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As Kalosyni syni informed us the other day, there has been a recent development regarding Philodemus' library at Herculaneum, and for the first time a complete scroll has been digitally unrolled from beginning to end.
A link to a PDF containing the Greek text and an English translation can be found at the website of the Vesuvius Challenge here. The PDF is linked immediately under the title and date, and also describes in great detail the process and technology used to virtually unroll the text.
To rely on their existence because everyone believes in them doesn't seem consistent.
I have my own questions on this topic, DaveT , but I have come to an understanding that may be helpful on this one.
Here is Bailey's translation of the text from the Letter to Menoikeus:
[123] The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many.
Regarding the sentence I've underlined, I no longer read this as Epicurus offering evidence of the existence of the gods. Rather, I think he is offering a definition of a god. This is in line with the pedagogy described in this passage in the Letter to Herodotus:
First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.
So when he says in Menoikeus that a god is 'a being blessed and incorruptible', he is saying that those are the ideas attached to the word god. It's not important or evidentiary that 'everyone believes in gods'. It is important (at least to Epicurus) that people commonly have an idea about the thing said to be represented by the word god.
The actual evidence comes in the next sentence in Menoikeus: we know the gods exist because of 'clear vision', ἐναργὴς. They are manifest. The 'true impression', or preconception, that is, the prolepsis of the gods, seems to derive from this clear vision.
TL:DR; From the point of view of the individual, other people are not involved in helping to determine the existence of the gods. They are only useful insofar as they ratify our grasp of the meaning of the word god.
A Latin inscription on a flyleaf at the back of Montaigne's personal copy of Lucretius:
Ut sunt diversi atomorum motus non incredibile est sic convenisse olim atomos aut conventuras ut alius nascatur montanus.
Since the movements of the atoms are so varied, it is not unbelievable that the atoms once came together in this way, or that in the future they will come together like this again, giving birth to another Montaigne.
Using this thread to keep everything together:
XXXVII. “They have nothing to do,” your teacher says. Epicurus truly, like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides, it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.
But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys? For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also, which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering in burning furnaces.
In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place, supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be happy and everlasting.
-Cicero, Tusculan Disputations
We didn't get very far into this yesterday, but a passage from Tertullian quoted by Stephen Greenblatt raises a similar problem of inactivity:
What we tend to see is Epicureans adapting the ideas of others, but refashioning them so that they slot in to the broader framework of Epicureanism.
The Empedoclean view of the principles of Love and Strife as ethical forces of nature was not found suitable, but the Lucretian refashioning of this idea into the metaphorical Venus and Mars of atomic physics was useful to him as a didactic poet, so he used it.
His borrowing of the account of the plague in Athens from Thucydides might have followed a similar course, except that the poem ends abruptly.
And DeWitt points out somewhere that Epicurus was capable of enlisting Homer in his defense if it came to it.
What a tedious person. 
Clement of Alexandria, like St. Jerome and St. Augustine, received a classical education in the pagan Greek tradition prior to converting to Christianity, and also like them developed a taste for pagan literature.
Jerome records in a letter that his own devotion to the works of Cicero earned him a visitation from his god in a dream:
Asked who and what I was I replied: “I am a Christian.” But He who presided said: “Thou liest, thou art a follower of Cicero and not of Christ. For ‘where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also.’” Instantly I became dumb, and amid the strokes of the lash—for He had ordered me to be scourged—I was tortured more severely still by the fire of conscience, considering with myself that verse, “In the grave who shall give thee thanks?” Yet for all that I began to cry and to bewail myself, saying: “Have mercy upon me, O Lord: have mercy upon me.” Amid the sound of the scourges this cry still made itself heard. At last the bystanders, falling down before the knees of Him who presided, prayed that He would have pity on my youth, and that He would give me space to repent of my error. He might still, they urged, inflict torture on me, should I ever again read the works of the Gentiles. Under the stress of that awful moment I should have been ready to make even still larger promises than these. Accordingly I made oath and called upon His name, saying: “Lord, if ever again I possess worldly books, or if ever again I read such, I have denied Thee.” Dismissed, then, on taking this oath, I returned to the upper world, and, to the surprise of all, I opened upon them eyes so drenched with tears that my distress served to convince even the incredulous. And that this was no sleep nor idle dream, such as those by which we are often mocked, I call to witness the tribunal before which I lay, and the terrible judgment which I feared. May it never, hereafter, be my lot to fall under such an inquisition! I profess that my shoulders were black and blue, that I felt the bruises long after I awoke from my sleep, and that thenceforth I read the books of God with a zeal greater than I had previously given to the books of men.
Equally delirious were the fantasies Confessions of St. Augustine, again by an encounter with Cicero:
Among such as these, in that unsettled age of mine, learned I books of eloquence, wherein I desired to be eminent, out of a damnable and vainglorious end, a joy in human vanity. In the ordinary course of study, I fell upon a certain book of Cicero, whose speech almost all admire, not so his heart. This book of his contains an exhortation to philosophy, and is called "Hortensius." But this book altered my affections, and turned my prayers to Thyself O Lord; and made me have other purposes and desires. Every vain hope at once became worthless to me; and I longed with an incredibly burning desire for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to arise, that I might return to Thee. For not to sharpen my tongue (which thing I seemed to be purchasing with my mother's allowances, in that my nineteenth year, my father being dead two years before), not to sharpen my tongue did I employ that book; nor did it infuse into me its style, but its matter.
How did I burn then, my God, how did I burn to re-mount from earthly things to Thee, nor knew I what Thou wouldest do with me? For with Thee is wisdom. But the love of wisdom is in Greek called "philosophy," with which that book inflamed me. Some there be that seduce through philosophy, under a great, and smooth, and honourable name colouring and disguising their own errors: and almost all who in that and former ages were such, are in that book censured and set forth: there also is made plain that wholesome advice of Thy Spirit, by Thy good and devout servant: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. And since at that time (Thou, O light of my heart, knowest) Apostolic Scripture was not known to me, I was delighted with that exhortation, so far only, that I was thereby strongly roused, and kindled, and inflamed to love, and seek, and obtain, and hold, and embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself whatever it were; and this alone checked me thus unkindled, that the name of Christ was not in it.
These in turn makes Clement's claim all the more risible:
As Scripture has called the Greeks pilferers of the Barbarian philosophy, it will next have to be considered how this may be briefly demonstrated. For we shall not only show that they have imitated and copied the marvels recorded in our books; but we shall prove, besides, that they have plagiarized and falsified (our writings being, as we have shown, older) the chief dogmas they hold, both on faith and knowledge and science, and hope and love, and also on repentance and temperance and the fear of God — a whole swarm, verily, of the virtues of truth.
If Greek philosophy was 'stolen' from the Hebrews as Clement claims, why do these zealous converts sneak away from the dull boredom of the allegedly genuine in order to delight themselves with the high refinement and polish of the allegedly counterfeit?
Oh, right. They do it because they are tempted by the Devil. As I said, tedious.
I quite like DeWitt on this point;
That's from pages 66-67 of Epicurus and his Philosophy. Lucretius had indeed written (Book IV, line 823) that sight did not exist before the eyes, or language before the tongue; these organs were not created to fulfill a purpose. Rather, their existence afforded the opportunity to be adapted by the organism for the uses with which we now associate them.
In this way the early Epicureans prefigured Charles Darwin, who also wrote about the eye in a well-remembered passage that is often abused by creationists:
To suppose that the eye, with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest possible degree. Yet reason tells me, that if numerous gradations from a perfect and complex eye to one very imperfect and simple, each grade being useful to its possessor, can be shown to exist; if further, the eye does vary ever so slightly, and the variations be inherited, which is certainly the case; and if any variation or modification in the organ be ever useful to an animal under changing conditions of life, then the difficulty of believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural selection, though insuperable by our imagination, can hardly be considered real. How a nerve comes to be sensitive to light, hardly concerns us more than how life itself first originated; but I may remark that several facts make me suspect that any sensitive nerve may be rendered sensitive to light, and likewise to those coarser vibrations of the air which produce sound.
But if Epicurus rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian view of teleology, what justification can we make for his continued use of the word telos (τέλος)? DeWitt resolves the problem by suggesting that, while Epicurus did throw out creationism and intelligent design, he did not wholly reject teleology.
"This amounts to saying that a nonpurposive Nature had produced a purposive creature, for whom alone an end or goal of living could have a meaning. This is teleology at a minimum."
He enlarges on this theme with a discussion of the word nature as opposed to reason on pages 127-132, and here is a relevant excerpt:
The priority of Nature was also insisted upon in establishing the identity of the end or telos. Aristotle had furnished a precious hint in this connection; he wrote "that perhaps even in the case of the lower animals there is some natural good superior to their scale of intelligence which aims at the corresponding good." To this principle Epicurus adapted his procedure. By the promptings of Nature alone, apart from reason, every animate thing, the moment it is born, reaches out for pleasure and shrinks from pain. Consistent with this reasoning is the steady practice of referring to pleasure as "the end of Nature," which occurs five times in our scant remains. As analogous phrases may be cited "the good of Nature" and "the pleasure of Nature," all of them implying that reason played no necessary role in establishing the truth. Similar is the implication of parallel phrases such as "the wealth of Nature," signifying that Nature and not reason reveals the true meaning of wealth; and also "the limits of Nature," implying that Nature and not reason teaches the true limits of the desires.
Thanks to Don for finding Martin Ferguson Smith's recent and updated work on his findings at the archaeological site at Oinoanda:
https://www.tabedizioni.it/web/content/462840
As I mentioned in the recording, it isn't always easy to keep up with fresh developments in the study of ancient Epicureanism. Most of us will be familiar with Martin Ferguson Smith's work through his revision of the Loeb edition of Lucretius, as well as through his prior translations of the text of an inscription by Diogenes of Oinoanda.
We were chatting on a Sunday zoom a few weeks ago when someone mentioned the parallel that can be drawn between the physics of Epicurus (mutually exclusive atoms and void) and the ethics of Epicurus (mutually exclusive pleasure and pain).
I tried to explain that in Aristotle there is a different parallel--a parallel between the square of opposition in the four classical elements on the one hand, and the square of opposition in logic on the other. One implication might be that logic is rooted in the very fabric of the cosmos, independent of mind or language. This might relate to our broader conversation as to the difference between the Cartesian dictum cogito ergo sum, and the Jeffersonian; "I feel, therefore I exist."
The second part of metaphysics, is the inquiry of final causes, which we note not as wanting, but as ill-placed; these causes being usually sought in physics, not in metaphysics, to the great prejudice of philosophy; for the treating of final causes in physics has driven out the inquiry of physical ones, and made men rest in specious and shadowy causes, without ever searching in earnest after such as are real and truly physical. And this was not only done by Plato, who constantly anchors upon this shore; but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, who frequently introduce such causes as these: “The hairs of the eyelids are for a fence to the sight. The bones for pillars whereon to build the bodies of animals. The leaves of trees are to defend the fruit from the sun and wind. The clouds are designed for watering the earth,” etc. All which are properly alleged in metaphysics; but in physics are impertinent, and as remoras1 to the ship, that hinder the sciences from holding on their course of improvement, and introducing a neglect of searching after physical causes. And therefore the natural philosophies of Democritus and others, who allow no God or mind in the frame of things, but attribute the structure of the universe to infinite essays and trials of nature, or what they call fate or fortune, and assigned the causes of particular things to the necessity of matter without any intermixture of final causes, seem, so far as we can judge from the remains of their philosophy, much more solid, and to have gone deeper into nature, with regard to physical causes, than the philosophy of Aristotle or Plato; and this only because they never meddled with final causes, which the others were perpetually inculcating. Though in this respect Aristotle is more culpable than Plato, as banishing God, the fountain of final causes, and substituting nature in his stead; and, at the same time, receiving final causes through his affection to logic, not theology.
-Sir Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning
1A marine suckerfish, which was thought of old to hinder the progress of sailing ships by attaching itself via suction to the hull.
I'm more familiar with measurements of the earth from my days in Land Surveying, and the classic experiments that I can recall are these;
What you need is an accurate measurement of the planet you're standing on, so that you can observe celestial phenomena from many different known positions on that planet at the same time and collate the data.
I'm at lunch now, I don't have time for a more complete answer.
That's a somewhat difficult question. Ancient Rome is usually credited with the first invention of what we now call public welfare, which for them was the grain dole; the 'bread' in 'bread and circuses'. In Greece, citizens that did not own land and thus could not support themselves were in the best case sent away to found a colony. In the worst case they were sold into slavery to settle their debts.
State coffers in antiquity were generally lavished on land and naval defense, on temples and palaces, on public festivals, or on grand engineering projects. Herodotus credits the Samians with three such public projects; the tunnel of Eupalinos, the man-made breakwaters that circumscribed the harbor at what is now called Pythagoreio, and the Temple of Hera, which was then the largest in the Greek world.
Everything about currency, taxation, and public expenditure has changed transformatively since then.
The problem is further compounded by the argument made in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that investment in the space program also boosted development in adjacent fields like satellite communication and navigation, in rocketry for wartime applications, and in the advancements in materials science and computer science which we all rely on everyday.
These are all issues that can be placed by modern individuals under an Epicurean lens, but which Epicurus himself would not have been well-equipped to discuss himself. When Lucian narrates a space voyage in his True Story, it's a farcical fantasy written to satirize the absurd travelogues that were being written by his contemporaries.
That is perhaps not the answer you were looking for!
Excellent question, Matteng!
Regarding the fourth criterion of the canon, I will simply point the way to Prof. David Glidden's Epicurean Prolepsis. It won't furnish any answers, but in it he does attempt to explain why the question itself is extremely confusing, and why we should tread carefully.
Regarding the passage you have quoted from Hiram's essay, we have direct evidence of this method in the Letter to Pythocles:
[95] for in our own experience we see many things which shine by their own light and many also which shine by borrowed light. And none of the celestial phenomena stand in the way, if only we always keep in mind the method of plural explanation and the several consistent assumptions and causes, instead of dwelling on what is inconsistent and giving it a false importance so as always to fall back in one way or another upon the single explanation. The appearance of the face in the moon may equally well arise from interchange of parts, or from interposition of something, or in any other of the ways which might be seen to accord with the facts.
[95] καὶ γὰρ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται πολλὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα, πολλὰ δὲ ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρων. καὶ οὐθὲν ἐμποδοστατεῖ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φαινομένων, ἐάν τις τοῦ πλεοναχοῦ τρόπου ἀεὶ μνήμην ἔχῃ καὶ τὰς ἀκολούθους αὐτοῖς ὑποθέσεις ἅμα καὶ αἰτίας συνθεωρῇ καὶ μὴ ἀναβλέπων εἰς τὰ ἀνακόλουθα ταῦτ᾽ ὀγκοῖ ματαίως καὶ καταρρέπῃ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐπὶ τὸν μοναχὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ ἔμφασις τοῦ προσώπου ἐν αὐτῇ δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ παραλλαγὴν μερῶν καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιπροσθέτησιν, καὶ ὅσοι ποτ᾽ ἂν τρόποι θεωροῖντο τὸ σύμφωνον τοῖς φαινομένοις κεκτημένοι.
The word translated as method in this passage is τρόπος, trope, or way. The way of manifold explanation; when confronted with a strange new phenomenon (φαινομένων), one should begin be considering the various natural hypotheses (ὑποθέσεις) or potential causes (αἰτίας) that might possibly have given rise to the phenomenon. These potential explanations must harmonize with sense perception, and also with known facts. All of this is in contrast to the way of the single explanation, which constitutes an arbitrary selection of one possible explanation to the exclusion of all others.
It's important to remember that the purpose of this exercise is not to develop a robust or rigorous scientific explanation for every phenomenon. The purpose is to eradicate fear. For example; are bolts of lightning hurled down by Zeus in order to punish hubris, as in the myth of Phaeton? There is no reason to think so; that is just one possible explanation, and that particular explanation isn't even a good one. As Lucretius notes (book 2, line ~1100), thunderbolts are often seen to strike the temples of Olympian Zeus himself. The explanation, in other words, does not accord with known facts.
[54] "Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους νομιστέον μηδεμίαν ποιότητα τῶν φαινομένων προσφέρεσθαι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ βάρους καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος συμφυῆ ἐστι.
[54] "Kai men kai tas atomous nomisteon medemian poioteta ton phainomenon prospheresthai plen schematos kai barous kai megethous kai hosa ex anagkes schematos sumphue esti.
[54] "Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the qualities belonging to things which come under our observation, except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily conjoined with shape.
-Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus, from Diogenes Laertius Book 10 (Perseus Project)
My rhetoric professor in grad school attributed Epicurus with moderation, which I can understand but I don’t see it as his actual point - more like being (reasonable*) and “sensible” in its classical definition of awareness and affectedness of the senses.
I probably wouldn't express it the following way normally, but since you have posed an interesting question and it can be helpful to think out loud sometimes, I might answer it this way:
I suggest that Epicurus advocated not moderation, but what modern philosophers following Max Weber call instrumental rationality; choices (and avoidances) are considered rational when they are expected to lead to a desired end, which for Epicurus is the end of increasing pleasure and reducing pain.
In any case, welcome!
First, I must distinguish between that which always is and never becomes and which is apprehended by reason and reflection, and that which always becomes and never is and is conceived by opinion with the help of sense. All that becomes and is created is the work of a cause, and that is fair which the artificer makes after an eternal pattern, but whatever is fashioned after a created pattern is not fair. Is the world created or uncreated?—that is the first question. Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and if sensible, then created; and if created, made by a cause, and the cause is the ineffable father of all things, who had before him an eternal archetype. For to imagine that the archetype was created would be blasphemy, seeing that the world is the noblest of creations, and God is the best of causes. And the world being thus created according to the eternal pattern is the copy of something; and we may assume that words are akin to the matter of which they speak. What is spoken of the unchanging or intelligible must be certain and true; but what is spoken of the created image can only be probable; being is to becoming what truth is to belief. And amid the variety of opinions which have arisen about God and the nature of the world we must be content to take probability for our rule, considering that I, who am the speaker, and you, who are the judges, are only men; to probability we may attain but no further.
***
Why did the Creator make the world?...He was good, and therefore not jealous, and being free from jealousy he desired that all things should be like himself. Wherefore he set in order the visible world, which he found in disorder. Now he who is the best could only create the fairest; and reflecting that of visible things the intelligent is superior to the unintelligent, he put intelligence in soul and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature, and the world became a living soul through the providence of God.
-Timaeus, Plato, transl. Benjamin Jowett
So, is there some root Latin that makes this “watching over everything” such an active tense, vs the simple, passive knowing that everything in the universe operates according to its own sentient nature?
That is a good question! I will try to remember to look into this later today.
The thing is, even Aristotle's Physics could be described as a text on metaphysics according to the modern meaning of that term. Both words, physics and metaphysics, had each of them one meaning in antiquity, and have both of them quite another meaning now. In antiquity, both branches were viewed predominately through the lens of logic, and neither of them were subjected to the method of rigorous experimentation against the standards of reproducibility and falsifiability. In modern usage, that method has come to mark out the shifting boundaries between the scientific study of nature and the non-scientific, the latter of which includes both common pseudoscience (the claims of which are usually falsifiable and generally have been falsified) and what we call the philosophical branches of metaphysics, theology, eschatology, etc.--the claims of which are often not falsifiable.
I say 'usually falsifiable' and 'often not falsifiable' because most systems of thought straddle the boundary, the opinions of Stephen J. Gould notwithstanding. For example, the claim in alchemy that lead can be transmuted into gold through basic chemistry (rather than high-energy particle physics) can be tested, has been tested, and has not produced the desired result; however, the corresponding claim in Hermeticism that the divinely-natured human soul can make an analogous spiritual ascent cannot even be tested. This latter claim falls outside of what we would now call physics, but it did not necessarily fall outside of what the Greek philosophers called physics.
All of that is to say that I do not favor a change in nomenclature. Both Aristotle and Epicurus discussed whether motion was possible, and whether anything can come from nothing, and whether atoms and void or love and strife or the four classical elements were the building blocks of nature, and both Aristotle and Epicurus referred to their studies of these questions as physics. We should focus our attention instead on clarifying, when necessary, the distinction between the ancient and the modern meanings of that word.
That was well done, Cassius, and I only have one note; I would suggest replacing the reference to Christian 'inner peace' in section I with a citation instead to Philippians 4:7, and the peace of God, which passeth all understanding. Christianity does not really idealize inner peace, it idealizes obedience.
