Posts by Eikadistes

Quote from Todd

I guess what I was trying to say above is: the cave should be an Epicurean metaphor.

It's really quite accurate to call it Plato's Cave, though. His ideas are largely responsible for chaining people in the cave in the first place. He advised rulers to do exactly that in the same goddamned book!

That's a good point. From the Epicurean position (if we are to appropriate the symbology of the Plato's Allegory), the entire Allegory of Plato's Cave is, itself, actually inside of a metaphorical Cave in the Epicurean world, and the light of day into which the Epicurean walks is the light of particles that allows us to physically see.

Here are larger uploads of my Oasis Allegory for clarity:

As Plato's Allegory included certain symbols that reverberate throughout his teachings (like the Sun, which not only represent philosophical illumination, but also, is literally a temporal manifestation of The Good), I would recommend the inclusion of Epicurean symbols. Symbols include (1) the brave, happy leaping pig, (2) a bright lighthouse that weathers a ferocious storm, (3) a port with tranquil waters, (4) the waning gibbous moon, (5) a kylix which might be seen on the dinner table every Eikas, (6) the images of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, or representation of "Mother Earth", "Gaia", "Venus", (etc.), (7) ascension to the summit of a mountain of maximum pleasure, (8) indivisible particles, (9) natural imagery or pastoral environments, (10) cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese.

At the same time, I also want to caution that one of the obstacles I ran into when conceptualizing an "Epicurean Allegory" was the tendency of metaphors to become misconstrued into mystical objects ("the map being mistaken for the territory"). Some of the symbols I included (like the "Desert of Superstition" and the "Mountain of Virtue") are derogations against the symbology adopted by philosophical opponents rather than a self-reflexive sort of icon.

... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.

Godfrey thank you for identifying this! Amazon is sending me this book tomorrow and I happen to be on a bit of a ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑΤΑ kick so I am really interested to see other people's interpretations of the "elementary principles." I've been breaking-down the Epistles and am including this brief sketch for myself for future references when I have a chance to read the book and explore how they constructed their list of elementary principles.

ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑΤΑ — STOIKHEIOMATA — ELEMENTARIES

στοιχειώμaτa, “elementary principles” (EH 36.8-9); στοιχεíωσιν, “first principles” (EH 37.5)

Αἱ δώδεκα στοιχειώσεις — “The Twelve Elements”

Epicurus’ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑΤΑ (stoikheiṓmata, or “elementary outline”, per R. D. Hicks) conceptually anticipated the Cosmological Principle, the Law of Conservation of Mass, the Law of Definite Proportions, the First Law of Thermodynamics, Molecular Vibration, Brownian Motion, the Special Theory of Relativity, and Quantum Field Theory.

Epicurus’ Synopsis On Physics (to Herodotus):

“Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one’s memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth.” (EH 36.1-2)

“I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine.” (EH. 37.4-5)

• • 1. Things don’t just appear. (EH 38.10-11; DRN I 150-174)
  • 2. Things don’t just disappear. (EH 39.1-2; DRN I 215-224, 238)
  • 3. It’s always been this way. (EH 39.2-6, 44.6-7; DRN II 297-308, V 362-364)
  • 4. It’s all just things in space. (EH 39.7-40.6; DRN I 419-439, V 352-362)
  • 5. All things are made of particles. (EH 40.7-41.5; DRN I 483-503)
  • 6. Everything extends infinitely. (EH 41.6-10; DRN I 959-984)
  • 7. Particles and space are unlimited. (EH 42.1-42.5; DRN I 985-1021, II 339-40, 523-531)
  • 8. Particles have nearly unlimited shapes. (EH 42.6-42.12; DRN II 341-381)
  • 9. Particles move constantly, even when entangled. (EH 43.1-44.7; DRN II 309-333)

“These brief sayings, if all these point are borne in mind afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.” (EH 45.1)

• • There are an infinite number of worlds. (EH 45.3-9)
  • Everything radiates tiny, sensible particles. (EH 46.1-47.2)
  • Particles are unsurpassably fine and fast. (EH 47.1-4, 61.11-13)
  • Particles flow at a continuous, instantaneous rate. (EH 48.1-6)
  • Particles can mix in the air and form illusions. (EH 48.6-11)
  • We see when particles emanate from things and hit our eyes. (EH 49.1-50.8)
  • “Truth” is a true opinion about sensations. (EH 50.8-52.4)
  • We hear when currents of particles stretch into our ears. (EH 52.5-53.8)
  • We smell when particles waft from things into our noses. (EH 53.9-53.13)
  • Particles have three qualities: shape, size, and weight. (EH 54.1-8; DRN II 748-752)
  • Particles have a maximum size. (EH 55.1-8)
  • Particles have a minimum size. (EH 56.5-59.12)
  • All positions are relative. (EH 60.1-12)
  • Particles move with equal speed when falling through the void. (EH 61.1-10)
  • Particles move imperceptibly, imcomprehensibly fast. (EH 46b.1-3)
  • Particles move even when entangled in compounds. (EH 62.1-47b.8)

“Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings <for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief>, you must consider that…” (EH 63.1-2)

• • The soul is made of particles. (EH 63.2-11)
  • The soul gives the body sensation. (EH 63.11-64.1)
  • The soul lives within the body. (EH 64.1-10)
  • The body cannot perceive without a soul. (EH 65.1-8)
  • The soul cannot perceive outside a body. (EH 65.8-67.9)
  • Only void is incorporeal. (EH 67.1-68.1)

“Now if one refers all these reasonings and remembers when was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in thse general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the sytem as well.” (EH 68.1-5)

• • Properties do not exist without bodies (EH 68.6-69.1)
  • Properties are not incorporeal. (EH 69.1-69.3)
  • Properties define bodies. (EH 69.3-69.11)
  • Properties of bodies can change. (EH 70.1-71.11)
  • Time is neither a body nor a body’s property. (EH 72.1-73.6)

• • Worlds evolved from clumps of particles. (EH 73.7-73.12)
  • Worlds are similar yet diverse in nature. (EH 74.1-2)
  • Worlds host other kinds of plants and animals. (EH 74.2-6)
  • Civilizations evolve over time. (EH 75.1-2)
  • Languages evolve over time. (EH 75.6-76.7)

• • “The All” is NOT governed by a divine being. (EH 76.8-77.5)
  • Celestial objects are just collections of fire. (EH 77.5-12)
  • Happiness requires a clear understanding of nature. (EH 78.1-79.1)
  • Obsessing over mythic questions does not lead to happiness. (EH 79.1-80.3
  • Conclusions should cohere with evidence. (EH 80.1-80.11)
  • Confidence is knowing that you are not being dogged by a demon. (EH 81.1-82.3)
  • Trust your feelings and sensations; apply standards of judgment. (EH 82.4-82.10)

“Here […] is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy.”  (EH 82.11-83.2)

A number of those can be derived (the nature of the soul, the orientation and organization of the world, human evolution and civilization, sensible properties, etc.) from the "first principles".

I am personally curious how many of EH 45-62 get included in their list.

I wonder if they provide new Doxai translations!

Then again, with respect to (1.), Epicurus does discuss the creation of worlds (EH 45.5), so perhaps Lucretius is merely referring to the creation of a world-system, and not the universe as a whole. (I am imagining – as a reasonable, modern analog – a contracting, pre-solar nebula that flattens into a protoplanetary disc that then rotates around a hot protostar until the rotating matter accretes into planetesimals that eventually develop into different worlds.) I might have been getting stuck on the idea that "nature creating" refers to a universal beginning rather than a local beginning.

"...such a world may come into being both inside another world and in an interworld, by which we mean a space between worlds; it will be in a place with much void [...] this occurs when seeds of the right kind have rushed in [...] little by little they make junctions and articulations, and cause changes of position to another place [...] and produce irrigations of the appropriate matter until the period of completion and stability, which lasts as long as the underlying foundations are capable of receiving additions." (EP 89.2-90.1). So Epicurus does identify a preceding stage of instability, per kosmos.

Therein, particles moved from a stage of "falling raindrops" (DRN II 223) "first", "and gradually grew in size by the aggregations and whirlings of bodies of minute parts" (EP 90.8-91.1). At some point "stability" is reached. I am comfortable with "creation" when taken as the development of a system of celestial bodies ... however, I still don't see the need for the "swerve" to create this arrangement. Perhaps one particle re-bounded from an "interworld" and started a cascade amid the cloud of "falling raindrops" (rather than one drop in the cloud "swerving" into another).

Overall, I question whether or not the "swerve" served any other function for Epicurus besides providing a rational counter-point to Democritus' determinism. Epicurus explained how world-systems develop to Herodotus and Pythokles without discussing the "swerve", and he explained choice and contemplation to Menoikeus without referring to an atomic "swerve". I am speculating that the declinando or clinamen in De Rerum Natura – described as a world-building and thought-forming agent – was more of a poetic embellishment by Lucretius than a reflection of Epicurus.

I am not sure that Lucretius' propositions (1.) and (3.) are supported by Epicurus' writing. (1.) His first point seems to imply that there was a previous time when all particles had the same orientation (the same "down"), prior to those particles becoming entangled to generate compound things. This seems to contradict the propositions of the temporal consistency of the universe (EH 39.2-6, 44.6-7) and the relativity of individual particles' orientations (EH 60.1-12).

(3.) Epicurus' existing writing are filled with discussions about choice, comparison, and contemplation, but they do not seem to require the ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ to explain. In the same way that sentience is proposed to originate from complex arrangements of insentient matter, it would be consistent to suppose that the capacity to make decisions originates from complex arrangements of choiceless matter. Given doubts on (1.), I am more prone to doubt (3.).

Quote from Todd

I think primordial is the wrong word. (I'm now waiting for Don or Nate to go find where Epicurus used exactly that word )

I think the image of atoms falling in parallel was an imaginary construction Epicurus used as evidence that there must be a swerve. I don't think it was intended to describe an actually existing state of the universe.

If there were no swerve, there would never be anything other than isolated atoms falling in parallel. Nothing more complex than individual atoms would ever come into existence. But other things do exist. Therefore...

It's time:

1. That a "Swerve" Is Necessary For Nature To Create:

…corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur

ponderibus propriis, incerto tempore ferme

incertisque locis spatio depellere paulum,

tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis.

quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum

imbris uti guttae caderent per inane profundum

nec foret offensus natus nec plaga creata

principiis; ita nihil umquam natura creasset. (DRN II 217-225)

“…when first-bodies are being carried downwards straight through the void by their own weight, at times quite undetermined and at undetermined spots they push a little from their path: yet only just so much as you could call a change of trend. But if they were not used to swerve, all things would fall downwards through the deep void like drops of rain, nor could collision come to be, nor a blow brought to pass for the first-beginnings: nature would never have brought aught to being.” (DRN II 217-225; trans. Bailey)

“…when the atoms are being drawn downward through the void by their property of weight, at absolutely unpredictable times and places they deflect slightly from their straight course, to a degree that could be described as no more than a shift of movement. If they were not apt to swerve, all would fall downward through the unfathomable void like drops of rain; no collisions between primary elements would occur, and no blows would be effected, with the result that nature would never have created anything. (DRN II 217-225; trans. Smith)

“Though atoms fall straight downward through the void | by their own weight, yet at uncertain times | and at uncertain points, they swerve a bit— | enough that one may say they changed direction. | And if they did not swerve, they all would fall | downward like raindrops through the boundless void; | no clashes would occur, no blows befall | the atoms; nature would never have made a thing.” (DRN II 217-225; trans. Copley)

2. That a "Swerve" Is Required To Refute a Deterministic Universe:

quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare necessest

corpora; nec plus quam minumum, ne fingere motus

nec plus quam minimum, ne fingere motus

obliquos videamur et id res vera refutet.

namque hoc in promptu manifestumque esse videmus,

pondera, quantum in <se> est, non posse obliqua meare,

ex supero cum praecipitant, quod cernere possis;

sed nihil omnino <recta> regione viai

declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese?

Denique si semper motu conectitur omnis

et vetere exoritur <motus> novus ordine certo

nec declinando faciunt primordia motus

principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat,

ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur,

libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat… (DRN II 244-256)

“Wherefore, again and again, it must needs be that the first-bodies swerve a little; yet not more than the very least, lest we seem to be imagining a sideways movement, and the truth refute it. For this we see plain and evident, that bodies, as far as in them lies, cannot travel sideways, since they fall headlong from above, as far as you can descry. But that nothing at all swerves from the straight direction of its path, what sense is there which can descry? Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth…” (DRN II 245-257; trans. Bailey)

“So I insist that the atoms must swerve slightly, but only to an infinitesimal degree, or we shall give the impression that we are imagining oblique movements—a hypothesis that would be contradicted by the facts. For it is a plain and manifest matter of observation that objects with weight, lell to themselves, cannot travel an oblique course when they plunge from above—at least not perceptibly; but who could possibly perceive that they do not swerve at all from their vertical path? Moreover, if all movements are invariably interlinked, if new movement arises from the old in unalterable succession, if there is no atomic swerve to initiate movement that can annul the decrees of destiny and prevent the existence of an endless chain ofcausation, what is the source of this free will possessed by living creatures all over the earth?” (DRN II 245-257; trans. Smith)

“And so again and again atoms must swerve | a little—the tiniest bit: we must not picture | crosswise movement, for facts would prove us wrong. | For this, we see, is obvious and clear: weight of itself can never move transversely; | it drops from above straight down, as we observe. | But that no atom ever swerves at all | from the perpendicular, who could sense and see? | To continue: if all movement is connected, | (new movement coming from old in strict descent) | and atoms never, by swerving, make a start on movement that would break the bonds of fate | and the endless chain of cause succeeding cause, | whence comes the freedom for us who live on earth?” (DRN II 245-257; trans. Copley)

3. That Freedom of Mind Is Facilitated By "the Tiny Swerve":

…sed ne res ipsa necesssum

intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis

et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,

id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum

nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. (DRN II 289–293)

“But that the very mind feels not some necessity within in doing all things, and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer, this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings in no determined direction of place and at no determined time.” (DRN II 289–293; trans. Bailey)

“But the factor that saves the mind itself from being governed in all its actions by an internal necessity, and from being constrained to submit passively to its domination, is the minute swerve of the atoms at unpredictable places and times.” (DRN II 289–293; trans. Smith)

“…all things are not caused by blows—external force; no internal power | controls the mind in every move it makes, | a helpless captive bound by what must be: | this comes from the tiny swerving of the atoms | at no fixed place and no fixed point in time.” (DRN II 289–293; trans. Copley)

Quote from Joshua

Quote from Don

And my take is that this was the primordial situation with all atoms falling in parallel "straight down." However, once a couple collisions happened, the order was interrupted by collisions and conglomerations in parts of the cosmos. In other parts, the parallel falling continued. And so on.

I've never been able to reconcile a 'primordial' downward movement with the concurrent claim that there was no beginning.

I have been considering this point as well.

Epicurus' third elementary principle proposes that "the universe is as it always was and always will be". If the distribution of matter in the universe has always been the same, it seems to follow that there would not have been a period where most particles were moving in a consistent, parallel stream in the same, perfectly "downward" movement. At all points in time, there was never an absolute "up" and "down", and at all points time, particles were falling against each other, so a deviation from perfectly straight paths would not be necessary, because linear motion can describe this.

Just a quick visual experiment as a point of reference.

Quote from Don

Quote from Nate

Agreed. Until someone can demonstrate better reason, I'm translating ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ as "[the] wiggle".

Don't get me wrong, I *really* like "wiggle" but...

On a more serious note, do the atoms "wiggle" back and forth or do they veer off to one side or the other at random intervals? The connotation of "wiggle" is that they're vibrating. παρέγκλισις seems to imply the idea of diverging from a set path (hence, "swerve" I guess) but I fully agree with you that "swerve" has too much the flavor of intentionality. κλίσις had to do with bending, inclining, or even the turning of soldiers to the left or right (per LSJ). There was κλίνω bend, slant, lean, wander, stray. etc. The English word used for clinamen or ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ should evoke a random, involuntary action on the part of the atom to deviate from a set direction, itself due to nothing more than the "weight" of the atom "falling" in a straight line.

I'm trying out the idea that particles are "twitchy" and "tweak" when they move. I'm finding that "twerks", "wiggles" and "wags" imply a patterned rhythm that does not reflect the spontaneous, irregular quality of the ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ.

Quote from Don

A question and an observation:

Are you positing a difference between these two?

Quote from Nate

Everything radiates tiny, sensible particles. (EH 46.1-47.2)

Particles flow from things constantly. (EH 48.1-6)

Yeah, I chose to distinguish the proposition that particles radiate from the further specification that the manner in which they radiate is constant. Though, I see your point. I frankly hesitate to distinguish the first two propositions, that the existing things "cannot be created from nothing" and "cannot be destroyed into nothing" as the same thing demonstrating object permanency. I can see that same debate regarding the "multitude of particles and void", which could be separated into two propositions. Being biased with knowledge of the concept of spacetime, I feel the same way about "the universe being boundless" and "its contents being infinite", which both seem to express "spatial infinity" to me.

Quote from Don

Eikadistes raises a number of good questions above. My suggestion?

1. Come up with any number of foundational principles one wants because there's no way to know what those "12 Rudiments" were referring to.

I did just that! I organized the major points I believe he proposes in his Epistle To Herodotus (38-44): “These brief sayings, if all these point are borne in mind afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.” (45.1). I identify each proposition according to whether or not it is textually followed by a counter-example.

Epicurus’ Synopsis On Physics (to Herodotus):

“Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one’s memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth.” (EH 36.1-2)

“I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine.” (EH. 37.4-5)

• • 1. Things don’t just appear. (EH 38.10-11; DRN I 150-174)
  • 2. Things don’t just disappear. (EH 39.1-2; DRN I 215-224, 238)
  • 3. It’s always been this way. (EH 39.2-6, 44.6-7; DRN II 297-308, V 362-364)
  • 4. It’s all just things in space. (EH 39.7-40.6; DRN I 419-439, V 352-362)
  • 5. All things are made of particles. (EH 40.7-41.5; DRN I 483-503)
  • 6. Everything extends infinitely. (EH 41.6-10; DRN I 959-984)
  • 7. Particles and space are unlimited. (EH 42.1-42.5; DRN I 985-1021, II 339-40, 523-531)
  • 8. Particles have nearly unlimited shapes. (EH 42.6-42.12; DRN II 341-381)
  • 9. Particles move constantly, even when entangled. (EH 43.1-44.7; DRN II 309-333)

“These brief sayings, if all these point are borne in mind afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.” (EH 45.1)

• • There are an infinite number of worlds. (EH 45.3-9)
  • Everything radiates tiny, sensible particles. (EH 46.1-47.2)
  • Particles are unsurpassably fine and fast. (EH 47.1-4, 61.11-13)
  • Particles flow at a continuous, instantaneous rate. (EH 48.1-6)
  • Particles can mix in the air and form illusions. (EH 48.6-11)
  • We see when particles emanate from things and hit our eyes. (EH 49.1-50.8)
  • “Truth” is a true opinion about sensations. (EH 50.8-52.4)
  • We hear when currents of particles stretch into our ears. (EH 52.5-53.8)
  • We smell when particles waft from things into our noses. (EH 53.9-53.13)
  • Particles have three qualities: shape, size, and weight. (EH 54.1-8; DRN II 748-752)
  • Particles have a maximum size. (EH 55.1-8)
  • Particles have a minimum size. (EH 56.5-59.12)
  • All positions are relative. (EH 60.1-12)
  • Particles move with equal speed when falling through the void. (EH 61.1-10)
  • Particles move imperceptibly, imcomprehensibly fast. (EH 46b.1-3)
  • Particles move even when entangled in compounds. (EH 62.1-47b.8)

“Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings <for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief>, you must consider that…” (EH 63.1-2)

• • The soul is made of particles. (EH 63.2-11)
  • The soul gives the body sensation. (EH 63.11-64.1)
  • The soul lives within the body. (EH 64.1-10)
  • The body cannot perceive without a soul. (EH 65.1-8)
  • The soul cannot perceive outside a body. (EH 65.8-67.9)
  • Only void is incorporeal. (EH 67.1-68.1)

“Now if one refers all these reasonings and remembers when was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in thse general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the sytem as well.” (EH 68.1-5)

• • Properties do not exist without bodies (EH 68.6-69.1)
  • Properties are not incorporeal. (EH 69.1-69.3)
  • Properties define bodies. (EH 69.3-69.11)
  • Properties of bodies can change. (EH 70.1-71.11)
  • Time is neither a body nor a body’s property. (EH 72.1-73.6)

• • Worlds evolved from clumps of particles. (EH 73.7-73.12)
  • Worlds are similar yet diverse in nature. (EH 74.1-2)
  • Worlds host other kinds of plants and animals. (EH 74.2-6)
  • Civilizations evolve over time. (EH 75.1-2)
  • Languages evolve over time. (EH 75.6-76.7)

• • “The All” is NOT governed by a divine being. (EH 76.8-77.5)
  • Celestial objects are just collections of fire. (EH 77.5-12)
  • Happiness requires a clear understanding of nature. (EH 78.1-79.1)
  • Obsessing over mythic questions does not lead to happiness. (EH 79.1-80.3
  • Conclusions should cohere with evidence. (EH 80.1-80.11)
  • Confidence is knowing that you are not being dogged by a demon. (EH 81.1-82.3)
  • Trust your feelings and sensations; apply standards of judgment. (EH 82.4-82.10)

“Here […] is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy.” (EH 82.11-83.2)

I think any attempt at justifying which 12 points make the ΔΩΔEKA is bound to hit a limit by a lack of sources. Epicurus easily makes a dozen observations about particle behavior, alone, without counting propositions regarding the universe, its contents, its age, its size, its expansiveness, and it's orientation. There could be easily two dozen.

I am still curious if Epicurus proposed 12 because the 13th item on the listed was vastly less significant than the first 12, or, if, like the 40 ΔOΞAI, the 12 was a changing list based on the perceived needs of his students.

Quote from Don

Quote from Nate

That said, I *really* like wiggle.

Agreed. Until someone can demonstrate better reason, I'm translating ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ as "[the] wiggle".

Though, I like to think of particles as being like a dog's tail ("wag"), leading to involuntary collisions due to a natural impulse that is beyond (or prior to) the conscious control of the dog. The image of someone twerking their thighs or wiggling their hips in a crowded club implies intentionality, which might be avoided when describing particles.

Quote from Nate

I'd also like to submit the idea that the word "wiggle" is the best available English word to describe the seemingly-random movements of particles due to internal motion that lead to collisions.

Recently, I've been thinking to myself that (outside of Epicurean discussions) I only ever invoke the word "swerve" when referring to (1) the object of "my car", and (2) "an intentional re-direct to avoid a collision". The clinamen is a proposition that explains why collisions occurred in the first place, so "swerve" in my vernacular is devilishly misleading.

Other candidates might include "jerk", "shimmy", "twitch", and "wag".

"Twerk" might be even more potent. Particles "twerk".

Quote from Don

Eikadistes raises a number of good questions above. My suggestion?

1. Ignore both Dewitt and Clay
2. Go through the letter to Herodotus oneself
3. Come up with any number of foundational principles one wants because there's no way to know what those "12 Rudiments" were referring to.

Both of their lists seem to focus on the makeup of the universe and the behavior of particles. In the middle of Epicurus' discussion on particle behavior, he goes on a tangent about the eidola and sense perception. DeWitt and Clay seem to omit any discussion of sense perception or the emission of films by compound bodies from their lists.

Every list I've come across distinguishes the principle of things not magically appearing from things not magically disappearing, but to my modern eyes (familiar with the Law of Conservation of Mass), those two look the same. They are both describing the principle of object permanency, and they can both be justified by the same observation.

I am not sure Epicurus would have seen those as separate propositions.

That being said, I am definitely sure, based on the organization of text, that Epicurus meant to distinguish the propositions that "the universe has no edge" from "particles and space are unlimited", but those seem to be saying the same thing to my modern eyes (familiar with the Cosmological Principle of an isotropic universe).

I am now wondering what criterion we might use to determine whether we are reading (what I'll call) a "main proposition", versus (what I'll call) a "sub-point" that can be derived from the main point.

I'd also like to submit the idea that the word "wiggle" is the best available English word to describe the seemingly-random movements of particles due to internal motion that lead to collisions.

Recently, I've been thinking to myself that (outside of Epicurean discussions) I only ever invoke the word "swerve" when referring to (1) the object of "my car", and (2) "an intentional re-direct to avoid a collision". The clinamen is a proposition that explains why collisions occurred in the first place, so "swerve" in my vernacular is devilishly misleading.

Other candidates might include "jerk", "shimmy", "twitch", and "wag".

I found a few discrepancies between the various attempts at reconstruction that can be points of exploration:

1. DeWitt identifies [a] the infinite multitude of particles and [b] the infinite extent of space as two different propositions, whereas every other reconstruction merges them into one. What gives?

2. Clay's list of 10 (of the 12) includes the proposition that [c] the universe always was as it is and always will be, but this proposition of a sort of temporal symmetry is not found in DeWitt's list. What gives?

3. Clay combines the ideas that [d.I] atomic motion is uniform and [d.II] atomic motion is of two kinds into one proposition. DeWitt separates them into two propositions. What gives?

4. In his Epistle To Herodotus, Epicurus contrasts particles that have recoiled to a distance with particles rebounding against other particles in a matrix of entangled particles. Elsewhere, he contrasts the recoiling due to collisions to the universal "fall" due to a particle's weight. Elsewhere, he includes the clinamen. I am reading either 3 or 4 kinds of motions: [I] the fall due to weight, [II] the clinamen due to internal motion, [III] the recoil due to collisions, and [III.b], the occasion when recoiling leads to particles being entangled in matrices that lead to the foundation of compounds and complex matter. How would Epicurus have arranged all of these ideas as propositions? (And how many?)

5. Why do the reconstructed lists specify two types of motion in one proposition, and yet introduce a third type of motion (the clinamen) as a separate proposition? Would Epicurus not have identified three kinds of motion?

6. Why does Clay omit (or not recognize) the proposition about [e] uniform motion?