Posts by Eikadistes

TΦ (Tetrapharmakos) Symbol 1:

Leaping Pig 2:

Leaping Pig 1:

EΦ (Epicurean Philosophy) Symbol 2:

EΦ (Epicurean Philosophy) Symbol 1:

EΠI Symbol 2:

EΠI Symbol 1:

Epicurus' Head 2:

Epicurus' Head 1:

This is excellent, Don! Thank you for taking the time to organize this information.

Quote from Don

Quote from Nate

Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.

It's all good.

The difference between TΩN AΓAΘΩN and TAΓAΘON is necessary if one is using genitive vs accusative cases. The article wouldn't end in a vowel in the genitive case so it couldn't be elided with the following vowel.

Could you share the context of TON XPHΣTON? I'd be very curious. It really appears to be synonymous with ΑΓΑΘΟΝ

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=xrhsto/s

TON XPHΣTON is a reconstruction that comes from Usener 180 (transcribing Philodemus, Vol. Herc. 2, I.116): " ...of the difference relating to the good, for which reasons Epicurus proclaimed himself the supreme monarch, or at least considered himself residing principally with Athena, where they live [in envy?] of the philosophers."

Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.

It's all good.

I meant to conclude my last post with the following:

According to various ancient sources, Epicurus is recorded as having declared both [a] HΔONH ("pleasure") and also [b] ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") to be both [1] MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON (the "highest good") and also [2] APXH (the "beginning").

At this point, I think the various forms of AΓAΘON are being used casually, whereas TAΓAΘON is being used technically, according to the verbiage employed by other Eudaimonic philosophers of the Hellenistic age.

Only HΔONH ("pleasure") is ever positively identified as TAΓAΘON ("The Good", the SVMMVM BONVM).

Bailey's Fragment 10 alludes to Epicurus having declared HΔONH ("pleasure") to be TAΓAΘON or “the good”.

The Tetrapharmakos also indicates that TAΓAΘON ("the good") is HΔONH ("pleasure").

Athanaeus seems to record Epicurus as identifying TAΓAΘON ("the good") with HΔONH ("pleasure") in Deipnosophists (U67). Diogenes Laërtius also documents this attestation in Lives of Eminent Philosophers.

Seneca records Epicurus as having written HIC SVMMVM BONVM VOLVPTAS EST, “here our highest good is pleasure” (Letters To Lucilius 21.10). Lucretius also employs the phrase BONVM SVMMVM in De Rerum Natura, Book VI.

In his Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus declares HΔONH ("pleasure") to be the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON the "first good". Interestingly, he later declares TO MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON ΦPONHΣIΣ, that "the greatest” or “highest good” is “prudence” (or “practical wisdom”). Epicurus also describes ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") as being the APXH, the "beginning" or "foundation". Incidentally, he also identifies HΔONH ("pleasure") as both the APXHN ("beginning") and TEΛOΣ ("end").

In KD7, Epicurus refers to AΣΦAΛEIAN (“security”) as a ΦΥΣEΩΣ AΓAΘΟΝ (“natural good”). Similarly, in KD6 (among a variety of translations), he describes any means by which to acquire ΘAPPEIN (“confidence” or “the assurance of safety”) from or between people as being a ΦΥΣΙΝ […] AΓAΘΟΝ (also translated as a “natural good”).

Philodemus contrasts the general ideas of TΩN AΓAΘΩN with TΩN KAKΩN or “the good” with “ill” (U38); of interest, later, Usener translates Philodemus’ phrase TON XPHΣTON (tón khrēstón) as “the good” (U180).

Quote from Todd

But don't you think all these different meanings of "good" is contributing to the problem?

Of course, we do need to untangle all that and understand what Epicurus was actually saying. Definitely.

But I think we need better terminology if we're planning to make any kind of outreach.

Agreed. We have (1) "good" the general adjective to refer to "being favorable"; we have (2) a "good" which is a philosophical category of virtues, we have (3) "good" used poetically by Epicurus to express Pleasure with respect to virtues, and we have (4) "The Good" which is the Goal in life toward which all other goods are instrumental.

I think, just in terms of making our vocabulary work for us and not against us, we can refer to "goods" as "virtues" or "instruments", and then "The Good" can be identified, variously, as "The Goal", The "End", or "The Telos".

Otherwise, it takes a more advanced understanding to deconstruct the fact that "goods are good because they lead to The Good, which is the first and last good, but not a good like the other goods, and also, not the highest good, which is the best good among goods, but the best good among goods is not The Good, which is technically not a good at all."

I concur with @Don's approach to this discussion insofar as acknowledging the difference Epicurus delineates between AΓAΘOΣ , which refers to instrumental objectives that further an individual toward a greater goal, versus TAΓAΘON, which is the greater goal of life (for which the former objectives are merely instruments).

I agree that Pleasure is not "a good", in that it would be inappropriate within the context of Epicurus' teachings to place "a good" in the same category as "The Good". Pleasure is The End, and the virtues are means by which to acquire that end.

Keep in mind, as well, that Epicurus refers to Pleasure as the "first Good" and "the beginning and end of the blessed life", but, he reserves the "highest good" for "prudence" (or "practical wisdom"). While translators throw around "good", "goods", "Good", and "The Good" somewhat ambivalently, Epicurus distinguishes all of the other "goods" (typically identified as "virtues"), including the "highest good" (being "prudence", the most important virtue) from "The Good" (which is not a virtue, but The Goal). As Epicurus writes to Menoikeus, "it is to obtain this end that we always act".

This all makes me wonder: do we have any documentation from ancient sources that shows how they treated (conceptually) the occasion of inducing a religious experience through digestion or inhalation of psychoactive substances? I can approach Epicurus' statement a lot better if "the gods" are contextualized as the objects of one's perception during psychedelic experiences. Our visual cortices, in tandem with other nerve clusters produce visions of extraordinary "other-presences" during a trip. We have reproduced these experiences under laboratory conditions using high doses of LSD, DMT, and other chemicals for decades. Indeed, these experiences are "manifest".

I am entertaining the idea that we might still be thinking too heavily of "the gods" within the context of modern theology (usually as abstract beings only accessible through imagination or faith) versus "the gods" as "the objects of psychedelic visions". It seems reasonable to me to suppose that the average ancient Greek had a working knowledge of mind-altering substances used for religious purposes based on ubiquity of mystery rites and their mind-altering sacraments. The Greeks were aware that the Scythians used cannabis (thus, the word cannabis comes from ancient Greek), so I have to assume that they understood the concept of "consumables that induce visions of divine beings".

Having shared in that experiences, I can attest to a personal certainty that the statement "the gods exist and knowledge of them is manifest" feels very appropriate, but I still understand that they are not immaterial subjects who exist between cosmic dimensions. They are objects of a material mind that are induced by a material substance. The common experience of a "dream" is extremely comparable to the psychedelic experience, as are the objects (sometimes mistaken for subjects) of the dream. Using the concept of a "dream" as a comparison for the state of the mind that oracles achieve when they inhale volcanic gases would be an appropriate and available concept.

I speculate that the ancient mind would have associated altered states with religious practice more readily than ours does; Epicurus' propositions might have been commenting on the visions induced during mystery rites.

I have become convinced by @Don's argument and I believe that disputing it will require (at least) adequate answers to questions that arise from the position that Diogenes provides inconsistent dates that require explaining:

1. Why would Epicurus choose to celebrate his own Birthday on a day that is other than his birthdate?

2. Why would Epicurus appropriate practices from the pre-existing cult of the Eikadistai who celebrated the 20th?

3. What justifiable significance would be attached to the 10th compared with the 20th (or 7th)?

4. What significance would the 10th and 20th carry for someone born on the 7th?

5. Given that later biographers of Epicurus did not use the Attic calendar, why would they have felt it more important to denote the day within Gamelion rather than explaining to their readers which sequential month is Gamelion?

Greetings, Stranger!

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

I do think we want a nice colored chart along the lines of what Nate has started for (a few) past and future years and we'll highlight that too.

Here is **another updated** draft. Please offer recommendations to organize the formatting.