Posts by Eikadistes

Quote from Don

My only hesitation is that the picture has - to me - an almost Jesus vibe with the orientation of the face and the long hair. I didn't notice the pig until cassius pointed it out.

“For if we are to speak, as the majesty of his revelations demand, a god he was, a god […] who first discovered that principle of life which is now identified with wisdom, and who by his genius saved life from such mighty waves and such deep darkness and moored it in such calm water and so brilliant light.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, Book V, Lines 7-12)

Another thing I noticed in Latin, speaking of repetition:

Book I 926-951

avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante

trita solo. iuvat integros accedere fontis

atque haurire, iuvatque novos decerpere flores

insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam,

unde prius nulli velarint tempora musae;

primum quod magnis doceo de rebus et artis

religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo,

deinde quod obscura de re tam lucida pango

carmina musaeo contingens cuncta lepore.

id quoque enim non ab nulla ratione videtur;

sed vel uti pueris absinthia taetra medentes

cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum

contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore,

ut puerorum aetas inprovida ludificetur

labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarum

absinthi laticem deceptaque non capiatur,

sed potius tali facto recreata valescat,

sic ego nunc, quoniam haec ratio plerumque videtur

tristior esse quibus non est tractata, retroque

volgus abhorret ab hac, volui tibi suaviloquenti

carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram

et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle;

si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere

versibus in nostris possem, dum percipis omnem

naturam rerum qua constet compta figura.

Sed quoniam docui...

"this is what impels me now to penetrate by power of intellect the remote regions of the Pierian maids, hitherto untrodden by any foot. Joyfully I visit virgin springs and draw their water; joyfully I cull unfamiliar flowers, gatherings for my head a chaplet of fame from spots whence the Muses have never before taken a garland for the brows of any person: first because I teach about important matters and endeavor to disentangle the mind from the strangling knots of superstition and also because of an obscure subject i compose such luminous verses, overspreading all with the charm of the Muses. For obviously my actual technique does not lack a motive. Doctors who try to give children foul-tasting wormwood first coat the rim of the cup with the sweet juice of golden honey; their intention is that the children, unwary at their tender age, will be tricked into applying their lips to the cup and at the same time will drain the bitter draught of wormwood--victims of beguilement, but not of betrayal, since by this means they recover strength and health. I have a similar intention now: since this philosophy of ours often appears somewhat off-putting to those who have not experienced it, and most people recoil back from it, I have preferred to expound it to you in harmonious Pierian poetry and, so to speak, coat it with the sweet honey of the Muses. My hope has been that by this means I might perhaps succeed in holding your attention concentrated on my versus, while you fathom the nature of the universe and the form of its structure. Now then..." (Smith 28-29)

Book IV 1-26

Avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante

trita solo. iuvat integros accedere fontis

atque haurire, iuvatque novos decerpere flores

insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam,

unde prius nulli velarint tempora musae;

primum quod magnis doceo de rebus et artis

religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo,

deinde quod obscura de re tam lucida pango

carmina musaeo contingens cuncta lepore.

id quoque enim non ab nulla ratione videtur;

nam vel uti pueris absinthia taetra medentes

cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum

contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore,

ut puerorum aetas inprovida ludificetur

labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarum

absinthi laticem deceptaque non capiatur,

sed potius tali facto recreata valescat,

sic ego nunc, quoniam haec ratio plerumque videtur

tristior esse quibus non est tractata, retroque

volgus abhorret ab hac, volui tibi suaviloquenti

carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram

et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle;

si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere

versibus in nostris possem, dum percipis omnem

naturam rerum ac persentis utilitatem.

Sed quoniam docui...

"I am penetrating the remote regions of the Pierian maids, hitherto untrodden by any foot. Joyfully I visit virgin prings and draw their water; joyfully I cull unfamiliar flowers, gathering for my head da chaplet of fame from spots whence the Muses have never before taken a garland for the brows of any person: first because I teach about important matters and endeavor to disentangle the mind from the strangling knots of superstition, and also because on an obscure subject I compose such luminous verses, overspreading all with the charm of the Muses. For obviously my actual technique does not lack a motive. Doctors who try to give children foul-tasting wormwood first coat the rim of the cup with the sweet juice of golden honey; their intention is that the children, unwary at their tender age, will be tricked into applying their lips to the cup and at the same time will drain the bitter draft of wormwood – victims of beguilement, but not of betrayal, since by this means they recover strength and health. I have a similar intention now: since this philosophy of ours often appears somewhat off-putting to those who have not experienced it, and most people recoil back from it, I have preferred to expound it to you in harmonious Pierian poetry and, so to speak, coat it with the sweet honey of the Muses. My hope has been that by this means I might perhaps succeed in holding your attention concentrated on my verses, while you apprehend the nature of the universe and become conscious of the beneficial effect of my instruction. Well, now that..." (Smith 100-101)

I have, before, come across the suggestion that repetition found throughout Lucretius' verse lends credence to the proposition that we are only reading a draft of De Rerum Natura and not its author's anticipated final form. I had not realized this myself; now that I found 26 consecutive lines that are repeated almost identically, it seems likely to me (unless there was a trend ancient poets adopted of heavily employing repetition as a rhetorical technique) that Lucretius used this as a placeholder, likely, in my mind, to be re-visited upon meeting some other conditions.

One other angle from the Villa Borghese:

Fun thing I just found while making some notes in my Latin copy:

Book II 27-31

cum tamen inter se prostrati in gramine molli

propter aquae rivum sub ramis arboris altae

non magnis opibus iucunde corpora curant,

praesertim cum tempestas adridet et anni

tempora conspergunt viridantis floribus herbas.

"...when they lie in friendly company on velvety turf near a running brook beneath the branches of a tall tree and provide their bodies with simple but agreeable refreshment, especially when the weather smiles and the season of the year spangles the green grass with flowers." (Smith 36)

Book V 1392-1396

saepe itaque inter se prostrati in gramine molli

propter aquae rivom sub ramis arboris altae.

non magnis opibus iucunde corpora habebant,

praesertim cum tempestas ridebat et anni

tempora pingebant viridantis floribus herbas.

"So they would often lie in friendly company on velvety turf near a running brook beneath the branches of a tall tree and provide their bodies with simple but agreeable refreshments, especially when the weather smiled and the season of the year embroidered the green grass with flowers." (Smith 174-175)

Quote from Cassius

Thanks for the new poll, but am I overlooking it or did you leave out the Brown 1783 version? We don't know the translator's name, but I actually consider that one of my favorites due to the rendering of several important passages - one that stands out to me is his use of "events" rather than exclusively "accidents" in describing emergent properties.

I've added him to both.

Same question, but this time you can select more than one answer.

Just a little poll while I was doing some work...

Outside of the Villa Borghese in Rome. I saw this the only time I went there in 2010.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Cassius

Early Continental philosophy was largely oriented toward the works of Kant whose ethics and metaphysics heavily contract with atomism and hedonism.

Nate, should I presume that that should have been "contradict" rather than "oontract with" and make that correction in the post above?

It should have been "contrasted", sorry about that.

Quote from Don

Thanks for those, Todd

If anyone's looking, I'd suggest the books by Bart Ehrman, too.

Big fan of Bart Ehrman here. I appreciate that shout-out.

Quote from Nate

Quote from Nate

... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.

So, later in the book, the offer non-lucid dreams as an example of the "extra" leg of the Canon.

"The imaginary impositions of the mind. The third criterion of truth, the imaginary imposition of the mind, is its attachment to representations (images) created in it. The imaginary imposition of the mind is of various kinds:

1) Depictions from direct sensory perception are classified by the Epicureans in senses or, if repeated, in preconceptions.

2) Depictions not derived from a direct sense include images of the unconscious, for example, the dreamlike depictions during sleep. For Epicurus, there is no distinction. He argues that 'what moved us it true, even the dreams of the lunatics, because only the non-existing does not affect us.' So, we have an ancient philosophical school which sees the value of analyzing the images of the unconscious in dreams and urges us to seek the truth that they may hide. Many centuries later, with the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, Freud proved, in his way, of course, that these interpretations are true for a specific individual.

The Epicurean philosophy does not give dreams any prophetic properties, as other ancient schools did, but observes with caution how our desires and especially our fears are displayed int eh form of depictions during sleep. Many of these images have no direct sensory origin. The sage knows well that these fears often cause pain, so Epicurenas consider this attachment to images of the unconscious as a criterion of truth."

Display More

The suggestion that dreams are as reliable as sensation reminds me of the movie "Minority Report". Are you all guys familiar with it? Law enforcement records the minds of human "precogs" whose prophetic dreams of "precrimes" provide law enforcement with the information needed to prevent crimes before they happen. While the author does acknowledge Epicurus' rejection of "prophecy", they seem to walk a thin line around clairvoyance.

"The Stoic-Kantian duty to authority, race and the misunderstood notion of homeland led in the recent past to a whole nation of high cultural standards to provoke World War II massacres and unprecedented genocidal crimes against other peoples that were historically defined as the Holocaust" (Dimitris Altas 115).

Wow. Bold statement, correlating our Stoic (and Kantian) philosophical opponents with the Holocaust, but I like it.

Quote from Nate

... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.

So, later in the book, the offer non-lucid dreams as an example of the "extra" leg of the Canon.

"The imaginary impositions of the mind. The third criterion of truth, the imaginary imposition of the mind, is its attachment to representations (images) created in it. The imaginary imposition of the mind is of various kinds:

1) Depictions from direct sensory perception are classified by the Epicureans in senses or, if repeated, in preconceptions.

2) Depictions not derived from a direct sense include images of the unconscious, for example, the dreamlike depictions during sleep. For Epicurus, there is no distinction. He argues that 'what moved us it true, even the dreams of the lunatics, because only the non-existing does not affect us.' So, we have an ancient philosophical school which sees the value of analyzing the images of the unconscious in dreams and urges us to seek the truth that they may hide. Many centuries later, with the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, Freud proved, in his way, of course, that these interpretations are true for a specific individual.

The Epicurean philosophy does not give dreams any prophetic properties, as other ancient schools did, but observes with caution how our desires and especially our fears are displayed int eh form of depictions during sleep. Many of these images have no direct sensory origin. The sage knows well that these fears often cause pain, so Epicurenas consider this attachment to images of the unconscious as a criterion of truth."

Quote from Nate

Quote from Todd

From the Epicurean position (if we are to appropriate the symbology of the Plato's Allegory), the entire Allegory of Plato's Cave is, itself, actually inside of a metaphorical Cave in the Epicurean world, and the light of day into which the Epicurean walks is the light of particles that allows us to physically see.

Yep. That should do it.

Quote from Cassius

I presume we are seeing a little roughness in the Greek to English translation, but aside from that what do you make of the list Nate? The "confirmed" and "cannot be confirmed" by the senses, but harder to tell about the "valid / invalid" labeling.

I am still deconstructing the expressions that the author employs to explain the principles of Epicurus’ analogical logic, so I am reserving an opinion about the second statements of each point.

For the most part, I find that the list coheres with the beginning of the Epistle To Herodotus and the elementary propositions defined therein. There are several items (as I predicted) which they organized as two separate points (infinite void and infinite particles being one example) instead of one. I think this is inevitable and mostly inconsequential. Like I mentioned before, I would be comfortable merging the first two propositions (no creation and no destruction) into one, though I am equally happy to recognize it as two, distinct points. Some of the points are two sides of the same observation, and can be appropriately expressed as such, so I am fine with those.

I think that some of their points are a little redundant. For example, 1. (that bodies exist) and 5. (that everything consists of bodies, except 6. void). Also, point 2. (the principle of linear, temporal causality, that one or more causes precede an effect) seems to be implied by 3. and 4. (that nothing is born out of nothing, and that nothing is annihilated). Also, points 7. (atoms having an unchanging and unbroken existence) and 8. (atoms being impenetrable) seem to be derivative of 4. (nothing being annihilated) so I would not personally include them. Point 14. (no divine intervention) seems implied by their recognition of 2. (things have temporal causes) and 5. (everything is made of bodies).

As Todd mentioned, 18. seems almost Platonic, and I do not find support for this proposition in Epicurus’ texts. I may be missing something in translation, but at this point I do not accept this one.

I will need to dig through what the author calls "analogical" and "Aristotelian logic" because I imagine that this criterion helped them organize each of their points, even when some seem (to me) to be redundant.

Quote from Todd

I'm not seeing anything in the Letter to Herodotus or Book 1 that I take to be suggesting 2 levels of reality. I only noticed some references to there being things we can see and things we can't see. (I was skimming quickly, so maybe I missed something.)

That seems a far cry from saying there are 2 levels of reality. You might as well say there are things we can smell and things we can't smell.

If anyone has a more specific reference for this "two levels" idea, I'd appreciate it.

Their describing "the level of atoms" as "timeless", versus "the level of the sensible world" which is "set in time" definitely has a Platonic tinge to it. This seems to contradict the way "time" is used in the Epistle To Herodotus:

"Moreover, their passage through the void [...] accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time. [...] even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move" (46b.1-62.7).

Quote from Godfrey

The topics of particular interest here are:

1) The principles of atomic physics. Not 12, not 10, but 18 principles are listed. I didn't notice how this number was derived. Given some of the recent discussion on the forum, however, this might be fuel for a post or two

Starting on Pages 58 and 59 of An Introduction From the "Garden of Athens", a chapter titled "The Epicurean Philosophy: Kanonikon – Physikon – Ethikon" by Giorgos Bakogiannis:

"A. Physikon (Physics)

First, I must stress that this presentation completes my previous short one on atomic physics at the Second Panhellenic Symposium of Philosophy, so I will deal with issues that I did not have the time to present back then.

The principles of atomic physics. Although the atom-based cosmology of Epicurus of Athens corresponds to a certain degree to the physics of Democritus of Abdera, it has its own principles. It is important to emphasize that these principles do not need prerequisites or a priori proposals. On the contrary, they can be subjected to intensive scrutiny through the use of Epicurean Kanon (Canon, Criterion). Epicurus proved each principle's validity using analogical thought and Aristotelian reasoning.

Based my argument on the method of the French academic J.M. Gabaude, I will refer to each one of these principles and their corresponding forms of proof:

1. There are bodies. Our senses confirm it.

2. Everything that happens has one or more causes of happening. The opposite cannot be confirmed through our senses.

3. Nothing is born out of nothing. The opposite cannot be confirmed.

4. Nothing is annihilated. The opposite argument is unconfirmed.

5. The whole consists of bodies. Our senses can confirm it.

6. The whole also consists of the void. The opposite can be ruled out through reductio ad absurdum (proof by contradiction).

7. Atoms possess a complete state of existence which is unchanged and unbroken. The opposite argument is refuted.

8. Each atom is impenetrable. No space can be simultaneously occupied by two different bodies. The opposite is invalid.

9. The whole is infinite. The opposite argument is invalid.

10. Void is infinite. The opposite argument is invalid.

11. The number of atoms is infinite. The opposite argument is invalid.

12. Atoms move ceaselessly. The opposite argument is invalid.

13. Each composite body possesses properties that the particles comprising it o not possess (principle of emergence-the basis of Chemistry)

14. There is no expediency in nature. There is no divine intervention. The opposite argument is invalid.

15. What is considered as necessary integrates the element of probability. There is a random or 'by chance' element occurring in nature. The opposite is not valid.

16. The birth of a compound body is achieved through the union of atoms. The opposite is invalid.

17. Every composite body is temporary, and when it is destroyed, it is dividied into the atoms that comprised it. The opposite is invalid.

18. There are two levels of reality, the level of atoms within the void that is timeless and the level of the sensible world set in time. The opposite holds no validity."

This approach demonstrates two, simultaneous, yet contradictory positions that I hold:

(1) We need avoid using metaphors and should strive to speak frankly.

(2) (Yeah, right). Everything is a metaphor.

I typically decide it is best to make responsible use of metaphors to which the author should be held accountable.

I suppose this is why Epicurus recognized that only a wise person is suitable to correctly deconstruct the metaphors of poetry. There is a fine line between using words that feel good but aren't really saying much and words that feel empty but are actually saying a tremendous amount of the reader would only exercise the patience required to understand.

The incidence of Lucretius writing spoonfuls of sugar to make the medicine of atomism go down comes to mind. We can also try using some of the metaphors Lucretius provides. De Rerum Natura seems to give Epicureans the OK to deify natural processes (like "Venus"), so we seem to have a green light to make liberal use of anthropomorphization.

I wanted to document that vocabulary used to express the idea that the Sun is "about as big as it seems" (EP 91.1-3).

...MEN TO ΠPOΣ HMAΣ THΛIKOYTON EΣTIN ΦAINETAI

"...μέν τò πρός ἡμᾶς τηλικοῦτóν ἔστιν φαίνεται."

(...mèn tò prós hēmâs tēlikoûtón éstin phaínetai)

"...is for us what it appears to be" (Bailey).

"...relative to us is just as big as it appears. [This is also in book 11 of the On Nature; for he says, if its size had been reduced because of the distance, its brightness would have been even more reduced; for there is no other distance more symmetrical with this [degree of brightness]]" (Inwood & Gerson).

“…relative to us is as great as it appears [This he also says in the eleventh book of his work On Nature; 'for if', he says 'the size of a star had dimished on account of the distance, its brightness would have dimished much more.'] For there is no other distance that could better correspond to this size.” (Mensch).

"...in relation to us, is as large as they appear. <<This is also in On Nature Book 11 [F81]: 'For if,' he says, 'they had lost their size because of the distance, much more would they have lost their color'>> For there is no other distance more congruent with that." (White)

I am reflecting on the word THΛIKOYTON (τηλικοῦτóν or tēlikoûtón), a parsed form of τηλικοῦτος (tēlikoûtos) meaning "of such a magnitude", or "as great as". I like the latest translation by Stephen White (2021), "is as large as they appear", because that is how I think of the Sun (subjectively, it seems to me to be larger than any terrestrial object).

The allusion to Book 11 of On Nature seems to present the following argument (based on my reading): If the Sun were both small and distant, it would appear dim or colorless. However, the Sun is very bright and colorful. Therefore, the Sun cannot be both small and distant. Based on Epicurus' rhetorical approach of entertaining a negative, I presume that he was implying either (1) the Sun is very close, (2) the Sun is very big, or (3) both.

Anyone (like Epicurus) who sailed across the Aegean (multiple times) would have known that the Sun does not reduce in size the further you sail from the horizon, so it must be significantly more massive than the mountains that shrink in the distance, or, as Anaxagoras proposed one century earlier, "larger than the Peloponnese". A ball of fire supposed to be the size of a loaf of bread, or a house, or even a city would never lead to this phenomena.

(It is also interesting that Epicurus' hypothetical description of a "small" and "distant" Sun matches the description of a "star", but I digress, since we have no evidence of Epicurus commenting on the correlation...)

Epicurus clearly misunderstood the fact that the Sun is actually over 100 times larger than the Earth. I am, however, very suspicious of what I consider to be a dubious claim that Epicurus thought the sun was a glowing basketball.

Translators of Diogenes Laërtius later note that Epicurus "says [...] in the twelfth book of his work On Nature [...] that the sun is eclipsed when the moon obscures it, and that the moon is eclipsed by the shadow of the earth [...] This is also said by Diogenes the Epicurean in the first book of his Selected Writings" (Mensch 525); "<<In On Nature Book 12 [F83] he says these things and also that the sun is eclipsed when the moon overshadows it, and the moon when the earth's shadow does so [...] This point is also made by Diogenes the Epicurean in Selections Book I.>>" (White 444)

Considering the lines following this description in the Epistle To Pythokles, where Epicurus acknowledges that the objective size of the Sun may vary from our perspective ( "vary" being the key word; 91.3-92.1), it seems unlikely that he was making a hard argument that the Sun is some kind of hyper-radiant grapefruit. His Epistles on astronomy and geoscience weren't dogmatic, and, like his other explanations, his approach was intended to be flexible to accommodate new observations and discoveries, so long as the conclusions never contradict sensory evidence.