Posts by Eikadistes

I find heavy similarities between each of the Twelve Propositions and contemporary scientific laws.

1. “Matter is uncreatable.” (Laws of Conservation of Mass/Energy, Momentum)

2. “Matter is indestructible.” (Laws of Conservation of Mass/Energy, Momentum)

3. “The universe consists of solid bodies and void.” (Atomic Theory; Quantum Field Theory)

4. “Solid bodies are either compounds or simple.” (Atomic Theory; Law of Definite Proportions)

5. “The multitude of atoms is infinite.” (Cosmological Principle)

6. “The void is infinite in extent.“ (Hubble’s Law of Cosmic Expansion; Cosmic Inflation) (Cosmological Principle)

7. “The atoms are always in motion.” (Laws of Thermodynamics)

8. “The speed of atomic motion is uniform.” (Maxwell’s Equations; Special Relativity)

9. “Motion is linear in space, vibratory in compounds.” (Newton’s First and Second Laws of Motion)

10. “Atoms are capable of swerving slightly at any point in space or time.” (Uncertainty Principle; Brownian motion)

11. “Atoms are characterized by three qualities, weight, shape and size.“ (Standard Model of Physics)

12. “The number of the different shapes is not infinite, merely innumerable.” (Standard Model of Physics

I might be forcing some mental gymnastics on 5 (infinite matter), and 11 (atoms identified by three variables) which is only barely similar to contemporary physics identifying subatomic particles by their mass, spin, and charge, but Epicurus' other propositions anticipate modern physics to the point of seeming prophetic.

I'm getting more comfortable getting away from the "specially-privileged extra-terrestrials" idea of "the gods" and beginning to see how "god" works as "each person's individualized concept of the best version of the ideal person".

I propose that the Epicurean framework recognizes that (a) extra-terrestrials must exist in an infinite universe, (b) some of those extra-terrestrials would be human-like, (c) some of those human-like extra-terrestrials would be awesome, (d) some of those awesome, human-like extra-terrestrials could have already been accurately envisioned by at least one person, (e) all such deities can, and, perhaps, do, exist (so long as they are not assigned supernatural qualities).

At the same time, even in a conceptually finite universe with limited beings, it would not invalidate each human's "god" as their "ideal character", a useful tool for human moral development. However, the Epicurean universe is infinite.

I am not as comfortable with the suggestion (what I'm going to call the "Radio Analogy") that knowledge of the gods is being inadvertently transmitted from the gods to the receiver that is the human mind in the form of weird particles. Humans would idealize regardless of whether or not the subjects of their ideals exist outside of the mind, and those idealizations (given that they do not contradict the reality of nature) can be used for moral development.

Perhaps that might be a grounding qualification, sort of a blanket generalization for all religious traditions: we might say, "their deity is real if it can be conceptualized as a distant, yet specially-privileged extraterrestrial". "God" can be assumed to be real as long as "God" is not supposed to have created the universe nor act in the human drama.

I've been looking through a biased lens, as a critic to my dominant culture. Our Abrahamic religions, at least, support creationism and immanence, and as a critic, my orientation, relative to our language, is, theologically, a-, or anti-. Ancient theology is difficult to understand through this lens. "God" begins to make a lot more sense to me if I accept that we all have our own, internalized idealizations of perfect character, and that The Creator is mistaken epitaph of god.

Quote from Don

- "natural conception of god" (της του δαιμονος επινοιας) Note we're using daimonos instead of theos here. Not sure why.

Don, do we have any other instances of rhetorical symmetry between daimonos and theos?

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"The evidence is very clear that in the Epicurean universe gods do exist, and that they are indeed made of atoms. However, when it is asked what this mode of atomic existence amounts to, interpreters divide into two broad parties, the realists and the idealists, with the latter interpretation in effect making Epicurus an atheist. [...] Even according to the alternative, realist interpretation, Epicurus sides with atheism to the extent that he denies all divine intervention in the running of the world, thus claiming to liberate his followers from the fear of divine wrath."

Whenever I see this discussion, it usually seems to following the above structure, with the author admitting, first and foremost, that Epicurus clearly believed in gods and enthusiastically attended religious celebrations. The notion that he qualifies as a contemporary atheist because his theology is incompatible with Abrahamic faiths is anachronistic. It seems to me that Sedley is moving the rhetorical goal post throughout the essay to fit his conclusion.

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But on the idealist (p. 147) interpretation his position is one that in most theological contexts would be called fully atheistic, and indeed was so called by Epicurus’ own critics."

This is not true of some of the Cyrenaics. It is also untrue of Skeptics who seem to take agnostic position that portrays Epicurus as a dogmatic theist. Attempting to orient Epicurean theology within the tradition of atheism (for me) is like trying to frame American Democrats as Communists. Many critics of the Democratic Party would be comfortable entertaining this proposition, with the notable exception of actual Communists, who would take offense to the suggestion that centrists and liberals are in any way sympathetic to Marxist-Leninism.

If this charges of atheism had merit, I would expect at least one treatise by Philodemus called Against Piety, or a polemic by Metrodorus called Against the Gods. Instead, we have the exact opposite.

I like that description.

We don't assume that supernatural explanations when proposing a hypothesis because it refutes the the intention of hypothesizing in the first place. "There is no explanation" is not an explanation. In Epicurus' time, the reason for celestial objects revolving was not understood. Similarly, in our time, coherence between gravity and quantum physics is not understood. Like Epicurus, we have a variety of sometimes mutually-exclusive hypotheses to solve these unknowns. I propose, like the revolving of the planets, we will eventually provide a functional description of the coherence between gravity and quantum physics that does not rely on imagined paradoxes like "immaterial matter".

Quote from EricR

Answer: Reality is comprised of whatever causes parts to combine to make wholes.

EricR I just want to acknowledge that the reason I've been asking this specific line of questions is to demonstrate that all of your questions seem to demand Stoic and Skeptic answers. For example, you just stated, if I understand you correctly, that reality is not made of "things", but rather, "the reason things do the things they do." You just perfectly described Heracltius' logos and the eternal fire of the Stoics, being the active principle that animates inert matter.

With respect, I am proposing that these questions are incoherent. We're chasing ghosts.

Quote from EricR

Frankly, without solidly finding firm philosophical ground for asserting there is "nothing other than atoms and void" and being able to explain this, EP is in the same position as other systems of thought, and yes, religions. ie: a metaphysical belief system.

Philosophically, atomism is a clever answer to Parmenides' proposition that there is no change versus Heraclitus' proposition that everything is change. If we are to question atomism, and propose that there can be existing things made of something besides particles, we must provide an alternative answer to the Parmenides vs. Heraclitus debate.

What else could comprise reality besides parts that can be re-arranged to make wholes?

And that's the grounding. Atomism is true because no other position resolves that philosophical debate.

Quote from EricR

there could be something other than material existence

There is, and you already mentioned it: Void.

Void is immaterial.

For something else to be immaterial, it must be void.

he Don e

Do we have any images of Polyaenus?

To my knowledge, TAΓAΘON is not found in the texts of early Ionian philosophers (whom De Witt identifies as being a philosophical inspiration for Epicurus), and Democritus rarely uses TAΓAΘON in favor of the abundant TAΓAΘA or "the goods" (https://philarchive.org/archive/PACTCO-8v1). Where we cannot find many instances of TAΓAΘON in Epicurean writings, and their older cousins, we find an abundance of the word in the writings of his contemporary and earlier opponents.

I did just notice that Epicurus only refers to ΦPONHΣIΣ as "the greatest good", but never as "the good", "the first good" or "The Good" which he explicitly uses elsewhere to reserve for "pleasure". So, I think I see what you mean, Don.

To respond to the original topic, both [1] Aristotle's Golden Mean and [2] the Romans' framing of Epicurean Voluptas as the Summum Bonum are misrepresentations of Epicurean ethics. While Epicurean philosophy is compatible with the phrase Summum Bonum (MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON), the Summum Bonum is not described as HΔONH (pleasure), but as ΦPONHΣIΣ (prudence). It would have been more accurate for the Stoics to have written "SVMMVM BONVM EST PRVDENTIA".

If Stoic and early Christian authors had described Epicurus as having taught "PRIMVM BONVM EST VOLVPTAS", then that would cohere with Epicurus' statement that HΔONH is the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON (versus the MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON).

Even so, we have found that Epicurus uses a variety of cases, tenses, and inflections of AΓAΘOΣ (or "good") to describe pleasant things, instrumental actions, a noble standard, a category of virtues, and an expression of pleasure. The abundance of this term leads to a cultural and linguistic displacement of "the Good" from its Platonic throne. It becomes reduced it to a frank, non-technical meaning, usually indicating either as "a pleasant thing", "that which is pleasant", or "pleasantness".

I propose that, unlike other Hellenistic philosophers, Epicurus did not see the question "What is the Supreme Good?" to be as fundamental to his ethics as the question "What is the goal of life?" Therein, the phrase Summum Bonum can be misleading because it frames Epicurus as having been a sort of "Goodness Ethicist" who presupposes the existence of a Supreme Goodness, versus a sort of "Purpose Ethicist" who begins his inquiry by observing nature.

I would view any mention of Summum Bonum in Epicurean philosophy with at least a little bit of suspicion.

After reflection, I'm inclined to see "the Good" as an evaluative statement that expresses a measurement of the magnitude of pleasure. On a scale of 0% to 100%, we might describe "the highest good" as those actions which most reliably facilitate the cultivation of maximum pleasure. Therein, "the Good" is not necessarily pleasure, itself (since pleasure is elsewhere defined as the goal of life), but rather, an evaluation of the means by which that goal is achieved.

Contrasting Epicurus "good" with Plato's might be helpful. Plato's Form of the Good reads to me like a contemporary description of God the Father (I am reminded that C. S. Lewis ends his Chronicles of Narnia with a character, having been resurrected, exclaiming "It's all in Plato, all in Plato.") The Form of the Good is supreme, existing beyond space and time, the origin of knowledge against which all forms can be compared to define their identity and agency.

This sort of a priori, transcendental knowledge provides a juxtaposition against Epicurus' preconceptions. Whereas the preconceptions are mental impressions that come from nature, the Form of the Good is the foundation of reality from which nature gains its (lessened) identity. The Form of the Good is the only thing that can be said to truly exist; the identities of the daily forms we experience are defined according to their relationship with the Form of the Good.

Contrary to the descriptions from the scholars I cited earlier, pleasure cannot be the only good, because Epicurus directly identifies prudence as the "highest good", as well as comparing "goods" to "virtues", so that leads me to believe that Epicurus recognized a host of goods, each of which can be measured against the others according to which one most reliably and successfully provides the means by which the goal of life (which is definitely pleasure) is achieved.

... but he does also identify pleasure as another good, and pleasure is definitely not a virtue.

It may behoove us to distinguish between "good" things, like dogs, sunshine, and pleasure versus "the Good(s)", a category of natural virtues which include prudence and wisdom. The adjectival employment of "good" is used by Epicurus as a functional descriptor to express approval; it is also used as a noun in reference to (as I read it) an evaluation of the efficacy of an action to produce the goal of pleasure.

Quote from Don

Good question. How do you parse his calling "practical wisdom" as the "greatest good" in light of this thread so far?

At this point, I can summarize my position as follows:

"It's all good."

Where do we fit the following phrase from Ep. Men. into this discussion?

"...TO MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON ΦPONHΣIΣ..."

Epicurus then compares ΦPONHΣIΣ against the "other virtues", therein linking the concepts of AΓAΘON with APETAI.

I found a number of descriptive, albeit conflicting accounts of the "highest good". In Epicureanism (2009), author Tim O'Keefe titles his eleventh chapter "Pleasure, the highest good". He explains, "For almost all Greek philosophers of the time, the fundamental questions of ethics were (i) what is the highest good and (ii) how do you attain it, with the highest good being what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. Epicurus declares pleasure to be the highest good" (107). He goes on, "Epicurus' ethics operates within the framework articulated by Aristotle, a framework that systematizes the ethical thinking of Aristotle's predecessors and was accepted by almost all later Greek philosophers. The central question of ethics is: what is the highest good? The good of something is its telos, its goal or purpose. This teleological analysis of the good extends quite widely; we can ask what the good is, not only of human life, but also of actions, artefacts, crafts such as medicine and so on. And in each case, we discover the item's good by discovering its goal or purpose" (111).

Sharples makes an interesting observation in Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1996) in proposing that "virtue will still, however, derive its value from pleasure, which is the sole good, rather than constituting an independent good" (93). Later, he observes, "The second of these views can be understood in terms of pleasure as the sole good [...] if the claim that friends come to be loved for their own sake rather than for advantage is interpreted simply as asserting that friendship ceases to be purely an instrumental good and becomes pleasant in itself" (119). So, here we have an author who supposes that pleasure is the only good, rather than being the greatest among many.

The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism (2009) makes that claim that it is indeed the "highest good". "The good is the end to which all other things are means, and never itself a means to an end (Fin. I.9). To discover what this end is, we ought to look at what creatures actually do pursue as the ultimate end of all of their actions, and this is to attain pleasure and avoid pain (Fin. I.30). [...] When Epicurus explain why pleasure is to be regarded as the highest good (Ep. Men. 129), he appeals to 'feeling' (pathos) as the yardstick for decision about what to choose. [...] Similarly, Epicurus calls pleasure the 'first and congenital' good (Ep. Men. 129)" (174).

The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) notes that "any experience of freedom from pain coincides with the highest good: 'pleasure exists everywhere, and for the entire time it lasts, there is no suffering either of body or of mind or both'" (KD3). Citing De Fin. 1.3 he quotes, "As soon as each animal is born, it seeks pleasure and rejoices in it as the highest good, and reject pain as the greatest bad thing, driving it away from itself as effectively as it can; and it does this while it is still not corrupted, while the judgment of nature herself is unperverted and sound." Later, they write, "Epicureans had in mind in identifying aponia and ataraxia as the highest good" and "Like almost all ancient ethicists, Epicurus is a eudaimonist, holding that the highest good is eudaimonia, or happiness. He is also a hedonist, because he identifies the happy life with the pleasant life: only pleasure is intrinsically good, and only pain is intrinsically bad".

I think it's important to recognize that our suspicion is toward "the form of the good", but not "goodness". (I'm going to avoid relying on an upper-case letter to distinguish these concepts because ancient Greek lacked this device).

The phrase H TOY AΓAΘOY I∆EA or "the form of the good" was used by Plato in The Republic, and enthusiastically adopted by Plotinus, the Neo-Platonists, and, much later, the Gnostics. The concept is at the heart of Platonism, so it is fair for anti-Platonists to view any discussion of "good" with (at least) a hint of healthy suspicion.

Of course, AΓAΘOΣ can be found in pre-Socratic literature, so the Platonists by no means own "good".

"Agathos" is an important ancient Greek concept in general (like "telos", "ataraxia", and "eudaimonia"), and not a Platonic concept in particular. Epicurus would have augmented the meaning of "the good" for his own purposes. Personally, in terms of basic, intellectual impressions from words, when I think of "telos", I tend to think of Aristotle's "Final Cause". The same is true of "eudaimonia", which makes me think more of Aristotle's privileging of "functionality" and "excellence". Similarly, when I read "the good", I tend think of Plato, regardless of the context.

But, again, no one owns any of these words. They are all common words with meanings that were constantly being augmented to fit the purposes of their employers. Since Plato and Aristotle won the hearts of the philosophers and theologians of the post-Classical period, the languages we inherited champion Platonic and Peripatetic definitions.

As Don found in the Epistle to Menoikeus, and as I found in the Kuriai Doxai, inflections of AΓAΘOΣ are used frequently, much moreso, even, than a key vocabulary word like "ataraxia", which Epicurus rarely uses. Not once does Epicurus use a form of "aponia" in his Doxai, but he does use an inflection of "agathos" half a dozen times. This includes at least one use of "good" being preceded by the definite article "the", indicating, explicitly "the good".

Is there a good that is equal to or greater than pleasure? If we cannot identify a good that is at least equal to pleasure, then I think we can safely say that pleasure is not just a good, but rather the good, the "greatest" good.