (i.e., everything that does not cause pain). It can be "easily" acquired. There are no impediments to acquiring The Good, only the impediments you put in your own way.

εὐ-εκκαρτέρητον "well/good" > ἐγκαρτερέω "persevere or persist in a thing" To me, persevere or persist has a a different feel/connotation than "endure." It's a subtle shade of meaning, but it's there - nagging at my neurons. Endure has a teeth-gritting quality to it. If one "perseveres well" or "persists well"... what could that mean? To me, the word is still saying that we can persevere in the presence of pain IF we don't throw up impediments that are unnecessary. Worrying about worrying. Being anxious about something that has not happened yet. And so on. Keeping PD4 in mind.

NONE of this is "easy" in the sense of "trivial." "Oh, that's SO easy. La de da." No, maybe effortlessly? One synonym is "uncomplicated" for effortless. Don't complicate the pursuit of pleasure or the perseverance of pain! Take it easy. Don't fight against the waves. Let the waves of pleasure wash over you. Enjoy them. Don't fight against the waves of pain. Acknowledge them. Embrace the help of friends and family. Accept emotional and medical help for chronic disease pain. Pick your battles. Don't fight needlessly.

So, in the end, I guess there's not a perfect one-word English modifer for a translation of εὔκτητον and εὐεκκαρτέρητον. Easily, effortlessly, boldly, readily, prudently?? Sensibly, wisely?

καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, - and The Good, on the one hand, is effortlessly acquired

τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον - while on the other hand, we prudently persevere against The Terrible

Those are convoluted paraphrases, taking the dynamic equivalence approach to translation to a fare-the-well! But that's how I'm beginning to understand those two lines and to make peace with εὔκτητον and εὐεκκαρτέρητον.

We all have issues with that "easily..." in the translations. So, this morning before work I took a stroll through the LSJ dictionary to look at other words with the eu- prefix. The prefix usually carries the idea of well or good, and not all eu- words are "easily" but first here's the small selection I pulled out:

ευκριτος easy to decide
ευκρυπτος easy to hide
εὐλέπιστος easily peeled or shelled
ευλυρος skilled in the lyre (easy with the lyre?)
ευλυσια suppleness, ease of movement
εὔρητος easy to tell
εὐρίπιστος easily fanned into flame
εὔροπος easy sliding, easy slipping (as in a noose)
εὐρύθμιστος easily shaped
ευλαβής Pass., easy to get hold of, but also metaph., undertaking prudently, discreet, cautious

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ε , εὐκρα_τό-μελι , εὐλαβ-ής

To me, the common idea is "without undue effort" or going smoothly or being able to accomplish something without any impediments or burdens. Maybe an option is to think about those last two lines as these paths need not be seen as being something to be worried about. We will endure pain. We endure it with the help of friends. We endure it by keeping it in perspective. Don't add undue mental suffering and worry to physical pain. We can find pleasure The Good if we're just open to it.

First thoughts. Responses welcomed.