Posts by Don

Max Miller has some great Greek and Roman recipes and history on his channel.

Ancient — Recipes — Tasting History

Max Miller has some great Greek and Roman recipes and history on his channel.

Ancient — Recipes — Tasting History

Just finished watching the episode. I found it very interesting, even though I knew most of the basics. I think they did a fairly decent job with Epicureanism. It was fun to see Piso and Philodemus portrayed by actors. Definitely worth a watch.

Quote from Pacatus

Wouldn't appeal to some common prolepsis (on the question of gods’ existence) be subject to the ad populum fallacy?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentum_ad_populum

Frankly, I sometimes have that feeling, too; which is one of the reasons I revert back to emphasizing that a correct view of the gods, Epicureanly-speaking, for me is:

1. (If) gods exist, they did NOT create the universe nor do they supervise it nor do they sustain it.
2. (if) gods exist, they do not trouble themselves with human beings' actions.
   1. They do not bestow blessings; Good things do not flow as gifts from any gods
   2. They do not rain down curses; Bad things do not come as punishment from any gods.
      1. This seems to me the most important implication of PD01
      2. I also like VS65 It is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves.
3. The only benefit realized by humans in relation to gods is as imagining them as the culmination of all the best things possible in life to their highest and most permanent degree.
4. Per Lucretius, Humans can personify and create metaphors using god-language: The crop is good = Demeter has blessed us; The wine makes me feel good = Dionysus has blessed this party!; He has died = He is with Hades now. Demeter, Dionysus, and Hades don't exist as beings, but they can exist as metaphor IF we remember they are metaphor.

I do not get hung up too much on the nature of the gods - What are the gods? What are they like? - but try to keep a correct understanding of the gods in relation to me. How should I conceive of divinity? For me, it is simply that - if external gods exist - these external gods have no power over me, no interest in me, and nothing to do with the ordering of the universe; any gods I conceive of should only be images, in my mind, of the best life possible... and then I can get on with imagining what that best life - the best mortal, human life - can be here now in reality and in the physical world... because this is all we got.

The Herculaneum Scrolls ~ About the Episode | Secrets of the Dead | PBS

Making headlines around the world, Brent Seales and his team of computer scientists set out on a mission to read the 2,000-year-old carbonized scrolls found in…

www.pbs.org

The most recent episode of PBS Secrets of the Dead is on the Herculaneum scrolls.

Here's a quick paraphrase that literally just came to mind (apologies for the first draft nature, suggested revisions or edits welcomed):

Gods aren't scary.

Death won't bite.

Feeling good is easy.

Feeling bad is finite.

Quote from Plantpierogi

Don’t fear god,

Don’t worry about death;

I feel the need to comment when this comes up. For me, it's critically important to remember that these are not imperatives or commands in the Greek original. They are statements of fact: The gods are not to be feared. "Death is not to be approached with suspicion."

The "don't" translations are objectively incorrect, but also sound to ...judgy? The original asks us to see things as they are.

On the belly:

Thread

2 Philipians 3:19 "Their God is The Belly

2 Philipians 3:19

ων ο θεος η κοιλια "their god is the belly"

και η δοξα εν τη αισχυνη "and the δόξα 'principle, belief, etc. is in the shame"

Dewitt

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4150/

At first glance, this one at least seems to have promise. See:

[…]

So the "belly" is associated with the Epicureans. Paul uses a different word, κοιλῐ́ᾱ koilia, than it is in the 409 fragment, γαστήρ gastēr (where we get gastro-).

The second part "η δοξα εν τη αισχυνη." Dewitt translates δόξα…

Don

October 7, 2023 at 10:02 PM

See also U130 : Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, VII p. 279F: It was in fact, for the sake of the belly and the pleasures of the flesh in general that this man flattered Idomeneus and Metrodorus. ... Epicurus, in fact, was the teacher of these men.

[ U409 ]

Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546F: And Epicurus says, "The principle and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; even wisdom and culture must be referred to this."

Ibid., VII p. 280A: The master of these men, indeed, was Epicurus, who loudly proclaimed… ["The principle," etc., cited above].

Metrodorus, Letter to his Brother Timocrates, fr. 13 [p. 51 Duen.], by way of Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 16, p. 1098D: {We are not called to save the nation or get crowned by it for wisdom; what is called for, my dear Timocrates, is to eat and to drink wine, gratifying the belly without harming it.} ... It made me both happy and confident to have learned from Epicurus how to gratify the belly properly. ... {The belly, Timocrates, my man of wisdom, is the region that contains the highest end.}

Cf. Plutarch, Against Colotes, 30, p. 1125A: For it is the men who look with contempt on all these things as old wives’ tales, and think that our good is to be found in the belly and the other passages by which pleasure makes her entry...

Ibid., 2, p. 1108C: ...by those who keep shouting that the good is to be found in the belly...

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 17, p. 1098D: Indeed these people, you might say, describing a circle with the belly as center and radius, circumscribe within it the whole area of pleasure...

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.66: It is his habit in all his discussions to attach higher value to the pleasures of the belly than to the delights of the eye and the ear.

Cf. Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 2, p. 1087B: "Oho!" I said laughing. "It looks as if you are going to hop on their belly and make them run for their flesh when you take pleasure away..."

Cf. Hegesippus, by way of Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, VII p. 279D (Com. IV p. 481)

I realize I stray from the title of this thread, but one Lucretian passage I return to when it comes to gods is in Book 2:

In many a way she brings the many forth
Into the light of sun. And here, whoso
Decides to call the ocean Neptune, or
The grain-crop Ceres, and prefers to abuse
The name of Bacchus rather than pronounce
The liquor's proper designation, him
Let us permit to go on calling earth
Mother of Gods, if only he will spare
To taint his soul with foul religion.

Here, we're given permission to personify physical things metaphorically as gods. Why not metaphorical ideal lives as gods?

Wow! Even items from the Villa of the Papyri! Thanks for sharing.

PS. And, oh, the cradle! That is heartbreaking.

I suspected you might have a response, Cassius . I'm happy to state explicitly: This is my opinion and in no way would I assume to make a "policy statement" for the EpicureanFriends forum as a whole.

That said... To expand on my personal perspective...

Epicurus' and the ancient Greek concept of eidolon (images, films, etc) was revolutionary in its time and was a move toward an understanding. It was less wrong than the alternative theory of rays from us interacting with the external works and reporting back to us. However, eidola are not how the senses work nor is it how the brain and memory work. For me, starting from Epicurus' desire to know how things work, we modern Epicureans should endeavor to know how things work to the best level (and reserve judgement on what needs confirmation) we should not try to shoehorn ancient understanding into modern molds. Epicurus didn't have access to information we have, and we can't unlearn general scientific principles we take for granted now.

Responding to TauPhi , in relation to gods' moral/ethical incorruptibility, I'd say it describes their ability to never make any choice that dilutes or decreases their pleasure. They don't have "temptations" for lack of a better word like us mortals.

But I'll lay my cards on the table:

I don't believe in any gods.

Whether Epicurus taught there were physical gods or he thought of them as metaphors is secondary, to me. The most important aspect of Epicurus' teaching on the gods is that even if there were gods, they have no impact on the blessings or misfortunes that befall me in my life. Any thoughts I have about the gods of a one-way interaction.

If I want to imagine a perfect state, I can do that. If I want to call that perfect state "godlike", fine. But that *is* metaphorical.

Putting ourselves in Epicurus' headspace and social context in this topic is nigh impossible given our current understanding of the universe. Those tenets of "1. gods don't bestow blessings or curses. 2. There's no evidence the universe is created or sustained or administered by gods" are enough for me.

Quote from Godfrey

This leads from the fullness of pleasure, and the confidence of it continuing, to blessedness and incorruptibility.

From this current direction I'm headed, the gods would have confidence in the continuation of their incorruptible nature because they've come to a right view of how things are, the nature of pleasure, their inability to be affected by praise or blame, their self-reliance, and so on. The gods would have no more need of infinite lives than a mortal would, but I'd have to dig into the texts a little deeper than Raghunanan does on that eternal existence issue. Gods or the divine nature as a class may be eternally existing but that doesn't necessarily imply to me the necessity of the eternal existence of any one specific god.

From my perspective, it is problematic to assign the gods the activity of maintaining their "incorruptibility" through their actions. That implies to me that if they, for some reason, fail to maintain themselves that would be a source of anxiety for the gods. They would have to remain vigilant every minute, maintaining, checking, working to keep balance in their atoms, or some such thing. That seems incompatible with Epicurus's whole definition of divinity. To me this excerpt from Diogenes Laertius implies that not only do the gods not experience an increase in pleasure but they do not experience any decrease as well. If their "incorruptibility" aspect dips a little and they have to maintain it, that implies a decrease in pleasure as well.

Quote from Diogenes Laertius 10.121

Happiness must be understood in two senses; the highest happiness, such as is that of God, which admits of no increase; and another kind, which admits of the addition or abstraction of pleasures. (Yonge)

[121] Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῆ νοεῖσθαι, τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: καὶ τὴν <κατὰ τὴν> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.

VS33 also says "The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness." To me, a god would not have a body that cries out to not be incorruptible. I suppose someone could counter that the gods are "confident of continuing" to be incorruptible.

The paper by Geeta Raghunanan provides an interesting solution to the incorruptible seen as eternal issue:

“Imperishability” as Immunity to Moral Corruption: A Response to the Problem of the Imperishability of the Epicurean Gods (Presentation for the CPA Annual Congress 2014)

“Imperishability” as Immunity to Moral Corruption: A Response to the Problem of the Imperishability of the Epicurean Gods (Presentation for the CPA Annual…

www.academia.edu

Quote

I contend that they may be imperishable; that is, the Epicurean gods may be destined to dissolution and yet be imperishable in the sense that they are impervious to decay or corruption, particularly, what might be termed moral decay or moral corruption. ... But I emphasize “moral corruption” or “moral decay” also to incorporate Epicurean descriptions of the gods that seem to suggest that imperishability might in fact have meant to the Epicureans imperviousness to moral corruption. ... it is possible
to maintain that given an Epicurean physical theory and the doctrine that all compounds will dissolve, the Epicurean gods, as compounds, are yet still imperishable in the sense that they are morally incorruptible.

This appeals to me - if I were to accept the idea that the Epicureans thought of the gods as living beings. One of my main objections to "god as living being" vs "god as conceptual metaphor" is that I can't reconcile Epicurus's foresight and critical thinking with believing in a physical god... However, Raghunanan narrowing of αφθαρτον to "incorruptible" ie "not able to be corrupted, from a moral/ethical perspective" - with the understanding that the gods will eventually physically decay due to their being material compound beings is enticing. And, if the gods do die, it would be nothing to them as they have lived in the midst of unceasing pleasure.

Things to think about for me at least.

123f. ἐναργὴς γαρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις.

Here's our δέ "on the other hand."

ἐναργὴς [δέ] ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις

"And the knowledge (ἡ γνῶσις (gnōsis)) of them (θεοί "gods", note the plural here) is ἐναργὴς." But what does ἐναργὴς mean?

LSJ provides two primary definitions:

visible, palpable, in bodily shape, properly of gods appearing in their own forms (in Homer); so of a dream or vision; ex., ἐναργὴς ταῦρος "in visible form a bull, a very bull"

manifest to the mind's eye, distinct

Epicurus can't mean the first meaning since he's adamant that the gods don't interact with humans. But the second definition coincides with his contention (and the idea of the prolepsis of the gods) that the gods are apprehended by the mind only. In first Principal Doctrine's scholia (i.e., a note added to the text by a later author), we read τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς "the gods are conceived of through contemplation by reasoning." We don't - can't! - see the Epicurean gods with our physical eyes as Homer describes seeing the Olympian gods "in visible form." Homer's gods were εναργής in one sense of the word; Epicurus's in the other sense. The truth of the gods' existence in Epicurus's philosophy takes place entirely in our minds by reasoning through their existence by means of contemplation. But through that contemplation, Epicurus asserts that their existence is εναργής "clearly discernible to us / manifest to us in our minds."

This emphasis on contemplation is interesting in light of the characteristic of the Epicurean sage in Diogenes Laertius Book X.30: μᾶλλόν τε εὐφρανθήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις. I continue to maintain that "in contemplation" is the best translation of ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις for this characteristic of the sage: "The sage will also enjoy themselves more than others in contemplation, speculation, and theorizing." Many translators see this as referring to state festivals and spectacles. I've explored the use of the word elsewhere in Diogenes Laertius' work as well as in Aristotle online. https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…tion?authuser=0 If the gods are "manifest" in contemplation, this seems consistent with that characteristic of an Epicurean sage.

Unfortunately, this does nothing to resolve our problem with puzzling out how a god is a ζώον. Are they physically-existent material beings? Are they existing only as mental perceptions manifest merely to the mind's eye? The ambiguous nature of εναργής doesn't necessarily help us fully. It does, however, set up some of Epicurus's clever wordplay contrasting his view with Homer's.

Thanks, TauPhi , for the citation. I did have On Nature 14 as part of my review of Les Epicuriens that I checked out of the library on interlibrary loan. Here's my rough translation from the French, but we'll need to march this up to the Greek, too. This rough draft just happened to be sitting in my Google Drive:

[34 : p. 19 Leone: (29.22)]. [those] who specify a particular form belonging to fire, earth, water or air, are more ridiculous than those who, without specifying any, according to the juxtapositions, willy-nilly, that certain particular species of forms arise, which correspond to each of the associations which one could call substantial (for some are mistaken on the subject of the elements); but in speaking thus, they would say something that is more in line with these. And generally also they [introduce ?] differences in mixtures, and...

π̣[υρ]ὸς ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ̣ [ἀ]έ̣ρος

Fire or earth or water or air

γελοιότεροί something like "those who are to be laughed at", ultimately from γελάω "laugh" but meaning more like ludicrous, absurd; mirth-provoking, amusing. Maybe in the spirit of the "laughing philosophers"?

For a start:

Ionia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Chios is the same place as referenced in Philodemus' invitation to Piso for the Twentieth with "Chian wine", wine produced in Chios Βρομίου χιογενῆ.

Chian wine - Wikipedia

Metrodorus was not an uncommon name.

On Metrodorus of Chios:

Aetius (philosopher) - Wikipedia