Posts by Eikadistes

Quote from Joshua

Quote from Don

And my take is that this was the primordial situation with all atoms falling in parallel "straight down." However, once a couple collisions happened, the order was interrupted by collisions and conglomerations in parts of the cosmos. In other parts, the parallel falling continued. And so on.

I've never been able to reconcile a 'primordial' downward movement with the concurrent claim that there was no beginning.

I have been considering this point as well.

Epicurus' third elementary principle proposes that "the universe is as it always was and always will be". If the distribution of matter in the universe has always been the same, it seems to follow that there would not have been a period where most particles were moving in a consistent, parallel stream in the same, perfectly "downward" movement. At all points in time, there was never an absolute "up" and "down", and at all points time, particles were falling against each other, so a deviation from perfectly straight paths would not be necessary, because linear motion can describe this.

Just a quick visual experiment as a point of reference.

Quote from Don

Quote from Nate

Agreed. Until someone can demonstrate better reason, I'm translating ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ as "[the] wiggle".

Don't get me wrong, I *really* like "wiggle" but...

On a more serious note, do the atoms "wiggle" back and forth or do they veer off to one side or the other at random intervals? The connotation of "wiggle" is that they're vibrating. παρέγκλισις seems to imply the idea of diverging from a set path (hence, "swerve" I guess) but I fully agree with you that "swerve" has too much the flavor of intentionality. κλίσις had to do with bending, inclining, or even the turning of soldiers to the left or right (per LSJ). There was κλίνω bend, slant, lean, wander, stray. etc. The English word used for clinamen or ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ should evoke a random, involuntary action on the part of the atom to deviate from a set direction, itself due to nothing more than the "weight" of the atom "falling" in a straight line.

I'm trying out the idea that particles are "twitchy" and "tweak" when they move. I'm finding that "twerks", "wiggles" and "wags" imply a patterned rhythm that does not reflect the spontaneous, irregular quality of the ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ.

Quote from Don

A question and an observation:

Are you positing a difference between these two?

Quote from Nate

Everything radiates tiny, sensible particles. (EH 46.1-47.2)

Particles flow from things constantly. (EH 48.1-6)

Yeah, I chose to distinguish the proposition that particles radiate from the further specification that the manner in which they radiate is constant. Though, I see your point. I frankly hesitate to distinguish the first two propositions, that the existing things "cannot be created from nothing" and "cannot be destroyed into nothing" as the same thing demonstrating object permanency. I can see that same debate regarding the "multitude of particles and void", which could be separated into two propositions. Being biased with knowledge of the concept of spacetime, I feel the same way about "the universe being boundless" and "its contents being infinite", which both seem to express "spatial infinity" to me.

Quote from Don

Eikadistes raises a number of good questions above. My suggestion?

1. Come up with any number of foundational principles one wants because there's no way to know what those "12 Rudiments" were referring to.

I did just that! I organized the major points I believe he proposes in his Epistle To Herodotus (38-44): “These brief sayings, if all these point are borne in mind afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.” (45.1). I identify each proposition according to whether or not it is textually followed by a counter-example.

Epicurus’ Synopsis On Physics (to Herodotus):

“Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one’s memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth.” (EH 36.1-2)

“I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine.” (EH. 37.4-5)

• • 1. Things don’t just appear. (EH 38.10-11; DRN I 150-174)
  • 2. Things don’t just disappear. (EH 39.1-2; DRN I 215-224, 238)
  • 3. It’s always been this way. (EH 39.2-6, 44.6-7; DRN II 297-308, V 362-364)
  • 4. It’s all just things in space. (EH 39.7-40.6; DRN I 419-439, V 352-362)
  • 5. All things are made of particles. (EH 40.7-41.5; DRN I 483-503)
  • 6. Everything extends infinitely. (EH 41.6-10; DRN I 959-984)
  • 7. Particles and space are unlimited. (EH 42.1-42.5; DRN I 985-1021, II 339-40, 523-531)
  • 8. Particles have nearly unlimited shapes. (EH 42.6-42.12; DRN II 341-381)
  • 9. Particles move constantly, even when entangled. (EH 43.1-44.7; DRN II 309-333)

“These brief sayings, if all these point are borne in mind afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.” (EH 45.1)

• • There are an infinite number of worlds. (EH 45.3-9)
  • Everything radiates tiny, sensible particles. (EH 46.1-47.2)
  • Particles are unsurpassably fine and fast. (EH 47.1-4, 61.11-13)
  • Particles flow at a continuous, instantaneous rate. (EH 48.1-6)
  • Particles can mix in the air and form illusions. (EH 48.6-11)
  • We see when particles emanate from things and hit our eyes. (EH 49.1-50.8)
  • “Truth” is a true opinion about sensations. (EH 50.8-52.4)
  • We hear when currents of particles stretch into our ears. (EH 52.5-53.8)
  • We smell when particles waft from things into our noses. (EH 53.9-53.13)
  • Particles have three qualities: shape, size, and weight. (EH 54.1-8; DRN II 748-752)
  • Particles have a maximum size. (EH 55.1-8)
  • Particles have a minimum size. (EH 56.5-59.12)
  • All positions are relative. (EH 60.1-12)
  • Particles move with equal speed when falling through the void. (EH 61.1-10)
  • Particles move imperceptibly, imcomprehensibly fast. (EH 46b.1-3)
  • Particles move even when entangled in compounds. (EH 62.1-47b.8)

“Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings <for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief>, you must consider that…” (EH 63.1-2)

• • The soul is made of particles. (EH 63.2-11)
  • The soul gives the body sensation. (EH 63.11-64.1)
  • The soul lives within the body. (EH 64.1-10)
  • The body cannot perceive without a soul. (EH 65.1-8)
  • The soul cannot perceive outside a body. (EH 65.8-67.9)
  • Only void is incorporeal. (EH 67.1-68.1)

“Now if one refers all these reasonings and remembers when was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in thse general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the sytem as well.” (EH 68.1-5)

• • Properties do not exist without bodies (EH 68.6-69.1)
  • Properties are not incorporeal. (EH 69.1-69.3)
  • Properties define bodies. (EH 69.3-69.11)
  • Properties of bodies can change. (EH 70.1-71.11)
  • Time is neither a body nor a body’s property. (EH 72.1-73.6)

• • Worlds evolved from clumps of particles. (EH 73.7-73.12)
  • Worlds are similar yet diverse in nature. (EH 74.1-2)
  • Worlds host other kinds of plants and animals. (EH 74.2-6)
  • Civilizations evolve over time. (EH 75.1-2)
  • Languages evolve over time. (EH 75.6-76.7)

• • “The All” is NOT governed by a divine being. (EH 76.8-77.5)
  • Celestial objects are just collections of fire. (EH 77.5-12)
  • Happiness requires a clear understanding of nature. (EH 78.1-79.1)
  • Obsessing over mythic questions does not lead to happiness. (EH 79.1-80.3
  • Conclusions should cohere with evidence. (EH 80.1-80.11)
  • Confidence is knowing that you are not being dogged by a demon. (EH 81.1-82.3)
  • Trust your feelings and sensations; apply standards of judgment. (EH 82.4-82.10)

“Here […] is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy.” (EH 82.11-83.2)

I think any attempt at justifying which 12 points make the ΔΩΔEKA is bound to hit a limit by a lack of sources. Epicurus easily makes a dozen observations about particle behavior, alone, without counting propositions regarding the universe, its contents, its age, its size, its expansiveness, and it's orientation. There could be easily two dozen.

I am still curious if Epicurus proposed 12 because the 13th item on the listed was vastly less significant than the first 12, or, if, like the 40 ΔOΞAI, the 12 was a changing list based on the perceived needs of his students.

Quote from Don

Quote from Nate

That said, I *really* like wiggle.

Agreed. Until someone can demonstrate better reason, I'm translating ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ as "[the] wiggle".

Though, I like to think of particles as being like a dog's tail ("wag"), leading to involuntary collisions due to a natural impulse that is beyond (or prior to) the conscious control of the dog. The image of someone twerking their thighs or wiggling their hips in a crowded club implies intentionality, which might be avoided when describing particles.

Quote from Nate

I'd also like to submit the idea that the word "wiggle" is the best available English word to describe the seemingly-random movements of particles due to internal motion that lead to collisions.

Recently, I've been thinking to myself that (outside of Epicurean discussions) I only ever invoke the word "swerve" when referring to (1) the object of "my car", and (2) "an intentional re-direct to avoid a collision". The clinamen is a proposition that explains why collisions occurred in the first place, so "swerve" in my vernacular is devilishly misleading.

Other candidates might include "jerk", "shimmy", "twitch", and "wag".

"Twerk" might be even more potent. Particles "twerk".

Quote from Don

Eikadistes raises a number of good questions above. My suggestion?

1. Ignore both Dewitt and Clay
2. Go through the letter to Herodotus oneself
3. Come up with any number of foundational principles one wants because there's no way to know what those "12 Rudiments" were referring to.

Both of their lists seem to focus on the makeup of the universe and the behavior of particles. In the middle of Epicurus' discussion on particle behavior, he goes on a tangent about the eidola and sense perception. DeWitt and Clay seem to omit any discussion of sense perception or the emission of films by compound bodies from their lists.

Every list I've come across distinguishes the principle of things not magically appearing from things not magically disappearing, but to my modern eyes (familiar with the Law of Conservation of Mass), those two look the same. They are both describing the principle of object permanency, and they can both be justified by the same observation.

I am not sure Epicurus would have seen those as separate propositions.

That being said, I am definitely sure, based on the organization of text, that Epicurus meant to distinguish the propositions that "the universe has no edge" from "particles and space are unlimited", but those seem to be saying the same thing to my modern eyes (familiar with the Cosmological Principle of an isotropic universe).

I am now wondering what criterion we might use to determine whether we are reading (what I'll call) a "main proposition", versus (what I'll call) a "sub-point" that can be derived from the main point.

I'd also like to submit the idea that the word "wiggle" is the best available English word to describe the seemingly-random movements of particles due to internal motion that lead to collisions.

Recently, I've been thinking to myself that (outside of Epicurean discussions) I only ever invoke the word "swerve" when referring to (1) the object of "my car", and (2) "an intentional re-direct to avoid a collision". The clinamen is a proposition that explains why collisions occurred in the first place, so "swerve" in my vernacular is devilishly misleading.

Other candidates might include "jerk", "shimmy", "twitch", and "wag".

I found a few discrepancies between the various attempts at reconstruction that can be points of exploration:

1. DeWitt identifies [a] the infinite multitude of particles and [b] the infinite extent of space as two different propositions, whereas every other reconstruction merges them into one. What gives?

2. Clay's list of 10 (of the 12) includes the proposition that [c] the universe always was as it is and always will be, but this proposition of a sort of temporal symmetry is not found in DeWitt's list. What gives?

3. Clay combines the ideas that [d.I] atomic motion is uniform and [d.II] atomic motion is of two kinds into one proposition. DeWitt separates them into two propositions. What gives?

4. In his Epistle To Herodotus, Epicurus contrasts particles that have recoiled to a distance with particles rebounding against other particles in a matrix of entangled particles. Elsewhere, he contrasts the recoiling due to collisions to the universal "fall" due to a particle's weight. Elsewhere, he includes the clinamen. I am reading either 3 or 4 kinds of motions: [I] the fall due to weight, [II] the clinamen due to internal motion, [III] the recoil due to collisions, and [III.b], the occasion when recoiling leads to particles being entangled in matrices that lead to the foundation of compounds and complex matter. How would Epicurus have arranged all of these ideas as propositions? (And how many?)

5. Why do the reconstructed lists specify two types of motion in one proposition, and yet introduce a third type of motion (the clinamen) as a separate proposition? Would Epicurus not have identified three kinds of motion?

6. Why does Clay omit (or not recognize) the proposition about [e] uniform motion?

Don what do you make of Erik Anderson's translation of U56 that renders ΣTOIXEIΩΣEIΣ ΔΩΔEKA as "Doctrine of the Elements (12 Books)"? I just came across this, and after our discussion about the ΠPOTEPᾼ ΔEKATῌ ΓAMHΛIΩNOΣ I am considering the possibility that the δώδεκα στοιχειώσεις refers to a collection of works on particle behavior called "The Elements (i.e. Atoms) in 12 Books", rather than one book called "The Twelve Elementary Propositions".

<http://epicurism.info/etexts/epicurea.html#2>

Elsewhere in Book X of Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Diognes uses στοιχειώμaτa ("elementary principles", "elementary outline") and στοιχεíωσιν ("first principles") to refer to "a digestible set of propositions about particles". Is στοιχειώσεις in this context referring to the "Element(al Propositions about particles)" or to "the Elements (which are particles)"? The difference could mean the difference between one work on theoretical propositions versus twelve books.

I continue to wonder, "why twelve?"

@Faunus you may find use for one of the Tetrapharmakos symbols above.

Happy New Year's Eve!

Waning Gibbous Symbol 2:

Waning Gibbous Symbol 1:

TΦ (Tetrapharmakos) Symbol 2:

TΦ (Tetrapharmakos) Symbol 1:

Leaping Pig 2:

Leaping Pig 1: