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When I insert a word into text that I've typed into a post, and use autofill to insert the word, the last letter drops off of the word. It happened in a post a few minutes ago as well as in this one. I'm using an Android tablet. Not sure if it's the tablet or the new software, but it's never happened before with any software on the tablet.
Otherwise, the new layout is quite nice!
I think real ethics are internal, not external.
Agreed.
I think we achieve excellent ethics when the foundation of our behavioral choices is not "me" but "we" - involving a larger group of valued considerations.
Does this quote conflict with the previous quote? My take is that it doesn't: most people make choices which are concerned with matters involving themselves, as well as matters involving things outside of themselves. But the choices themselves are internal, including the choices as to which matters to pursue.
However I'm wondering if the second quote is suggesting that there's a way in which the external becomes internal. The Epicurean Canon relies on external inputs. Is this quote making the case for a faculty (perhaps neurological) in addition to the sensations, anticipations and feelings?
Re the poll, I use all three. I've had text inputting issues on my phone in the past; it'll be interesting to see if they disappear with this update. I never tried to figure out if they were caused by the phone or the software.
When we make choices using whatever degree of free will that's available to us, the effects of those choices form "ripples" in the deterministic fabric. These ripples then determine subsequent events up to the point at which free will occurs in those events. And so on, ad infinitum.
What are the philosophical implications of this? Or are there any? I suppose hard determinists would say that there's no free will available to us, so there are no implications. But if we do have any amount of free will, it seems to me that, over infinite time, the amount of free will would increase exponentially.
Other than a sense of agency v nihilism, what are the practical implications of this debate? I tend to get brain freeze thinking about this 
Aren't emergent properties a form of randomness? Or do they fall under the idea of "if we knew enough about everything, we would see how they actually emerged"?
Does "if we knew enough about everything, then we would see how x" mean that as we learn more we will have more free will?
Being good or being eudaimonic seems to me to necessarily begin with the self. The only way that we can affect ourselves or others is through our own agency. However that doesn't imply that we direct our actions strictly toward ourselves.
Part of the beauty of this particular philosophy, to me, is that it places the self within a view of all that is. And it provides us with effective tools with which to increase our agency as well as our eudaimonia. Each of us grapples with measuring the limits of our effectiveness in a wide variety of realms. The sensations, anticipations and feelings provide input. The feelings in particular provide guidance: will pursuing "x" increase my agency (which is pleasurable) or make me miserable (which will decrease my effectiveness)? This guidance serves to join the self with the other in, arguably, the most effective manner.
Thanks Bryan ! I think we're on the same page.
This morning I listened to the Dr. Glidden interview again. He explicitly states that prolepseis are not infallible, which makes sense to me. But in this way he repeatedly separates them from sensations and feelings while leaving them in the Canon. He may have gone as far as to say that they're not true, but I'm interpreting that as not infallible. Riffing on this I get the notion that the three elements of the Canon all vary in degrees of infallibility:
- Sensations are true, but not infallible (as in the bent stick in the water, or the rounded or square tower)
- Anticipations can be true or false, so not infallible (as in the snake or stick illustration)
- Feelings are true and infallible. But they need to be carefully attended to in order to properly hear them (particularly wrt to those who incorrectly think that there is a "neutral zone".)
(I'm using infallible here to mean "a reliable source of information".)
The above is some very helpful explanation and great analogies. Particularly comparing the technology of casting a net to focusing a camera lens: that's a great way to illustrate the 2300 year time difference.
One thing that I'm still confused about: is this focusing conscious? To my understanding prolepseis are pre-conscious in a way that might be analogous to a feeling being pre-conscious. Then we use conscious thinking to examine the data provided by the senses, prolepseis and feelings.
My understanding, again, is that the mind does tons of focusing and processing without our conscious awareness. I've been interpreting this as the activity that generates prolepseis. However I can also see that the focusing I'm doing now, consciously, could be considered an activity that generates a prolepsis. But now I'm getting confused, because my line of thought is leading to a prolepsis being both a process and a result. And also "learning".
I need to go back and review from the beginning of this thread. Meanwhile, any further explanations would be much appreciated!
Here's a post after a webinar with Voula Tsouna that tries to point out some of the issues:
Bryan I'm interested in hearing more of your thinking on visual focus of the mind. This seems to be a topic of some controversy, and one of which my understanding is pretty limited. What do you mean by coalescing them with the anticipations? Would they then be a type of anticipation? And what exactly is the visual focus of the mind? Conscious, unconscious, dreams...? Is the Greek epibolai equivalent to these? How does the Greek word relate to the Greek phrase that you posted above?
And I love that Cassius finally got irritated with Cicero.
One thing that is commonly missed is that EP is a philosophy of personal responsibility. In a world in which there is no supernatural god, no afterlife, no absolute forms or essences, how do we avoid nihilism and live our lives? This is the context in which pleasure and pain are the guides. Some people choose abstract ideas such as virtue for a guide, but what is that other than a mental construct? Some people choose sex, drugs and R&R, but I question whether this is being aware of their pain or simply papering over it.
Pleasure and pain are innate, biological tools for guidance. To properly use them one must delve into the nuances of their own awareness and come to terms with what they find, keeping in mind that there is no neutral state. Often what appears to be neutral, when examined, contains pains and pleasures that we've just never noticed. That's where the real work takes place.
Fascinating! It's interesting (and reassuring) how closely our experience follows the biology. We've occasionally discussed, mostly anecdotally, the difference between "pain" and "suffering". For example if I have an injury I may eventually notice that I'm avoiding doing certain things, even though doing them doesn't actually hurt. Or I'll anticipate an action being painful and tense up, thereby making it more painful than it would be otherwise. I'm thinking here of the injury as being "pain" and the avoiding or anticipating as being or causing "suffering".
How do desires fit into this evolutionary picture of pains, or do they? Are desires, biologically, considered pains or are they completely different? Philosophically, they seem to be a type of pain and yet, at the same time, they seem to be something quite different.
Also, is a complete absence of pain something that is considered neurologically possible while maintaining full consciousness?
My thinking is that, eventually, it would be most interesting to get an outline of how pleasure, pain and desire operate, together and separately, then perhaps dig into details from that point. But in my ignorance I might be overly ambitious about such a complex subject....
And, I was wondering if, particularly in this era of the planet, we can really say that searching for "a happy life" is going to save us all from the ecological and technological dilemmas we are creating.
In Epicurean terms, pleasure and pain are our guides. When the present or future conditions of, say, the planet or society are dismal, that's a source of pain to many of us as individuals. It's critical to remember that searching for a happy life involves paying attention to both our pleasure and pain, since they both are our guides. Over time, it often becomes evident that ignoring or suppressing our pain (such as distress over the state of the world) doesn't lead to more pleasure, and that we need to do the work to deal with the pain. In this case pain becomes a guide to living a happy life.
Also central to Epicurus' ethics are three categories of desire. One place to find these is in the Principle Doctrines, particularly PD29-30, PD15, and PD26. These categories are natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, and unnatural. These perhaps could be considered more specific guides to what is prudent to pursue, and can help us to sort out actions that we might take to remove particular pains. I think most Epicureans would say (well, at least I would) that if more people were aware of and followed this ethical system, society and the planet might not be in the situation that they're in.
Epicurean ethics is really quite interesting, but it takes a lot of work to really dig into it and get full benefit from it. However there's much pleasure to be had from doing this work!
This gets to the heart of the ethical hedonism.
First, per PD03, freedom from pain in the body and trouble in the mind is the same thing as maximum pleasure.
Next, pleasure is the goal to which all things point. So by this reasoning, a relevant, contributing life is worth pursuing because it is pleasurable. Many studies point out that a relevant, contributing life increases well-being: what is well-being, if not pleasure?
To me, if you begin with the goal of being relevant and contributing (to whatever you might find relevant), then you're pursuing duty ethics. From my experience this eventually leads to burnout and poor health. Keeping pleasure as a guide, I can actually contribute more and be more relevant. To me, this is a valuable insight of Epicurus', although it's extremely controversial to this day.
In my own life, experimenting with becoming more aware of my feelings of pleasure and pain, and using them as a guide, has been a game changer. Combining this with an understanding of Epicurus' categories of desires provides a powerful set of tools for living a fulfilling life.
There are learning behaviors such as many elements of remembering behaviors, "modeling" (copying a trusted source), data integration behaviors, formations of beliefs, values, expectations
BrainToBeing do you have any similar sources regarding learning behaviors? Specifically data integration, forming beliefs, values, expectations... the sorts of things involved in concept formation.
In Diogenes Laertius and in Cicero (I don't have the specific cites at hand), two examples are given to illustrate prolépseis, and there is some scholarly disagreement as to their correctness. The interview with Dr. Glidden, previously posted in this thread, is a good discussion of that as I recall. One of the examples is that we learn to recognize a cow, or a horse, through repeated exposure to cows or horses. The other example, which is really just a mention, is that justice is a prolépseis. In your experience, is there a common thread between these examples? If not, how might the differences be described neurologically?
Unquestionably, as an evolved species, we are born with "bootstrap" behavioral programs
This is one of the key areas to pursue, in my opinion. What are examples of "bootstrap" behavioral programs?
In previous threads we've discussed instinct in animals and how that could perhaps provide some clarity. Maybe that's a useful place to begin?
Well said! The only thing I would add is regarding the final sentence. Your sentence as written follows logically from your observations, but for further clarity I would say that both pleasure and pain are guides. So to live our best lives we need to continually practice being aware of our pleasures and pains in order to obtain maximum information. From this information we can more skillfully make our choices and rejections which will maximize pleasure.
So yes, we naturally pursue pleasure, but not always skillfully. The task of increasing our skill of understanding and following the feelings as guides could reasonably be considered pursuing pleasure.
This path is following "the nature of things". The Stoic path seems to be following a mental construct. They say, I think, that almost nobody is virtuous.
There aren't many extant texts regarding the prolépseis. I'm really curious if and how these may relate to current neurology. As Don mentioned, some of us have been reading "popular" neuroscience books and, to us, there seems to be a connection. There are various threads in the forums discussing this.
