Welcome to Episode 273 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in philosophy, with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:
- Is Death An Evil? (Cicero says no and Epicurus says no, but for very different reasons)
- Is Pain An Evil? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
- Does the Wise Man Experience Grief and Fear? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
- Does the Wise Man Experience Joy and Desire? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
- Is Virtue Sufficient For A Happy Life? (Cicero says yes, Epicurus says no)
As we found in Cicero's "On Ends" and "On The Nature of the Gods," Cicero treated Epicurean Philosophy as a major contender in the battle between the philosophies, and in discussing this conflict and explaining Epicurus' answers to these questions, we will deepen our understanding of Epicurus and how he compares to the other major schools.
These week we turn our attention further to "Is Death An Evil," and we will read beginning in Section XII where the discussion continues.
XII.¶
A. Explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first, if you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail in that, (and it is a very difficult thing to establish,) that death is free from all evil; for I am not without my fears that this itself is an evil; I do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact that we shall hereafter suffer deprivation.
M. I have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all cases. And first, I have all antiquity on that side, which the more near it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps, on that account did it discern the truth in these matters. This very doctrine, then, was adopted by all those ancients, whom Ennius calls in the Sabine tongue, Casci, namely, that in death there was a sensation, and that, when men departed this life, they were not so entirely destroyed as to perish absolutely. And this may appear from many other circumstances, and especially from the pontifical rites and funeral obsequies, which men of the greatest genius would not have been so solicitous about, and would not have guarded from any injury by such severe laws, but from a firm persuasion that death was not so entire a destruction as wholly to abolish and destroy everything, but rather a kind of transmigration, as it were, and change of life, which was, in the case of illustrious men and women, usually a guide to heaven, while in that of others, it was still confined to the earth, but in such a manner as still to exist. From this, and the sentiments of the Romans,
In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives;
as Ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too Hercules is considered so great and propitious a god amongst the Greeks, and from them he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to the very ocean itself. This is how it was that Bacchus was deified, the offspring of Semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive Castor and Pollux as gods, who are reported not only to have helped the Romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the messengers of their success. What shall we say of Ino, the daughter of Cadmus? is she not called Leucothea by the Greeks, and Matuta by us? Nay more; is not the whole of heaven (not to dwell on particulars) almost filled with the offspring of men?
Should I attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what the Greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who are called their principal gods, were taken from among men up into heaven.
XIII.¶
Examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in Greece; recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. But they who were not acquainted with natural philosophy, (for it did not begin to be in vogue till many years later,) had no higher belief than what natural reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the principles and causes of things; they were often induced by certain visions, and those generally in the night, to think that those men, who had departed from this life, were still alive. And this may further be brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are gods,—that there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in the world so savage, as to be without some notion of gods: many have wrong notions of the gods, for that is the nature and ordinary consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain divine nature and energy. Nor does this proceed from the conversation of men, or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion established by institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case the consent of all nations is to be looked on as a law of nature. Who is there, then, that does not lament the loss of his friends, principally from imagining them deprived of the conveniences of life? Take away this opinion, and you remove with it all grief; for no one is afflicted merely on account of a loss sustained by himself. Perhaps we may be sorry, and grieve a little; but that bitter lamentation, and those mournful tears, have their origin in our apprehensions that he whom we loved is deprived of all the advantages of life, and is sensible of his loss. And we are led to this opinion by nature, without any arguments or any instruction.
XIV.¶But the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a silent judgment in favour of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as all are anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which concern futurity;—
One plants what future ages shall enjoy,
as Statius saith in his Synephebi. What is his object in doing so, except that he is interested in posterity? Shall the industrious husbandman, then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see? and shall not the great man found laws, institutions, and a republic? What does the procreation of children imply—and our care to continue our names—and our adoptions—and our scrupulous exactness in drawing up wills—and the inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that our thoughts run on futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be formed of nature in general, from looking at each nature in its most perfect specimens; and what is a more perfect specimen of a man, than those are who look on themselves as born for the assistance, the protection, and the preservation of others? Hercules has gone to heaven; he never would have gone thither, had he not, whilst amongst men, made that road for himself. These things are of old date, and have, besides, the sanction of universal religion.
XV.¶
What will you say? what do you imagine that so many and such great men of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good, expected? Do you believe that they thought that their names should not continue beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their country, but under a firm persuasion of immortality! Themistocles might have lived at his ease; so might Epaminondas; and, not to look abroad and amongst the ancients for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow or other, there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages; and this both exists most firmly and appears most clearly, in men of the loftiest genius and greatest souls. Take away this, and who would be so mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers? I speak of those in power. What are the poet's views but to be ennobled after death? What else is the object of these lines—
Behold old Ennius here, who erst
Thy fathers' great exploits rehearsed?
He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says in another passage—
Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I
Claim from my works an immortality.
Why do I mention poets? the very mechanics are desirous of fame after death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do our philosophers think on the subject? do not they put their names to those very books which they write on the contempt of glory? If, then, universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general opinion everywhere, that those who have quitted this life are still interested in something; we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtue see most clearly into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most perfect work; it is very probable that, as every great man is especially anxious to benefit posterity, there is something of which he himself will be sensible after death.
(We will likely go further depending on the time we have.)
--------------------------------------------------------
We'll be reading from the Charles Yonge edition.
Here is a link to our discussion guide: Epicurean Views Of Tusculun DIsputations
Our thread here at the forum specifically dedicated to Tusculum Disputations is here.
For purposes of planning ahead, this series will be followed by a series on the Epicurean-relevant material in CIcero's "Academic Questions." A thread devoted to that series where you can make comments on what aspects of "Academic Questions" to include is here.
Episode 272 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "Is Death An Evil?" as we proceed into part one of Tusculan Disputations
I have previously been aware of controversies about Shakespeare's authorship of his plays, but I see that AI and technology have introduced a new variation: that there are uncanny aspects of borrowing by Shakespearean plays from Thomas North, translator of "Plutarch's Lives."
Since there is an overlap in several angles here -- numerous Shakespeare reference to Epicurean ideas, Plutarch being a major player in anti-Epicurean writing, and "Plutarch's Lives" being a source of lots of information from the period, I thought I'd post this link to the author of the latest theory:
Not sure where this leads but given the ample connections with Epicurean ideas that are preserved in major literature, it might over time lead to relevant information about Epicurean source material.
I feel sure Joshua will have an opinion about this.
I just want to make sure I'm not missing an edge-case or something, because I certainly cannot think of any Choice without foreseeable satisfaction (among other pleasures), nor can I think of any Avoidance without foreseeable relief (among other pleasures
Are you asking this because you are writing an article and want to be complete, or because you see some practical use for the exercise?
I know you're asking something you see as helpful but I wonder if you are overthinking the issue (?)
If you're writing up something and you wish to dot an I or cross a T I can see that, but would you ever be able to get anything done if you were trying to actually live this way?
Probably not directly on point but also relevant to this is the vatican saying -- Necessity is an EVIL, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.
To me, that's a statement that the ability to choose and avoid is a good, which means it is a pleasure.
I think it's very important to note that the act of making a Choice / Avoidance decision is itself a pleasure, because that immediate gratification conditions the brain towards making Choices / Avoidances in the first place.
Here's a first effort at a response:
On a very basic level I'd start off observing that it seems to me that Epicurus is saying that simply being alive and not in pain is pleasurable, so the act of choosing / avoiding would also be classified as pleasurable unless there's something specifically painful about the situation.
Now it is necessary at times to think about this to realize it, because some choices may not involve immediate mental or physical stimulation, and the standard philosophical position other than Epicurus was/is that there is a neutral state where you are experiencing neither pleasure nor pain.
So I do think it's correct to say that in general being alive and making a choice / avoidance is pleasurable, and it's important to think that way. But to suggest to someone that exercising choice is going to produce immediate pleasurable "stimulation" in the sense of eating candy isn't likely to be the way to look at it.
So I see this as an occasion to be very clear about what is meant by pleasure.
Very helpful!
So to what extent did Democritus keep his atomism essentially theistic?
Was Democritus laying the groundwork for a no supernatural universe, or just laying the groundwork for today's theists to say that God works not in mysterious ways but through atoms?
Simply referring to Democritus as a great man is not very clarifying in terms of what he actually believed.
Happy Birthday to Remus! Learn more about Remus and say happy birthday on Remus's timeline: Remus
The topic of Democritus' zombies is interesting, great sources for that! "Stories of people who appeared to have died and then came back to life were collected by many of the ancients including the scientist Democritus in his writings...
Bryan I have the feeling that there is more going on here than I understand. I would think that anyone of normal experience would know that there are "degrees" of sickness and disease, including being "knocked out" and in "comas" that would present interesting questions of how "far gone" a person is before death. That wouldn't seem to me to be so exotic as to pose a particularly difficult question, and I think we have instances in Lucretius where it is spoken of that the spirit retreats within the body.
I suppose everyone was interested in this just as to what it says about how life operates, but I don't necessarily see why the Epicureans would be critical of Democritus on this unless Democritus were trying to draw from this some conclusion about the soul to which the Epicureans objected.
Do we really know and understand Democritus' religious views? Just because he was an atomist, does that mean that he had rejected all supernatural influences, or did he perhaps try to integrate the supernatural with his atoms, perhaps due to some issue deriving from his determinism and skepticism?
I sure wish we had more info on Democritus!
Episode 271 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "Understanding Epicurus Through Tusculan Disputations," which is an introduction to our new series of episodes.
In the Cratylus, Plato goes over how well formed language is, and agrees it must have been by purposeful design... and in the end he decides the purposeful designer did such a good job, that he must have been a god.
I think we've talked about this before so my comment here is not a new observation, but this would go a long way toward explaining why Lucretius spends so much time addressing the formation of language - the issue goes right to the heart of whether there are supernatural intelligent forces controlling or guiding human life.
The discussion of teleology that previously was here has been split off into a separate thread:
Epicurean Views of "Teleology"
[…]
Here's a sentiment I can fully endorse, and it might reveal a weakness of our presentation here at the forum. We need to find a way to clearly address Aristotle's teleology! If Lucretius' objection to what DeWitt calls "Purposiveness" in Nature is not of first-tier importance, as are those doctrines in the image below, then it certainly merits a place in any proposed second-tier list of doctrines.
[…]
Lightly indeed:
Add this from Torquatus:
[33] But in truth we do blame and deem most deserving of righteous hatred the men who, enervated and depraved by the fascination of momentary pleasures, do not foresee the pains and troubles which are sure to befall them, because they are blinded by desire, and in the same error are involved those who prove traitors to their duties through effeminacy of spirit, I mean because they shun exertions and trouble.
In contrast to the idea that no teleological causes exist at all, however, how would we classify this from Torquatus:
[30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions.
Does that amount to DeWitt's term of "teleology at a minimum."?
Some things, like hammers, are in fact shaped by intelligences, and it is appropriate to understand them based on the reason that they exist. So"teleoglogical thinking" is not always wrong in itself, or is it?
What and where is the dividing line? And where if anywhere do we see Epicurus stating a principle of division?
What we're talking about now is here in Lucretius Book Five:
[823] Herein you must eagerly desire to shun this fault, and with foresighted fear to avoid this error; do not think that the bright light of the eyes was created in order that we may be able to look before us, or that, in order that we may have power to plant long paces, therefore the tops of shanks and thighs, based upon the feet, are able to bend; or again, that the forearms are jointed to the strong upper arms and hands given us to serve us on either side, in order that we might be able to do what was needful for life. All other ideas of this sort, which men proclaim, by distorted reasoning set effect for cause, since nothing at all was born in the body that we might be able to use it, but what is born creates its own use. Nor did sight exist before the light of the eyes was born, nor pleading in words before the tongue was created, but rather the birth of the tongue came long before discourse, and the ears were created much before sound was heard, and in short all the limbs, I trow, existed before their use came about: they cannot then have grown for the purpose of using them.
[843] But, on the other side, to join hands in the strife of battle, to mangle limbs and befoul the body with gore; these things were known long before gleaming darts flew abroad, and nature constrained men to avoid a wounding blow, before the left arm, trained by art, held up the defence of a shield. And of a surety to trust the tired body to rest was a habit far older than the soft-spread bed, and the slaking of the thirst was born before cups. These things, then, which are invented to suit the needs of life, might well be thought to have been discovered for the purpose of using them. But all those other things lie apart, which were first born themselves, and thereafter revealed the concept of their usefulness. In this class first of all we see the senses and the limbs; wherefore, again and again, it cannot be that you should believe that they could have been created for the purpose of useful service.
[858] This, likewise, is no cause for wonder, that the nature of the body of every living thing of itself seeks food. For verily I have shown that many bodies ebb and pass away from things in many ways, but most are bound to pass from living creatures. For because they are sorely tried by motion and many bodies by sweating are squeezed and pass out from deep beneath, many are breathed out through their mouths, when they pant in weariness; by these means then the body grows rare, and all the nature is undermined; and on this follows pain. Therefore food is taken to support the limbs and renew strength when it passes within, and to muzzle the gaping desire for eating through all the limbs and veins. Likewise, moisture spreads into all the spots which demand moisture; and the many gathered bodies of heat, which furnish the fires to our stomach, are scattered by the incoming moisture, and quenched like a flame, that the dry heat may no longer be able to burn our body. Thus then the panting thirst is washed away from our body, thus the hungry yearning is satisfied.
What do you think is the broadest statement of the principal that is still useful that we might look for in the texts:
- - that Nature has no purpose of itself?
- - that the Universe has no purpose of itself?
As we discuss this it seems to me that we will want to be very clear what we are talking about. For example do we agree with this from chatgpt?
Teleology is the philosophical study of purpose or design in natural phenomena. It comes from the Greek words telos (meaning "end," "goal," or "purpose") and logos (meaning "study" or "reason"). In teleological explanations, events or objects are understood in terms of their intended purpose or final cause rather than solely their material or mechanical causes.
In classical philosophy, Aristotle distinguished four causes, one of which was the final cause, referring to the purpose or function of a thing. In contrast, modern science often rejects teleological explanations in favor of mechanistic or causal accounts, especially in fields like physics and chemistry. However, teleology remains relevant in areas such as biology (where functions of organs or behaviors may be described in terms of their evolutionary purpose) and ethics (where discussions of human purpose or the "good life" arise).
Epicurean philosophy generally rejects teleology, especially in a divine or cosmic sense, emphasizing that natural phenomena occur due to atomic interactions rather than serving a predetermined purpose.
I am seeing lots of discussion among commentators about Cicero writing this at a time of great stress for him. I am not very familiar with the history of the times, and what happened with Cicero AFTER he wrote Tusculun Disputations.
I was about to get the impression that he wrote these just before dying, and that he was in a "I'm giving up state" - but I see a LOT happened after he wrote these and before his death.
I found this video that shows how much was going on in the last couple of years of his life. Sounds like he was highly engaged and fighting right up til the end, so it would probably be a mistake to think that he had already "given up" and had totally "retreated" to philosophy when he wrote these books. As I understand it none of the philosophical works mention the death of Caesar, presumably meaning they were written before that occurred, and the events in this video happened:
I suppose one possibility would be the part in Lucretius where he talks about "Calling upon Neptune / Ceres if you like but don't be superstitious" (I'm remembering Humphries) Let me get that, but it probably goes to 2 and 3 and isn't exactly that nature is nonpurposive.
Note: it's from Book 2 and actually closer than I remembered (Humphries)
Let a man
Call upon Neptune, if he likes, say Ceres
When he means corn or wheat, miscall his wine
By an apostrophe to Father Bacchus,
Let him keep on repeating that our globe
Is the gods' mother - but let him, all this while,
Be careful, really, not to let religion
Infect, pollute, corrupt him. Earth indeed
Is quite insentient, has always been,
And as possessor of all particles
Sends many forth in many ways to light,
No consciousness about it.
Book 2 at 644 Bailey
[644] Yet all this, albeit well and nobly set forth and told, is nevertheless far removed from true reasoning. For it must needs be that all the nature of the gods enjoys life everlasting in perfect peace, sundered and separated far away from our world. For free from all grief, free from danger, mighty in its own resources, never lacking aught of us, it is not won by virtuous service nor touched by wrath. Verily, the earth is without feeling throughout all time, and ’tis because it has possession of the first-beginnings of many things, that it brings forth many in many ways into the light of the sun. Herein, if any one is resolved to call the sea Neptune and corn Ceres, and likes rather to misuse the title of Bacchus than to utter the true name of the vine-juice, let us grant that he may proclaim that the world is the Mother of the gods, if only in very truth he forbear to stain his own mind with shameful religious awe.
It would also be very interesting to get the full Bacon quote referenced in that excerpt from page 168, because i think there are lots of subtleties in that too.
One such subtlety is that the statement as quoted doesn't necessarily address the issue of whether the "final cause" is true. if in fact some supernatural force as a "final cause" does exist, then I am not entirely sure myself whether it would make sense to worry about the intermediate physical causes.
i can see a good argument that It's the fact that the supernatural final cause does not exist that makes knowledge of the intermediate physical cause particularly important.
Which means to me that it's really important to be clear and state the uitimate conclusion (that the final cause does not exist) as you are saying.
Finding Things At EpicureanFriends.com
Here is a list of suggested search strategies:
- Website Overview page - clickable links arrranged by cards.
- Forum Main Page - list of forums and subforums arranged by topic. Threads are posted according to relevant topics. The "Uncategorized subforum" contains threads which do not fall into any existing topic (also contains older "unfiled" threads which will soon be moved).
- Search Tool - icon is located on the top right of every page. Note that the search box asks you what section of the forum you'd like to search. If you don't know, select "Everywhere."
- Search By Key Tags - curated to show frequently-searched topics.
- Full Tag List - an alphabetical list of all tags.