Posts by Eikadistes

Essentially, are we arguing that Seneca's use of "Summum Bonum" (or "highest good") as opposed to another phrase, perhaps the available "Maximum bonum" (or "greatest good") is an indication that Seneca misunderstood a nuanced, yet crucial distinction between "high" and "great"? What leads us to believe that Epicurus recognized such a distinction?

I personally think "Summum" might be a better rendering than "Maximum": the ancient Greek word Epicurus employed to describe the fullness of pure pleasure in KD4 was AKPON, meaning "extreme", "acutest", "intense", "sharpest", "end", with the added connotation of "peak", "highest", and "mountain top". He chose to describe the limit of pleasure, not only in terms of a general magnitude, but, specifically, within the figurative context of "altitude" (i.e. "highest").

That being said, Epicurus is not specific to a single term. There are multiple words in ancient Greek he employed that describe a "magnitude" of pleasure. He uses MEΓEΘOYΣ (KD3) meaning “great”, “loudness”, “quantitative limit”, “maximum”, “upper limit”, “total power”, the “full measurement of greatness”, ΠOΛΛAΣ (KD4) meaning “much”, “many”, “often”, “might”, “great”, “strong”, EIΛIKPINEΣTATH (KD14) meaning "great", "abundant", "bountiful", KYPIOTATA (KD16) meaning “essential”, “principal”, “dominant, “most important”, “primary”, as in the Kuriai, MEΓIΣTA (KD16) meaning "greatest", ΠΛEIΣTHΣ (KD17) meaning "most", "greatest", "largest" ... that's just a quick sample of the magnitude-expressing words Epicurus uses. Given this, is there really that big of a different between "Summum" and "Maximum"?

If Seneca used "Maximo Bonum" (or "loudest pleasure") it could still carry the same meaning of 100%. Epicurus was willing to describe good, full pleasure with MEΓEΘOYΣ, which can connotate the magnitude of audible volume, instead of AKPON, the magnitude of altitude, as well as the general concept of the greatest measurement of a thing.

OR, is it our suggestion that any adjective implying "greatest" is inappropriate to link to the noun meaning "good"?

Quote from smoothiekiwi

Quote

When life is the highest good- why does Epicurus then allow suicide? Why isn’t the goal of Epicureanism then to prolong life to the maximum? Why do we then even pursue pleasure, when the highest good is tp simply stay alive?

Epicurus resolutely rejects suicide under any circumstances:

"Even if the wise man should lose his eyesight, he will not end his whole life ...." (Wise Man Saying 17)

"He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life." (Vatican Saying 38)

Philodemus does argue that the length of the wise person's life should be maximized:

"And therefore the greatest good has been grasped by the person who has become wise and lived through a certain amount of time. Once his journey has achieved balance and consistency, it would be fitting to prolong it for an unlimited time, if such were possible; but should his life be limited, this will not be the deprivation of what has already been, but [sc. merely] a prevention of its continued presence." (Philodemus, On Death).

While De Witt is one of our greatest resources in modern scholarship, he takes liberties where he sees fit. His suggestion that Life (not Pleasure) is the Greatest Good does not align with my reading of Epicurus' original texts. Nowhere that I have found does Epicurus suggest that agathon ("the good") is biou or bion ("life", "living"). A life devoid of pleasure is not Good. I would argue to De Witt that a thing is only Good when Pleasure is present.

This is one of few places (to me) that De Witt's scholarship seems tinged by his own reading.

Quote from Cassius

Lacking that, they all reduce - to me - to nothing more than "too much" "just right" and "too little" - isn't that a nursery story of some kind about some bears? https://americanliterature.com/childrens-stor…the-three-bears

"And then she went to the porridge of the Little Wee Bear, and tasted it, and that was neither too hot nor too cold, but just right, and she liked it so well that she ate it all up, every bit!"

I've been thinking of Goldilocks this entire time, Cassius.

Epicurus recognized pleasure as including both katastematic ("static", "stable") pleasures as well as kinetic ("active") pleasures. Aristotle (as did most other ancient philosophers) saw pleasure as an excited state that deviates from a preferable state of "balance". Within this context, Epicurus partially saw pleasure as the preferable state of "balance".

For Epicurus, virtue is an instrument to achieve the good. For Aristotle, virtue is the good. The good in Epicurean philosophy is not a balance between two excesses, but rather, pleasure, total absence of all forms of pain.

In Book II of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies a number of virtues by name: "[Virtue] is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defects [...] With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains [...] the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. [...] With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. [...] With regard to honour and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of 'empty vanity', and the deficiency is undue humility [...] With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean [...] let us call the mean good temper; [...] With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness [...] With regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement the intermediate person is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit [...] With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness [...] he who falls short or is not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest. Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite" (1107a - 1108b)

Temperance, Liberality, Proper Pride, Good Temper, Truthfulness, Ready Wit, Friendliness, and Righteous Indignation are always virtues for Aristotle, even if adherence to those virtues leads to evil consequences.

In general, Aristotle's Golden Mean privileges the space between the "extremes" of pleasure and pain.

Epicurus privileges pleasure.

Epicurus' pursuit of pleasure is distinguished from Aristotle's pursuit of excellence. Aristotle thought that an excellent person would necessarily enjoy happiness, whereas Epicurus recognized that an excellent person is only "happy" when enjoying the fruits of their excellence. Excellence, itself, is not the motivating goal. Pleasure is the goal.

The "Epicurean Golden Mean" (to use Aristotle's vocabulary) is always pleasure, not courage, or temperance, but pleasure.

Now, that's not to devalue the profitability of practicing moral virtue, it's simply a recognition that the Golden Mean is not really what motivates us, and that Aristotle is wrong in de-prioritizing pleasure. Both philosophers agreed on the importance of living moderately and avoiding excess. The issue of pleasure is where they disagree on ethics.

I'm also partially splitting hairs, in that sym- (Gk.) and com- (Lat.) mean nearly the same thing, and -pathos (Gk.) and passion (Lat.) are directly related. However, the -pathos (in "sympathy") links directed to a word that Epicurus, himself employed to refer to one of the three criteria of knowledge. Whereas, hundreds of years later in Italy, the idea of "passion", linguistically, was developing parallel to the Christian myth, which lead to a different historical connotation.

Noting the slight different between feeling as judgments of pleasure versus pain as opposed to passion as an undesirable emotional disturbance helps highlight what I propose to be the Epicurean rejection of the idea of unconditional pity. It also helps illuminate the idea of an "untroubled being" (KD1) and its incompatibility with kharisi (or "care"). A being that is not weak will not weaken itself; it will empower those around it to achieve a similar state of robust security.

I tend to avoid the word "compassion" altogether. It's etymology is sticky. The word is rooted in ecclesiastical Latin, and specifically alludes to the "co-suffering" of the Christ with the rest of humanity. Additionally, since "compassion" (or "co-suffering") necessarily includes the idea of "suffering", I think the word is antithetical to the Epicurean goal. A wise person would not contribute to their own suffering by accepting the same punishment as someone else; rather, a wise person would direct their efforts toward trying to remedy the situation, or risk their life to rescue a friend in need. I think our interests would be better served by employing "sympathy" or "empathy" instead of "compassion".

I think we can adequately demonstrate that Epicurean philosophy contrasts sharply with the ancient Indian philosophy of Ajñāna, and, by extension, with the metaphysically reserved philosophy of Buddhism.

"The wise man will take care of his property, and provide for the future." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 21)

From the 2022 Epicurus vs Buddhism Compare and Contrast Thread, a chart I created:

I read most of the book and definitely have some observations.

He proposes that Epicurean philosophy not only influenced the development of early Christianity, but may even a primary influence on the apocryphal Gospel of Thomas. His thesis relies on several assumptions that I think are difficult to prove, that the Gospel of Thomas is an authentic representation of early Christianity, that the life of the Jesus of the Gospels can be adequately reconstructed, and that the Jesus of the Gospels was an Epicurean wise man.

He heavily relies on personal speculation to further his propositions.

Chronologically, the Gospel of Thomas was written sometime after Mark, Matthew, Luke, and the hypothesized "Q" Gospel from which Matthew and Luke both drew. Most scholars date Thomas closer to John (if not explicitly after it), sometime at the beginning of the 2nd-century along with other, apocryphal writings of Gnostics. Given this chronology, the Gnostic tone, and the later rejection of this gospel of Biblical canon, it seems unlikely that the Gospel of Thomas is a useful historical text from which to reconstruct a sketch of the allegedly historical figure called Jesus.

Hannah spends a significant chapter exploring "the paranormal" and speculates that Jesus may have been connected to ancient paranormal activity. He catalogues various accounts of "inexplicable" phenomena reported throughout the modern era to help substantiate his claim and further speculates that the "miracles" of Jesus were actual instances of extraordinary phenomena controlled by a wise man connected with "the paranormal". This chapter is a good example of Hannah's general approach, hand-picked evidence, a lack of peer review, and personal speculations.

The rest of the book is a commentary on each Jesus Saying in The Gospel of Thomas. The connections drawn between most of the sayings and Epicurean philosophy are tenuous (much like our recent discussions about Buddhism). While Hannah does find several interesting connections, the lack of an ability to definitively demonstrate Thomas as an Epicurean document, and Jesus as an Epicurean philosopher neutralizes the speculation.

I think De Witt makes the best argument for a connection between Epicurean philosophy and Christianity based on the historical tensions documented in the Pauline Epistles and Paul's appropriation of Epicurean vocabulary and techniques to evangelize a non-Christian, Greek audience. Beyond Paul, I don't think we'll find any Epicurean connections with the character of Jesus from the Gospels. There are obvious connections with Philo's Neo-Platonic Judaism, with the eschatological John the Baptist and the community of the Essenes, with the anti-imperialism of the Zealots, and, most of all given the likely historical context, as one (of many) 1st-century Jewish Messiah-claimants.

Personally, I believe that any investigation of "the historical figure of Jesus" needs to begin with an honest attempt to authenticate his historicity as a verifiable individual, and not just the amalgamation of similar stories of Jewish guys named "Josh" who claimed to be the Messiah and were executed by the Roman empire. Besides several very brief anecdotes from Flavius Josephus, Tacitus, and Pliny, we lack the evidence to authenticate his identity. It seems odd to me that someone writing from an Epicurean perspective would jump straight to the claim that "Not only did Jesus exist ... but also he harnessed psychic energy to heal people with Epicurean magic."

I think Hannah set out to try to prove a highly imaginative fiction. He paints a colorful picture that would be the perfect topic for late night on the History Channel, but not something constructive to our study as Epicureans.

Here's another way to approach this discussion that I think can be fruitful. Let's ask:

"Why are peoples in the modern world so drawn to ancient Idealism?"

My short answer is that they feel like the modern world (which they relate to particle physics) is missing a heart, an substantive, meaningful context for a person within a rapidly changing world of symbols and technology. Epicurus' moral take on atomism, I think, provides a bridge between particle physics over what many perceive (ironically) as nihilism.

We predominantly find Therevada and Mahayana forms of Buddhism within the cultures in which they developed. Removed from this context (for me in America), "Buddhism" becomes a sort of "Eclectic, Pseudo-Religious, Psycho-therapeutic, mental compliment to the de-contextualized physical analogue of Hindu Yoga".

What I think we'll find is that the measurably beneficial practices that have developed within the Buddhist tradition are compatible with Epicurean ethics, in general. Any scientific findings from competing traditions that have a physiological basis and a measurably-positive impact are coherent with atomism, materialism, and the pleasure principle.

Therein, the parts of "Buddhism" that a lot of Americans like are really just secular practices, in the same way that Yoga has become a secular practice for non-Yogis. And a lot of American "Buddhists" are just non-religious.

Keep in mind, we're talking about different denominations caused by political schisms throughout the centuries, no different than Christianity. Just like all Christians adopt the Nicaean Creed, agree on Biblical literary canon, and accept the early intellectual tradition of the Church Fathers, all Buddhists accept a common liturgy (the Pali Canon, with some cultural-specific additions) and a common intellectual tradition originating from Siddhartha Gautama.

None of the Buddhist denominations are more or less similar to Epicurean philosophy (especially compared with other heterodox ancient Indian philosophical traditions). "Mind over matter" is a fairly universal Buddhist attitude. The current Dalai Lama's rejection of mysticism and embracing of particle physics is the closest similarity we'll find.

I found a few quick images for some context:

I didn't create this, but it matches up with what I'd generalize:

Without going to deep into doctrines, here's a brief historical sketch:

In general, Theravada Buddhist are a doctrinally-conservative group who follow a trend of Buddhism that recommends a withdrawn life of monasticism. Monks and nuns are typically separated like the Catholic Church. It's sort of like ... if the only expression of the Catholic tradition were the Desert Fathers who withdrew into contemplation. This form is found predominately in Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia, where Buddhism first spread under Emperor Ashoka.

Mahayana Buddhism is sort of our "Protestant" catch-phrase for everything from deity-worshipping Chinese Buddhists (Buddhism processed through Confucianism, among other philosophies, and Taoism) to Zen Buddhism (Buddhism processed through Taoism and Shinto) in Japan. Depending on your preferred scholar, we may also group Tibetan Buddhism into the group of Mahayana, though, it often gets its own designation.

Vajrayana, Tibetan, or Tantric Buddhism is what American teenagers were admiring in the 1960s, when they weren't stuck on the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (see: "Tomorrow Never Knows" by the Beatles for an example of Tibetan Buddhism). This form is highly related to early Indian Buddhism, and was the first form of Buddhism to migrate Northward. This form later influenced Mongolian Buddhism (Tantra processed through Tengriism).

Then we have, what I'll personally call, our "Western Buddhism". While "Western" is a poor adjective to describe anything in comparative cultural studies, I think we'll find a markedly different version of Buddhism that was evangelized through modern market economies to consumer societies that offer a highly eclectic form of Buddhism. I almost want to call it Eclecticism instead of Buddhism, and Siddhartha's teachings aren't as important as later Buddhist scholars.

Learning about ancient Indian philosophy helped me understand the context of Christian politics better. It also helped me, ultimately, understand and accept Epicurus' theism without getting stuck on contemporary vocabulary.

It fascinated me that the vocabulary of Sanskrit recognizes two general classes of religious expression: the insiders, those who use the national historical texts as the basis of intellectual engagement, and the outsiders, those who do not. The first category includes atheists, non-theists, agnostics, polytheists, and theists as well as monists, dualists, and pluralists, as well as deontologists, logicians, ethicists, mystics, physicians ... you name it, "Hinduism" hosts it.

Of the second category, or the cultural outsiders, we find an equal range of diversity, atheists, non-theists, agnostics, polytheists, and theists as well as monists, dualists, and pluralists. Categorical divisions are determined according to a sense of national unity versus decentralization, not doctrines or positions along the philosophical spectrum.

Imagine, conversely, living in ancient India, and only having vocabulary at-hand to express "the amalgamation of Academics, Skeptics, Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Cynics members of the 'Hellenic' religion" (versus how we put "the amalgamation of Vaisheshika, Vedanta, Yoga, (etc.) as members of the 'Hindu' religion").

Anyway, breaking down these individual propositions made it easier to see how Epicurus could be a critic of common religious beliefs, bemoan the popular superstition, reject all forms of supernaturalism, ground all phenomena in a scientific framework, and yet still work with the concepts of God and the Soul.

It is a useful historical point of study to supplement Epicureanism, particularly (in the same way we use Democritean atomism as a point of comparison) as a contrast to the deterministic forms of atheistic Indian atomism, as well as the non-atomistic form of Indian hedonism, as well as the religious form of theistic atomism.

It also helps illuminate the thought-patterns of Gassendi and other neo-Epicureans of the Renaissance.

It also further shows how the basic propositions to which Siddhartha Gautama was responding were the same propositions that were being considered in ancient Greece: Is the nature of reality a unity, a duality, or something else? Is the experience of the world more real than the world itself? The propositions the Buddha taught are very much so the same propositions that Epicurus rejected, as represented by ancient Greek Skepticism.

Surely, there are multiple points of agreement between Siddhartha and Epicurus. They agreed on withdrawing from popular society. They agreed that suffering is undesirable and we should strive to overcome it. They agreed that conventional superstitions are insubstantial and intellectually bankrupt. They were suspicious of social means by which to acquire wealth. They saw empty speculation as a source of suffering. They entertained a form of atomism. At the same time, these attitudes were also shared by Siddhartha's non-"Hindu", Indian contemporaries, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Ajita Kesakambalī, Makkhali Gośāla, Pūraṇa Kassapa.

The important comparison to draw here is not necessarily Epicurus and Buddhism as much as it is Epicurus versus Heterodox Indian Traditions (Buddhism being one of several). They share a common suspicion of the predominant philosophical context in which they arise, and offer reforms to what they see as formal misunderstandings. I think most comparisons that can be found between Epicureanism and Buddhism are largely superficial, and can, to some degree or another, be found in nearly every ancient Hellenistic and Indian school of thought.

Beyond being "outsiders", the doctrines vary so greatly, the contrast is stark.

Buddhism shares enough in common with Pyrrhonism that we might not say Epicureanism is the Black to Buddhism's White, but we might say that Epicureanism is the Black to Buddhism's Very Light Grey.

Of the ancient Indian philosophies of Ājīvika, Ajñana, Buddhism, Chārvāka, Jainism, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Samkhya, Vaisheshika, Vedanta, and Yoga, we'll find the closest companion to Epicureanism in Chārvāka. Early Buddhism is most closely related to the Indian school of Ajñana, from which Pyrrhonism developed, so, in general, I don't think that comparisons between early Buddhism and Epicurean philosophy are helpful. They are dissimilar and historically unrelated.

In terms of physics, Epicureanism shares the atomism of Ājīvika and Vaisheshika (though, both traditions propose a deterministic physics) as well as the materialism of Chārvāka.

It uniquely shares the ethics of Chārvāka, whereas every other tradition devalues hedonism.

We find the most similarity between Epicurean epistemology and Chārvāka, which justifies the criterion of direct physical and mental perceptions, without inference, comparison, or speculation. It is most dissimilar from Ajñana, which rejects all criteria of knowledge, followed closely thereafter by early Buddhism, which avoids making any certain claims.

Epicurean theology is comparatively unique. Epicurus would have been opposed to the atheism of Ājīvika, Chārvāka, Nyāya, and Vaisheshika, as well as the agnosticism of Ajñana and Buddhism, as well as the immanent dualism and mysticism of Samkhya and Yoga, and also the divine idealism of Mīmāṃsā and Vedanta. The Jain universe of multiple, physical deities (the Tirthankaras), is the closest ancient Indian theology that in any way resembles Epicureanism. There is not, to my knowledge, any significant historical link between the two at any point in time.

As far as ancient Indian philosophies go, early Buddhism overwhelmingly contradicts Epicurean philosophy. They are at the opposite ends of the epistemological spectrum, propose completely different goals in life, and are only barely physically compatible if, for no other reason than early Buddhism's refusal to provide any hard answers on physics.

Whereas Epicureanism is most similar to Chārvāka and, to an extent Ājīvika and Vaisheshika, early Buddhism shares intellectual similarities with Ajñana and Prryhonian Skepticism, and the meditative practices with Vedanta and Yoga. Buddhism's propositions are much closer to Epicurus' opponents than to Epicurus in any meaningful way.

"The point which Epicurus discusses after sensation is what he called by the technical term of προλήψις, anticipation or preconception. It is explained asa general idea stored up, a right opinion, a conception, or the memory of what has been more than once presented to us from without. When we apply a name to an object we can only do so by means of a previous conception corresponding to the name: and that conception is ultimately an image derived from the senses. Epicurus, in explaining these "anticipations,” says: “In the case of every term of speech the primary ideas it conveys must be seen (by the mental eye) and not stand in need of demonstration: otherwise we shall have nothing to which to refer the point in question. These preconceptions are not in any true sense innate. They are products of observation. Their value lies in being common to the mass of mankind, and so affording a basis of argument. In the case of any dispute, in which general terms are employed, the first question is: What clear and distinct idea can we attach to it? And this does not mean, can I define it—can I substitute one set of general terms for another? But can I really put it before my intellectual vision distinctly? Epicurus, like Bishop Berkeley, reduces general ideas to the individual images which do duty for them in the imagination. He wants us to realize our ideas in a concrete case as the true test of our having them. And here, perhaps, is a fundamental fallacy of Epicureanism. It holds that truth is identical with what is clearly and distinctly conceived. It substitutes imagination for thought. Unlike Spinoza, who contrasts the imperfect conception of the imagination with the adequate knowledge of understanding, Epicurus abides by what is easily and satisfactorily presented to the mind under a pictorial or semi-sensuous aspect. Now, imagination most easily reproduces the phenomena familiar to us of bodies in motion. [...] A word only existed as the symbol of a mental image: and therefore it must present its credentials in the shape of a prolepsis, i.e. a clear and distinct image, conveyable, not in the general terms of a definition, but in the precise and particular language of a description. Can the conception be realized as an image? If it can, it is a safe and satisfactory basis of argument : if it cannot, it must be dismissed. A curious example of this dislike to generalities, to definitions and divisions, is seen in the contest which the Epicureans carried on against mathematics. If we believe Cicero, Epicurus declared the whole of geometry to be false : and he couples the remark with an expression of surprise as to whether Polyænus, who had a considerable mathematical reputation, had put the whole science aside after he became a disciple of Epicurus. We may be sure he did not; and the very conjunction of the two statements suggests that Epicureanism rather expressed a view of the nature and method of geometrical truth, than a doubt as to its scientific value. What the Epicureans principally objected to, we infer, were the principles—the axioms, postulates, and definitions: though others of them, like Zeno the Sidonian, went further, and urged that there were points involved in the demonstrations which had not been explicitly accepted in the preliminary principles. Now, the definitions of geometry have the defect that they cannot be represented in any distinct image. No man can conceive an image of a geometrical line, or point, or surface; the only image which can be raised to meet these terms is that of a physical line or surface, which is evidently quite unsatisfactory for the purposes of mathematics. Even if we go a step further, we can say that the general conception of a circle or a triangle corresponding to the definitions of Euclid is such as can only be realized in special and individual instances ofthesefigures. We need not particularly care for the abuse which, according to an ancient mathematician, they lavished on the proof of the proposition of the 1st Book of Euclid, as demonstrating what was palpable even to a donkey.) The main ground of their attack on the mathematical sciences was, that if they started from false premises (i.e.not in accordance with facts), they could not be true [...] The 'imaginative impressions on the intellect' are contrasted with the sensations in such a way as to render it more probable that we should understand by them the images which present themselves to the intellect (in the Epicurean description of it), and not to the senses. In other words, they represent the impressions derived from the spectra or idola, which are too delicate to affect the senses, but can act upon the mind." (Wallace, Epicureanism, 220-225)