Posts by Eikadistes

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

Νο. No, no, no.

My view is that *both* observations have to be made (the "greatest good" does not exist as an ideal form but does exist as a feeling which is our guide), and we have to be flexible enough to keep both in mind at the same time. Only then can we both understand where Plato and friends go wrong, while at the same time understand where Epicurus gets it right.

I think an analogue can be found in the discussion about Epicurean theology on Facebook (i.e. what is the proper descriptor for Epicurean theology? In which case, I proposed that "anti-creationist polytheism" might fit the bill).

Simply invoking the word "the God(s)" immediately invokes Idealistic notions. One responder to the Facebook post seemed to have been stuck on that point, that "the God(s)" necessarily indicates ideas like "Creation", "Fate", and "Magic". In fact, Epicurus used ϴEOΣ without implying anything related to the traditional burden of being a member of a cosmic government or in being a cosmic shepherd to sheep on the other side of the galaxy.

TAΓAϴON seems to have a similar application, in that the word popularly connotes a perfect, transcendental principle, but also literally refers to that objects that create pleasurable feelings, or pleasure itself.

Perhaps, the Paul Bloom would elect to voluntarily receive a physical disability, perhaps, blindness? Maybe he should go to a doctor and request that his eyeballs be removed so he can find more meaning in life.

See, I'm a little confused, because the purpose behind the article is not to inform us about a meaningful life. The purpose of the article is to sell his book. The purpose of the book is not to inform us about a meaningful life. It's to sell copies. He could just publish the PDF online and disseminate it for free (as many of us do). However, he is not. So his primary goal is generate wealth, and wealth is an instrument to pursue desires, and we desire good experiences, not bad ones.

So this guy is selling books to have a pleasant life, but the book tells people that pleasure is evil.

Sure thing, Paul. Sure thing.

I hear that the Ukrainians are currently being blessed with a heightened level of existential meaning.

Perhaps Paul Bloom would like to join them to re-orient himself to a more purposeful life?

Quote from Cassius

the gods are capable of feeling pain, but do not because they have so arranged their affairs so as never to be exposed to it, and in that way of looking at things they would serve as a model for we as humans to also in our own ways arrange our affairs.

This is what makes me envision the Epicurean gods as animals that have undergone countless iterations of self-improvement. I imagine the gods as citizens of an endless universe (a universe without a cosmic government), citizens who have perfected their ability to perpetually, and self-sufficiently maintain a stable, bio-chemical equilibrium so that the consistency of their lifestyle is incapable of being disrupted (including the disruption of death).

Quote from Nate

Quote from Nate

But, to reiterate: Christianity is the biggest reason.

Actually, I take that back.

The biggest culprit in the modern era (because your average American can't be expected to employ historical terminology like "Epicureanism") are restaurateurs, who have changed the definition to mean "foodie".

I think at this point it's not a matter of criticism as much as a complete re-definition of the word.

Quote from Nate

Christianity.

To be fair, Hedonists (albeit Cyrenaics, or Epicureans, or others) have always been accused of excess by their philosophical and religious opponents. One of the first criticisms we find of Epicurus comes from Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who accused Epicurus of being a glutton and a pervert.

Even then, Stoics like Seneca, and critics like Cicero, still demonstrate genuine admiration for Epicurus, and recognize that most of his philosophical positions were dignified and respectable.

With the (possible) sole exception of Gassendi and his followers in the Renaissance, Christian clergy, scholars, and theologians have operated on the principle that Epicureanism is at least misguided and at most pure evil. St. Augustine lambasts Epicureanism. Dante degrades Epicureans in his Divine Comedy. Pamela Gordon's excellent book The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus shows how, for millennia, opponents of Epicureanism (primarily Christians) bastardized his name with slurs (primarily accusing him of being effeminate because Christian culture has been so hostile to femininity). The examples are extensive.

But, to reiterate: Christianity is the biggest reason.

(You can read Gordon's book for free at this publicly-hosted location that in no way, shape, or form implicates EpicureanFriends as infringers of copyright: https://librosycultura2.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/gordon…of-epicurus.pdf)

Christianity.

I'm thinking of approaching this from a different angle.

Can we disprove the following assertion?

The gods are grateful to Nature, for, without the eternal atoms, they would not enjoy pleasant lives.

I really like that proposition Joshua . That really answers the question in my mind.

KD1 is just identifying that the gods are immune to the petitions of Earthlings.

It does not provide a blueprint for Humans Pursuing Happiness that discourages the practice of gratitude.

As I read it based on those sources, Hermarchus (and/or Philodemus) were thinking along the following lines:

1. The gods are blessed (KD1).

2. b is an element of the blessed life.

3. The gods must therefor possess b quality.

In the previous citations, the Boys argue that the gods have friends:

1. The gods are blessed (KD1).

2. Friendship is an element of the blessed life.

3. The gods must have friends.

At first glance, this argument does not seems to work for gratitude:

1. The gods are blessed (KD1).

2. Gratitude is an element of the blessed life.

3. The gods must be grateful.

But given the point that Joshua suggested (that "anger" and "favor" in KD1 are not descriptions of the gods' personal qualities, but rather, examples of human provocations toward which the gods are deaf) it seems to be more consistent; I have trouble accepting that living beings that have friends and enjoy having conversations would not experience gratitude toward the blessed nature that allows them to enjoy the pleasure of those friendships.

Quote from Don

Quote from Nate

It seems to me that he (and apparently Hermarchus, based on fragmentary attestation I'm still trying to organize) had concerns about the status of the gods' social lives and their speech patterns

If you compile those sources, I'd be very interested to see them.

My access to primary sources is limited, but these reputable sources feature secondary attestation:

Quote

"One specific thesis is however attributed to Hermarchus, cited at Philodemus On Gods, PHerc. 152/7, col. 13.20–41:25 the gods breathe and are not mute but converse with each other, since felicity is incompatible with lack of conversation. He is even said to have provided an argument: the gods are living beings, and the notion of a living being entails that of breathing, just as that of a fish that of water and of a bird that of wings; breathing, we may infer, is a ‘permanent property’ of the gods. Philodemus col. 4.8–13 adds that their language is Greek. He also tells us, col. 10.25–30, that the Epicureans not only accept the existence of the gods of the Panhellenes but say that there are even more. But we are unable to determine to what extent the ideas found in our later sources may be traced back to Hermarchus and Epicurus." (The Cambridge Guide To Hellenistic Philosophy 456-457)

And also:

Quote

"Philodemus asserts the connection in fr. 13, 'Those who attempt to deprive them of imperishability must [also] deprive them of blessedness'; and the same idea seems to underlie the discussion of the gods' use of language which eh cites from Epicurus' successor Hermarchus in cols. xiii.36-xiv.6:

'And one must say that they use speech and converse with one another; for, he says, we would not consider them more fortunate and indestructible [...] if they did not, but rather similar to mute human beings. For since in fact all of us who are not maimed make use of language, to say that the gods either are maimed or do not resemble us in this respect (there being no other way either they or we could give shape to utterances) is extremely foolish, especially since conversation with those like themselves is a source of indescribable pleasure to the good.'

[...] Hermarchus wrote a treatise Against Empedocles in twenty-two books, and Bernays' suggestion that Plutarch On the Cessation of Oracles 420c-e [...] is derived from it has been generally accepted. Certainly it is the most economical hypothesis that this vast work was both Plutarch's source for the Epicurean attack on Empedocles and Philodemus' for this argument and for the further points about divine physiology for which he cites Hermarchus by name in cols. xiii-xiv." (Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustuns 218-219)

That leads me to another question:

Were/are the god(s) animal(s)?

If not, how can a feeling-being be "eternal" in the temporal sense of things?

Quote from Little Rocker

Yeah, I've wondered about the same thing. I seem to remember that concern showing up in the objections section of a paper I read on Epicurean gratitude by Ben Rider (attached in its pre-published form)

This is precisely what I needed. Thanks!

"VII. Gratitude is weakness?

I argue that, for Epicureans, gratitude is necessary for a happy human life. But some passages seem to say that gratitude is actually a sign of weakness. In particular, this claim appears as a premise in Epicurus’ argument that we have no reason to anticipate rewards and punishments from the gods:

What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness. (KD I; compare Letter to Herodotus 76-77, Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.45 = IG I-16)

The gods exist, but because they are ‘blessed and indestructible’ they need not feel gratitude. Gratitude indicates weakness and is relevant only for those who have deficiencies and thus need others to help or benefit them. That humans feel anger or gratitude reveals our limitations and dependency. So, if wisdom enables a human to ‘live as a god among men’ (Ep. Men. 135), would not a wise and virtuous person also have no need for gratitude?

The answer, it seems to me, must be ‘no.’ The fact that gods feel no gratitude does not mean that we should not; though Epicureans seek to emulate the gods’ tranquility and happiness, no human can attain their invulnerability or immortality, and any desire to do so would be unnatural and empty.

It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132). We see this most clearly in Epicurus’ analysis of justice: Justice exists because of ‘a pledge of reciprocal usefulness’ (KD 31), a ‘pact about neither harming another nor being harmed’ (KD 33). Justice is ‘in general outline’ the same for all humans, but what counts as just may vary depending on circumstances—’the peculiarities of a region,’ for instance (KD 36)—and when circumstances change, it could happen that a law that was originally useful and just ‘no longer possesses the nature of justice’ (KD 37; also KD 38). We should not become fixated on abstract notions but instead ‘simply look to the facts’ (KD 37).

In the same way, then, it is unsurprising that, for indestructible and perfectly self-sufficient gods, gratitude is not a value, while for vulnerable and deficient humans, it is. No matter how wise we become, we cannot eliminate these facts about what we are. Gratitude is part of how we achieve what limited and imperfect self-sufficiency we can obtain."

This seems to be consistent with the position that has thus far been enumerated.

I have been trying to find more fragments to flesh-out Epicurean religiosity, largely through Philodemus. It seems to me that he (and apparently Hermarchus, based on fragmentary attestation I'm still trying to organize) had concerns about the status of the gods' social lives and their speech patterns; that, combined with the analysis of gratitude, which is a seemingly human-unique, conscious behavioral practice (there are better words for that) Not to suddenly follow a distracting tangent, but this lends a lot of credence to the "Realist interpretation" of the Epicurean deities.

I am leaning away from the "Idealist interpretation" because it seems to rob the god(s) of blessedness.

I am also approaching this inquiry with an assumption: I personally have assumed that the gods were once not gods. My conception of a deity is a being who, through choice and personal development, has mastered the natural ethical path to achieve a perfect, animal life; this carries an additional assumption that they must exist, because, if such beings do not exist in an infinite universe, than choice if futile and ethics is an exercise in futility.

I think that KD1 seems incompatible with the "Idealist interpretation" if we rob the god(s) of their blessed ability to make perfect choices, having created (through development) a supportive circle of excellent companions; if gods are just inspiring thought-forms generated by cosmic particles that have intermingled through the void, they aren't much different that inspiring shapes in the clouds or any other experience that can be explained as an optical illusion.

As a side-note, perhaps Lucretius is assuming too much of a poetic license in describing Epicurus as a god if Epicurus (and, as it seems, Philodemus) had such specific preconceptions of the forms of deities.

I've been mulling over the concept of "gratitude" with respect to KD1:

KHARISI - ΧAΡΙΣΙ - χάρισι - /'kʰa.riːsi/ - the dative plural inflection of χάρις (kháris) from χαίρω (khaîrō, “rejoice”, “take pleasure in”, “delight”) meaning “gratitude”, “favour”, “partiality”, “partisanship”, “indebtedness”, “benevolence”, “care”.

Kuria Doxa I indicates that ΧAΡΙΣΙ (or kharisi, variously translated as "gratitude", "favour", "partiality", "partisanship", "indebtendess", "benevolence", and "care") is a form of weakness. Epicurus identifies "gratitude" (kharisi) as being incompatible with the character of an animal living their best life. Kuria Doxa I seems emphatic that ΧAΡΙΣΙ (kharisi) is to be discouraged.

In nearly every other extant document, "gratitude" (expressed using forms of kharis) is encouraged as an indispensable moral practice:

In his Epistle To Menoikeus, Epicurus encourages the old to practice gratitude "so that although old [they] may stay young in good things owing to gratitude [kharin] for what has occurred." He repeats this point in Vatican Saying 17: "the old man [...] has secured the goods about which he was previously not confident by means of his secure sense of gratitude [khariti]."

In Vatican Saying 55, Epicurus seems to encourage the practice of gratitude as a remedy against depression and regret: "Misfortunes must be cured by a sense of gratitude [khariti] for what has been and the knowledge that what is past cannot be undone". Gratitude seems to be encouraged through the practice of Remembrance, exemplified by Epicurus in his final Epistle To Idomeneus as a means of managing pain.

In Vatican Saying 69, Epicurus identifies the "ingratitude [akhariston] of the soul" makes animals "greedy for unlimited variation in its lifestyle". This seems to be a consequence of failing to abide by Nature, exemplified by the failure to recognize the fact that the greatest pleasures are the most abundant, whereas the most rare luxuries always seem to instigate unnecessary stress.

In a fragment, Epicurus reinforces the aforementioned prioritization of desire. He is recorded as having said "I am grateful [kharis] to blessed Nature, because she made what is necessary easy to acquire and what is hard to acquire unnecessary" (U469).

At numerous points in De Rerum Natura, Lucertius encourages gratitude (grata) and rejects thanklessness (ingrata), echoing Epicurus' recommendations in his Epistles (found in at least Book III.931-42, III.955-60, III.1003-1010).

... given all of this, I am wondering: what is unique about the employment of kharisi in KD1 that contradicts these other usages?

I run into "happiness" most often as a translation of EYΔAIMONIA, whereas "blessedness" tends to be reserved for MAKAPION. However, they are intrinsically related Epicurean philosophy and both can imply the goal of pleasure.

Quote from Nate

Bailey's Fragment 10 alludes to Epicurus having declared HΔONH ("pleasure") to be TAΓAΘON or “the good”.

The Tetrapharmakos also indicates that TAΓAΘON ("the good") is HΔONH ("pleasure").

Athanaeus seems to record Epicurus as identifying TAΓAΘON ("the good") with HΔONH ("pleasure") in Deipnosophists (U67). Diogenes Laërtius also documents this attestation in Lives of Eminent Philosophers.

Seneca records Epicurus as having written HIC SVMMVM BONVM VOLVPTAS EST, “here our highest good is pleasure” (Letters To Lucilius 21.10). Lucretius also employs the phrase BONVM SVMMVM in De Rerum Natura, Book VI.

In his Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus declares HΔONH ("pleasure") to be the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON the "first good". Interestingly, he later declares TO MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON ΦPONHΣIΣ, that "the greatest” or “highest good” is “prudence” (or “practical wisdom”). Epicurus also describes ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") as being the APXH, the "beginning" or "foundation". Incidentally, he also identifies HΔONH ("pleasure") as both the APXHN ("beginning") and TEΛOΣ ("end").

In KD7, Epicurus refers to AΣΦAΛEIAN (“security”) as a ΦΥΣEΩΣ AΓAΘΟΝ (“natural good”). Similarly, in KD6 (among a variety of translations), he describes any means by which to acquire ΘAPPEIN (“confidence” or “the assurance of safety”) from or between people as being a ΦΥΣΙΝ […] AΓAΘΟΝ (also translated as a “natural good”).

Philodemus contrasts the general ideas of TΩN AΓAΘΩN with TΩN KAKΩN or “the good” with “ill” (U38); of interest, later, Usener translates Philodemus’ phrase TON XPHΣTON (tón khrēstón) as “the good” (U180).

Display More

I just read Philodemus' treatise "On Death" and found an instance of the phrase TO MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON (19.1). Throughout the treatise, he alludes to the pursuit and enjoyment of TOY KPATIΣTON BIOY, or "the best life" (38.14).

It seems anachronistic to re-contextualize Vatican Saying 41 in a Roman context. I have always taken this pronouncement to be directed toward Epicurus' correspondents who were logistically unable to relocate into the Garden. Unlike Noah's Ark, which apparently functioned like Mary Poppins' carpet bag (finite geometric dimensions with infinite volume), the Garden had limited space. Surely, "his friends who were so numerous that they could not be contained in whole cities" could not all cohabitate with the Hegemon. The author's commentary seems to parrot the criticism that it is impossible to live according to Epicurus' teachings.

Regarding open-source solutions, I am a big fan of https://sketch.io/sketchpad/.

Sketchpad is the tool I regularly use. I used it to make the Epicurean Communities of the Ancient World map: Epicurean Communities of the Ancient World

Quote from Joshua

Looks like Eikadistes has come across it though.

It's a great image! (I made it)