Posts by Godfrey

I don't think that sequence matters much. The calculus is more of a cost - benefit analysis: is x amount of pleasure worth y amount of pain? Wll z amount of pain produce a pleasure greater than z?

Rereading post #1, I find that "blessedness" does have a certain attraction. That might relate it to the blessedness of the gods as in PD01 and to Epicurus' comments about living like a god among men.

It seems to be pretty all-encompassing as well: not necessarily confined to mental/spiritual, but including physical and external. At least that's one (rather Aristotlean?) way to think about blessedness. The word has various connotations in modern English. Here we go again....

Welcome! Nice username

Peter St-Andre mentions in his blog post for today that he prefers "fulfillment" as an interpretation of eudaimonia. Any thoughts on this one? To me, fulfillment and happiness both seem particularly mental/spiritual whereas well-being seems to be more inclusive of mental/spiritual as well as physical. I can't say which approach is most in line with the original meaning of eudaimonia.

VS52. Friendship dances around the world, announcing to each of us that we must awaken to happiness.

Of course the first one that came to mind was the Tetrapharmakon, but I understand your reservations.

Pacatus can you summarize the doctrinal differences between the two? If that's too complicated to be reasonable, just say no.

Thanks Cassius , you do a better job of clarifying isonomy than DeWitt does! Still a lot to chew on, but you've cleared up the shocking inconsistencies.

Perhaps DeWitt's conclusions were colored by his interest in Christianity....

Thanks for the DeWitt section, Cassius ; it helps a lot to read it again.

Now I'm beginning to understand the sources of my bafflement with isonomy:

- Isonomy appears to be simply a logical formula, not a natural principle, and therefore is subject to fallacies and misuse. The formula is fine, but each premise must be evaluated for validity.

- In this way, the principle of isonomy can create conclusions which conflict with the conclusion reached by thinking through the implications of a fully material universe.

- The idea of perfection in a fully material universe is problematic to me. To my understanding, in an infinite universe there can be no "perfect" just as there can be no boundary or limit.

- "Perfection" seems to be getting uncomfortably close to Plato's ideal forms. If there must exist a perfect mirror of a human, using the principle of isonomia, mustn't there exist a perfect dolphin? Elephant? Fruit fly? &c....

- A similarly disturbing conclusion reached through isonomia might be this: "the number of living beings must be equal to the number of dead beings." This is to offset the imperfection of death with the perfection of eternal life, another logical leap of monotheistic religions.

- An interesting conclusion that follows from isonomy is that the gods must be shaped like humans. In this way they are of the same class, and logically consistent.

Quote from DeWitt via Cassius

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

To the best of my understanding (which may be wrong), I disagree with all three of these conclusions.

1. "in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist, that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better". This, to me, is an erroneous proposition in that it describes a finite universe, not an infinite one.

2. "that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals". If there is no perfection, then this is erroneous in that it's comparing two different classes of beings, such as great apes and humans.

3. "in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction." This seems to conflict with the idea of isonomia: shouldn't the forces of preservation and destruction be equal in the universe at large? Isn't their equality a basic principle of modern science as well?

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What might Epicurus have answered if he was asked what natural law necessitates the existence of the gods? Why couldn't the atomic universe simply do without them?

To my understanding, and I think it's in DeWitt and perhaps Cicero, isonomia is the concept that explains this. Isonomia would also explain why there can't be just one god.

I don't really understand the validity of isonomia, but I think the idea is that in an infinite universe, the opposite of each thing must exist, and in equal number. So if there are a certain number of mortals, there must be an equal number of immortals.

The finer point in this particular example would seem to be that isonomia shouldn't be used to posit something which is outside of the system, meaning it shouldn't be used to introduce the supernatural into a purely natural system. So this begs the question: what is meant by "immortal?"

One might see how monotheists could adapt the idea of isonomia to come up with not only a supernatural being, but also another supernatural being opposed to the first one. God and Satan, for instance.

I freely admit that I find the idea of isonomia somewhat baffling, particularly as to its validity. If anyone can clarify it, please do!

Oops, looks like I cross posted....

In case it's of use, these epistemological terms also feature in Philodemus' On Signs. There are hints as well in PD24, and in the Letter to Herodotus 10.39-40. And Long and Sedley discuss them in The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume 1, in their commentary in the Epistemology section. I'm sure that they can spotted elsewhere, if one is looking for them.

Happy Pi Day!

P.S. Joshua, in particular, is doing in the podasts exactly what I'm describing

Agreed. However, I think it's important to begin with the big picture:

- Platonism and its offspring subscribe to a worldview that includes things beyond what is natural. These things include "Forms" and "Ideals" which are more real than material reality.

- Epicurus rejected anything beyond the natural, including "Forms" and "Ideals" which are more real than material reality.

That may be enough for some people to know, without diving deeper into the details. But every discussion of the details which has been prompted by a Platonist argument needs to begin with the explicit understanding that Platonism is antithetical to EP for these reasons. And this needs to be repeated, early and often. Apples and oranges.

How do you describe Platonism in Epicurean terms? You can't: it's nonsense. How do you describe EP in Platonic terms? The best example that we have comes from Epicurus, but in today's world that is extremely difficult to decipher. So every argument needs to begin with this distinction, because the Platonists insist on arguing in their own terms and discard the Epicurean worldview. If we want to resuscitate EP, we need to argue in our own terms. In this way we can point out the absurdities of Platonism while we explain EP.

That's my rant I'm not trying to refute any of the arguments being made above, I just feel that they need to be firmly and repeatedly placed in the proper context. Reframed. Which is to see Platonism through Epicurean eyes, and not to see EP through Platonic eyes. They're fundamentally incompatible.

Quote from Cassius

If this were not so, then we would never be able to experience pleasure at all, because what we would be experiencing would be some incomplete pleasure, some mixture of pleasure and pain, which from this perspective is not pleasure at all. A "mixture" is not the same thing as a "thing in its pure form."

So this "pleasure is the absence of pain" is necessary to comprehend that it is possible to experience pleasure at all.

This sounds a lot like the argument that you can never get from point A to point B, because you can only advance half of the way at a time and the halfways keep getting smaller, ad infinitum. Can't remember the name of the argument....

The idea of measurement is a great take on the subject. I'd like to envelop that in a "brute force" argument, which to me is common sense and available to everyone. You need to have the big picture in mind before getting into the details.

Quote from Cassius

SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

Understanding and being able to explain clearly to an ordinary person why asked that question, and why Epicurus' answer would differ from that of Plato, is key.

First step back and compares the competing worldviews of "Platonic Forms" to the worldview of "atoms and void and none other." You must think completely outside of (discard?) the Platonic worldview in order to fully understand Epicurus, even though Epicurus does the work to refute the Platonic worldview. The Platonic worldview is one of mysticism, which has no place for Epicurus.

Nothing material is perfect. Here's a minor reworking of Seneca, to emphasize this point:

"Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is [a Platonic Ideal]. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is [a Platonic Ideal]? Nothing otherwise that was not [a Platonic Ideal] to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is [not a Platonic Ideal]."

Read in this context, PDs 18-25 are each about not getting caught up in the Platonic worldview.

Quote from Cassius

So from that perspective wanting to be Zeus would be a natural but unnecessary desire - unnecessary because while the variation is desirable, we can live approximately like Zeus while we are alive and say we have tasted the same thing. Frustration at not being perfect doesn't become an enemy of living a good pleasant life.

This might even be considered an unnatural desire, since it's arises from the groundless opinion that you can achieve perfection. But from these two PDs it seems to be open to debate whether it's natural or unnatural, but not that it's unnecessary:

PD29. Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).

PD30. Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind.

PD19. Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning.

It's critical to note that PD19 makes no reference to a life, only to time and to joy. (At least in English: greater minds than mine can confirm that that's the case in the Greek.) The reasoning mentioned is to come to the understanding that a life has a limit in time, which separates it from the infinite. There's nothing more to it than that.

In order to come to the Ciceronian interpretation you would have to add in "a life," or replace time with life: "A finite life and an infinite life contain the same amount of joy...." This isn't what Epicurus was saying at all.

Quote from Cassius

This gets blurry as well in asking "are we talking about concepts vs things that have a material existence?"

Good question, but I sense a rabbit hole!!!

Here's a shot at it: "Idealism" as I've used the term is defined as a worldview that believes in perfect, ideal "Forms" that exist in some higher plane than the material world. "Materialism" as I've used the term is defined as a worldview that believes that everything that exists is either atom (physical) or void (empty, nothing).

Where the rabbit hole appears is where you try to figure out if any idea in the material world is physical or non-physical. The proper distinction, in my mind, is whether there are ideas that exist outside of the material world and in some higher dimension. It seems to me that Cicero and the Stoics both see ideas such as honor, virtue, courage as existing "out there" in a higher plane. This is why, for instance, the Stoics say that almost nobody can be truly Virtuous. Virtue in this case is more than an idea, it's a perfect "Ideal".

Quote from Cassius

Is Epicurus in fact saying that a longer life is not more pleasant than a shorter life, or is he only comparing the limited human span (whatever it is) to an unlimited span? Cicero is arguing that Epicurus said that length of time adds nothing to pleasure. Did Epicurus in fact say that?

Epicurus describes three components of pleasure (and pain): intensity, location and duration. You really can't single out any one of these components to generically evaluate pleasure. Ideally the three components, in a particular situation, combine to form an unmixed pleasure: the right intensity, the right location and the right duration. As long as the combination results in an unmixed pleasure, then you could say that it's more pleasant for it to last longer. But each component can have a limit which divides pleasure from pain in a specific circumstance.

Simply put, to my understanding the longer life of pleasure is more pleasant than the shorter life of pleasure. A life of any duration is finite, and not worth comparing to an unlimited span. Given that our lives are finite and happen only once, we should enjoy the life we have to the fullest. But when the time comes to leave, we don't invite pain by grasping onto the fact that life is, indeed, finite.

Excellent discussion of the issue in the podcast! One thing that you discussed (maybe not explicitly) which I think is key, is that the argument of limited v unlimited time is in many ways a matter of materialism v idealism.

In the materialist view a lifespan is limited. In the idealist view there may be a soul which exists for an unlimited time. This to me is the sticking point with Cicero (who I would call a strident idealist). For an Epicurean it's somewhat ludicrous to discuss pleasure without the limit of time, since a limited lifespan is inherent in being alive.

In the same vein, virtue and similar concepts are strictly that: concepts. They are idealist, not materialist. Being untethered to physical reality, they can extend forever or do whatever else one wants them to do: they're all imaginary. Epicurean pleasure, on the other hand, is strictly material. It's a real, physical element of living creatures, not an idealist concept.

So one's goal is to prudently maximize one's pleasure, which is limited by one's lifespan. Cicero's argument is about the larger issue of materialism v idealism.

Thanks for the response Onenski .

Quote from Onenski

...how do an epicurean find eudaimonia?: recognizing his place in the universe, studying nature, moderating desires, looking for pleasures, avoiding pain/suffering, feeling satisfied, enjoying time with friends. Is that contradictory with free will skepticism? If you think so, you can help me in developing my understanding both of free will skepticism and of epicureanism by pointing out those contradictions.

The biggest practical contradiction, in my mind, has to do with the Canon and methods of inference. If we don't use proper reasoning based on our sensations, anticipations and feelings, then we can't form correct conclusions.

As I understand the determining of opinions to be true or false, based on Philodemus (and I'm not sure that I understand this very well) there is confirmation (also called attestation), and contradiction (also called contestation). True equals confirmed and not contradicted. False equals not confirmed and contradicted. Conjectural equals awaiting confirmation/contradiction. Based on this, I would say that denying free agency is false, based on our perceptions. Or at best conjectural.

From Diogenes Laertius 10.32; Mensch translation:

...the fact that our perceptions exist guarantees the truth of our sensations; for seeing and hearing are as real to us as feeling pain.” Hence, it is from phenomena that we must draw inferences about nonevident realities. For all our thoughts are derived from sensation, either by contact, analogy, resemblance, or synthesis (with some assistance from reasoning). And the delusions of madmen, as well as the visions we see in sleep, are real, since they have effects; whereas what is unreal has no effect.

From Philodemus, On signs 34.29–36.17 Long and Sedley translation 1987:

(1) Those who attack sign-inference by similarity do not notice the difference between the aforementioned [senses of ‘in so far as’], and how we establish the ‘in so far as’ premise, such as, for instance, that man in so far as he is man is mortal…. (2) For we establish the necessary connexion of this with that from the very fact that it has been an observed concomitant of all the instances which we have encountered, especially as we have met a variety of animals belonging to the same type which while differing from each other in all other respects all share such-and-such common characteristics. (3) Thus we say that man, in so far as and in that he is man, is mortal, because we have encountered a wide variety of men without ever finding any variation in this kind of accidental attribute, or anything that draws us towards the opposite view. (4) So this is the method on which the establishment of the premise rests, both for this issue and for the others in which we apply the ‘in so far as’ and ‘in that’ construction – the peculiar connexion being indicated by the fact that the one thing is the inseparable and necessary concomitant of the other. (5) The same is not true in the case of what is established merely by the elimination of a sign. But even in these cases, it is the fact that all the instances which we have encountered have this as their concomitant that does the job of confirmation. For it is from the fact that all familiar moving objects, while having other differences, have it in common that their motion is through empty spaces, that we conclude the same to be without exception true also in things non-evident. And our reason for contending that if there is not, or has not been, fire, smoke should be eliminated, is that smoke has been seen in all cases without exception to be a secretion from fire. (6) Another error which they make is in not noticing our procedure of establishing that no obstacle arises through things evident. For the existence of chance and of that which depends on us is not sufficient ground for accepting the minimal swerves of atoms: it is necessary to show in addition that nothing else self-evident conflicts with the thesis.

Quote from Onenski

The possible practical problems that one may find in a metaphysical or physical conclusion are not reasons to deny that conclusion

I agree with this if the conclusion is true, as described above. The reason that I asked about how to live with eudaimonia if you believe in hard determinism is that I'm genuinely curious how that would work.

Quote from Onenski

Finally, how do an epicurean find eudaimonia?: recognizing his place in the universe, studying nature, moderating desires, looking for pleasures, avoiding pain/suffering, feeling satisfied, enjoying time with friends. Is that contradictory with free will skepticism?

I honestly don't understand how you can achieve eudaimonia doing these things if you believe that you have no free will. Is the answer that you just go ahead and do them, realizing that there's not really a "you" that's doing them, and find eudaimonia in that? I'll have to ponder that for a while....