Posts by Godfrey

What he describes as enjoyment sounds to me pretty much like pleasure as envisioned by Epicurus.

Definition of enjoyment (all definitions from Merriam-Webster online):

1a) the action or state of enjoying

1b) possession and use: the enjoyment of civic rights

2) something that gives keen satisfaction: the poorest life has its enjoyments and pleasures

Definition of enjoy:

- intransitive verb: to have a good time

- transitive verb: 1) to have for one's use, benefit, or lot; experience: enjoyed great success 2) to take pleasure or satisfaction in

Definition of pleasure: (Entry 1 of 2, noun)

1) desire, inclination: wait upon his pleasure— William Shakespeare

2) a state of gratification

3a) sensual gratification; 3b) frivolous amusement

4) a source of delight or joy

Definition of pleasure: (Entry 2 of 2, verb)

- transitive verb: 1) to give pleasure to: gratify; 2) to give sexual pleasure to

- intransitive verb: 1) to take pleasure: delight; 2) to seek pleasure

Definition of pleasure: (from Oxford Languages online)

- a feeling of happy satisfaction and enjoyment.

From this quick Google search, I'd say that the author's choice of words is somewhat sloppy. Then again, the English language doesn't seem to be very specific when it comes to these ideas. Might this point to a cultural lack of appreciation of pleasure and enjoyment? I wonder how these concepts are expressed in, say, French?

Googling, I found Philothea, A Grecian Romance by L. Maria Child as a free PDF. It might be a different edition of the same story, apparently without the Transcendentalist commentary. Although the commentary could be as interesting as the book!

One note: in her preface she notes that she wrote the book for her own pleasure

Yes, it's a case study in how not to respond to anger and of the ramifications of such action, both personally and in a wider context.

Reading this, I think of the Oscars last week, which provided an interesting and practical case study on anger in a modern context.

This has a section (pages 24-37) on Lucretius' plague narrative in Book 6. The author compares it to Thucydides' narrative and discusses how the differences in Lucretius' version emphasize Epicurean philosophy. This is in opposition to Bailey, who determined that the differences in DRN were due to mistranslation on Lucretius' part.

And for the more literary minded among us, there's much more: Homer, Sophocles, Thucycides, Vergil, and the titular Ovid.

Here's the translation from The Hellenistic Philosophers by Long and Sedley:

Quote

Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 123–4

(1) First, think of god as an imperishable and blessed creature, as the common idea of god is in outline, and attach to him nothing alien to imperishability or inappropriate to blessedness, but believe about him everything that can preserve his combination of blessedness and imperishability. (2) For there are gods – the knowledge of them is self-evident. (3) But they are not such as the many believe them to be. For by their beliefs as to their nature the many do not preserve them. The impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to gods the beliefs of the many about them. For they are not preconceptions but false suppositions, the assertions of the many about gods. It is through these that the greatest harms, the ones affecting bad men, stem from gods, and the greatest benefits too. (4) For having a total affinity for their own virtues, they are receptive to those who are like them, and consider alien all that is not of that kind.

This puts it in a more complete context, and now I see that Don has

Quote

The gods do not exist in the way that the 'hoi polloi' believe them to, because they do not perceive what maintains the gods.

I've never noticed this phrase before and it adds quite a bit to chew on!

Sedley's article which started this thread has a very unique translation from the Letter to Menoeceus.

Quote

"First of all, consider god an immortal and blessed living being, as the common no­tion of god is in outline, and attach to him nothing alien to imperishability or inap­propriate to blessedness, but believe about him everything that is capable of pro­tecting that combination of blessedness and imperishability. For although there are gods—the knowledge of them being self-evident—they are not as the many re­gard them, since by regarding them as of that kind the many fail to protect them." (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 123–4)

This heavily coded statement combines the firm assertion that there are gods with an instruction to us to conceive those gods in a way which will ‘protect’ them. Later Epicureans seem to have no doubt that their school’s founder was referring, in realist mode, to biologically immortal be­ings. But the language chosen at least licenses an idealist alternative, that our gods are a projec­tion of our own thought, whose invulnerability it falls to us to ensure.

Unless I'm missing something, every translation that I'm familiar with is diametrically opposed to the underlined portion above. Typically, the gods fail to protect those with wrong ideas of them. Sedley uses his version as support of the idealist interpretation, although I don't see this interpretation as necessary for that.

Does anybody have any insight into this particular translation? Including Don , of course

From Mythology: Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes by Edith Hamilton:

...people felt about Dionysus as about no other god. He was not only outside of them, he was within them, too. They could be transformed by him into being like him. The momentary sense of exultant power wine-drinking can give was only a sign to show men that they had within them more than they knew; “they could themselves become divine.”

To think in this way was far removed from the old idea of worshiping the god by drinking enough to be gay or to be freed from care or to get drunk. There were followers of Dionysus who never drank wine at all. It is not known when the great change took place, lifting the god who freed men for a moment through drunkenness to the god who freed them through inspiration, but one very remarkable result of it made Dionysus for all future ages the most important of the gods of Greece.

What was done at his great festival was open to all the world and is a living influence today. No other festival in Greece could compare with it. It took place in the spring when the vine begins to put forth its branches, and it lasted for five days. They were days of perfect peace and enjoyment. All the ordinary business of life stopped. No one could be put in prison; prisoners were even released so that they could share in the general rejoicing. But the place where people gathered to do honor to the god was not a wild wilderness made horrible by savage deeds and a bloody feast; it was not even a temple precinct with ordered sacrifices and priestly ceremonies. It was a theater; and the ceremony was the performance of a play.

I was unaware of this change in Dionysian revelry. As underlined, she doesn't say when this change happened, and I suspect it was after Epicurus' time. But it potentially brings a different perspective to the festivals.

Further on she states that

His worshipers believed that his death and resurrection showed that the soul lives on forever after the body dies.

So that's problematic.

You're quite welcome!

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A podcast episode on how ideas can percolate.

I've had a chance to read the paper I attached to post #7. Here are some quotes highlighted from the paper that, to me, give a clearer picture of the intersection of philosophy and religion prior to Epicurus and which would have informed Epicurus' practice:

_The position of Plato and Socrates thus accords with the standard naturalistic interpretation of the pre-Socratics—that they believed the world functioned entirely according to natural laws. I agree with this interpretation, but I am nonetheless intrigued by the question of what the early Greek philosophers thought they were doing when they entered a temple to pray, sing hymns, or sacrifice. It is highly unlikely that the early Greek philosophers (before 450 BC) would have even entertained notions that we associate with atheism._

_Regardless of whether Alcmaeon thought that the universe had been “consciously” created, as in the Timaeus, or is eternal and unique, as we find in Aristotle (and, on my reading, in the Plato’s arguments for the existence of God in Laws 10), neither option in any way suggests that the gods intervene in human affairs. Indeed, humans are an integral part of the nature of things. The fact that humans like the gods are endowed with consciousness suggests that there must be a telos. The gods must have represented the paradigms of virtue and goodness._

_While it seems unequivocally clear that there was no room for the supernatural in Anaximenes’ natural philosophy, it seems equally clear that he saw humans as endowed with consciousness and cognition, which they have in common with the all-pervading cosmic divinity. However, since there is nothing in Anaximenes’ description of the celestial bodies that would suggest that they comprise some kind of model for humans to follow, as we saw in Alcmaeon, the question arises as to what divinities he had in mind as models to emulate and address in prayer. One possibility could be hidden in Hippolytus’ account of Anaximenes theory (DK13A7). Here he lists gods and divine things (theous kai theia) as also products or offspring of the originative living substance. These could be a concession to traditional religion or what the materialist Democritus, a century later, understood as images that appear to humans and sometimes speak to them (DK68B166; 175; 217). These are gods, who are givers of good and not evil, and who love only those who hate injustice (B175, 217). These theoi or theia could thus be inspirational models of virtue for human behaviour and wholly worthy of prayer._

_There is no room for atheism, but neither is there a notion of intentionality or providence as we find in theism. Anaximander thus represents what I call one of the first secular theories of everything that is expressed in the form of a natural teleology. But this does not, of course, exclude a religious tendency, which could be thought of as the relation between humans and the cosmic order that he would have characterized as divine. I conjecture that Anaximander tried to understand the secrets of the universe, and at the same time he understood the laws of nature as indicative of caring, but non-interfering, gods who were by nature good. We gain a better insight through historia or secular investigation. I think there is evidence of this in his famous fragment (DK12B1) cited above, which can be interpreted as claiming that human society should model the cosmos, which functions according to rigorous laws exemplified in the seasons, night and day, and the regular movements of the celestial bodies (see Naddaf 2005, 86ff). Praying would be about using our reason, making wise decisions, taking responsibility for our actions, and being able to convince others to follow a similar path._

_Xenophanes was also the first of the early philosophers on record to advocate a “higher” form of religious practice—a way of prayer that goes beyond attempts to cajole favors from the gods (DK21B1) The context is how one should behave at a symposium. Xenophanes insists that a sound-minded man (euphronas andras) should first hymn the god (theon humein) with pious words and pure thoughts (euphêmois muthois kai katharoisi logois, 1.14), and then after having poured a libation and prayed for the strength to be able to do what is just (speisantas de kai euxemenous ta dikaia dunasthai prêssein, 1.15), make his request. These include bringing noble deeds to light and striving for aretê or virtue, and, in particular, moderation._

_...the accent is on inspirational awareness, not supernatural intervention. With Heraclitus we have the first literary reference to the Delphic maxim “know thyself” (DK22B. 101, 116), and there are also a number of references in Heraclitus to self-knowledge (DK 22B101, 112, 113, 116), the unexamined life (B123), care of the self (B123), and the psuchê as the “true self” (B118, 77). Indeed, there is a considerable affinity with what we find in Socrates. Or better still, Socrates comes across as less of a maverick when we give Heraclitus his due._

_Anaxagoras: “Blessed is he who has devoted his life to scientific research (tês historias): he will neither malign nor harm his fellow citizen, but observing the ageless order of immortal nature, will enquire from what source it was composed and in what way. Such men would never take part in shameful deeds” (fragment 910 Nauck). This fragment suggests that the order of nature is the standard of goodness. Indeed, its study (tês historias) will discourage humans from harming one another and doing unjust deeds. This idea seems to be at the core of most of the early Greek philosophers that we have passed in review, and constitutes in large part what can be considered as their religion, that is, living in harmony with nature or the cosmos as they understood it to function._

_Socrates didn’t believe in the traditional gods to in the popular sense, for the gods for Socrates were by nature good and perfect, true paradigms of virtue, and thus true models to follow..._

_It’s unclear when an open hostility toward natural philosophy and thus the religion of the early Greek philosophers originated in Periclean Athens. It is often connected with the Decree of Diopeithes, a seer, around 432. Plutarch, Life of Pericles (32), which is our only source of the Decree, says it attacked “those who fail to respect (nomizein) things divine (ta theia) or teach new doctrines about the heavens.” Its object seemed to be, in particular, the natural philosopher Anaxagoras and ultimately his friend and benefactor Pericles._

_Critias of Athens (c. 460–403) claimed that the gods were invented by a clever man in order to frighten those who were surreptitiously evil whether in words or deeds._

_Democritus of Abdera, the atomist (c. 460–360), connected the origin of gods with the fear of celestial phenomena (DK68A75, B30), but also considered them living, intelligent, material beings (and thus part of the objective world) that, as images or eidola, are somehow capable of foretelling the future by communicating with humans (68B166). These are all brilliant hypotheses, and in the case of Democritus an acknowledgement that the phenomena of the divine cannot be explained away even for someone for whom in the beginning there were only atoms and the void._

_The religious event required the participation of the entire polis when appealing to god’s grace. It was unlikely that any philosophers missed the occasion for obvious reasons, but they could remind their fellow citizens of the hubris of making a request of a god that was not backed up with a worthy motive. The Seven Sages were after all at the source of the famous Delphic maxims. And the new “masters of truth” competed opening with the iconic poets._

_...in this paper I have attempted to show that all the early Greek philosophers that we passed in review still saw the cosmological order as a model for humans endowed with nous or reason to follow, even if there was no divine intention in the Platonic sense behind it._

With the caveat that I haven't read it yet, this paper looks like it could give some context to the discussion. It doesn't look like it mentions Epicurus, but it discusses his predecessors.

In order to try to process this info, I've put together an extremely simplified listing of the basics of Epicurean reasoning:

Attestation: I perceive this, therefore it is evidence

Non-attestation: that evidence conflicts with this evidence

Contestation: if that exists, it implies this can't exist

Non-contestation: this exists, and implies that exists

True opinions: attested and non-contested by perceived evidence

False opinions: contested and non-attested by perceived evidence

Conjectural opinions: awaiting verification through attestation and/or contestation

Multiple conjectured: if there are multiple reasonable opinions, it's foolish to insist on one

As for a compilation, I hadn't really thought of taking it much further but can keep at it. My main source right now is The Hellenistic Philosophers by Long and Sedley: they've already done much of the work with their compilations of their own translations. But there's certainly more out there, particularly comparative translations of various passages. BTW is there an online source of Sextus Empiricus? I found the Bury book online, which is good, but the Sextus passage that I used above is in book 7, and his translation of Against the Professors stops at book 6

Quote from Cassius

In other words, I have always thought that Diogenes Laertius's statement about seeing multiple oxen and then over time forming a picture or definition of an ox is something that definitely does happen - I think that's probably the conceptual reasoning process.

I think we're on the same page, except for this quote. The oxen problem, to me, is part of function 1 but I see how there is also a rational, function 2 element to it. For function 1, learning begins in the womb and follows from there, so as an infant you could passively perceive oxen (or pictures of oxen) and at the same time hear people talking about oxen. Your faculty of pattern recognition would take this information and process it into a notion of oxen. This is what I understand, hopefully correctly, from Lisa Feldman Barrett and other current neuroscientists.

Self-evident does seem problematic. Like so many words it apparently has a technical meaning and a common meaning. The dictionary definition is near the end of post #2. Epicurus' definition, I think, is:

PD24 ...what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression... Long and Sedley, 1987

PD24 ...that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind... Bailey, 1926

To my understanding, this snippet refers to the "data" that comes from the faculties and which is then examined using Epicurean reasoning. Maybe instead of "self-evident" it could be called "evidence from perception"?

Cassius do you remember Voula Tsouna's Zoom epibolai presentation for the 2021 Hellenistic Forum? This was one of the passages that she used in her presentation. If I read my illegible notes correctly, she and Elizabeth Asmis interpreted "focusing of thought" as a conscious operation whereas A.A. Long felt it was not a conscious process. Much of that discussion was over my head though, so I may have that wrong. But I believe I'm correct in my understanding that this snippet is only referring to the signs, not the method of inference. Is that what you're saying as well? So that addressing this is addressing a re-phrasing of "self-evident"?

If "focusing of thought" is thought of as a non-conscious process, such as light focusing through a lens, that would read similarly to Bailey's "intuitive apprehension", "apprehension" meaning understanding or grasp. This seems to be describing the anticipations if I'm understanding it correctly.

The Hellenistic Philosophers has a translation of Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 7.211–16 (Usener 247, part) (p. 142-3, kindle version) which seems to me to be a great start for an outline of methods of inference (or Epicurean logic, Epicurean reasoning, Epicurean processing). I edited and rearranged the text to get the beginnings of an outline.

1. The Basics

A. Self-evidence is the foundation and basis of everything.

B. True opinions: attested and non-contested by self-evidence

C. False opinions: contested and non-attested by self-evidence

D. Conjectural opinions: awaiting verification through attestation and/or contestation

2. Definitions

A. Attestation: perception through a self-evident impression of the fact that the object of opinion is such as it was believed to be.

Example: if Plato is approaching from far off, I form the conjectural opinion, owing to the distance, that it is Plato. But when he has come close, there is further testimony that he is Plato, now that the gap is reduced, and it is attested by the self-evidence itself.

B. Non-contestation: the following from that which is evident of the non-evident thing posited and believed.

Example, Epicurus, in saying that there is void, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident fact of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not to be motion either, since the moving body would lack a place to pass into as a result of everything’s being full and solid. Therefore the non-evident thing believed is uncontested by that which is evident, since there is motion.

C. Contestation: is something which conflicts with non-contestation. It is the elimination of that which is evident by the positing of the non-evident thing.

Example: the Stoic says that void does not exist, judging something non-evident; but once this is posited about it, that which is evident, namely motion, ought to be co-eliminated with it. For if void does not exist, necessarily motion does not occur either, according to the method already demonstrated.

D. Non-attestation: opposed to attestation, being confrontation through self-evidence of the fact that the object of opinion is not such as it was believed to be.

Example, if someone is approaching from far off, we conjecture, owing to the distance, that he is Plato. But when the gap is reduced, we recognize through self-evidence that it is not Plato. The thing believed was not attested by the evident.

E. Self-evident: evident without proof or reasoning (from Merriam-Webster online)

It would probably be helpful to agree on plain English versions of these definitions!

Not covered here is the idea of multiple satisfactory theories from Pythocles and Lucretius. I don’t have a cite at hand but that seems much more straightforward than this.

Getting away from Philodemus On Signs for a moment, I’ve been looking at The Hellenistic Philosophers by Long and Sedley for original quotes from Epicurus regarding signs and methods of inference. I also had a look at a cluster of Principle Doctrines that are relevant (PD 22 & 23 are from Nate’s compilation, with thanks).

PD22 We must take into account both the underlying purpose and all the evidence of clear perception, to which we refer our opinions. Otherwise, everything will be filled with confusion and indecision. O'Connor (1993)

PD23 If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn. Yonge (1853)

PD24 (1) If you are going to reject any sensation absolutely, and not distinguish opinions reliant on evidence yet awaited from what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression, you will confound all your other sensations with empty opinion and consequently reject the criterion in its entirety. (2) And if you are going to treat as established both all the evidence yet awaited in your conjectural conceptions, and that which has failed to <earn> attestation, you will not exclude falsehood, so that you will have removed all debate and all discrimination between correct and incorrect. Long and Sedley (1987, p. 135-6, kindle version)

Letter to Herodotus 37-38 (1) First, then, Herodotus, we must grasp the things which underlie words, so that we may have them as a reference point against which to judge matters of opinion, inquiry and puzzlement, and not have everything undiscriminated for ourselves as we attempt infinite chains of proofs, or have words which are empty. For the primary concept corresponding to each word must be seen and need no additional proof, if we are going to have a reference point for matters of inquiry, puzzlement and opinion. (2) Second, we should observe everything in the light of our sensations, and in general in the light of our present focusings whether of thought or of any of our discriminatory faculties, and likewise also in the light of the feelings which exist in us, in order to have a basis for sign-inferences about evidence yet awaited and about the non-evident. Long and Sedley (1987, p. 136, kindle version)

Are the data from the canon "signs"? I would assume this to be the case; does that do anything to tie inferences or processing into the Canon? Sorry to be so daft about this, it's definitely not my strong suit.

BTW The Hellenistic Philosophers sections 15, 16, 17 and 18 have some pertinent texts. I plan to review these tomorrow.

So, in outline:

Physics

Canonic

- the faculty of Sensations

- the faculty of Anticipations

- the faculty of Feelings

- the process of Epicurean reasoning

Ethics

Or are you saying this:

Physics

Canonic

- the faculty of Sensations, mediated by Epicurean reasoning

- the faculty of Anticipations, mediated by Epicurean reasoning

- the faculty of Feelings, mediated by Epicurean reasoning

Ethics

These outlines consider the Canon to encompass the entire Epicurean epistemology, which makes sense. I've been thinking of the Canon as restricted to faculties, and that it's a tripod, which doesn't allow for either reasoning or a fourth leg. Is this how DeWitt presents it? I don’t remember.

To my understanding, the type of logic that doesn't connect to canonic data is not really a part of Epicurus' philosophy and doesn't belong in the outline.