Posts by Don

Spaced out and transliterated in upper/lower case for easier reading, the letters on the image on the scroll would be:
Tetrapharmakos
Ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, (transliterated: Aphobon ho theos)
ἀνύποπτον ὁ θάνατος (anupopton ho thanatos)
καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, (kai tagathon [to + agathon] men eukteton)
τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον (to de deinon euekkartereton)

My own literal translation (with more alternatives shared below):
God is no cause for fear.
Death is free from risk.
The Highest Good is easily procured,
While the Terrible is easy to endure.

Line by line:
Ἄφοβον ὁ θεός,
1a. Ἄφοβος causing no fear, free from fear (a + phobon)
1b. ὁ θεός with the singular article, god/God BUT Liddell & Scott give an interesting alternative definition at 1.d. ὁ θ., of natural phenomena. So, an interesting *possibility* would be, paraphrasing, "We have nothing to fear from the gods or natural phenomenon."

ἀνύποπτον ὁ θάνατος

2a. ἀνύποπτος LSJ: without suspicion; i.e., free from risk
2b. θάνατος death

καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, (NOTE: καὶ = and; μὲν... δὲ... in lines 3 & 4 simply show those two phrases are connected. Clunky translations would be "One the one hand,...; on the other hand,...)

3a. τἀγαθὸν can be thought of as “the highest good” "The Good" (to + agathon) So, is this actually refer to Pleasure, "The Highest Good" "Pleasure is easy to obtain"?
3c. εὔκτητον “honestly acquired” per LSJ (Phld.Sto.339.4.), easily gotten. From: εὔ-κτητος, ον “good, well” + “that may be gotten”

τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον
4a. τὸ (δὲ) δεινὸν “fearful, terrible; danger, suffering, horror” (TRIVIA: This "deino" is the "dino" in "dinosaur = terrible lizard")
4b. εὐεκκαρτέρητον “easy to endure”
As above is "τὸ δεινὸν to deinon" The Terrible referring to Pain? Pleasure is easy to obtain, and Pain can be endured.?

So another alternative:

There is nothing to fear from gods or natural phenomenon,

There is no afterlife of which to be suspicious,

And Pleasure is easy to obtain,

while Pain can be easily endured.

Food for thought.

Cassius has also expressed interest in finding out more about PHerc 1005 in which the tetrapharmakos is found. The following provide some context for the work and was found in two reviews of Anna Angeli's work in JSTOR:

The following citation and excerpt were in Italian. I used Google Translate (see below)

1st Work from JSTOR:
Review
Reviewed Work(s): L'ira. volume V, (ed. Bibliopolis) by null Filodemo, Giovanni Indelli and
Marcello Gigante; Frammenti. volume VI, (ed. Bibliopolis) by null Ermarco, Francesca Longo Auricchio and Marcello Gigante; Agli Amici di Scuola (P. Herc. 1005). volume VII, (ed. Bibliopolis) by null Filodemo, Anna Angeli and Marcello Gigante; La poesia. volume IX, (ed. Bibliopolis) by Demetrio Lacone, Costantina Romeo and Marcello Gigante
Review by: Elisabetta Martelli
Source: Aegyptus, Anno 69, No. 1/2 (gennaio-dicembre 1989), pp. 288-293
Published by: Vita e Pensiero – Pubblicazioni dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41217138

Excerpt from 291-2 using Google Translate for Italian > English

In her Introduction, Angeli deals with the difficult task of reconstructing the subject, structure, doctrine, title and dating of Philodemus' Ad Contubernales treatise, preserved by P. Herc. 1005 with serious gaps especially in the initial part (p. 25 ff.). The work has a controversial content, as revealed not only by the contents, but also by the subscription, of which only "Philodemou Pros tous .." survives. A careful investigation on several fronts allows the scholar to exclude a controversy by Philodemus against philosophers from other schools, and leads her to glimpse a lively debate within the Epicurean school itself; confirming an intuition already of Gigante, Angeli admits as possible the integration "Pros tous [synethes]", or "Pros tous I [hetairous]", or similar; worthy of note is the accepted hypothesis that "Pros" can be interpreted with the meaning of ad, rather than with the value of adversus (pp. 71-75); the work is dated around the middle of the first century. B.C. Angeli dedicates large sections of her research to the study of the three topics around which it is possible to reconstruct the controversy of Philodemus against classmates. The first argument concerns the accusation, evidently addressed to the Epicureans of the school of Athens, of venerating the figure of the wise philosopher as the mass of men venerates the gods; Angeli presents it in a chapter entitled "Logoi eis apeiron ekpiptontes", with the aim of underlining the logical and gnoseological principle to which Philodemus refers to refute the accusation (fr. 77), according to a typically epicurean procedure; in conclusion, Philodemus shows the interlocutor critic that the reverence towards the wise is fully licit, and was born as an act of gratitude for the benefits received from his philosophical teachings, while the reprehensible cult of the gods, proper to the mass, arises from the false prejudice that from them descend the good to which man aspires and the unexpected evil; the debate is felt by the scholar as a sign of the need for a part of Epicureanism of the first century. B.C. to limit the religious characterization of the cult to the essay proper to the school (pp. 29-37). The second topic concerns the nature of the summaries, epitomes and maxims, which played a large part in the spread of Epicureanism on the initiative of the Master himself, but which in the course of time inevitably led to a certain trivialization and simplification of the doctrine; the debate on this theme is reconstructed with great detail by Angeli, according to which it testifies, already for the second half of the second century. BC, a strand of Greek Epicureanism that spread the doctrine among ever wider social strata, but with tools not approved by the Athens school. The famous maxim of tetrapharmakoe mentioned in col. V 1-6, is finally attributed to Philodemus himself, rather than Epicurus (pp. 37-61). The third argument enters into the merits of Epicurus' struggle against traditional "paideia", and of the subsequent problem of characterizing doctrine as a democratic or aristocratic philosophy, strongly felt by the Epicureans themselves; Philodemus clashes with the other Epicureans precisely on the system's diffusion program (pp. 61-70).

2nd excerpt from JSTOR:
Review
Reviewed Work(s): Filodemo, Agli Amici di Scuola (Pherc. 1005) by Anna Angeli; Demetrio
Lacone, Aporie Testuali ed Esegetiche in Epicuro (Pherc. 1012) by Enzo Puglia; Demetrio
Lacone, La Poesia (Pherc. 188 e 1014) by Costantina Romeo; Carneisco, Il Secondo Libro del
Filista (Pherc. 1027) by Mario Capasso
Review by: Phillip de Lacy
Source: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 111, No. 4 (Winter, 1990), pp. 573-577
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/295250

The latest of these texts is 1005 (vol. 7), a work of Philodemus. By the time of Philodemus, early first century B.C., the Epicureans were adapting their teachings to changing times and circumstances. Questions of orthodoxy arose, and Philodemus participated in the resultant controversies. In 1005 he accuses certain unnamed Epicureans of failing to follow the teaching of Epicurus, and in support of his position he quotes and explicates passages from Epicurus' writings. Angeli, who gives in her introduction a good account of the history of controversy within the school, presents a text that differs at many points from that of E Sbordone (Naples, 1947). She rejects outright some of Sbordone's restorations, including those that appear as fragments 262 and 263 in the second edition of Arrighetti's Epicuro. Others are greatly altered. An important passage in 1005 is Philodemus' quotation from a letter almost certainly by Epicurus that mentions Aristotle's Analytics and Physics, frag. 13 Sbordone, frag. 127 Arrighetti, and now frag. 111 Angeli. Aristotle is still there, but Crates has disappeared, Aristippus is now author of a work Su Socrate, and there is a new entry, Speusippus' Encomium of Plato. Angeli's comment on this passage is seven pages long, and indeed her restoration is attractive, except that one might question whether Aristippus' work had the title "Peri Sokratous"; see the lists of Aristippus' writings in Diog. Laer. ii. 84-85.
The title that Angeli gives to the papyrus is also questionable. All that remains of the subscription is "Philodemou Pros tous". Taking "pros" as expressing opposition, Sbordone, and Vogliano before him, supplied "sophistas". Angeli, however, believing that Philodemus is addressing his associates, supplies "hetairous". But the Epicureans, so far as I can discover, did not address each other as hetairoi. In Epicurus, frag. 119 Arrighetti, hetairos does not refer to a member of the school, and the hetairos of Diogenes of Oenoanda (frag. 16 11 Chilton) is beginning the study of philosophy and is not committed to Epicureanism. The feminine hetaira, courtesan, was used in attacks on the school (see Plut. Mor 1129B, Diog. Laer. x.6), and Angeli introduces ieaita as a conjecture in 1005.
The similar entry in Usener's Glossarium Epicureum is also a conjecture. But even if these conjectures should be correct, they give no support to the view that the Epicureans addressed each other as hetairoi. When Epicurus wrote to his followers he called them philoi.
Another uncertainty bearing on Angeli's title is the question whether in this papyrus Philodemus is addressing one person or a group. Some of the second-person forms are singular, some plural. Angeli's solution is that he is addressing a group but sometimes limits his address to one member of the group. Possibly, but since JtQ6g is ambiguous, it is better to leave the question of the title unanswered.

Welcome, Dernga ! "Here you will do well to tarry; here our highest goal is pleasure."

Yes, I think we do agree. Epicurus built his whole philosophy to do this. Lucretius built his whole poem to establish why other philosophies and Religion, writ large, were unsatisfactory and even dangerous individually and as a society.

My contention through our discussion is just that I think you're trying to make this one brick (KD 10) do more work than it has to. It's just one brick in the fortress, holding up other bricks and being held up by others (to overuse my metaphor). *I* think it's fine for this one brick to say the things giving pleasure to the profligate are not going to dispel their fears and teach them the limits of pleasure. Then we go on to other bricks to get more detail on the inadequacy of virtue as the goal of life, why we can't be Skeptics and still function in the world, why the study of nature is so important, and so on.

Quote from Cassius

Eugenios where is that Bailey list found?

Extant Remains, p.346 (Internet Archive link)

LOL I suspected you might have a different take, and I looked forward to reading your response

As previously, I don't think we're as far apart as some others reading this may think, I think. I certainly respect your passion, and I am looking forward to delving more into DeWitt.

I agree that Epicurus and his intellectual descendants were no wilting violets when it came to defending the school he founded. We just have to read the titles of their works in Diogenes L to see all the "Against" this school or "against" that Philosopher. I imagine Epicurus saying, anachronistically of course, "Come at me, bro! You don't stand a chance." Philodemus and Lucretius were doing the same with their works. Cannons/Canons were blazing until the Christian Juggernaut swept ALL before it. I highly recommend the fairly recent book The Darkening Age: The Christian Destruction of the Classical World by Catherine Nixey if you really want to weep for what might have been.

I find your point about the possible original narrative structure of the Kuriai Doxai interesting. That makes sense, especially when we have the Letters as examples of narrative epitomes. I have also seen Cyril Bailey's proposed division of the 40. He proposed that the KD can be grouped thus:

• CBi. 1-4: The tetrapharmakos, the four-fold fundamental principles necessary for a tranquil life
• CBii. 5: The relation of pleasure to virtue
• CBiii. 6, 7: Protection from external disturbances
• CBiv. 8-10: The selection of pleasures
• CBv. 11-13: The ethical value of physical science
• CBvi. 14-21: The wise man’s life in relation to nature, his fellow men, and to true pleasure (can be sub-divided)
• CBvii. 22-26: The tests and standards of moral (i.e., truly pleasant) action
• CBviii. 27, 28: Friendship
• CBix. 29, 30: The classification of desires
• CBx. 31-38: Justice and injustice
• CBxi. 39, 40: The wise man’s life in the Epicurean community

I'm not saying any of that is earth-shattering but I've found it interesting as an organizing principle which would lend itself whether in list or paragraph form.

I will say that when you wrote:

Epicurus could not simply state a goal of "more pleasure than pain" without justifying that pleasure was in fact the goal.

I have to say, in a small way, I disagree with you in emphasis. I think Epicurus DID justify pleasure as the goal in how he laid out the entire Canon, Physics, and Ethics. Lucretius does the same. It wasn't that Epicurus just "stated the goal" that pleasure was the goal. He built, from the ground up, a mighty fortress to defend that assertion with the flag of pleasure flying from the turrets! He continued to let fly arrows at his opponents through his writings until the Christian nuke ALMOST wiped him out. But eventually, "he" (as in his and his followers' works) could emerge from the underground bunker and begin some guerilla warfare.

And you thought YOU had a "too romantic an attachment to the Epicurean school,."

An interesting take, but...

Quote from Cassius

Have the anti-Epicureans been arguing that it is difficult to predict that relentless drinking and debauchery will ultimately lead to pain that outweighs the pleasure that was involved initially? Have the anti-Epicureans been saying that Epicurus was too tough and too judgmental on people who didn't have the judgment to stop drinking before it was too late?

Or have the anti-Epicureans been arguing against his message that there is is no absolute rule-making authority, and that their gods and their virtue are meaningless or worse?

Which message more distinguishes Epicurus, and therefore is so important to understand that it makes the "top ten" list of important things for Epicurean students to remember?

...I would say let the anti-Epicureans take a one-way trip with Charon across the Styx (figuratively, speaking, of course ). From my perspective, The Principal Doctrines weren't made for them or to refute their ignorant philosophies. The epitomes were written for Epicureans by Epicureans to have a ready summary to review and memorize. Just as VS 26 says: Understand that short discourses and long discourses both achieve the same thing. We are lucky to even have what we have to even discuss different interpretations, but the teachings are all encapsulated in both long and short discourses (even the 4-line Tetrapharmakos). So, technically, PD 10 made the Top 40.

My take is that, for an Epicurean, this Doctrine reminds us to ignore society and culture telling us that more is better, greed is good, and that true pleasure has limits and we would do well to remember that, otherwise we could end up with more pain than pleasure in our life. Society and culture can speak with bullhorns. Ignore them! I'm not saying that's the only import of PD 10, but I believe it's an important one.

I find it interesting that PD 10 is sandwiched between PD 9 and 11. This is surely another discussion but PD 9 seems to reinforce "Pleasure is pleasure, period" (what we've been saying in 10) and 11 talks about the same fears in 10 that aren't allayed by the overindulgence of the profligate. I think there *may* be some significance in the context and order of those 3, and I'm sure I'm not the first to say it. Just cogitating out loud.

I have been taking great pleasure in this back and forth, Cassius . Thank you for a stimulating conversation. Would that we could be enjoying it in the shade of the Garden, a slight breeze blowing through the trees, with some bread, cheese, and a bottle of wine or spring water, whichever pleases you.

I hear what you mean (I think) about different emphases. It's not so much disagreement as seeing different parts of the elephant (to use the old proverb). We just need to acknowledge we're both looking at the same elephant.

Agree when your sentiments, plus The Disgruntled Medievalists would be a great name for a band, I think.

I *think* we may have come to a mutual agreement!

I believe we're both agreeing with the "proof is in the pudding" and I would concur with your assertion that Epicurus would agree with #1 (general rules, general categories, "not that God or virtue or anything else makes it "evil" or "always wrong."") but reject #2 ("absolute standard by which we can say that a particular course of conduct is ALWAYS worthy of reproach").

I also find the "general category" idea in keeping with Epicurean reasoning by inference as I understand it and comparing similar cases : If this is usually the case, and this case looks like that case, this is going to be the likely result. Likewise, in this Doctrine, if "party hard" behavior usually leads to pain, chances are that if you engage in that, you're going to experience more pain than pleasure. For that reason, we're going to "strongly advise" (read: reproach) you to not go down that path. As Epicureans, we'd like to offer an alternative perspective for you to consider. But, hey, it's up to you.

I *think* I see where you're going with this, Cassius . Let me provide a little more of my understanding, trying to incorporate what I think you are saying.
τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν means "Those things which produce the pleasures of the profligate (ἀσώτοι)." That's what the text says. Period.
So, what produces "the pleasures of the profligate"? I imagine this would refer to what is typically associated with decadent behavior: too much alcohol, too many drugs, too much dangerous sex, too much rich food, etc. All these things *would* result in pleasure. And, as Epicurus said, no pleasure is in itself an evil but some pleasures should be chosen while others should be rejected for future pleasures. I understand this Doctrine to speak directly to that precept.
The problem for the profligate is that they don't respect the natural limits of pleasure and so would, more than likely, see "those things which produce" their pleasures result in pains greater than the pleasure experienced. They are pleasures which have been excessively overindulged in by the profligate, which is what opens them up to reproach and blame. They have not utilized their choices and rejections wisely. They have not practiced prudence, which is one of the features of leading a pleasurable life, and so, even though they experience pleasure, they are, in the end, going to experience more pain because they don't respect the limits of pleasure or will not have their existential fears assuaged.
Epicurus isn't putting forth a standard of pleasure here. Pleasure is pleasure. Period. What I believe he's saying here is:
If an overabundance of alcohol, overindulgence in dangerous sex, overeating rich food, allayed the profligate's fears and taught them the limits of pleasure, we'd have no reason to reproach them. (But, if they keep ignoring the limits of pleasure and are not practicing prudence to attain the greatest good, which is maximizing pleasure in one's life, we can reproach them for their unwise behavior.)
That's my take on this Doctrine.

I've been giving your response some thought and have have done some additional investigation. τὰ ποιητικὰ, upon further study as well as consultation of the Epicurus Wiki, means "those things which produce" or "those things which are capable of making". τὰ ποιητικὰ are the subjects of the sentence.

Therefore εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν would mean something like "IF those things which produce the pleasures of the profligate..." So we're talking explicitly about those things which produce the feelings of pleasure for the profligate.

So, IF these things...did what?
...ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων...
"... set free the fears of thinking about meterological phenomena, death, and pains..."

The remainder of the doctrine then tells us that IF these things which produce the pleasures of the profligate dispelled these fears and taught them the limits of pleasure, we would have no reason to reproach them (i.e., the profligate).

The Epicurus Wiki gives a good full translation:
"If the things which debauched men find pleasurable put an end to all fears (such as concerns about the heavenly bodies, death, and pain) and if they revealed how we ought to limit our desires, we would have no reason to reproach them, for they would be fulfilled with pleasures from every source while experiencing no pain, neither in mind nor body, which is the chief evil of life."

Yonge (1895) gives the following: "If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our desires, we should have no pretence for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter."

All of this, from my perspective, then clearly shows that Epicurus did not believe the pleasures these profligate individuals were experiencing were indeed dispelling the fears of death, etc., nor were they teaching them the limits of pleasure, and that this DID open the profligate up to reproach and blame.

This appears to be a direct refutation of the sensual, hedonistic Cyrenaics and to rebuff the argument that some leveled against the Epicureans as debauched hedonists. Epicurus could point to his tenth Principal Doctrine and say, "If the pleasures of the profligate really dispelled the fears I say are important and taught them them the limits of pleasure as I teach, you could lump me and my friends in with them. But I find the profligate worthy of reproach because they are not having their fears dispelled not are they learning the limits of pleasure."

I look forward to reading your thoughts, Cassius ! Thanks!

I sincerely found your post very thought-provoking, Elayne . Thank you for some intellectually-stimulating reading.
That being said, I'm not sure that I accept all of your premises. Let me further explain my perspective, and then I welcome your response and others'. That's what I'm here for: to share, to discuss, and to learn.
I certainly agree that pleasure is given to us by nature to serve as "the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing." (Letter to Menoikos). Yes! Fully onboard with that. So, my initial point was not necessarily that sociopaths or psychopaths are not feeling pleasure. I think they could be subjectively feeling pleasure. However, I think an argument could be made that their brains are "wired" differently than the majority of people. In which case, are their feelings of pleasure reliable guides for them? Why else would medications be prescribed for some?
Parallel to that, there are people who are physically unable to feel pain and are unable to tell if they are being injured. There is a literal physical impediment to their being able to use a feeling of pain to make choices and rejections. Could not there also be people who are unable to feel pleasure correctly, similar to those who can't feel pain or even whose sight may perceive the distant square tower as round? Epicurus writes to Herodotus that "Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true." If one is blind or visually impaired, they cannot use the sense of sight to perceive the world and to base any choices or rejections on it. If someone's mental sense of feeling pleasure or pain is impaired, can they use those as reliable standards?
Additionally, Principal Doctrine 25 instructs that "If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony." (St-Andre translation) Is the psychopath or sociopath doing this? Are they "turning too soon to some other kind of goal" and so keeping their thoughts and actions out of tune? I would interpret the "natural goal of life" to be "living pleasurably." I would further interpret "living pleasurably" as defined by Principal Doctrine 5 (emphasis added): "It is not possible to live pleasurably without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; and it is impossible to live with wisdom, morality, and justice without living pleasurably. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a pleasurable life."
It is my contention that we can decide if someone is living a pleasurable life or if they're living with a delusion by applying this standard. Similarly, from my perspective, Epicurus also tells us that we can see famous and rich people thinking that they are going to be living pleasurably but they're just swapping one set of pains for another (Fragment 479). We could say they believe they're living pleasurably but they're delusional in the general sense of the word.
Living pleasurably is not the same as feeling pleasure. A prisoner (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleasurably. Someone living in abject poverty (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleasurably. The feeling of pleasure alone is not a sufficient reason to contend that someone is living a pleasurable life.

Elayne , I would concur with your post. I hope I didn't imply "rest was preferable." I would agree that Epicurus is saying "most people" don't know how to be at rest or how to be active. An Epicurean should be able to find pleasure in both stillness/rest and activity/motion. So, an alternative translation, taking advantage of the stereotypical translation of μεν... δε...would be:

On the one hand, for the majority of people, being at rest is to be in a stupor and numb; on the other hand, being active for them is to be raving like a rabid dog.

I thought it might be helpful for this discussion to put the major players into historical context. How far removed from Epicurus was Cicero? How about Diogenes Laertius? Who was a contemporary of who? Who had access to whom?

Here's a little scorecard:

Name, birth and death, Years +/- from Epicurus' birth

• Socrates (470 – 399 BCE) (E -129)
• Democritus (b. c.460 BCE) (E -119)
• Plato (428-423 – 348/347 BCE) (E -87)
• Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE) (E -43)
• Epicurus (341 – 270 BCE) (E 0)
• Zeno of Citium (c. 334 – c. 262 BCE) (E +7)
• Metrodorus of Lampsacus (331 – 277 BCE) (E +10)
• Hermarchus (325 – 250 BCE) (E +16)
• Zeno of Sidon (150 – 75 BCE) (E +191)
• Philodemus (110 – 35 BCE) (E +231)
• Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 – 43 BCR) (E +235)
• Titus Lucretius Carus (b. 94 BCE) (E +247)
• Quintus Horatius Flaccus ("Horace", 65 – 8 BCE) (E +276)
• Epictetus (55 – 135 CE) (E +396)
• Diogenes of Oenoanda (wall dated 117 – 138 CE) (E +458)
• Diogenes Laërtius (b. 180 - 240 CE) (E +521)

I have been reading the Gosling & Taylor and Nikolsky articles in the Library here. They are fascinating and I thank Cassius for recommending them. I simply took the kinetic/katastematic categories to be accepted fact. Those articles are an eye-opener in arguing persuasively that that isn't necessarily so.

I can see your perspective (Oops, no pun intended there). These kinds of ambiguous or hard-to-interpret lines reinforce facts like we're dealing with:

• a language in which no one alive today can really be 100% fluent (Latin as it was spoken and understood by actual Romans)
• a manuscript transmission for which it is impossible to know if it was 100% accurately transcribed.
• a philosophy for which we've lost so much primary source material and have to rely on fragments and so much secondhand and often hostile commentators.

It's not impossible to take all these into account and interpret texts and try to follow Epicurus' path, but it is often all seen through a glass darkly to bring that whole vision analogy back in...

OMG! That *just* stuck me as I write that! I *think* I Corinthians 13:12 could be saying something parallel (but supernatural) to that line in Lucretius in a similar poetic manner. The Amplified Bible has:

12 For now [in this time of imperfection] we see in a mirror dimly [a blurred reflection, a riddle, an enigma], but then [when the time of perfection comes we will see reality] face to face. Now I know in part [just in fragments], but then I will know fully, just as I have been fully known [by God].

Please don't misinterpret! This Pauline poetic metaphorical language about vision just struck me. I'm not implying or ascribing ANY supernatural or Christian content in or connection to Lucretius, just that using poetic metaphor in DRN like this conveys something - for us - like our vision isn't capable of seeing the reality of atoms with our eyes through our limited vision but Epicurus was the first to be able to "see" reality face-to-face through those "barred doors" and to share that with us so we could "see" it, too.

Okay, I realize I'm descending down the rabbit hole on this one. Time to climb my way back to the sunlit world and move along in the poem.

εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν <καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων> ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

A big "if." If this is the case, we have no argument against the profligate. But...
The word translated as just "profligate" here is ἀσώτους which literally means "those having no hope of safety, the abandoned, the profligate, Latin. perditus." And the Latin word then conveys "the destroyed, the ruined; the wasted, the squandered; the lost."

From these connotations, we can easily see that Epicurus does not hold out the prospect here that the ἀσώτοι have a chance of resolving all their fears of death, suffering, etc., through their wanton "pleasures" ἡδονῶν. That is why Epicurus does indeed have complaints against them. They have no hope of safety - they literally need to be saved as if they're still at sea and drowning - and Epicurus is out to save them from themselves.

Fair points, Cassius Allow me to rephrase my thoughts.

By using "wanting" I wanted to convey that if you're envious, you want something. You're lacking something you want, something you feel that you deserve. From my perspective, Lucretius is saying our vision is jealous in the sense that it "wants" to see all of Nature's secrets, greedy to see everything hidden from view... but it can't. But our vision just isn't capable of seeing atoms, so Lucretius is telling us how we can perceive them by analogy and by using our other senses (including our mental sense).

As to the barred doors of Nature, I have thoughts. (Hard to believe, I know ) From my perspective, this is nothing more than Lucretius exercising his poetic muscles. This language is simply describing, in a poetic manner, the idea that Epicurus was the first to reveal the secrets of nature that no one else could figure out. Before Epicurus, nature's processes were accepted as being under the control of the gods or other supernatural forces. The processes behind "the nature of things" were hidden behind "the close-set bolts upon the doors of nature" to simply use poetic language. That's so much better than just saying "Epicurus figured things out that no one else figured out before him because he was really smart." There is no one or no thing standing guard at actual or figurative doors. It's simply poetry: the honey on the rim of the cup of wormwood.

I was listening to Episode 9 in my car on my way to work this morning and found myself desperately wanting to chime in as you all were discussing the jealous/envious aspect of vision.

My take on that line was that it is our faculty of vision itself that is greedy, envious, that is wanting, etc. There's no outside agency that's jealous.

Inanother sense, it is we, through our sight, who feel we are entitled to see everything! Nothing should be hidden from us. Who is nature to hide something from our vision?!

I also got this corroborated somewhat in a book I found via Google Books which gives a translation as "The grudging nature of our vision had shut is off from proof as to which atoms have left at a given time."

Great episode!