Early Continental philosophy was largely oriented toward the works of Kant whose ethics and metaphysics heavily contract with atomism and hedonism.
Nate, should I presume that that should have been "contradict" rather than "oontract with" and make that correction in the post above?
It should have been "contrasted", sorry about that.
Thanks for those, Todd
If anyone's looking, I'd suggest the books by Bart Ehrman, too.
Big fan of Bart Ehrman here. I appreciate that shout-out.
... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.
So, later in the book, the offer non-lucid dreams as an example of the "extra" leg of the Canon.
"The imaginary impositions of the mind. The third criterion of truth, the imaginary imposition of the mind, is its attachment to representations (images) created in it. The imaginary imposition of the mind is of various kinds:
1) Depictions from direct sensory perception are classified by the Epicureans in senses or, if repeated, in preconceptions.
2) Depictions not derived from a direct sense include images of the unconscious, for example, the dreamlike depictions during sleep. For Epicurus, there is no distinction. He argues that 'what moved us it true, even the dreams of the lunatics, because only the non-existing does not affect us.' So, we have an ancient philosophical school which sees the value of analyzing the images of the unconscious in dreams and urges us to seek the truth that they may hide. Many centuries later, with the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, Freud proved, in his way, of course, that these interpretations are true for a specific individual.
The Epicurean philosophy does not give dreams any prophetic properties, as other ancient schools did, but observes with caution how our desires and especially our fears are displayed int eh form of depictions during sleep. Many of these images have no direct sensory origin. The sage knows well that these fears often cause pain, so Epicurenas consider this attachment to images of the unconscious as a criterion of truth."
The suggestion that dreams are as reliable as sensation reminds me of the movie "Minority Report". Are you all guys familiar with it? Law enforcement records the minds of human "precogs" whose prophetic dreams of "precrimes" provide law enforcement with the information needed to prevent crimes before they happen. While the author does acknowledge Epicurus' rejection of "prophecy", they seem to walk a thin line around clairvoyance.
"The Stoic-Kantian duty to authority, race and the misunderstood notion of homeland led in the recent past to a whole nation of high cultural standards to provoke World War II massacres and unprecedented genocidal crimes against other peoples that were historically defined as the Holocaust" (Dimitris Altas 115).
Wow. Bold statement, correlating our Stoic (and Kantian) philosophical opponents with the Holocaust, but I like it.
... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.
So, later in the book, the offer non-lucid dreams as an example of the "extra" leg of the Canon.
"The imaginary impositions of the mind. The third criterion of truth, the imaginary imposition of the mind, is its attachment to representations (images) created in it. The imaginary imposition of the mind is of various kinds:
1) Depictions from direct sensory perception are classified by the Epicureans in senses or, if repeated, in preconceptions.
2) Depictions not derived from a direct sense include images of the unconscious, for example, the dreamlike depictions during sleep. For Epicurus, there is no distinction. He argues that 'what moved us it true, even the dreams of the lunatics, because only the non-existing does not affect us.' So, we have an ancient philosophical school which sees the value of analyzing the images of the unconscious in dreams and urges us to seek the truth that they may hide. Many centuries later, with the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, Freud proved, in his way, of course, that these interpretations are true for a specific individual.
The Epicurean philosophy does not give dreams any prophetic properties, as other ancient schools did, but observes with caution how our desires and especially our fears are displayed int eh form of depictions during sleep. Many of these images have no direct sensory origin. The sage knows well that these fears often cause pain, so Epicurenas consider this attachment to images of the unconscious as a criterion of truth."
From the Epicurean position (if we are to appropriate the symbology of the Plato's Allegory), the entire Allegory of Plato's Cave is, itself, actually inside of a metaphorical Cave in the Epicurean world, and the light of day into which the Epicurean walks is the light of particles that allows us to physically see.
Yep. That should do it. 
I presume we are seeing a little roughness in the Greek to English translation, but aside from that what do you make of the list Nate? The "confirmed" and "cannot be confirmed" by the senses, but harder to tell about the "valid / invalid" labeling.
I am still deconstructing the expressions that the author employs to explain the principles of Epicurus’ analogical logic, so I am reserving an opinion about the second statements of each point.
For the most part, I find that the list coheres with the beginning of the Epistle To Herodotus and the elementary propositions defined therein. There are several items (as I predicted) which they organized as two separate points (infinite void and infinite particles being one example) instead of one. I think this is inevitable and mostly inconsequential. Like I mentioned before, I would be comfortable merging the first two propositions (no creation and no destruction) into one, though I am equally happy to recognize it as two, distinct points. Some of the points are two sides of the same observation, and can be appropriately expressed as such, so I am fine with those.
I think that some of their points are a little redundant. For example, 1. (that bodies exist) and 5. (that everything consists of bodies, except 6. void). Also, point 2. (the principle of linear, temporal causality, that one or more causes precede an effect) seems to be implied by 3. and 4. (that nothing is born out of nothing, and that nothing is annihilated). Also, points 7. (atoms having an unchanging and unbroken existence) and 8. (atoms being impenetrable) seem to be derivative of 4. (nothing being annihilated) so I would not personally include them. Point 14. (no divine intervention) seems implied by their recognition of 2. (things have temporal causes) and 5. (everything is made of bodies).
As Todd mentioned, 18. seems almost Platonic, and I do not find support for this proposition in Epicurus’ texts. I may be missing something in translation, but at this point I do not accept this one.
I will need to dig through what the author calls "analogical" and "Aristotelian logic" because I imagine that this criterion helped them organize each of their points, even when some seem (to me) to be redundant.
I'm not seeing anything in the Letter to Herodotus or Book 1 that I take to be suggesting 2 levels of reality. I only noticed some references to there being things we can see and things we can't see. (I was skimming quickly, so maybe I missed something.)
That seems a far cry from saying there are 2 levels of reality. You might as well say there are things we can smell and things we can't smell.
If anyone has a more specific reference for this "two levels" idea, I'd appreciate it.
Their describing "the level of atoms" as "timeless", versus "the level of the sensible world" which is "set in time" definitely has a Platonic tinge to it. This seems to contradict the way "time" is used in the Epistle To Herodotus:
"Moreover, their passage through the void [...] accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time. [...] even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move" (46b.1-62.7).
The topics of particular interest here are:
1) The principles of atomic physics. Not 12, not 10, but 18 principles are listed. I didn't notice how this number was derived. Given some of the recent discussion on the forum, however, this might be fuel for a post or two
Starting on Pages 58 and 59 of An Introduction From the "Garden of Athens", a chapter titled "The Epicurean Philosophy: Kanonikon – Physikon – Ethikon" by Giorgos Bakogiannis:
"A. Physikon (Physics)
First, I must stress that this presentation completes my previous short one on atomic physics at the Second Panhellenic Symposium of Philosophy, so I will deal with issues that I did not have the time to present back then.
The principles of atomic physics. Although the atom-based cosmology of Epicurus of Athens corresponds to a certain degree to the physics of Democritus of Abdera, it has its own principles. It is important to emphasize that these principles do not need prerequisites or a priori proposals. On the contrary, they can be subjected to intensive scrutiny through the use of Epicurean Kanon (Canon, Criterion). Epicurus proved each principle's validity using analogical thought and Aristotelian reasoning.
Based my argument on the method of the French academic J.M. Gabaude, I will refer to each one of these principles and their corresponding forms of proof:
1. There are bodies. Our senses confirm it.
2. Everything that happens has one or more causes of happening. The opposite cannot be confirmed through our senses.
3. Nothing is born out of nothing. The opposite cannot be confirmed.
4. Nothing is annihilated. The opposite argument is unconfirmed.
5. The whole consists of bodies. Our senses can confirm it.
6. The whole also consists of the void. The opposite can be ruled out through reductio ad absurdum (proof by contradiction).
7. Atoms possess a complete state of existence which is unchanged and unbroken. The opposite argument is refuted.
8. Each atom is impenetrable. No space can be simultaneously occupied by two different bodies. The opposite is invalid.
9. The whole is infinite. The opposite argument is invalid.
10. Void is infinite. The opposite argument is invalid.
11. The number of atoms is infinite. The opposite argument is invalid.
12. Atoms move ceaselessly. The opposite argument is invalid.
13. Each composite body possesses properties that the particles comprising it o not possess (principle of emergence-the basis of Chemistry)
14. There is no expediency in nature. There is no divine intervention. The opposite argument is invalid.
15. What is considered as necessary integrates the element of probability. There is a random or 'by chance' element occurring in nature. The opposite is not valid.
16. The birth of a compound body is achieved through the union of atoms. The opposite is invalid.
17. Every composite body is temporary, and when it is destroyed, it is dividied into the atoms that comprised it. The opposite is invalid.
18. There are two levels of reality, the level of atoms within the void that is timeless and the level of the sensible world set in time. The opposite holds no validity."
This approach demonstrates two, simultaneous, yet contradictory positions that I hold:
(1) We need avoid using metaphors and should strive to speak frankly.
(2) (Yeah, right). Everything is a metaphor.
I typically decide it is best to make responsible use of metaphors to which the author should be held accountable.
I suppose this is why Epicurus recognized that only a wise person is suitable to correctly deconstruct the metaphors of poetry. There is a fine line between using words that feel good but aren't really saying much and words that feel empty but are actually saying a tremendous amount of the reader would only exercise the patience required to understand.
The incidence of Lucretius writing spoonfuls of sugar to make the medicine of atomism go down comes to mind. We can also try using some of the metaphors Lucretius provides. De Rerum Natura seems to give Epicureans the OK to deify natural processes (like "Venus"), so we seem to have a green light to make liberal use of anthropomorphization.
I wanted to document that vocabulary used to express the idea that the Sun is "about as big as it seems" (EP 91.1-3).
...MEN TO ΠPOΣ HMAΣ THΛIKOYTON EΣTIN ΦAINETAI
"...μέν τò πρός ἡμᾶς τηλικοῦτóν ἔστιν φαίνεται."
(...mèn tò prós hēmâs tēlikoûtón éstin phaínetai)
"...is for us what it appears to be" (Bailey).
"...relative to us is just as big as it appears. [This is also in book 11 of the On Nature; for he says, if its size had been reduced because of the distance, its brightness would have been even more reduced; for there is no other distance more symmetrical with this [degree of brightness]]" (Inwood & Gerson).
“…relative to us is as great as it appears [This he also says in the eleventh book of his work On Nature; 'for if', he says 'the size of a star had dimished on account of the distance, its brightness would have dimished much more.'] For there is no other distance that could better correspond to this size.” (Mensch).
"...in relation to us, is as large as they appear. <<This is also in On Nature Book 11 [F81]: 'For if,' he says, 'they had lost their size because of the distance, much more would they have lost their color'>> For there is no other distance more congruent with that." (White)
I am reflecting on the word THΛIKOYTON (τηλικοῦτóν or tēlikoûtón), a parsed form of τηλικοῦτος (tēlikoûtos) meaning "of such a magnitude", or "as great as". I like the latest translation by Stephen White (2021), "is as large as they appear", because that is how I think of the Sun (subjectively, it seems to me to be larger than any terrestrial object).
The allusion to Book 11 of On Nature seems to present the following argument (based on my reading): If the Sun were both small and distant, it would appear dim or colorless. However, the Sun is very bright and colorful. Therefore, the Sun cannot be both small and distant. Based on Epicurus' rhetorical approach of entertaining a negative, I presume that he was implying either (1) the Sun is very close, (2) the Sun is very big, or (3) both.
Anyone (like Epicurus) who sailed across the Aegean (multiple times) would have known that the Sun does not reduce in size the further you sail from the horizon, so it must be significantly more massive than the mountains that shrink in the distance, or, as Anaxagoras proposed one century earlier, "larger than the Peloponnese". A ball of fire supposed to be the size of a loaf of bread, or a house, or even a city would never lead to this phenomena.
(It is also interesting that Epicurus' hypothetical description of a "small" and "distant" Sun matches the description of a "star", but I digress, since we have no evidence of Epicurus commenting on the correlation...)
Epicurus clearly misunderstood the fact that the Sun is actually over 100 times larger than the Earth. I am, however, very suspicious of what I consider to be a dubious claim that Epicurus thought the sun was a glowing basketball.
Translators of Diogenes Laërtius later note that Epicurus "says [...] in the twelfth book of his work On Nature [...] that the sun is eclipsed when the moon obscures it, and that the moon is eclipsed by the shadow of the earth [...] This is also said by Diogenes the Epicurean in the first book of his Selected Writings" (Mensch 525); "<<In On Nature Book 12 [F83] he says these things and also that the sun is eclipsed when the moon overshadows it, and the moon when the earth's shadow does so [...] This point is also made by Diogenes the Epicurean in Selections Book I.>>" (White 444)
Considering the lines following this description in the Epistle To Pythokles, where Epicurus acknowledges that the objective size of the Sun may vary from our perspective ( "vary" being the key word; 91.3-92.1), it seems unlikely that he was making a hard argument that the Sun is some kind of hyper-radiant grapefruit. His Epistles on astronomy and geoscience weren't dogmatic, and, like his other explanations, his approach was intended to be flexible to accommodate new observations and discoveries, so long as the conclusions never contradict sensory evidence.
I guess what I was trying to say above is: the cave should be an Epicurean metaphor.
It's really quite accurate to call it Plato's Cave, though. His ideas are largely responsible for chaining people in the cave in the first place. He advised rulers to do exactly that in the same goddamned book!
That's a good point. From the Epicurean position (if we are to appropriate the symbology of the Plato's Allegory), the entire Allegory of Plato's Cave is, itself, actually inside of a metaphorical Cave in the Epicurean world, and the light of day into which the Epicurean walks is the light of particles that allows us to physically see.
Here are larger uploads of my Oasis Allegory for clarity:
As Plato's Allegory included certain symbols that reverberate throughout his teachings (like the Sun, which not only represent philosophical illumination, but also, is literally a temporal manifestation of The Good), I would recommend the inclusion of Epicurean symbols. Symbols include (1) the brave, happy leaping pig, (2) a bright lighthouse that weathers a ferocious storm, (3) a port with tranquil waters, (4) the waning gibbous moon, (5) a kylix which might be seen on the dinner table every Eikas, (6) the images of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, or representation of "Mother Earth", "Gaia", "Venus", (etc.), (7) ascension to the summit of a mountain of maximum pleasure, (8) indivisible particles, (9) natural imagery or pastoral environments, (10) cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese, cheese.
At the same time, I also want to caution that one of the obstacles I ran into when conceptualizing an "Epicurean Allegory" was the tendency of metaphors to become misconstrued into mystical objects ("the map being mistaken for the territory"). Some of the symbols I included (like the "Desert of Superstition" and the "Mountain of Virtue") are derogations against the symbology adopted by philosophical opponents rather than a self-reflexive sort of icon.
... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.
Godfrey thank you for identifying this! Amazon is sending me this book tomorrow and I happen to be on a bit of a ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑΤΑ kick so I am really interested to see other people's interpretations of the "elementary principles." I've been breaking-down the Epistles and am including this brief sketch for myself for future references when I have a chance to read the book and explore how they constructed their list of elementary principles.
ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑΤΑ — STOIKHEIOMATA — ELEMENTARIES
στοιχειώμaτa, “elementary principles” (EH 36.8-9); στοιχεíωσιν, “first principles” (EH 37.5)
Αἱ δώδεκα στοιχειώσεις — “The Twelve Elements”
Epicurus’ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑΤΑ (stoikheiṓmata, or “elementary outline”, per R. D. Hicks) conceptually anticipated the Cosmological Principle, the Law of Conservation of Mass, the Law of Definite Proportions, the First Law of Thermodynamics, Molecular Vibration, Brownian Motion, the Special Theory of Relativity, and Quantum Field Theory.
Epicurus’ Synopsis On Physics (to Herodotus):
“Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one’s memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth.” (EH 36.1-2)
“I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine.” (EH. 37.4-5)
“These brief sayings, if all these point are borne in mind afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.” (EH 45.1)
“Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings <for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief>, you must consider that…” (EH 63.1-2)
“Now if one refers all these reasonings and remembers when was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in thse general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the sytem as well.” (EH 68.1-5)
“Here […] is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy.” (EH 82.11-83.2)
A number of those can be derived (the nature of the soul, the orientation and organization of the world, human evolution and civilization, sensible properties, etc.) from the "first principles".
I am personally curious how many of EH 45-62 get included in their list.
I wonder if they provide new Doxai translations!
Then again, with respect to (1.), Epicurus does discuss the creation of worlds (EH 45.5), so perhaps Lucretius is merely referring to the creation of a world-system, and not the universe as a whole. (I am imagining – as a reasonable, modern analog – a contracting, pre-solar nebula that flattens into a protoplanetary disc that then rotates around a hot protostar until the rotating matter accretes into planetesimals that eventually develop into different worlds.) I might have been getting stuck on the idea that "nature creating" refers to a universal beginning rather than a local beginning.
"...such a world may come into being both inside another world and in an interworld, by which we mean a space between worlds; it will be in a place with much void [...] this occurs when seeds of the right kind have rushed in [...] little by little they make junctions and articulations, and cause changes of position to another place [...] and produce irrigations of the appropriate matter until the period of completion and stability, which lasts as long as the underlying foundations are capable of receiving additions." (EP 89.2-90.1). So Epicurus does identify a preceding stage of instability, per kosmos.
Therein, particles moved from a stage of "falling raindrops" (DRN II 223) "first", "and gradually grew in size by the aggregations and whirlings of bodies of minute parts" (EP 90.8-91.1). At some point "stability" is reached. I am comfortable with "creation" when taken as the development of a system of celestial bodies ... however, I still don't see the need for the "swerve" to create this arrangement. Perhaps one particle re-bounded from an "interworld" and started a cascade amid the cloud of "falling raindrops" (rather than one drop in the cloud "swerving" into another).
Overall, I question whether or not the "swerve" served any other function for Epicurus besides providing a rational counter-point to Democritus' determinism. Epicurus explained how world-systems develop to Herodotus and Pythokles without discussing the "swerve", and he explained choice and contemplation to Menoikeus without referring to an atomic "swerve". I am speculating that the declinando or clinamen in De Rerum Natura – described as a world-building and thought-forming agent – was more of a poetic embellishment by Lucretius than a reflection of Epicurus.
I am not sure that Lucretius' propositions (1.) and (3.) are supported by Epicurus' writing. (1.) His first point seems to imply that there was a previous time when all particles had the same orientation (the same "down"), prior to those particles becoming entangled to generate compound things. This seems to contradict the propositions of the temporal consistency of the universe (EH 39.2-6, 44.6-7) and the relativity of individual particles' orientations (EH 60.1-12).
(3.) Epicurus' existing writing are filled with discussions about choice, comparison, and contemplation, but they do not seem to require the ΠAPEΓKΛIΣIΣ to explain. In the same way that sentience is proposed to originate from complex arrangements of insentient matter, it would be consistent to suppose that the capacity to make decisions originates from complex arrangements of choiceless matter. Given doubts on (1.), I am more prone to doubt (3.).
I think primordial is the wrong word. (I'm now waiting for Don or Nate to go find where Epicurus used exactly that word
)
I think the image of atoms falling in parallel was an imaginary construction Epicurus used as evidence that there must be a swerve. I don't think it was intended to describe an actually existing state of the universe.
If there were no swerve, there would never be anything other than isolated atoms falling in parallel. Nothing more complex than individual atoms would ever come into existence. But other things do exist. Therefore...
It's time:
1. That a "Swerve" Is Necessary For Nature To Create:
…corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur
ponderibus propriis, incerto tempore ferme
incertisque locis spatio depellere paulum,
tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis.
quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum
imbris uti guttae caderent per inane profundum
nec foret offensus natus nec plaga creata
principiis; ita nihil umquam natura creasset. (DRN II 217-225)
“…when first-bodies are being carried downwards straight through the void by their own weight, at times quite undetermined and at undetermined spots they push a little from their path: yet only just so much as you could call a change of trend. But if they were not used to swerve, all things would fall downwards through the deep void like drops of rain, nor could collision come to be, nor a blow brought to pass for the first-beginnings: nature would never have brought aught to being.” (DRN II 217-225; trans. Bailey)
“…when the atoms are being drawn downward through the void by their property of weight, at absolutely unpredictable times and places they deflect slightly from their straight course, to a degree that could be described as no more than a shift of movement. If they were not apt to swerve, all would fall downward through the unfathomable void like drops of rain; no collisions between primary elements would occur, and no blows would be effected, with the result that nature would never have created anything. (DRN II 217-225; trans. Smith)
“Though atoms fall straight downward through the void | by their own weight, yet at uncertain times | and at uncertain points, they swerve a bit— | enough that one may say they changed direction. | And if they did not swerve, they all would fall | downward like raindrops through the boundless void; | no clashes would occur, no blows befall | the atoms; nature would never have made a thing.” (DRN II 217-225; trans. Copley)
2. That a "Swerve" Is Required To Refute a Deterministic Universe:
quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare necessest
corpora; nec plus quam minumum, ne fingere motus
nec plus quam minimum, ne fingere motus
obliquos videamur et id res vera refutet.
namque hoc in promptu manifestumque esse videmus,
pondera, quantum in <se> est, non posse obliqua meare,
ex supero cum praecipitant, quod cernere possis;
sed nihil omnino <recta> regione viai
declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese?
Denique si semper motu conectitur omnis
et vetere exoritur <motus> novus ordine certo
nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat,
ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur,
libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat… (DRN II 244-256)
“Wherefore, again and again, it must needs be that the first-bodies swerve a little; yet not more than the very least, lest we seem to be imagining a sideways movement, and the truth refute it. For this we see plain and evident, that bodies, as far as in them lies, cannot travel sideways, since they fall headlong from above, as far as you can descry. But that nothing at all swerves from the straight direction of its path, what sense is there which can descry? Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth…” (DRN II 245-257; trans. Bailey)
“So I insist that the atoms must swerve slightly, but only to an infinitesimal degree, or we shall give the impression that we are imagining oblique movements—a hypothesis that would be contradicted by the facts. For it is a plain and manifest matter of observation that objects with weight, lell to themselves, cannot travel an oblique course when they plunge from above—at least not perceptibly; but who could possibly perceive that they do not swerve at all from their vertical path? Moreover, if all movements are invariably interlinked, if new movement arises from the old in unalterable succession, if there is no atomic swerve to initiate movement that can annul the decrees of destiny and prevent the existence of an endless chain ofcausation, what is the source of this free will possessed by living creatures all over the earth?” (DRN II 245-257; trans. Smith)
“And so again and again atoms must swerve | a little—the tiniest bit: we must not picture | crosswise movement, for facts would prove us wrong. | For this, we see, is obvious and clear: weight of itself can never move transversely; | it drops from above straight down, as we observe. | But that no atom ever swerves at all | from the perpendicular, who could sense and see? | To continue: if all movement is connected, | (new movement coming from old in strict descent) | and atoms never, by swerving, make a start on movement that would break the bonds of fate | and the endless chain of cause succeeding cause, | whence comes the freedom for us who live on earth?” (DRN II 245-257; trans. Copley)
3. That Freedom of Mind Is Facilitated By "the Tiny Swerve":
…sed ne res ipsa necesssum
intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis
et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum
nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. (DRN II 289–293)
“But that the very mind feels not some necessity within in doing all things, and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer, this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings in no determined direction of place and at no determined time.” (DRN II 289–293; trans. Bailey)
“But the factor that saves the mind itself from being governed in all its actions by an internal necessity, and from being constrained to submit passively to its domination, is the minute swerve of the atoms at unpredictable places and times.” (DRN II 289–293; trans. Smith)
“…all things are not caused by blows—external force; no internal power | controls the mind in every move it makes, | a helpless captive bound by what must be: | this comes from the tiny swerving of the atoms | at no fixed place and no fixed point in time.” (DRN II 289–293; trans. Copley)
