Posts by Godfrey

I guess that I was unclear in my summaries of attestation &c. My reference point is Sextus Empiricus as described in this previous post:

Thread

The Beginning of an Outline of Epicurean Reasoning

Getting away from Philodemus On Signs for a moment, I’ve been looking at The Hellenistic Philosophers by Long and Sedley for original quotes from Epicurus regarding signs and methods of inference. I also had a look at a cluster of Principle Doctrines that are relevant (PD 22 & 23 are from Nate’s compilation, with thanks).

PD22 We must take into account both the underlying purpose and all the evidence of clear perception, to which we refer our opinions. Otherwise, everything will be filled with…

Godfrey

March 17, 2022 at 9:19 PM

In commentary elsewhere in The Hellenistic Philosophers, Long and Sedley point out some potential errors in this formulation based on the sources that Sextus Empiricus was using. So there's still a lot to sort out!

Quote from Cassius

Godfrey: just to be clear in terms of images I think the foundational observations about them is that images was a theory about *everything* and how we perceive them. So the first step in the process is to discuss the theory about things directly in from of us, not starting with gods long distances away.

Agreed. I realized in the middle of posting that this was an important point. The texts have lots of instances of reasoning/inference but very little explanation that I can find. Presently I'm overloaded with unprocessed collected data; I may have to step back and let it percolate for a while.

Quote from Cassius

Do we have even any specific examples of a description of an Epicurean observation of a god with which to agree or disagree?

None that I'm aware of, although there is that description of gods in the form of humans and speaking Greek. I don't remember the source of that, but I remember it as a product of reasoning and not an observation.

Cassius, some thoughts on your comment, with an attempt to use methods of inference:

- The idea of films of atoms coming from the gods and into our minds over great distances was consistent with the theory of atomism in the time of Epicurus, and his innovations regarding the theory. I understand it as a conjectural opinion, but Epicurus considered it as true. It's also reasoning by analogy, I think, being formulated similarly to how he reasoned the correctness of atomism in general. As I understand it, it is:

1. Attested: (I perceive this, therefore it is evidence) For Epicurus I would say that this applies.

2. Non-attested: (evidence conflicts with the original evidence) For Epicurus, I think this would not apply.

3. Contested: (if x exists, it implies this doesn’t exist) For Epicurus, this would not apply.

4. Non-contested: (this exists, and implies that exists) For Epicurus, this would apply.

So for Epicurus, the idea of films of atoms reaching us from the gods would be attested and non-contested, which would make it a true opinion.

- Today, with far more information with which to work:

1. Attested: we have no evidence of this occurring, so this does not apply.

2. Non-attested: there is evidence that ideas of gods are obtained from the society, family, etc in which one is reared (based on neuroscience), so this applies.

3. Contested: the evidence in 2 exists, and implies that the films of gods from afar don't exist. This applies.

4. Non-contested: there is no current evidence to support the idea of these images from afar being biologically received, so this does not apply.

So for us, this idea is Non-attested and contested, which makes it a false opinion.

Additional evidence made Epicurus' opinion false by this method. Similarly, future evidence could make the current opinion (ideas of gods are propagated through socio-environmental conditions) false.

I'm in the midst of a lengthy process of trying to sort out the methods of inference/logic/reasoning; this is my first attempt at this so I welcome further discussion!

I just happened across this passage in Lucretius, which relates to the LM passage discussed above:

"Unless you expel these ideas from your mind and drive far away beliefs unworthy of the gods and alien to their tranquillity, the holy divinity of the gods, damaged by you, will frequently do you harm: not because of the possibility of violating the gods’ supreme power, and of their consequent angry thirst for bitter vengeance, but because you yourself will imagine that those tranquil and peaceful beings are rolling mighty billows of wrath against you. You will be unable to visit the shrines of the gods with a calm heart, and incapable of receiving with tranquillity and peace the images from their holy bodies which travel into men’s minds to reveal the gods’ appearance. The direct effect on your life is obvious." (Lucretius 6.68–79, Long and Sedley translation, The Hellenistic Philosophers)

This reads to me like the best resolution of the realist and idealist views that I've seen. It appears to acknowledge the realist view that the gods exist, while at the same time stressing that what is important to our well-being is how we view them.

Sitting here in 2022, the idea that we get images of the gods "from their holy bodies" is what makes the gods so problematic. That sounds silly today, but it’s perfectly consistent with Epicurus' atomism. To me, the idea that in an infinite universe there are beings which would appear godlike to us (realist) is reasonable (admittedly I do enjoy science fiction 😉). I also agree with the (idealist) notion that how we think of potential godlike beings can be of benefit or harm to us. The cleavage between the two is how we interpret the images and anticipations.... Our modern theories of perception invalidate the ancient idea of images of beings reaching us from afar; instead, our anticipations (at least to my understanding) of gods are passed down to us in the same manner as, say, language. So the "black" of the realist view and the "white" of the idealist view are both valid. It's just the shades of grey in between which have naturally changed over the millennia.

There are techniques, such as journaling or making a checklist sometime before going to bed, that encourage a brain dump to help clear the mind.

Sometimes of late I think of my coming night's sleep as a delicious, nourishing meal to enjoy.

"The sword of Damocles" is a great description of what I faced a decade or so ago, for a decade or so. Thanks for that Matt ! At times I regret that I didn't have the benefit of Epicurean philosophy back then and was obsessed with the "sword".

Quote from Cassius

As long as reason is being used to justify pain so that greater pleasure can be obtained then tat would presumably be correct reasoning.

I get the feeling that our error is often not so much "listening to reason" vs "listening to the feeling of pleasure" so much as it is that we lose sight of the fact that the ultimate goal of reasoning is to achieve pleasure (even if temporarily through pursuit of pain).

Agreed, although the Platonic/Aristotelian model prevalent in our society is to divorce reason from feelings. So often this puts us in a position to consciously attempt to "override" our feelings, which are necessary for prudent actions. This seems like the root of the problem, and one of the issues that Epicurus was addressing in making reason subservient to our canonic faculties.

It's amazing how often reason is used to justify pain, and it's a challenging process to learn to listen to our Feelings, develop prudence, and begin our reasoning process with our perceptions. I confess that it's a process I'm still learning.

Quote from Matt

This state of the pursuit pleasure is the natural state of human behavior, surrounded by a cloud of illusory constructs that tell us to reject this natural state. Those constructs are wrong…they keep us from pursuing pleasure.

Well put: that seems to be the crux of the problem! Not only on the level of the individual, but on the level of society.

What he describes as enjoyment sounds to me pretty much like pleasure as envisioned by Epicurus.

Definition of enjoyment (all definitions from Merriam-Webster online):

1a) the action or state of enjoying

1b) possession and use: the enjoyment of civic rights

2) something that gives keen satisfaction: the poorest life has its enjoyments and pleasures

Definition of enjoy:

- intransitive verb: to have a good time

- transitive verb: 1) to have for one's use, benefit, or lot; experience: enjoyed great success 2) to take pleasure or satisfaction in

Definition of pleasure: (Entry 1 of 2, noun)

1) desire, inclination: wait upon his pleasure— William Shakespeare

2) a state of gratification

3a) sensual gratification; 3b) frivolous amusement

4) a source of delight or joy

Definition of pleasure: (Entry 2 of 2, verb)

- transitive verb: 1) to give pleasure to: gratify; 2) to give sexual pleasure to

- intransitive verb: 1) to take pleasure: delight; 2) to seek pleasure

Definition of pleasure: (from Oxford Languages online)

- a feeling of happy satisfaction and enjoyment.

From this quick Google search, I'd say that the author's choice of words is somewhat sloppy. Then again, the English language doesn't seem to be very specific when it comes to these ideas. Might this point to a cultural lack of appreciation of pleasure and enjoyment? I wonder how these concepts are expressed in, say, French?

Googling, I found Philothea, A Grecian Romance by L. Maria Child as a free PDF. It might be a different edition of the same story, apparently without the Transcendentalist commentary. Although the commentary could be as interesting as the book!

One note: in her preface she notes that she wrote the book for her own pleasure

Yes, it's a case study in how not to respond to anger and of the ramifications of such action, both personally and in a wider context.

Reading this, I think of the Oscars last week, which provided an interesting and practical case study on anger in a modern context.

This has a section (pages 24-37) on Lucretius' plague narrative in Book 6. The author compares it to Thucydides' narrative and discusses how the differences in Lucretius' version emphasize Epicurean philosophy. This is in opposition to Bailey, who determined that the differences in DRN were due to mistranslation on Lucretius' part.

And for the more literary minded among us, there's much more: Homer, Sophocles, Thucycides, Vergil, and the titular Ovid.

Here's the translation from The Hellenistic Philosophers by Long and Sedley:

Quote

Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 123–4

(1) First, think of god as an imperishable and blessed creature, as the common idea of god is in outline, and attach to him nothing alien to imperishability or inappropriate to blessedness, but believe about him everything that can preserve his combination of blessedness and imperishability. (2) For there are gods – the knowledge of them is self-evident. (3) But they are not such as the many believe them to be. For by their beliefs as to their nature the many do not preserve them. The impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to gods the beliefs of the many about them. For they are not preconceptions but false suppositions, the assertions of the many about gods. It is through these that the greatest harms, the ones affecting bad men, stem from gods, and the greatest benefits too. (4) For having a total affinity for their own virtues, they are receptive to those who are like them, and consider alien all that is not of that kind.

This puts it in a more complete context, and now I see that Don has

Quote

The gods do not exist in the way that the 'hoi polloi' believe them to, because they do not perceive what maintains the gods.

I've never noticed this phrase before and it adds quite a bit to chew on!

Sedley's article which started this thread has a very unique translation from the Letter to Menoeceus.

Quote

"First of all, consider god an immortal and blessed living being, as the common no­tion of god is in outline, and attach to him nothing alien to imperishability or inap­propriate to blessedness, but believe about him everything that is capable of pro­tecting that combination of blessedness and imperishability. For although there are gods—the knowledge of them being self-evident—they are not as the many re­gard them, since by regarding them as of that kind the many fail to protect them." (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 123–4)

This heavily coded statement combines the firm assertion that there are gods with an instruction to us to conceive those gods in a way which will ‘protect’ them. Later Epicureans seem to have no doubt that their school’s founder was referring, in realist mode, to biologically immortal be­ings. But the language chosen at least licenses an idealist alternative, that our gods are a projec­tion of our own thought, whose invulnerability it falls to us to ensure.

Unless I'm missing something, every translation that I'm familiar with is diametrically opposed to the underlined portion above. Typically, the gods fail to protect those with wrong ideas of them. Sedley uses his version as support of the idealist interpretation, although I don't see this interpretation as necessary for that.

Does anybody have any insight into this particular translation? Including Don , of course

From Mythology: Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes by Edith Hamilton:

...people felt about Dionysus as about no other god. He was not only outside of them, he was within them, too. They could be transformed by him into being like him. The momentary sense of exultant power wine-drinking can give was only a sign to show men that they had within them more than they knew; “they could themselves become divine.”

To think in this way was far removed from the old idea of worshiping the god by drinking enough to be gay or to be freed from care or to get drunk. There were followers of Dionysus who never drank wine at all. It is not known when the great change took place, lifting the god who freed men for a moment through drunkenness to the god who freed them through inspiration, but one very remarkable result of it made Dionysus for all future ages the most important of the gods of Greece.

What was done at his great festival was open to all the world and is a living influence today. No other festival in Greece could compare with it. It took place in the spring when the vine begins to put forth its branches, and it lasted for five days. They were days of perfect peace and enjoyment. All the ordinary business of life stopped. No one could be put in prison; prisoners were even released so that they could share in the general rejoicing. But the place where people gathered to do honor to the god was not a wild wilderness made horrible by savage deeds and a bloody feast; it was not even a temple precinct with ordered sacrifices and priestly ceremonies. It was a theater; and the ceremony was the performance of a play.

I was unaware of this change in Dionysian revelry. As underlined, she doesn't say when this change happened, and I suspect it was after Epicurus' time. But it potentially brings a different perspective to the festivals.

Further on she states that

His worshipers believed that his death and resurrection showed that the soul lives on forever after the body dies.

So that's problematic.

You're quite welcome!

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I've had a chance to read the paper I attached to post #7. Here are some quotes highlighted from the paper that, to me, give a clearer picture of the intersection of philosophy and religion prior to Epicurus and which would have informed Epicurus' practice:

_The position of Plato and Socrates thus accords with the standard naturalistic interpretation of the pre-Socratics—that they believed the world functioned entirely according to natural laws. I agree with this interpretation, but I am nonetheless intrigued by the question of what the early Greek philosophers thought they were doing when they entered a temple to pray, sing hymns, or sacrifice. It is highly unlikely that the early Greek philosophers (before 450 BC) would have even entertained notions that we associate with atheism._

_Regardless of whether Alcmaeon thought that the universe had been “consciously” created, as in the Timaeus, or is eternal and unique, as we find in Aristotle (and, on my reading, in the Plato’s arguments for the existence of God in Laws 10), neither option in any way suggests that the gods intervene in human affairs. Indeed, humans are an integral part of the nature of things. The fact that humans like the gods are endowed with consciousness suggests that there must be a telos. The gods must have represented the paradigms of virtue and goodness._

_While it seems unequivocally clear that there was no room for the supernatural in Anaximenes’ natural philosophy, it seems equally clear that he saw humans as endowed with consciousness and cognition, which they have in common with the all-pervading cosmic divinity. However, since there is nothing in Anaximenes’ description of the celestial bodies that would suggest that they comprise some kind of model for humans to follow, as we saw in Alcmaeon, the question arises as to what divinities he had in mind as models to emulate and address in prayer. One possibility could be hidden in Hippolytus’ account of Anaximenes theory (DK13A7). Here he lists gods and divine things (theous kai theia) as also products or offspring of the originative living substance. These could be a concession to traditional religion or what the materialist Democritus, a century later, understood as images that appear to humans and sometimes speak to them (DK68B166; 175; 217). These are gods, who are givers of good and not evil, and who love only those who hate injustice (B175, 217). These theoi or theia could thus be inspirational models of virtue for human behaviour and wholly worthy of prayer._

_There is no room for atheism, but neither is there a notion of intentionality or providence as we find in theism. Anaximander thus represents what I call one of the first secular theories of everything that is expressed in the form of a natural teleology. But this does not, of course, exclude a religious tendency, which could be thought of as the relation between humans and the cosmic order that he would have characterized as divine. I conjecture that Anaximander tried to understand the secrets of the universe, and at the same time he understood the laws of nature as indicative of caring, but non-interfering, gods who were by nature good. We gain a better insight through historia or secular investigation. I think there is evidence of this in his famous fragment (DK12B1) cited above, which can be interpreted as claiming that human society should model the cosmos, which functions according to rigorous laws exemplified in the seasons, night and day, and the regular movements of the celestial bodies (see Naddaf 2005, 86ff). Praying would be about using our reason, making wise decisions, taking responsibility for our actions, and being able to convince others to follow a similar path._

_Xenophanes was also the first of the early philosophers on record to advocate a “higher” form of religious practice—a way of prayer that goes beyond attempts to cajole favors from the gods (DK21B1) The context is how one should behave at a symposium. Xenophanes insists that a sound-minded man (euphronas andras) should first hymn the god (theon humein) with pious words and pure thoughts (euphêmois muthois kai katharoisi logois, 1.14), and then after having poured a libation and prayed for the strength to be able to do what is just (speisantas de kai euxemenous ta dikaia dunasthai prêssein, 1.15), make his request. These include bringing noble deeds to light and striving for aretê or virtue, and, in particular, moderation._

_...the accent is on inspirational awareness, not supernatural intervention. With Heraclitus we have the first literary reference to the Delphic maxim “know thyself” (DK22B. 101, 116), and there are also a number of references in Heraclitus to self-knowledge (DK 22B101, 112, 113, 116), the unexamined life (B123), care of the self (B123), and the psuchê as the “true self” (B118, 77). Indeed, there is a considerable affinity with what we find in Socrates. Or better still, Socrates comes across as less of a maverick when we give Heraclitus his due._

_Anaxagoras: “Blessed is he who has devoted his life to scientific research (tês historias): he will neither malign nor harm his fellow citizen, but observing the ageless order of immortal nature, will enquire from what source it was composed and in what way. Such men would never take part in shameful deeds” (fragment 910 Nauck). This fragment suggests that the order of nature is the standard of goodness. Indeed, its study (tês historias) will discourage humans from harming one another and doing unjust deeds. This idea seems to be at the core of most of the early Greek philosophers that we have passed in review, and constitutes in large part what can be considered as their religion, that is, living in harmony with nature or the cosmos as they understood it to function._

_Socrates didn’t believe in the traditional gods to in the popular sense, for the gods for Socrates were by nature good and perfect, true paradigms of virtue, and thus true models to follow..._

_It’s unclear when an open hostility toward natural philosophy and thus the religion of the early Greek philosophers originated in Periclean Athens. It is often connected with the Decree of Diopeithes, a seer, around 432. Plutarch, Life of Pericles (32), which is our only source of the Decree, says it attacked “those who fail to respect (nomizein) things divine (ta theia) or teach new doctrines about the heavens.” Its object seemed to be, in particular, the natural philosopher Anaxagoras and ultimately his friend and benefactor Pericles._

_Critias of Athens (c. 460–403) claimed that the gods were invented by a clever man in order to frighten those who were surreptitiously evil whether in words or deeds._

_Democritus of Abdera, the atomist (c. 460–360), connected the origin of gods with the fear of celestial phenomena (DK68A75, B30), but also considered them living, intelligent, material beings (and thus part of the objective world) that, as images or eidola, are somehow capable of foretelling the future by communicating with humans (68B166). These are all brilliant hypotheses, and in the case of Democritus an acknowledgement that the phenomena of the divine cannot be explained away even for someone for whom in the beginning there were only atoms and the void._

_The religious event required the participation of the entire polis when appealing to god’s grace. It was unlikely that any philosophers missed the occasion for obvious reasons, but they could remind their fellow citizens of the hubris of making a request of a god that was not backed up with a worthy motive. The Seven Sages were after all at the source of the famous Delphic maxims. And the new “masters of truth” competed opening with the iconic poets._

_...in this paper I have attempted to show that all the early Greek philosophers that we passed in review still saw the cosmological order as a model for humans endowed with nous or reason to follow, even if there was no divine intention in the Platonic sense behind it._

With the caveat that I haven't read it yet, this paper looks like it could give some context to the discussion. It doesn't look like it mentions Epicurus, but it discusses his predecessors.

In order to try to process this info, I've put together an extremely simplified listing of the basics of Epicurean reasoning:

Attestation: I perceive this, therefore it is evidence

Non-attestation: that evidence conflicts with this evidence

Contestation: if that exists, it implies this can't exist

Non-contestation: this exists, and implies that exists

True opinions: attested and non-contested by perceived evidence

False opinions: contested and non-attested by perceived evidence

Conjectural opinions: awaiting verification through attestation and/or contestation

Multiple conjectured: if there are multiple reasonable opinions, it's foolish to insist on one